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THE DEVEL01PNENT OF NEW SYSTEMS OF ]POLITICAL COHKNICATION IN NIGERIA: 
EUGENK C. MGBEKERE 
This study deals with the development of political communication in Nigeria, 
from the colonial, independence and post-colonial periods. Also background 
information is given on the political communication systems in the pre- 
colonial period. It is argued that the patterns of pre-colonial systemq 
still persist, particulary in the rural areas of Nigeria. 
Hence, the thesis undertakes to examine in detail, the political 
communication relationships between 'two separate but relatively autonomous 
environments in Nigeria with particular reference to the 1983 general 
elections. The thesis is divided into two parts. The f irst is a 
historical theoretical and methodological - analysis of politics and 
co=unication in Nigeria and the second a 
ýpecifip stud 
"of 
the'1983 general CP y 
elections. 
The first chapter analyses the classical conceptions of political 
development and the development of political communication. The classical 
models are discussed and defined in three main stages: traditional, 
transitional, and modern nation-state. Chapter Two examines the pclitical 
communication trends that have led to the assumption that modern 
communication systems are all powerful politically. This leads to my 
analysis, criticisms and rejeciton of the linear model of communication 
development. Following my rejection, of the linear model, I suggested a 
theoretical and methodological framework for this study. Chapter Three 
looks at the structure of political and communication systems in the pre- 
colonial Nigeria. Kinship and religion are established as the mechanisms of 
sociopolitical and economic relationships in the pre-colonial period. 
Chapter Four centres on the impact of colonial administration on the pre- 
colonial institutions and the development of party politics, Christian 
religion and western education. Chapters Five and Six analyse the 
development of mass media and their relationship to different groups. 
Chapter Seven critically evaluates the political role of mass media as 
factors that influence electorates' political opinion. 
Pa 
* 
rt two presents an empirical analysis of the 1983 general elections with 
particular reference to Imo State. Under it, Chapter Eight sets out the 
method of the research. Major problems encountered in the fieldwork and how 
they were solved are stated. Chapters Nine, Ten,, Eleven and Twelve 
establish the characteristics and attributes of five groups of participants, 
their membership of voluntary organisations, their political participation 
and relationship to channels of communication respectively. In Chapter 
Thirteen political issues are discussed in relation to voters' views. la 
Cbapter Fourteens the relationship between the mass media, political 
personalities and issues are examined. Finally Chapter Fifteen attempts to 
assess the role and direction of political communication development in 
Nigeria today - Some suggestions are made as regards to the most useful 
approach to political communication in Nigeria. 
I 
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AIK OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this investigation is to examine in both historical aad 
contemporary terms, the development of new systems of political 
communications in Nigeria. It aims to set out clearly both quantitatively 
and qualitatively the pattern of political communication developments and 
how different identifiable political participants are associated with the 
old and new political communication systems. These are not examined between 
religious or tribal groups but within a tribe. This approach should help us 
to understand the actual structure of political communication in Nigeria. 
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THK DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW SYSTEK OF POLITICAL COHMUNICATION IN NIGERTA 
CHAPTER ONE 
INMDUCTION 
A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO SYSTEKS OF POLITICAL COMM UNI CATION 
Some statements about the problems of political conmunicatiou, in general 
terms 
The problems of political development in West Africa and, in particular, 
Nigeria can be seen in terms of the change from a traditional political 
system to the modern nation-state. A political system is: 
a particular kind of system. It maintains coordinated 
expectations among 'the people who live under it and coordinates a 
good deal of the actual behaviour by means of their cooperation 
and compliance habits which are reinforced by rewards and 
. Penalties. 
"l I 
Contrast this with the narrowly legalistic definition of 
Isa set of formal legal institutions that emphasize a government or. 
state where modern societies are always and inevitably 
centralized, in the sense that the maintenance of order is the 
task of one agency or group of agencies, and not dispersed 
throughout the society. "2 
Thus the political system is a vital component of the social system in which 
the individual, nuclear families, extended kinship networks, the villages, 
towns, cities, small and large nations interact. This system should be 
considered as a process of interaction between sub-systems with or without 
explicit political content such as the 'classic sub-system' - the family and 
the household sector, the economic sector, the cultural sector and the 
political sector. Deutsch (1908: 146) maintains that "each of these classic 
sub-systems of the society inter-changes with all the others, and depends on 
all of them" . His concept of 'reward' and 'penalties' in'the process of 
inter-changes between sub-systems is associated with 'power' in relation to 
the 'state' and legal organizations in a political system. 
1.1 - 
Interaction between individuals and groups is the substance of political 
communication. Two types of actors in the system can fulfil the process of 
political communication through the political or media organizations. 
"Members of the top echelons of both organizations might maintain 
contacts aimed at regulating the memberships between the two; 
resolving conflicts where they arise and generally defining the 
boundaries between them and maintaining the smooth functioning of 
the system". (Gurevitch and Blunder, in Curran, J. et al (ed) Mass 
Communication and Society, 1977: 277). 
The environment in which informal interaction between members of the top 
echelons occur is often social, where 'confidential exchange of views takes 
place over a drink' . The product of these interactions includes not only 
streams of specific messages on the problems of the day, policies evolved to 
deal with them, arguments for and against alternative positionst the 
personalities involved in the controversy etc. - but also ( .... ) those more 
abiding ground rules that preserve the standardized formats through which 
information is regularly presented to the public (Dearlove, 1974) in 
Gurevitch and Blunder (1977: 280). 
. 
So while members of different formal o-rganisations engage in horizontal 
interaction on a person to person basis, they' also act independently using 
t6 mass media to disseminate and process 'political information in a 
vertical direction between opinion leaders and the mass citizenry. 
Drawing from the works of Aristotle, Politics (335-332 BQ Max Weber, The 
Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans., 1947 pp. 145-154, and 
Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Haplan Power and Society 1950, pp. VIX, 240, 
R. A. Dahl has defined a political system as: 
", oo any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, 
to a significant extent, control, influence, power and 
authorityo"3 
He points out that, 
"Many associations that most people ordinarily do not regard as 
'political' process are political systems: private clubs, business 
firms, labour unions, religious organizations, civic groupst 
primitive tribes, clans, perhaps even families. --4 
1.2 
Dahl maintains that 'every human association has a political aspect'. But 
Dahl's definition plays down the importance of the individualistic desires 
and the motives of the political actors. In Nigerian politics, the concept 
of motive for personal gain is important in the understanding of the 
political, social, and economic relationships between political leaders and 
the masses in the general system. Burgon, Micheal et. al., in their 
discussion of human association emphasized this point in discussing "a 
hidden agenda which 
"... is a secretly held preference that governs an individual's 
behaviour. The person with a hidden agenda tries to manipulate 
the group to take the direction he wants, without appearing to do 
Soo He has already made a private decision about the outcome he 
desires, which means that he is not approaching the group with an 
'open mind. The real detriment of the hidden agenda is that it 
usually evolves from ulterior motives that are never exposed to 
the group ... The hidden agenda may produce decisions that 
have 
an unsound basis if the person is successful in manipulating the 
group. This orientation may bring personal satisfaction but it is 
not a mark of a good group member. "D 
Such hidden agendas of ten further individual economic gains rather than 
rational national political development. It is an aspect of exploitation 
which leads to politital instabilty, because exploitation in political 
association as in a social exchange "ultimately ... leads to the termination 
of social relation" (Ekeh, 1974: 56). 
Many political writers tend to use the term 'political system' to mean 
government or state, particularly when Easton's concept of political system 
is used to describe legislative and institutional relationships. 
6 But 
Dahl's definition, which is flexible, allows various observable human 
associations and behaviour to be studied, particularly when they are 
politicized. Thus, a political system can be systematically studied from 
the traditional, through the transitional to a modern nation-state, taking 
account of the political activities of individuals, and the formal and 
informal organizations and institutions in the system and sub-systems in 
various communities. 
I argue that a flexible, yet systematic attitude to the study of politics, 
permits the development of a theoretical framework which emphasizes the 
inter relationship between various apparatuses of the system (government or 
state). , 
It also. helps to reveal the structure of the relationship between 
the total system and sub-systems, e. g. economic, communication systems* etc. 
1.3 
It of f ers a broad theoretical model of how the system, as a whole, changes 
and develops through the process of interrelationship. 
Political Communication 
The term association or interrelation can be described as communication. 
Among communication scholars, there is no agreed definition of what is meant 
by communication. Definitions vary widely according to investigations 
involving human and animal communication activities. Perhaps, one of the 
best definitions of communication was provided by I. A. Richards, a literary 
critic in 1928. He defined communication as a phenomenon of 'human 
enterprise' in which 
"Communcation takes place when one mind so acts upon its 
environment that another mind is influenced, and in that other 
mind an experience occurs, which is like the experience in the 
first mind and is caused, in part, by that experience. -7 
Yet Jurgen Rucsch distinguished- between' '40-50 different types of 
communication which could be applied to various disciplines of politics, 
anthroplogy, psychology, economics, history, law, architectures etc* Even 
when the meaning and definition of communication is specific to a discipline 
such as political systems, the term still defies precise definition. Thus 
Jack Plano et. al. rely on the pivotal portmanteau term 'meaning' in 
defining political communicaiton: 
"The transmission of meaning having relevance for the functioning 
of a political system. Political communication like other 
communi6ation requires a sender, message, some channel of means*of 
transmission, and a receiver. " 
The definition is appropriate to the understanding of some aspects of an 
organized political communication system in relation to an undifferentiated 
political audience and actors. But Plano et. al. point out that: 
"Political communication ordinarily involves the written or spoken 
word, btit it may occur by means of any sign, symbol, or signal 
through which meaning is transmitted. Thus communciation would 
include systematic acts as diverse as burning a draft card, 
voting, Political assassination, or sending a fleet around the 
world. ". 
1.4 
They conclude by narrowing the definition and study of political 
communication to the field of: 
"specialized institutions, such as the mass media, government 
information agencies, or political parties. " 
Davison and Yu (1974: 10) have broadened the focus to include advertisingo or 
international communication which involves many kinds of individuals, 
collectivities, and situations; rather than restricting it to politics, 
business, or formal international relations. 
Davison (1974: 7)) argues that political communication generally focuses on 
the 'way governments, parties and pressure groups make use of the media'. 
And in the political development process, communication can be defined in 
the way 'in which mass media can help to establish or strengthen political 
and economic and cultural institutions'. In his opinion, mass media rather 
than initiating political directions 'may much more give expression to ties 
already established by other means'. Similarly, Katz et al (in Davison and 
Yu 1974: 34) argue that mass media and politics can be defined 'chiefly in 
terms tied to the aims of would-be persuaders - individuals and groups 
wishing to influence people and change their attitude'. -But Nimmo (1964)- 
warns that influence is subject to time, and time spent in exposure might 
detract from originating political communication, through a variety of 
participatory activities. Generally, exposure can be governed by limits of 
time, economic expenditure and absorptive skills (Davis, B. Bobrow, 1974). 
In the study of Indonesian political communication system, (Anderson 1978) 
defined politics as a mode that involves direct speech. Tirect Speech' in 
reality forms the overwhelming block of political communicaiton in any 
society: gossip, rumours, discussions, arguments, interrogations and 
intrigues (Anderson, B. in Jackson and Pye, 1978: 284). On another level, 
Anderson points out that where direct speech 'eludes the academic eye 
because of its fluid and emphemeral nature, symbolic speech escapes 
attention for rather different reasons. Thus 'public monuments and rituals, 
cartoonsp films and advertisement represent a 'mode of political 
communication'. 
In summary then, political communication in modern day politics involves a 
complex relationship with other systems which varies in degree from one 
country to another. 
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-Political communicaiton provides af ertile field of study 
nowadays for researchers steeped in a wide range of disciplines 
and methodologies: historians may compare the technological, 
rhýetorics and public for political communication prevalent at 
different periods of time; mass media operations may be described 
through concepts borrowed from pressure group analysis; the 
relation of media institution to political parties may be 
observed; and audience members may be studied from those 
perspectives other than that of effect. " (Surevitch and Blumler, 
1977: 270-1) 
Political communication in a transitional nation with a strong kinship 
system often emphasises horizontal patterns of communication such as 
rituals, symbols and signs etc. Interdependent on these patterns of 
communication are the mass media through which new ideas and information are 
introduced into the traditional communities.. Local opinion leaders are the 
principle persuaders and influencers of new political ideas and behaviour. 
In Nigeria, it is not uncommon to observe that the mass media while being 
used to spread new ideas also function as means to reinforce the old values 
attached to kinship relationships and politics. This is primarily because 
the ability of the political elites to persuade and influence othrs in the 
community, either through horizontal or vertical communication systems, is 
subject to kinship relationships and associations. By definition and for 
the purpose of this thesis therefore, political commdnication in'Nigeria 
involves the appropriate mixture or combination of modern mass media and 
traditional-channels to influence and mobilize the electorate for political 
participation and voting. 
CONCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 
(1) The classical models of the development of Political Communication 
Classical models of the development of Political Communication have tended 
to assume three stages: traditional, tran3itional and modern nation-state 
Political Communicaiton systems. These general models have been central in 
many writings of sociologist, anthropologist, political, history and 
communication scholars. 9 
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In West Africa, the change has been straight from the traditional to the 
national system. In Nigeria, the change in the Political System from the 
traditional to the modern type is taking place simultaneously with the 
change in communications from the traditional oral system to mass media 
networks. In studying political and communication development and change in 
a society where both processes take place simultaneously, an investigation 
should focus on long-term changes in which the trend of change seems to be 
in one direction, i. e. from oral traditional communication to modern nation- 
state mass media systems. In this view, communication is both indicative 
and an agent of total political transitions in West Africa, and particularly 
Nigeria. But Pye maintains that the three stages of political communication 
development "share much in common and their differences are only relative, 
not-absolute. "10 
(a) Political communication in traditional societies 
Political comunication in traditional societies is characterized by Pye as 
f ollows: 
i) Communication is not systematically organised, 
ii) -there is a lack of professional communicatorsp 
iii) participation is as a result of political position or social 
organisation, 
iv) information flow is according to the line of social hierarchy 
and an individual's relationship with others in the community. 
In a classical traditional political communication system in Nigeria, as 
will be illustrated in the following discussion of pre-colonial systems, 
politics, religion, economic, cultural and social activities in the 
communities were fused in one leader, which made it difficult to define what 
was political communication. Thus Pye concludes, "the process in 
traditional societies was not independent of either the ordering of social 
relationship or the content of the communication. " 
political communicaiton can be studied exclusively in terms of interpersonal 
and group interaction within and between communities engaged in decision- 
making and leadership selection processes. In such situations, political 
information flow between members is informal, decentralized and horizontal. 
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Political communication in Transitional societies 
The classical conception of political communication has further assumed 
that, in Africa, modern economicl occupational and educational *systems have 
resulted in the development of urban politics: communication which is 
different from traditional political communications. Among early scholars 
of this classical concept was Lucian Pye, who has stated that, generally, in 
transitional political communicaion systems, the structure of communication 
is bifurcated and fragmented, because of its inclination to modern 
technology only in the urban areas. In addition, political communication in 
such systems has "a separate complex system which conforms in varying 
degrees to traditional systems in that it depends upon face-to-face 
relations and tends to follow the patterns of social and. communial life. " 
Pye's conclusion on the relationship between the systems in transitional 
social systems is problematic in relation to West Africa. As we shall see 
shortly, the work of P. C. Lloyd (1967) in Nigeria has shown that, when the 
traditional system yields to a transitional pattern, the systems and sub- 
systems in the communities, either urban or rural operate under the dynamic 
communication linkages between groups, leaders and the state. Besides, as 
will be made clear 'in later chapters, the constitutional development ýf 
Nigerian political communication systems have developed in a pattern that 
encourages and reinforces ethnic and kinship systems reminiscent of the 
traditional political communication. One of-the major factors of modernity 
is the leading role of the political elites in the transitional system. 
The balance between modernity and traditionalism is set by the roles of the 
elites. The composition and functions of the elites in Nigeria as in Ghana, 
"reflect a society in transition whose values, old and new, have yet to be 
synthesized" (P. C. Lloyd 1966: 107). Lloyd synthesized the maj or 
characteristics of a political system in a transitional society through the 
functions of the elite in a historical process from pre-colonial, colonial 
and post-colonial-periods. The crucial issue of political participation and 
mobilization for the political elites, who exclusively pull their supports 
from their ethnic communities, makes the comparative study of traditional, 
transitional and modern nation political communication in Nigeria important. 
In other words, the three systems should be revealed in both their 
historical and contemporary patterns. 
In transitional societies: 
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a) Communication is partly organized particularly in the urban 
areas while in the rural areas it remains predominantly 
unorganized or informal; 
b) most of the professional communicators are directly associated 
with communication organizations in the urban areas; 
c) participation in politics is a combination of both political 
position and social organization as well as by'the influence of 
information flow from organized media network. 
d) the most distinctive feature of transitional societies is the 
relatively autonomous existence of urban and rural political 
communication network systems. 
, (C) Political communication in the modern nation-state 
Political communiaiton in the modern nation state is characterized by 
urbanization, centralization, formal organization and consumption by 
heterogeneous communities and audience. The classical model's close 
association of modern mass media with the nation-state presents a major 
problem 'in Nigerian political communication studies. For example, Pye has 
argued that urbanization is the ideal environment of the 'modern technology' 
of communication. Hence he analyses political communication in terms of the 
mass media and its relationships with state institutions, organizations, 
political parties etc. But interpersonal communication which is a major 
characteristic of not only traditional rural political communication but 
also of urban politics and institutional interactions among and between 
state officials are marginally analysed. The second problem in the Nigerian 
context is that a modern nation-state mass media political communication 
system has been introduced when the nation (Nigeria) has not politically 
reached a nation-state status. 
Many factors influence the bases on which a nation-state can be established, 
thus the nation-state has many definitions. Broadlv. the bases can be 
common history, culture and language which determine common national 
identity. For instance, 'linguistically, England, France, Italy and Germany 
are modern nation-states. Though other countries such as the USSR, 
Switzerland etc. are nation-states without a common language, culture or 
race, a common historical experience has pulled them together as nation- 
states, 
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Most of these factors which influence the bases of a nation-state do not 
exist in*Nigeria. While common historical experience ie. colonialization, 
would have been an important basis for a nation-state in Nigeria, 'the 
colonial constitutions and policies, to be discussed in chapter three, 
pulled Nigeria apaýt into competing ethnic political regions and then to the 
present-day 19 autonomous states* A nation is not a thing such as f lag, 
geographical boundary etc. but what people are working to build within a 
political boundary. 
When a country such as Nigeria has developed a modern nation-state political 
communication system without itself tending towards a nation-state status, 
political communication becomes dotted with conflicts between modernity and 
traditonalism. The research problem is to discover which one is real and 
which is superficial in the context- of actual political participation, 
mobilization and voting, particularly during election period. On the other 
hand to assume, as Pye has done, that in developing countries modern and 
traditional communication systems are separate and autonomous implies that 
in most states, where technology and urbanization have generated a new form 
of political communication the final stage of political development - the 
nation-state - has been achieved. The false assumption is that the stage 
of transition leads directly to separation of the rural populaton from the 
urban population. Each would therefore maintain separate political 
participation and mobilization through communication processes, 
In West Africa, it is inadequate to state that Urban Political communication 
and rural communication systems are relatively autonomous, but very 
necessary to establish that they are strongly inter-dependent on one another 
because of the structure of the network of kinship ties (which are 
frequently politicized) between rural and urban environments, This 
structure of political communication relationships is peculiar to West 
Africa as will be illustrated with Igbo communities in the Nigerian 1983 
general elections. 
The importance of traditional and modern communication systems in any of the 
three societies - traditional, transitional and nation-state has been noted 
by Karl Deutch. He warned that: 
"In evaluating the political significance, two mistakes may be 
made ... Over-estimating the importance of impersonal media of 
communication 999 radio broadcast and newspaper, and under- 
estimating the comparably greater significance of face-to-face 
contacts. " 
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He illustrated the importance of face-to-face communication in terms of the 
network and linkage in political system where party politics involves an 
underground movement and stressed that: 
"The face-to-face contacts determine to a large degree what, in 
fact, will be transmitted more effectively and who will be the 
'insiders' in the organization, that is those persons who receive 
both information and attention on highly preferred terms. " 
The second level of mistake he points out is the consideration of 
"legitimacy myths or symbols in isolation from the actual 
communicaions networks, and from the human networks - often called 
'organizations', 'machines', 'apparatus' or bureaucracy - by which 
they are carried and selectively disseminated. "12 
Historically, the works of Pye (1963) Sehramm (1964) and Lerner (1959), were 
primarily concerned with the study of political communication in relation to 
the status and position of leadership in a political system., Interest in 
this approach to political communication was generated by the publication of 
Karl Deutsch (1963) The Nerves of Government: Models of Political 
Communication. He presented a series of models and concepts of political 
communication in which power or the instruments or agencies of power and 
formal and informal communication were central to his analysis. For Deutch, 
the study of politics is the study of power relationships between people. 
Communication determines how people comply and are controlled in a society. 
He points out that every sector of the society has various forms of power 
relationship and control and then he distinguished five main types - 
particularly in his later works, Deutch (1966a, 1966b) instrument of power - 
the family or kinship, in which informal communication prevails. But public 
opinion associated with 'pressure group opinion', formal organizations such 
as the political parties, the school, the church, trades unions, etc., have 
various forms of sanction and instruments of power and control at their 
disposal. The state (government) has various branches, the police, the 
court, the cabinet, parliament etc. with varying degrees of power to control 
the citizens. 
While Deutsch's political communication theory was full of explanatory 
models of power relationship in a political system, the scope of such power 
as the determinant of political communication was not adequately explained. 
For instance, there is no indication of how communicaiton ideologically 
influences reality. In organized communication channels, media 
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professionals more often influence reality to shape public opinion; a notion 
which Habermas regards as af iction particualrly during election campaigns. 
It is the ideology of those in power that is legitimated. Legitimate 
instruments of power are also a counterpart of political power. The power 
of the media to inf luence opinion would only exist as a fiction but in 
certain cultures it works, i. e. in reality the power does not exist, yet it 
dominates the audience and their decision. 
One of the practical ways in which this is achieved in organized 
communication is the way journalists shape the writing of news and this is 
not independent of the way in which they are trained. In Nigeria, the 
training has not been addressed to the Nigerian reality. During an election 
campaign most journalists are interested in the immediate present and not 
the past or the future. The critical question about the nation cannot be 
answered without reference to the past or the future. The tendency , 
therefore, by the media is to be concerned more with personalities than 
reality, i. e. critical sociopolitical issues. 
Despite the inadequate explanation by Deutsch of the scope of power as the 
determinant of political communication, his cybernetic concept helped him to 
develop a broader dimension 'of political communication beyond the level of 
the mass media in an election campaign. It was at this stage that 
researchers began to consider mass communication as less synonymous with 
political development in which elections were the core investigations. Thus 
mass communication began to embrace wider areas in the socio-economic and 
political processes which are essential for changes and development. 
In general, therefore, the development of political communication has been 
described as a process of moving from traditional, through transitional to 
modern nation-state systems. With a functional definition and approach to 
the study of political communication, Fagen. (1966) presented a general 
summary definition/description of the model of the process. He maintained 
that the functioning of a political system depends on the follow of 
information. 
"that co=unicatory activity is considered political by virtue of 
the consequences, actual and potential, that it has for the 
functioning of the political syStem. "13 
But he recalled that he has indirectly 'incorporated' Laswell's 'effects' 
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model of communication and warned that the. concepts of I sources, messages, 
channels and audience' are not abandoned by his emphases 'on consequences 
and political functioning'. His expansion of political communication 
beyond an election campaign became more apparent in chapter 11, pp 34-52, 
where he explained the components of communication networks and functional 
political communication significances. He recommended those theorists who: 
"See political development principally in a system's increased 
capacity to extend national communication networks (and all that 
this implies) into new sectors of the society. These theorists 
also view the penetration of previously isolated local and 
traditional communication by the national system as requisites of 
political development. -14 
An important contribution here is that the penetration of communication into 
all parts of a political system is no longer the function of the mass media, 
but also of 'organizations', 'groups', and 'special channels for interest 
circulation and aggregation'. For instance, the function of a trade union 
organization, as a political communication channel would be: 
"That of providing a channel of communication between the 
political elite 7- which may be the government in power or a party 
in opposition - and the masses. In the best of situations, the - 
channel is two-way .... To be effective in this channelling 
function, a union must have the widest possible mass character and 
it must have means for mobilizing its indoctrinated membership or 
sympathizers for action and command. "15 
Fagen'. s inclusion of channels of political communication other than the mass 
media was important for his study of comparative political systems at a 
global level, but also useful in the study of political development and 
changes in a transitional society, particuarly where the urban and rural 
political communication systems are apparently or superficially different - 
i. e. in terms of traditional and modern mass media communication system. 
'David Lerner (1974) emphasised that in the nation-state it is essential 
that every organization must have a communication system of some shape, size 
and sort. Setting up an empirical question, he proposed that in a nation- 
state communication shapes organizations, a proposition which is generally 
'applicable to all varieties of collective behaviour or social institutions: 
large and small formal and informal hierarchical. and egalitarian'. He 
argued that in a large nation-state and in large organizations, formal 
communication tends to be more one-way than in 'small, informal egalitarian 
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organisations'. Furthermore, in a nation-state, political communication 
revolves around the mass media which are 'mainly owned and operated - or at 
least regulated - by offical agencies of the nation-state'. Lerner then 
contextualized four classical models of mass communication in a nation-state 
which operate in terms of size and shape, mobility and participation, 
disposable income, options and decisions.. (Unfortunately, limited space 
prevents elaboration of these classical models). 
However, Bobrow (1974: 94) discussed the relationship between communication 
systems and the political system in a nation-state. He defined mass 
communication as systems of messages and means of generation and 
transmission (human and technological) that have three properties: first, 
the messages and the media arL- intended for a large and spatially dispersed 
audience; second, the messages and the media are sufficiently standard to be 
readily comprehensible to and usable by a large proportion of the intended 
audience; third, the messages are available, because of media availability 
to a large proportion of the relevant population. He concluded that mass 
communication and political processes relate to these properties in terms of 
mes sage content, media personnel and technology, and cultural level of 
messages or availability of the media output. But his theory of the 
relationship between mass media comunication and politics in a nation-state 
casts much doubt on what happens to the control of the mass media content 
and output by political authorities and pressure groups in such a society. 
One of the fundamental relationships between the state and the mass media is 
the persistent attempt by the former to control the latter. This attempt is 
found in transitional and nation-states and often more so in the former. 
Nations such as Nigeria, Ghana and most developing nations have very firm 
control on the media content and output. 
In particular reference to nation-states (industrialized states) such as 
Britain, Sweden, and Ireland etc. Peter Golding (1974: 78) stated that 'the 
mass media are an integral part of political life'. He agrees that 'the 
independent newspaper will be one of the future forms of government' because 
'for most people the media provide the major or only link with government as 
well as the information. on which political judgements and attitudes are 
based'. 
In illustrating the theoretical relationship between the media and the 
state, P. Golding and P. Elliott (1979: 45-46) pointed out that broaicasting 
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was involved with government from its inception. In many countries, 
national monopoly control was taken to be a technical necessity to protect 
the national interest, represented by military and intelligence users, and 
generally to regulate the air waves". From the writings of several authors 
in the 1950s, they drew our attention to a set of theories of broadcasting 
which spell out the prevailing pattern of media control by the state: 
"The first is the authoritarian; the media are for control of the 
people by the ruling elite, their purpose to service state power 
... second, libertarian, derived from the classic writing of 
Milton ... based on the idea of a free market place for 
competitive political information and ideals. Third, ... the 
notion of the freedom of the press, and access to privately owned 
media over which the state should have no control other than to 
check excesses and ensure they serve the public interest. Finally 
... the totalitarian theory, the media and state apparatus 
contributing to successful dictatorship by the ruling party. $* 
Gurevitch and Blumler in J. Curran (ed) (1977: 282-287) examined the control 
of political communication in terms of internal and external constraints on 
the two organizations and believed that the analysis of political 
communicaiton systems would involve an examination of the 'formal and 
informal mechanisms that span the boundaries between the two kinds of 
organizations'. Some 'of the constraints they explained were 'economic, 
legal, normative, political etc. Very carefully, they compared the nature 
of broadcasting networks and how they provide easier means of applying 
constraints by the state. Constraints are easier in some media than in 
others. For instance, in many democratic countries, newspapers have 
traditionally belonged in the private sector, whereas the dependence of 
broadcasting transmission on scarce wave-lengths immediately placed first 
radio and television in the public domain. 
, 
Many consequences have followed 
from this distinction. Perhaps the most important one is the development of 
a regulatory licensing system for broadcasting, which was either totally 
absent or far looser in the case of the press. " 
These constraints when applied to the media in transitional states of 
developing nations, make the media totally one of the state's apparatus. 
But Golding and Elliott (1979: 46) felt that Nigeria's media, particularly 
the press (newspapers), are quite different from other African countries in 
terms of state control and constraints. But with radio, they argued that it 
has 'emerged as so much part of, and essential to, the policies of 
government that many of the countries which inherited with independence a 
statutory corporation in charge of broadcasting, have legislated to bring 
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radio and televsion back under direct ministerial control (Ainsle, 1966: 174, 
cited by Golding and Elliot, 1979: 46). 
But today in Nigeria "broadcasting, like that in many developing' 
countries, has become more rather than less closely integrated 
into government, at both national and regional level. In fact 
Nigeria was in many ways exceptional among African countries in 
not introducing broadcsting from the outset as a government 
institution. " (Golding and Elliott, 1979: 49) 
Also, they noted that broadcasting in Nigeria had become more integrated 
with the government after the 1966 military take-over of government. 
Indeed, it was during the civil war that both Nigerian and Biafran 
broadcasting networks experienced the highest control by the governments. 
Ever since then, broadcasting in Nigeria "has moved closer to the state" and 
"it has adopted many government policies as its own and redefined its own 
production practices to accommodate them. " 
The notion of 'accommodation' was then explained by Golding and Elliott in 
the Nigerian broadcasting context when they pointed out that Nigerian 
broadcasters in times of "social stress had shown fundamental agreement over 
the social value of the state in its existing form. Rather, it was that 
they were prepared to accept specific social values embodied in particular 
government policies. In a military dictatorship the distinction between 
government and the state is much less clear than in liberal, western 
democracies ooeo the relationship between broadcasting and the state may 
be typified as accommodation rather than mediation or intervention" (Golding 
and Elliott, 1979: 27,65). When the media are closely attached to military 
or party political government, a number of problems regarding media 
content/output and audiences orientation thereto start to show. For 
instance, Gurevitch and Blumler (1977) pointed out that a party-tied media 
system will produce a high proportion of 'one-sided political content, 
tending as a result to activate partisan role orientations among members of 
the audience as well as selective exposure mechanism'. When the media are 
subordinate to a political party, manifestos and party statements tend to 
generate partisan behaviour. By contrast, comparatively autonomous media 
increasingly generate a 'balanced' political information flow and a less 
partisan attitude. 
Peter Golding (1974: 78-102) has discussed some of the major relationships 
between broadcasting and the state particularly in an election situation. 
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He suggested ways of researching and evaluating media roles in politics. He 
schematised political communication study in terms of 'time-span' into 
'long-term' and 'short-term': the long-term approach emphasises orientation 
towards policy and ideology, while in the short-term approach, the election 
campaign and inferential structures predominate in the research. 
From the above discussion, much of the relationship between the media and 
the state in terms of control and constraints may help us to understand 
elite political behaviour in a developing nation and make it more adequately 
applicable to media and political processes, particularly in short-term 
electoral activities. But if applied to Nigerian elections, the majority of 
the electorate - the illiterate and semi-literate masses - political 
participation and behaviour will be left unaccounted for. 
However, the major characteristics of nation-state political communication 
are: 
a) Many channels of political communication have been developed with very 
high levels of organisation and efficiency. 
b) Highly Skilled and professional communicators are involved in the 
running of the systems. 
C) Political participation is no longer conditioned by political position 
or social organisation. 
d) The differences between urban *and rural political communication are 
insignificant, mass media tending to be the dominant channels of 
political information flow for both urban and rural areas. 
e) National political, social and economic issues rather than the 
dominant position of political leaders are the central concern of the 
media particularly at election time. 
f) Though interpersonal communication remains the important channel of 
political influence, the mass media by far exceed the role of the 
former in the mobilization of the audience for political support. 
g) Ethnic interests tend to give way to national interests. 
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h) The predominant face-to-face or horizontal communication in 
traditional and transitional societies is 'combined with vertical or 
mass media communication in political interactions. But the structure 
of horizontal political communication in traditional society can in 
many ways differ from those in the industrialized and politically 
advanced nations. For instance the way journalists participate in 
parliamentry lobbying among MPs can be entirely different from the way 
traditional organizations are used to create news about political 
participation in Nigeria. Both interact horizontally but different 
roles and political actors are involved. 
Before we look at the major weaknesses of the above conceptions of political 
communication in the context of the West African situation, I shall briefly 
outline the complex and differing patterns of traditional and transitional 
political communication systems in the region. I hold the opinion that 
most West African states are still at the transitional political 
communication stage where traditional forms of modern media are 
interrelated. 
In general, the underlying conception of the development of political 
communication, is the view that traditional, i. e. pre-colonial societies, 
are quite similar in the structure of their political communication. With 
the advent of colonialism and contact with industrialized nations, a fairly 
uniform type of modern political communication was introduced in West 
Africa. Thus, the development of political communication can be described 
as a fairly uniform process of change from a particular pre-colonial pattern 
to a pattern resembling that of the Western industrialized nations. While 
this argument can be sustained in this thepis, it is important to note that 
the change from traditional to modern political communication systems has 
not weakened the effectiveness of traditional patterns of communication. It 
is on the basis of the assumption that traditional political communication 
patterns have been weakened as a result of contact with industrialized 
nations, that many observers note that this typology of the development of 
political communication tends to be very much oversimplified. 
Patterns of traditional political communication in West Africa 
In relation to West African traditional Political communication systems, 
Pye's major characteristics of traditional political communication are the 
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typical simplistic type with its tendency to over-generalization 
particularly as he fails to consider the differences in the political 
sysiems of various traditional societies. Such major differences will be 
illustrated in chapter three on the pre-colonial city-states, kingdoms and 
village'communities in Nigeria. 
Evans-Pritchard and Fortes distinguished two types of traditional political 
systems in Africa: (a) the centralized, and (b) the decentralized political 
systems. Others refer to them as state and stateless societies. The 
centralized or city-state political sytem had recognized authority, 
administrative machinery and judicial institutions. Through these, power, 
wealth and status are maintained. The rulers in such societies control 
organized force through which their authority is legitimated and upheld. 
The Sokoto Caliphate, to be discussed in chapter three, was an example of a 
centralized traditional political system in West Africa. 
The Nuer, Nupe, TIV, and Igbo communities are examples of a decentralized 
system in which power and legitimacy are linked to Ainship netowrk. But 
between these two systems is the Yoruba political system which was not 
described by Evans-Pritchard and Fortes (1940: 1-15). 
P. C. Lloyd in his study of Yoruba political communication system critized 
Evans-Pritchard and Fortes by stating that their model clearly: 
"Separates the societies ... but being largely descriptive rather 
than analytical, it lacks the precision necessary to deal with a 
society falling between these broad groups, particularly those of 
West Africa, such as the Yoruba in their numerous kingdoms, each 
with slightly different political structures. 9916 
Lloyd then fills the gap by distinguishing four different political systems 
in West Africa based on 'lineages' and 'associations' which were also 
identified by Paula Brown (1951). The four different lineage systems were 
illustrated with political systems in Igbo, Yoruba, Mende, Ashanti, Dahomey 
and Nupe political cultures. Lloyd notes from Brown's analysis and 
classification that lineage, association and state overlap. The 
introduction of 'associations' is an important step towards the. 
understanding of political communication and development in West Africa and 
particularly Nigeria. Though neither Lloyd nor Paula Brown specified 
whether the associations were voluntary or forced ones, nor did they state 
the criteria by which members were recruited, their observation remains 
analytically important in the development of political communication in West 
Africa. In the later chapter, the criteria for membership of and way in 
which associations or what would be frequently referred to as 'clubs' 
operate as channels of political communication in Nigeria will be accounted 
for in some detail. 
However in understanding the Yoruba political system, Lloyd emphasised the 
importance of 'associations' which politically are cultural. 
"Political system is the constitutional relationship between, 
various institutions and associations which comprise the system. 
Thus in the case of the Yoruba kingdom, the most important parts 
of the political structure are the descent groups, with their own 
internal structure and organization, the various forms of age 
grade and set, with our without an associated grade or chiefs in 
which one may rise from the lowest to the highest level ... in 
each institution, one must know how a man joins or how a man is 
chosen to assume a title, and on what condition he holds the 
office. 
One must know the chain of authority in the political system by 
which the legislation is transformed into administrative action 
and finally executed. "17 
Lloyd's approach to the study of the traditional political system offers us 
a clear insight into traditional politics as a dynamic system which allows 
for change and at the same 'time retains its fundamental values in the, 
process of changes. 
For instance, in Nigeria, political development was particularly influenced 
by external f actors generated by colonization. Af ter the amalgamation of 
the North and the South of Nigeria on January 1st, 1914, the North was ruled 
indirectly through native authorities, while the South and Lagos colonies 
were ruled directly through a legislative council whose members had no 
constitutional power. By 1946, the 1922 constitution faced sharp criticism 
from individuals, organizations and by the press outside the legislative 
council. But before the Richard's constitution of 1939, Nigeria was already 
a nation where it -s citizens had little or no direct political participation 
on colonial political system. , Sir Arthur Richards recognised the cultural 
and political diversities in Nigeria aimed: 
"to promote the unity of Nigeria to provide adequately within that 
unity f or the diverse elements which made up the country and to 
secure greater participation by Africans in the discussion of 
their own affairs. "18 
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This was an important step in political participation and development in 
Nigeria. The constitution reshaped politics and still, today, has 
considerable influence on it. The regional structure of Nigeria, as 
Richards saw it, determined its political structure. 
"Nigeria falls naturally into three regions: the North, the West 
and the East, and the people of these regions differ widely in 
race, in customs, in outlook and in their traditional systems of 
government. "19 
Thus in 1939, the East and West 'were separated as two administrative units 
in the south, while the North remained a separate unit. Hence Nigeria 
emerged as a geographically three political regions, in which Richards' 
constitution reinforced ethnic/regional nationalism, and at the same time, 
put serious limitations to the development of nation-state politica 1 system. 
Politically the North became larger in area and population than the south. 
Post et. al (1973: 41) show that since "population figures were directly 
translated into regional representation in the Federal House of 
Representatives, the lower house of the central legislative,, this meant that 
the North was allocated more- than half of the seats - 167 out of 312 in 
1%4". The census became highly politicized and pushed Nigeria into more 
criseg that divided it further along regional or ethnic political lines. 
But the real problem which generated intense agitation of Richards' 
, constitution was 
the lack of real political power for the legislators. 
The emergence of political parties within the regions led to more demands 
for real political participation and decision-making. Among these parties 
was the National Council of Nigeria and the Camaroons (NCNC), founded by 
Herbert Macauley and Dr- Nnamdi Azikiwe (ZIK) in 1944. In particular, the 
NCNC put pressure on the governor general, Sir John MacPherson, to change 
Sir Richards's constitution which lacked constitutional power for Nigerian 
leaders. 
The new political parties were created out of cultural associations, a point 
which was stressed by Lloyd above. In this process of political 
development, the Action Group -was established in 1951, whch emerged, into a 
political party from a Yoruba cultural organization known as 'Egbe Omo 
Oduduwa I, previously founded and led by chief Awolowo in 1945 among Yoruba 
students in London. Similarly, 
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"The Northern Peoples Congress (NPQ has its origin in the 
Jamiyyar Maneu Arewa (congress of the northern peoples) which had 
been formed in 1949 by some educated Northerns, notably Abubakar 
Tafawa Belewa., Yohaya Gusan and Dr. R. A. B. 
- 
Dikko. The congress 
was intended to be a cultural organization and not a political 
one, but it was declared a political party in October 1951 ... --20 
The NCNC was believed to be the most nationalistic party, but pressure put 
on it by other ethnic political organizations restricted it to ethnic 
politics to cater for the interests of the Igbos and other minority ethnic- 
groups in the Eastern part of Nigeria. We are here confronted with a* 
political development which, as a result of constitutional changes 
reflecting upon the regional differences of Nigeria, never emerged beyond 
regional politics. The concept of a nation-state through which a national 
identity is established and national issues are discussed has never 
materialised in Nigeria. The constitutional regionalization of Nigerian 
politics has remained at the level of ethnic groups and with strong ethnic 
nationalism and sentiment, it is only when a nation has become a nation- 
state that politics can transcend ethnic nationalism and issues rather than 
personalities, and ethnic distrust and competition become the norms of 
politics. 
Post et al (1973: 40) pointed out that "Legislative powers were divided 
between the centre and the regions, with the balance in favour of the 
latter. This was reinforced by the more solid party control of the regional 
government", Indeed, legislative power which enhanced regional political 
powers of the regional governments at the expense of the federal power 
remains one of the major drawbacks in nation-state development of Nigeria 
political system. 
From the above brief analysis of the complex Nigerian case of interaction of 
pre-colonial and colonial patterns of political institution which will be 
elaborated in Chapter Three, it is clear that there is no uniformity. That 
is, there was no uniform 'traditional' pattern before the introduction of 
colonial and Western politcal institutions and institutions of political 
communication. Also, there has been no uniform, unilinear process of 
development from traditional through transitional to modern nation-state* 
Much depends on the kind of pre-colonial structure and the way this 
structure interacts with the external influences of ad hoc colonial 
political 
, arrangements - as illustrated with the, 
brief analysis of the 
complex interaction of pre-colonial and colonial political institutions 
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above. Thust as the classical model of political communication would 
suppose, Nigeria did not develop as a uniform nation-state but Into 
regionalized ethnic divisions. In particularg the development of political 
parties strongly reinforced ethnic political associations rather than 
representing national interests. The use of convergence theory and 
analysis of data might suggest that today, In part, because of the Influence 
of the mass media and especially because of interpersonal linkages and other 
national institutions* regionalism is breaking down. But the way the mass 
media institutions are owned and controlled In Nigeria particularly at state 
level rather Intensifies ethnic polit1cso secondly, membership of various 
cultural organizations are strongly based on kinship, 7hese organizations 
are often politicized and are Important linkages between rural and urban 
populations, they merely reinforce ethnic politics. My position on the 
theory of convergence will be clarified In chapter two. 
(C) Variations in the characterizations of the political communication In 
the modern nation state 
00 
While Fagan, as seen above, has Included channels of political communication 
other than the media in his study of comparative political systems. his 
conceptual approach was his central weakness. 
Fagan's functional approach and his concentration on the comparative global 
political system renders his analysis of political communication woak. 
because functionalism could not reveal the structure of political 
communication when applied to world communities with different socio- 
politicalg cultural and economic activities. Furtharmorat although lie gave 
full consideration of his definition of political communication in modern 
nations. he functionally limited his analysis to the relationship between 
political participation, socialization and development. lie undermined tho 
strength of the variations in the character of political communications in 
different nations by the assumption that communication functions as the 
agent of change and develops independently of socio-cultural atc. 
structures* 
In a functional approach to political co=unicatLong and strictly In the 
developing areas of political systems$ Almon C. and Coleman. Jo (1960) 
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generally argued that socialization and rule-making, application and 
adjudication, were a function carried out through communication. All 
activity in the society was communication and communication was politics. 
For them, political activity 'should be described and analysed through 
communication. But when communication changes, the political system remains 
constant and unaffected -a major weakness of functional approval. What 
changes is the particular way in which information is gathered and 
disseminated through the system. 
However, they made useful observations in the political communication in 
modern states and developing nations when they pointed out that: 
"The introduction of a mass communication system has not destroyed' 
the traditional communication network based upon personal 
relations. It simply means that a new network has been introduced 
which greatly expands the physical area of communication. What 
cannot now be communicated by face-to-face contact can be 
communicated through the mass media. "21 
With reference to West Africa and Nigeria in particular, the concept of an 
independent mass media in the modern nation-state is not a reality in 
Nigeria. There are several anomalies in the modern political communication 
system of Nigeria which do not fit the model of what a modern political 
communication system is supposed to be and how it is supposed to function. 
Until the late 1960s, the definition of and research into political 
communication was broad both in terms of face-to-face, formal and informal 
interaction and the mass media. Then, Arora and La sswell (1969) began to 
narrow down the study of media to a particular mode in relation to a group. 
Language in the press was examined in terms of American and Indian elites. 22 
In 
- 
recent years, mass communication research has centred heavily on 
political communication revolving round the press, radio and particularly TV 
- Chaffee 1975, Kraus Davis 1976, Rivers et. al 1976, Blumer and Gurevitch 
1975. The major problem is that when political communication research is 
developed exclusively in terms of mass media content, influence and effect, 
the broad view of communication, as an integral part of political 
development that involves socio-economic and cultural life, is narrowed to 
only advanced nations. Even in advanced industrial nations, effective 
interpersonal political communications among decision-makers is neglected. 
I 
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In a system approach to political communication, analysis takes ! account of 
both the system and sub-systems. In this case sub-systems within the system 
should be identified and the pattern of communication activity recognised. 
For instance, group formation and the structure of political communication 
within and between groups. Political communication, then, can be analysed 
in terms of vertical and horizontal interaction where face-to-face and the 
mass media can bring together members of a nation from both the rural and 
urban environments to participate in politics. Or in terms of the wider 
perspective of the media as major conveyors of political information where 
it is possible to make a distinction between horizontal communication 
between members of the 'political public' whose activities the media 
describe and vertical communication to the 'mass public' for whom the 
information is provided (Golding*, P. 1974: 87). 
From the above discussions, four broad dimensions of political communication 
can be identified in any political system, which can be later narrowed to 
analyse political interaction in a developing nation - Nigeria: 
a) face-to-face communication between traditional political 
participants, 
b) organized political communication where information flows from 
organised media to mass audiences, 
C) face-to-face communication between political elites within 
formal and informal state institutions, 
d) face-to-face communication between political elites and non- 
elite groups, individuals, etc. in the system*23 
The point made by Deutsch that despite the introduction of modern political 
communication in a transitional/nation-state, "face-to-face contacts 
determine to a large degree what, in fact will be transmitted more 
effectively". This reinforces the importance of the interdependence of 
these four broad dimensions of political communications. Deutsch's position 
became clearer when he stressed that political communication should be seen 
as "a system's increased capacity to extend national communication networks 
... into new sectors of society". Communication capacity, therefore, would 
involve the inter -dependence of the mass media, organizations, groups and 
special channels for interest articulation and aggregation. 
Also, despite the major weaknesses of Fagen, Coleman and Almond's functional 
approach to the study of political communication, they have strongly 
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emphasised the importance of face-to-face communication in the seemingly 
'effective' new or dominant mass media networks. In transitional political 
communication systems, Pye (1963), Lloyd (1967), Deutsch's cybernetic 
concep#&- (1963) suggested that the mass media may not be the key factor in 
political communication development. West Africa and Nigeria in particular 
are typical examples of transitional political areas of the world. The 
inter-penetration of traditional and modern systems is taking place in a way 
that does not follow the classical model. The key role of the interpersonal 
network is very important and remains a major argument in this thesis. 
In West Africa, and in Nigeria in particular, there is a strong relationship 
between these dimensions in the political system mainly because of the 
structure of social and cultural relationships in the communities. 
For instance, in the West African political system, there is a close 
association between political parties and ethnic and kinship systems and, at 
the same time, modern mass media for political participation and activities 
have developed along the line of ethnic ties and party politics - Mytton G. 
(1983), Lews W. A. (1965), Coleman J. S. (1965), Duyile (1979). Though the 
mass media are closely related to elite urban political communication, the 
socio-economic, - cultural and political relationship between the elites and 
the non-elite kin and *friends in the rural and urban anvironments reduces 
the impacts of the mass media. Political information, mobilization' and 
participation are shaped by the kinship ties. By contrast, 
"In an industrially advanced society, most people receive their 
major information through ... the mass communication network", and 
the "mass media are comparatively independent of the governing and 
the basic social process of the country. "24 
A particular problem for mass media political development in Nigeria is that 
the political content of the media has been f or the exclusive use of the 
minority but powerful group - the elite. Though the press is decentralized, 
it was historically developed as a medium of political agitation and most 
newspapers are printed in a foreign language akin to the elite class. Thus, 
government policy on the ownership and control of radio and TV constitutes a 
problem. Social, cultural, etc. differences between different tribes and 
regions imply that mass media. political communication in Nigeria is within 
rather than between regions/states. 
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Other particular problems that Nigeria has in the development of politics 
and communications are either apparent or real. For the fomer, the 
extensive developments of education, urbanization, commericalization and 
capitalism have meant that various aspects of traditional political systems 
are superfically abandoned. In certain communities, different social 
factors, e. g. religion, kinship network and obligation, etc. have forced the 
elites to adhere to conflicting traditional values in order to gain 
political support. Some of the relationships with the rural population are 
renewed and strengthened during the election period when they need their 
votes. The process has led to a distrust of politicians by the masses. 
Also, the tendency to rely heavily on one's ethnic community for political 
support has led to a permanent non-national political development in 
Nigeria, *and this increasingly weakens national political stability. , 
The 
high rate of corruption, particularly among politicians in Nigeria, can be 
analysed in relation to the lack of nationalism. 
Some of the real problems begin to emerge - the army constantly intervenes 
as a corrective power, but often stays in power so long after independence 
as to make party political development non-existent in Nigeria. 
Consequently, political communication, particularly the use of the mass 
media for participation and mobilization of support, has been greatly 
undermined. While Nigeria has seen a very rapid expansion in the mass media 
network, the expansion has very largely reflected commercial, social and 
cultural change, rather than party political change and development. 
The press which developed along ethnic political party lines in the 160s was 
only as Coleman reported: 
Ot responsible for the recruitment of most literate Africans into 
the political arena and for the incubation of nationalist 
sentiment. Its influence in the communication of ideas and of 
interpretation of events has been far greater than in most 
countries. Nationalist organizations have grown up around the 
press rather than around organized membership.. During the period 
1948-1951 ... the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons 
... existed in the pages of Nnandi Azikiwe chain of newspapers; 
organizationally, it was moribund. -'25 
It was widely believed that Nnamdi Azikiwels West African Pilot was the most 
outstanding newspaper in this respect. Perhaps the paper made ZIK more 
popular than the NCNC party which he led. "The sensationalism, picture 
journalism, human interest stories and, organized marketing of the Pilot took 
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its circulation to the unprecedented figure of 12,000 by 1940. Success bred 
success in the shape of the IZIKI' group of newspapers. " (Azikiwe, 1970 in 
Golding and Elliott 1979: 30). 
While Coleman makes the valid point that the press served to reunite elites 
into the NCNC party, he greatly over-emphasized the role of the press in 
political development in Nigeria. This is because he embarked upon a 
functional analysis of political communication which neglected the role of 
the social structure that determines such organizations as ethnic unions, 
e. g. Igbo Sate Union, kinship, regional interests that formed the basis of 
political support and mobilization of the Nigeria party political system 
during the elections in the 1960s. The attitude by political elites 
regarding the power of the media in the 1960s was implanted in this view 
until the army took over in 1966. Party politics has not developed further 
to enable scholars to evaluate the relationship between politics, the mass 
communicaion media and voters. 
Under circumstances of military dictatorship and party political 
communication in which political leaders mobilize support only f rom the 
rural and urban ethnic communities of their origin, Nigeria has not been 
able to develop a national system of political communication. 
Thus, national issues which, since independence, have involved social, 
cultural and economic difficulties are neglected. As the personalities 
represent ethnic interests, it is the politicians who matter rather than the 
issues. The crucial point here is that ethnic political sentiments have 
overshadowed the political realities'of Nigeria. 
Under the combination of the various f orces, mentioned above, Nigeria has 
not developed political and communication institutions that look beyond 
ethnic political changes. Various changes have occured but they have not 
been studied in a new political communication context. The rapid economic 
development, urbanization, industrialization, *particularly during the mid- 
1970s and early 1980s oil boom, and the wide-spread development of higher 
education, have generated new groups of political interests and 
participants. The new groups are no longer characteristic of, or identified 
with, any one or two ethnic groups, but they exist in all groups. Though 
there is evidence that Nigerian politics and communication are strongly 
ethnic, the 1983 general elections in Imo State point to a new direction and 
could provide a new approach towards understanding political communication 
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in election campaigns in Nigeria. 
At this point, I propose that Nigerian political and communication systems 
can best be understood in terms of a network of systems of participation, 
mobilization and voting. The changes can be studied within any ethnic group 
in terms of different participants in the system. From our discussions so 
far, we can within any community or ethnic group identify the following 
sectors: 
a) traditional 
b) young school leavers 
C) urban poor 
d) urban elites 
e) rural elites. 
These have some marked differences as a result of social, political, 
economic and cultural changes that have occurred in Nigeria since 
independence. We cannot clearly understand politics and communication 
developments in Nigeria by examining the relationship between ethnic groups 
in a pseudo-national political system when - much concentration and 
orientation of politics have occurred, which seem to reflect the social 
economic structure of the country. 
It is important, at this stage, to establish that the above network groups 
exist in Nigeria and have different political communication activities. In 
fact, through their political activities, a more complex social structure is 
operating in Nigeria than in most political and communication theorists have 
assumed. Me approach, though, presents theoretical and other problems; it 
is hoped that it carries great potential for a more congruent understanding 
of political communication in Nigeria. From the definitions of political 
communications given above, it can be seen that there are broadly two types: 
traditional face-to-face (informal) and organized mass media. The two Most 
important groups associated with these political communication systems are 
the traditional network group and urban elite network. The term 'group', in 
this study, will be clarified later not as a group in terms of members but 
as aggregated individual 
*s 
in terms of their socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics. Other network groups - younger school leavers, urban poor 
and rural elites are emerging or tend to emerge from either the traditional 
group. Dr the urban elite sector. The latter is associated with urban 
political environment, while the former with rural political communication 
systems in Nigeria. 
RESEARCHES AND OTHER STUDIES INDICATING THE 
EXISTENCE OF THESE FIVE NETWORK GROUPS/SYSTEMS 
1. TRADITIONAL COMHUNICATION NETWORKS 
. European and 
American anthropologists were. the first to study African 
political systems in relation to c hanges that occurred as a result of 
contact'with Europeans. Initial changes were observed in terms of culture 
rather than politics. Malinowiski and Richards (1938, pp. VII, VIII) 
stressed that European contacts with Africans were the "greatest enemy" ... 
that "has set the machine above the human being. Changes were introduced 
that entailed adjustments to mechanical progress which were almost beyond 
the possibilities of organic adaptation. " The changes, however, were more 
rapid than anthropologists thought. On politics and communication, 
Malinowiski observed that the new systems were "adapted to the African 
physical environment and remain dependent on the African milieu". 
In the 1930s, anthropologists - Fortes, Wagaer, Hunter, Mair etc, - studying 
African political systems* maintained that the impact of European influence 
on African systems could not be studied within an anthropological framework 
because, where 'communications are poor, one can ... observe marked 
diffferences in the extent of European influence on different sections of 
the same country, while in towns and industrial areas, where the native 
population is heterogenous and has grown up. with no inheritence of 
tradition, the approach would necessarily be entirely different. -27 
Hair conversely recognised the differences between urban and rural political 
and social systems as a result of modernization. In terms of political 
communication, the crucial contribution of Mair was to locate the 
communication and interaction between different social and political 
institutions and how they were internaly organized, maintained and related 
to one another. 
The early works -of anthropologists thus began to generate interest in the 
study of comparative political systems within nations and between nations. 
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I All these studies about traditional political relationship, point out 
clearly that kinship networks were the basic political communication system. 
The kinship-based political communication system renders less emphasis on 
power and legitimate right to control others. Thus Habermas J. writes: 
", organized according to kinship relations ... in these 
societies there are myths that interpret the natural and social 
order. They fix membership in the tribal group (and its limits) 
and thus secure a collective identity. Mythological world views 
here have a constitutive significance rather than a subsequent 
legitimate significance.,, 29 
This is only an aspect of political relation in a traditional society where 
myths such as in the Igbo mythology constitute only one aspect of the 
political system. Religion, Habermas, 1979: 81, notes, was a powerful 
legitimacy which helped to resolve conflicts in traditional political 
systems. Habermas compared legitimate power in African political systems 
with those in Europe. But Fortes and Evans -Pritchard, from the experience 
in their study of political and social relations in Tallensi, in Ghana, 
debated whethe. r, before the colonial period, Aýrica had any political 
system. 
The problem of legitimacy here is 'the problem of the methods used to 
maintain law and order, in order to achieve political stability and progress 
for the society, rather than a definition of political system. Schapara 
pointed out that for a traditional political system to survive and the 
social order of the group to be maintained, the use of physical force was 
necessary, thus he described political legitimacy in a traditional society 
as: "that aspect of the total organisation which is concerned with the 
establishment and maintenance of internal co-operation and external 
independence" (I. Schapera, London: Watts, 1956, p. 217) 
Other studies which have examined in some detail the existence, structure, 
content and characteristics of traditional political systems and interaction 
are (to name but a few) E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Divine Kinship of the 
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Shilluk, 1948, The Nuei, 1940; G. Lienhardt, 'The Western Dinka' in Tribes 
Without Rulers; J. Middleton and Ronald Cohen (eds) 1967; Middleton, 1958; 
Wagner, J*q 1949, etc. 
Most of the early studies recognised forms of pofitical communication: 
"The Chief s of higher rank are expected ' 
to move within their 
territory, hold meetings, and explain to people the measures for 
the improvement of hygiene, cultivation ... if people are to adopt 
these measures they must be constantly reminded of them, and this 
measure is the duty of the lower level chiefs, headmen of the 
villages... --30 
The differences between chiefs, headmen, kins and the process of political 
communication vary widely in Africa. The differences also determine the 
degree of conflict, 'power distribution and political stability in the 
traditional and even in the modern national government in many African 
countries today. In the New African Year Book, 1979: 130, Watson, W. 
1977: 55,152, shows how political stability is maintained in traditional and 
modern African states where both have instituted leadership and association 
with the rest of the system though kinship. 
But where the two have been fused together, Ernest Gellner (1983: 13) 
'believedi that communication, force, persuasion and dialogues are the major 
instruments capable of such fusion. He also pointed out that 
geographically, larger areas within two different political traditions can 
be fused together through communication processese 
However, the basic unit of political communication in a traditional system 
is that small groups are held together by common descent or kinship, living 
in a limited geographical setting. The means of livelihood are the 
principal occupations were farming, fishing, hunting and trading. 
Generally, there is lack of formal education in the Western sense of the 
terms Its major political communication characteristics have been outlined 
above according to W. Pye (1963: 24-25), observation. 
Much literature and research results exist which describe and. state various 
approaches to the understanding and analysis of poliiical communication in 
traditional societies. But in relation to modern political systems and 
communication, they treat them separately. Often, politics and 
communication in both systems are studied independently of each other. In 
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this study, I should argue that in developing countries such as Nigeria, 
both traditional and urban politics and communication should be studied 
together to show how the relationships between them and the political 
participants have brought about the emerging new political communication 
structures. 
THE URBAN ELITE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
Perhaps the most important result in the Af rican contact with the European 
traderss missionaries, and colonials was the development of an elite class 
which altered the shape of African political communication systems. In the 
context of Africa, P. C. Lloyd (1966: 288) defined African elites as "those 
men and women who have received a substantial Western education and are 
(almost in consequence) relatively wealthy. They are a national elite 
With reference to the Yoruba in Western Nigeria, Lloyd states that the 
elites "are a small group; they have a highly distinctive style of life; 
they enjoy great economic privilege in the State. Most leading members were 
educated in Britain and many participated in left-wing political parties. " 
He admits that though the elite has its own distinctive lifestyle, 'class' 
and soci-al stratification as we know them in Europe are totally absent from 
his description of social relationships in Yoruba society. He concludes 
that the wealthy but illiterate and semi-literate traders, traditionally 
orientated and prominent educated Obas and chiefs are excluded from the 
elite group. The crucial years of elite political power began between 1946 
and 1951, thus Arthur Lewis writes: 
"the years 1946 to 1951 created a new political situation in West 
Africa. The new constitutions offered real power; not merely the 
opportunity to be in a minority of one or two in a legislative 
assembly dominated by men nominated by the Governor, but the 
opportunity to influence policy. ' ... By 1961 every West African 
country had become independent, except Gambia and Portuguese 
Guinea. The real road to political power lay through organising 
millions of voters in the countryside; a few speeches in the 
capital and articles in the newspapers were no longer central; one 
had to have widespread organisation and bureaucracy. "31 
In this chapter, 
* 
the important roles of African elites in the development of 
a new political communication system are not going to be elaborated; the aim 
is to show that elite political groups do exist in West Africa, Nigeria and 
elsewhere. Karl Deutsch, using the mathematical model developed by 
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Professor Rashevsky in his Theory of Human Relations32 identified three 
levels of political communication participants - 'active'l 'partially 
active', and 'passive population'. In relation to these levelsq he 
associated different population categories to them - 'active-' to 'a 
relatively small elite' usually of less than 5 percent of the population. 33 
Also Deutsch (1966a: 156) identified bureaucratic decision-making elites from 
poitical party elites. 
In terms of symbolic political mobilisation through powerful public 
speeches, Edelman, in his book 
- 
'The Symbolic Uses of Politics' p. 72,180, 
argued that political leadership should not be emphasised 'in terms of the 
traits of an elite' but the number of supporters a political leader is able 
to rally behind him* 
Mills, C. W. The Power Elite (1956), discussed the role of the 'power elite' 
in terms of important political and social issues which are also issues that 
interest the mass media, hence elite interest and mass media in political 
terms are unique. Lowi (1963: 16,667-715), and also 'Bachrach, P. and 
Baratz, M. (1970) argued that important social and political issues could be 
irrelevant. in the understandihg of the roles of political elites because 
this group tries to keep them out of the agenda. In particular, Lowi argues 
that what is important in the understanding of elite political roles is the 
r edistributive issues which are class-based. Cohen (1963) also shared 
similar views of elite political communication roles in democratic politics. 
In the production of broadcast news, Golding and Elliott (1979: 122) ' stated 
that the "elites are covered to the extent that their activities are 
accessible and to the extent that these activities match other news values. 
Thus the political circus is a prime focus of attention, while economic and 
financial elites remain shrouded ... It is those elites whose activities 
fit, or who. choose to be accessible and visible which make news". News is 
about people they said and in Nigerian context, "organisations and groupings 
appear less of ten than isolated individuals as the prime movers in the 
historical process captured by news stories". Statistically, they showed 
that 50.5% of NBC TV and 41.8% NBC Radio news content centred around the 
activities of individual actors. They mentioned that 'this focus on 
personalities rather than groups inevitably shape the portrayal of - events 
themselves, suggesting the powerful and sudden influence of personalities as 
the potent drive in the affairs rather than any less tangible, or less 
objective subjects'. Later, we shall see the relevance of this observation 
and empirical report in the discussion of charismatic ethnic leadership, 
state ownership and control of the media in relation to news and political 
broadcasts in 1983 general elections in Nigeria. 
Perhaps, one of the most elaborate studies on the role of elites and the 
ruling class, in which concertedness in political, social and family 
networks formed the basis of relation, was that carried out by Lamb, R. K. 
(1952). He vividly illustrated the political roles of elites and leading 
families in America in the struggle for national unity and independent 
movement and their leadership in American politics thereafter. 
From different theoretical points of view, one of ,, -he major problems in 
elite politics is how to identify them in any given society34 so that we can 
determine whether that society has an elite political system or not. Dahl, 
R. IA. Critique of the Ruling Elite Model' (1958) distinguished the political 
elýtes in terms of influence and power within a political group or system. 
"A ruling elite, is a controlling group less than a majority in 
size that is not a pure artifact of democratic rules. It is a 
minority of individuals whose preferences regularly prevail in 
0. cases of differences in preference on key political issues, 35 
Dahl stressed that an elite does not determine whether a political system 
exists or not, but an elite political system. exists only when a political 
system is dominated and controlled by a group of elites - i. e. the masses 
are not in control of the crucial decision-making processes and the 
distribution of power and wealth etc. Nettle, J. P. (1967: 92) discussed the 
concept of elite political systems in terms of socio-economic power which in 
turn yields them political power and authority. He pointed out that those 
who rule are not exclusively elites but those who have high potential to 
control. He emphasised the importance of institutionalised authority in 
relation to elite potential control. Draus, S. and Davis, D. (1978: 178) 
shared a similar view but pointed out that social organisations when 
centralised, become effective organs of political control by a few elites 
who have authority to transfer power. They noted that in a democratic 
political system, the masses have the power to reject the legitimate 
authority of the elite leaders if they so wish. 
Relating these theoretical models to the third world and particularly to 
Africa, Fagen, R. (1966: 126) pointed out that the elements of colonialism 
generated the emergence of an elite group. He described them as 
'charismatic leaders' in fragmented political systems. Samjeeva Nayak 
(1973) from the work of David E. Apter (1973) classified the elites in Ghana 
into: civil servants, who were apolitical during the colonial rule; the non- 
governing elites - the opposition party who try to displace the ruling 
elite; the ruling elite and its supporters; and the intellectual elite who 
are engaged in education. The battle for political power ranges between the 
governing elite and the opposition elite36. 
Arthur Lewis (1965: 13,19-25) has demonstrated how the development of elite 
politics in West Af rica has created both horizontal and vertical political 
struggle. The nature of the struggle between traditional and modern elites 
illustrates the emergence of a new complex political communication structure 
in West Africa. The close relationship between elites and the political 
party system was stated and he concluded that: 
"One of the potential merits of a political party is that it can 
break down .... apathy and political ignorance, by establishing a 
cell in every villageq maintaining a steady flow of communication 
between leaders and rank and file, in both directions. "37 
In Senegal (West Africa), Paul Mercier38 recognised that colonisation 
resulted in an elite class in West Africa and that individuals in this class 
competed among themselves for political leadership. Berghe, V. (1965) 
pointed out that during the colonial period, political struggle in West 
Africa was between African elites and colonial authorities. Basil Davidson 
(1978: 231) noted that amongst 'top-elites', journalism was primarily 
responsible for the achievement of independence in West Africa - ie. 
Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone. 
The elite political system in Nigeria has the same general characteristics 
as other ex-British West African countries. Virtually every publication on 
Nigerian politics and communication systems has emphasised the crucial roles 
of the educated elites in the systems. The emphases range from leadership 
in national, regional, urban, small village, to unions or clubs etc - of 
whose roles K. W. Post and Michael Vickers note 'several' among other 
functions, "as important communication links between urban migrants and 
rural communities, and political parties were able to' exploit these links 
for their own purpose. - 39 
They developed the concept of 'primodial attachments in a conglomerate 
society', which helped them to distinguish different political groups 
through which information flows. Political information, participationg 
mobilisation and identification are dependent on individual membership of a 
group in Nigeria. 
James S. Coleman (1965), examined the role of the elites in nationalist 
movements and independent attainment in Nigeria. 
"The leaders and most of the active supporters of the Nigerian 
Nationalist movement come from the ranks of those who had been 
most strongly affected by Western influences, and in particular 
from the Western-educated English-speaking minority.,, 40 
Makintosh (1966) a laid major emphasis on the party Political system and the 
working of the Nigerian constitution and hir, analysis was extremely general 
but mostly centred on urban and elite political activities. Though he did 
not fail to observe the strong connection between the urban and rural 
population in Nigerian political systems. 
"Politics in the sense of division of scarce resources among 
competing villages, tribes and regions, cannot be permanently 
avoided. Politicians in the sense of men (with local connections 
and therefore local pressure) whose task is full-time decision- 
making at the top level, cannot be dispensea with. When these 
procedures and persons, be they civil or military in origin, have 
been in action f or some time, many of the f actors af f Pcting 
politics are likely to occur. --41 
His observation is very important in the understanding of urban/village 
politics in Nigeria in terms of interpersonal networks of connections. 
But, at the group level, linkages between village and urban political 
participation and mobilisation for support through union, has been noted by 
Smoch (1971) who emphasised the role of educated elites. She pointed out 
that ethnic political systems as they operated in the urban areas and their 
ties with rural areas were organised by those who were most politically 
conscious. She demonstrated the existence of such political struggle with 
the Igbo communities in Eastern Nigeria where the development of 'unions' 
constituted the most powerful socio-political body that integrated the 
activities of the Igbos in the cities and in the villages. In the process, 
she pointed out that: 
"Confrontation with the forces of modernity unleashed by the 
colonial administration precipitated the formation of a new and 
more inclusive identity, the Igbo people. Educated elements first 
embraced this new identity.,, 42 
J. E. Goldthrope (1961) has argued that 'there is a considerable power 
component in the term '(elite)' which is not quite or not necessarily 
justified when we speak of the educated African elite. He feels that the 
term should be applied only to independent African states, e. g. Ghana. He, 
however, agrees that to understand how African modern political systems 
operate, the elite or the educated class should be considered as a group. 
In categorising African elites during the colonial period, Professor Busia 
(1961) distinguished three groups of African elites: 
a) "the traditional 'royal' families" 
b) European or colonial officials 
C) The educated Africans 
But at the attainment of independence, the Af rican elites took control of 
power and 
O-new elites are thus able to monopolise power ... It is 
permissible in the Gold Coast (Ghana) to regard all who are 
literate as an elite because their patterns of aspiration are 
'Western', that is European-orie. ntated. "44 
Goldthorpe (1961: 147) maintained that it is these elites who have set a new 
'standard' in Africa and 'its influence or power being that of a model 
accepted and considered worth following'. In African political systems 
therefore, there are traditional elites, with local and non-western 
education, and the broad or generalised elite with western education, but 
not all the latter group are political elites. Lloyd (1966: 14) 
distinguishes two significant elites in the early periods of colonialization 
in Nigeria "The traditional elite of the political office-holders of tribal 
societies and the earlier westernized elites". Socio-politically, Lloyd 
(1966: 51) then described an African elite as the mediator between western 
and traditional influences. Its individual members, born most probably 
into traditional homes, have to decide what to incorporate from the western 
industrialized world and what to reject. The masses, furthermore, often 
look to them for leadership in these matters. All the different categories 
of elites necessary for political communication analysis in Western Africa 
have been outlined by Nayak (1965); Goldthorpe (1961); Lloyd (1967); 
Balandier (1955: 161) and Leith-Rose (1956: 178). 
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Finally, the expansion of university education in Nigeria has produced a 
large number of aspirants into the elite political system. The competition 
for political support now ranges among the elites themselves. Those who 
cannot win considerable support from their own community to gain political 
power, now tend to satisfy the requirement of other powerful political 
elites outside the contender's own ethnic region or state. In socio- 
political terms, Goldthorpe (1961: 156) pointed out that: 
"**. when the social climber is excluded" or even decides to 
exclude himself "... from the group to which he aspires, 
anticipatory socialisation becomes dysfunctional for the 
individual who becomes the victim of aspirations he cannot achieve 
and hopes he cannot satisfy. " 
t 
This concept can be applied to two groups in Nigeria between the 1979 and 
1983 general elections. Those individuals who joined other political 
parties that were dominated by ethnic groups other than their own and the 
ethnic minorities who joined other larger ethnic groups outside their own 
geographical region. Most of the leaders in this new political movement, 
based on identification and participation are the elites. The trend is in 
fact an important- phase in Nigerian political communication. (of 
participation and mobilisation of support) at rural/urban and national 
levels. 
THE URBAN POOR (THE PROLETARIAT AND LUMPEN PROLETARIAT) YOUNG SCHOOL 
LEAVERS, AND RURAL ELITES GROUP/SYSTEMS 
As pointed out earlier, the above groups are derivatives of either the 
traditional network system or the urban elite system. The dif f erences 
between them depend on several inter-related factors, e. g. residence, 
education, age and occupation etc. In West Africa and particularly 
Nigeria, their similarities and differences vary widely but differences tend 
to be softened by the structure of extended family and kinship relatio nship 
predominant in West Africa. Leith-Rose comments in reference to Nigeria 
that: 
"The family is not the unit of parents and children but the 
extended family which looks for financial help or moral support to 
whatever member has made good. The minister has a sister 'selling 
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casava in the market'. the successful doctor has a 'brother# 
working as public worker department labourer. The family bond 
linking rich and poor, literate, influential and insignificant, 
militates against iny idea of strictly isolated 'clas * S1. 
It also 
prevents the group, though increasingly westernised from eing cut 
off from its origin. --45 
With particular reference to modernizing African elites, Lloyd (1977: 135) 
has shown quantitatively that there is a strong link between traditional and 
rural sectors: 
"Very many of the elite have come -f rom humble homes. Two f if ths 
of those men with post-secondary education have fathers who never 
attended school and who were in consequence farmers or poorer 
craftsmen; only one quarter have-fathers who received post-primary 
education. These latter fathers were, of course, the elite of 
their own generation - the chief clerks, the primary school 
headmasters, the clergy, etc. " 
The observation also prevents any revolution and 'class' struggle similar to 
what happened in Western Europe in the 1830s and 1840s. It generates 
nepotism and corruption and furthermore reinforces the fundmentals of ethnic 
political participation. Narrowly assessed, Arthur Lewis (1965) noted that: 
"West African society does not fit into the marxist categories. 
The area is under-populated, so land is abundant, and in most 
tribes a man has the right to as much land as he can cultivate. 
Hence landlord, rents, oppressed peasants and landless labourers 
are rare.,, 46 
As groups which emerge are from either the traditional or urban elite 
groups, I shall state only the principal characteristics and attributes 
which distinguish them from the two main groups (traditional and urban 
elite) . 
THE URBAN POOR 
A good example of a city in West Af rica where there are sharp differences 
and a steadily widening gap between the poor and the rich is Lagos. In 
Victoria Island it costs as much as N45,000 (E36,000) a year to rent a three 
bedroom flat by the rich, while in Idimangro Ikeja, Lagos, the poorest 
Nigerians live in empty containers or abandoned lorries. The root of'urban 
poor emergence- in West Africa has been traced by J. R. Rayfield who argues 
that the colonial cities - cities founded in the early twentieth century in 
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West Africa - were founded to serve the interest of the colonial authorities 
and af ter independence in the sixties, the cities underwent little or no 
structural changes. Though the indigenous elites assumed power, the 
economic power remained in the hands of foreigners. Migration from the 
rural to urban areas was a continual process. He notes that: 
"In most colonial cities, bad housing and unemployment are serious 
problems, but only Gutkind sees the new urban proletariat as a 
serious threat to political stability. "47 
Peter Worsely and Franz Fanon have described the urban poor as the 
'underclass or proletariat or the victims of urbanisation and 
industrialisation'. They pointed out that in the colonial systeml, the urban 
poor were unable to find a 'bone -to growl, they deserted the family and 
rural occupation and moved into the cities where they became the core 'of 
the shanty townsi through lack of regular employmentt they were forced to 
embark on 'stealing, debauchery and alcoholism. Juvenile delinquency in the 
colonial countries is the direct result of the existence of a lumpen 
proletariat-48 
A description of the urban proletariat * in the Af rican context has been 
attempted by Amilcar Gabral who described the lumpen proletariat as those 
city Ideclassed people' and the proletariat - 'made up of young people who 
are connnected to petty bourgeois or workers' families" and recently 
'arrived from the rural areas and generally do not work ,.. they have 
relationship with rural areas as well as with the towns and even with the 
Europeans. '117hey often live of. A. one kind of work or another but generally 
live at the expense of their families. t49 
The urban proletariats are the equivalent of young school leavers who are in 
part potential members of urban lumpen proletariats or the urban elites. 
Their future economic status determines which of the groups they would 
belong to. Because of the unstable character of the socio-political and 
economic situation in West Africa in relation to different groups, the term 
proletariat and lumpen proletariat should, to avoid over-generalization, not 
be frequently used because: 
"Generalisations are specially dangerous in societies which are 
changing. "50 
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The truth of this warning is vividly illustrated in Nigeria where within a 
decade of the oil boom, the nation saw the emergence of a new wealthy class 
which was previously so poor members of it could ill af ford a meal a day. 
In this respect I chose the simpler term 'urban poor' to describe the socio- 
political and communication activities of this 'clas' in an election 
campaign. 
The definition of social group in terms of economic status has been stated 
by Lloyd. Even when social groups are defined in ethnic or residential 
terms, interests are "often couched in economic terms and involving power 
relations". In the Third World countries "the urban poor are the 
immigrants from the rural areas" (Lloyd 1984: 74). 
The real urban experience of the urban poor has been summed up by Philip 
Hauser, who emphasised that the rapid urbanisation has created 'acute' and 
chronic socio-political problems which are: 
"most discernible in the adjustment of migrant to the urban 
living. In the city, he is confronted with a bewildering and 
almost incomprehensible vastness with his fellow villagers or 
relatives and only gradually becomes accommodated to city. life. "51 
Adjustment to city life may not be a very serious problem in Nigeria. The 
degree of the problem varies from one part of the country to the other. The 
greater the similarities between the rural areas from where the migrant 
originates and the city where he has started a new urban life, the less 'the 
pressure for adjustment in terms of language and culture. The maj or 
'subjective problem' arises as J. A. Jackson observed when: 
Issuccessful participation in one social system subjects the 
individuals to penalties or deprivations in the other. This may 
arise when participation in more than one sub-system is peceived 
as an act of disloyalty or. when there is discrimination against 
the migrant in the dominant social system. --52 
The problem of adjustment for a migrant in African -townships is structural 
and pre-exist the arrival of the migrant himself. 
"The young migrant arrives, with or without prior warning, and in 
most cases makes immediately for the house of his closest 
relatives. Indeed, many will. have already spent a holiday there. 
A smaller number will join their school classmates who have 
established themselves. The host acknowledges an obligation to 
provide board and lodging and help the new comer to find 
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employment and a permanent place in which to live. Not 
unnaturally he is anxious to see his lodger independently 
established a soon as possible and to this end he exploits his own 
network to the full. The migrant is thus quickly drawn into an 
established network consisting most immediately of his close kin 
in the city, and then other members of the same area. " (Lloyd 
1984: 75). 
Lloyd emphasised that while new network ties are being created in the urban 
area, the migrant also maitains a tenacious link with the rural homeland. 
The link with the rural origin is not 'merely an effective tie, it must be 
seen in terms of the security which it affords in the urban situation. ' 
The essential features of the urban poor have been described by Nelson who 
sums up their status characteristics as 'low', often excluded from formal 
lorganisations and association' and who at the same time, while they live in 
the city, exhibit major characteristics that are 'rural in origin'. 
Particularly, they create informal and private webs of contacts which 
constitute the urban social structure. He concludes that: 
"They may also be culturally marginal, clinging to customss 
mannerst dress, speech and values which contras ,t` with the accepted urban patterns. -They lack ties to, or influence on, the 
established political institutions. --53 
Lloyd (1984) did not only identify the urban poor as migrants from the rural 
area, he also associated them with certain occupations in'the city: 
"as building construction labourers or temporary unskilled 
workers". They are mostly artisans or petty traders. A typical 
village urban migrant is "young who migrates from the village 
between the age of 15 and 25, perhaps at the end of primary 
education. Most of these young men/women have abandoned farming 
which is stagnant. Their poor skill for city jobs makes them 
extremely vulnerable for lack of moral and financial support. 
Their most important need is a regular employment. The 
information on jobs comes from relatives who live in the city. 
Consequentlys there is 'a strong reliance upon those who can 
provide information about jobs, or introduce one to employers or 
customers. One's social network is thus a most valued resource; 
time and energy spent in maintaining it is as important as 
investing in a savings account - and in conditions of extreme 
poverty it is much more prevalent. But the network so created is 
far from congruent with economic, ethnic, or residential- 
categories (Lloyd, 1984). 
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YOUNG SCHOOL LEAVERS 
The expansion in education from primary to university levels in Africa is a 
clear evidence that this group exists. In Nigeria, the evidence can be 
summed up statistically, thus: 
Education (1980-81) 
Schools Teachers Students 
Student/ 
Teacher ratio 
Primary (age 6-12) 36,683 384,201 14,022,165 36.5 
Secondary school (12-17) 4,495 69,005 2,0240025 29.3 
Vocational, teacher training 470 12,156 359,817 29.6 
Higher 77 - 153,306 - 
College graduates per 100,000 population (students graduating 1981): 19.5 
literacy (1980): total population literate (30.4%). 
(Extract from Britannica World Data Annual, 1985, p. 752) 
Compared with the Cameroons (55.2%), Liberia (70.5%), Zaire (57.9%), and the 
Ivory Coast (35.0%), the level of literacy in Nigeria is still very low. 
This is because the Northern part of the country did not embrace 
, 
w6stern 
education as vigorously as the south until a few years after independence. 
Serious attempts have been made to 'bridge the gap'. 
In Nigeria and other West African countries, young school leavers are the 
floating group who have been described by Arthur Lewis (1965: 12) as primary 
school graduates pouring out of the schools at an accelerating pace, and 
looking for clerical jobs which do not exist'. He believed that 
unemployment was due to young people leaving the land for the towns (village 
groups) faster than the cities could provide them with jobs. He recognised 
their political potential as a group which supplies radical politicians with 
a solid core as devoted party workers. 
Arthur Lewis' notion of what causes of unemployment of young school leavers 
in the cities is only in part true. In my view, the crucial issue is that 
the the type of education given to young people in West Africa is 
practically unrelated to agriculture. Secondly, while, the missionaries were 
establishing schools and colleges in the rural areas, the colonial 
administration as well as post-colonial authorities failed to set up 
industries and ministries in the same areas to absorb young school leavers. 
The cities where these activities were inadequately concentrated became a 
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great attraction. Manufacturing industries were set up in the colonial 
metropolitan centres, raw mateiral came back as finished goods to be 
consumed by the colonialized city population. Young school leavers who left 
the village for the cities were thus disappointed and frustrated. They 
could easily become politicised by more 'radical politicians'. In the time 
of an election, they constitute important political party agents of 
violence. In this study the young school leaver group also includes 
secondary and university graduates, who are incrasingly constituting the 
majority of the unemployed young people. 
We have noted above that the predominant economic activity of most 
traditional societies is agriculture. As late as 1966, "agriculture alone 
is reported to account for some 50 per cent of Nigeria's national income and 
85 per cent of the country's export trade" (Carter 1966: 30). Recent 
economic change, and the rapid expansion of primary education (Loyd, 
1966: 26) have produced large numbers of young school leavers. The most 
serious problem, Lloyd (1967: 197-198) "is unemployment among school leavers. 
Young men and women who attend school in villages reject the traditional 
occupations of their parents and hopefully migrate to the cities in search 
of paying jobs. - With the rapid expansion of basic education, the number of 
job-seeking youths has increased sharply. But the economy is not growing at 
a high enough rate to provide immediate employment for more than a small 
proportion of these school leavers". He concluded that lbadan, in Nigeria, 
as a centre of political, administartive and commercial activities, attracts 
many school leavers who remained unemployed. "Their unemployment condition 
reflects a major lack of balance between the education process and the 
developing economy. " 
Claude Meillassoux (1968: 96) also maintained that economic and social 
factors force young Africans to migrate to the cities from the village. "A 
young man goes to school in a small town near his village; at the end of his 
elementary studies, he finds no employment worthy of his literacy. The 
feeling of losing a precious investment is very keen, both for the young man 
and for his family. Someone therefore advises him to go to Bamako where 
opportunities are. grdater. " Socially, Meillassoux feels that another reason 
which compels young school leavers to migrate to the city was "to free 
themselves from patriarchal rule. " 
Margaret Peil (1972) in her study of ' Industrial Mileu in Africa' showed 
that in Ghana, school leavers from the North and S6uth of the country show 
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different attitudes to work in the city. 
"Those who grew up in the villages, especially Northerners and 
non-Ghanans, were more likely to escape long periods of 
unemployment than were southerners and those of urban origin. 
This is related to the willingness of the former to do unskilled 
work and farm, whereas the latter are orientated towards 'school 
leavers' jobs which take longer to find" (Peil 1972: 72). 
She showed that reasons for the migrants to go to a particular city also 
differed: 
"Three quarters of the urban workerst 84% of Kumabi workes and 89% 
of rural workers said they chose their destination because of its 
reputation for jobs". (Peil 1972: 144). 
Most of her respondents obtained information on jobs through a network of 
friends and relatives. Another popular reason for a chosen destination was 
the availability of someone with whom the migrant would stay with 'while 
looking for work'. 
Adrean Peace in her study of migrant workers of Southern Nigeria illustrates 
that the general characteristics 'of the migrants are youthfulness - the 
majority of them are in their late teens and early twenties. And in 
particular most of them "are educatedo though not to a high level. 
Virtually all have ýompleted primary school, and a sizeable proportion have 
spent'between one and three years in secondary school. The education of 
most has been prematurely terminated through lack of family finances 
(Pece, 1979: 10-11). Some of his respondents were attracted to Agege, Lagos, 
because they expected help from ex-school friends or relatives who lived 
there. 
Unemployment is no longer restricted to primary and secondary school leavers 
but the slow expansion' in the economy has resulted in large numbers of 
university graduates becoming unemployed (Lloyd, 1974: 39). Lloyd also 
pointed out that, not long ago, a holder of a primary school leaving 
certificate could obtain bureaucratic employment, but today although the 
situation has changed large numbers of them continue to leave the village 
for the city as the last hope for employment. 
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RURAL ELITES 
Most of the characteristics attributed to African elites described above are 
applicable to this group. Major differences are that rural elites are 
mainly teachers by training and professional. And most important of all, 
they live and teach in the rural areas in Nigeria. 
During the colonial period, they played leading political roles. Almond and 
Coleman (1960: 341) observed that in those days in Ghana and Nigeria, 
11 **e 30 per cent of the members of the legislature are teachers. 
Most of these are from the rural areas and constitute what Lucian 
Pye has called the 'Provincial elites'. One ... argues that this 
heavy representation of teachers is mainly attributable to the 
fact that the primary school teacher enjoys a position in the bush 
village which gives him a high social standing and great 
influence. This is also true in Nigeria. "54 
Trained teachers for both primary and secondary institutions have 
(particularly in Imo state) begun to experience similar problems of 
unemployment as the school leavers. By 1966, Lloyd noted that Nigeria had 
only a third of the qualified secondary school graduate teachers needed for 
the rapidly expanding secondary institutions. Today, large numbers of these 
graduates ýho pass out from several. Nigerian Univerities join the mass of 
unemployed. There was even a time when: 
"Most students received a government scholarship or were bonded by 
grammar school or teacher-training colleges (the school paid their 
fees in return for a promise that the student would work there -a 
means of ensuring a steady flow of graduate teachers at a period' 
when competition for a limited number leaving the universities 
were very high)". (Lloyd, 1974: 98) 
With the expansion in secondary and post-secondary education, and the top 
business class, the role of teachers and civil servants as professional 
politicans (legislative representatives) became more marginal. In the 1979 
and 1983 general. elections, they were not allowed to play particular 
political roles. This does not mean that local teachers did not participate 
actively as party agents and voters (as will be seen later) in the 1983 
elections. Their close contact with the rural population made them a very 
important political group in the Nigerian political communication system. 
In fact, through their political activities, a more complex social structure 
is operating in Nigeria than most political communication theorists have 
perceived. Unlike groups of young school leavers, rural elite in Nigeria 
have a wide range of ages and are deeply involved in education in the rural 
areas. When they retire from teaching or school administration, most of 
them remian in their native village and become more active in local 
political organisations. They understand local politics more clearly than 
their urban elite counterparts, Political elites tend to depend on their 
village connections and influence during an election campaign. 
By establishing that these different groups of political actors exist in any 
particular region or state in Nigeria, we shall be able to evaluate roles 
and processes of political communications between them it is hoped that 
though this approach presents theoretical and other problems; it offers 
great potential for a more congruent understanding of political 
communication in Nigeria. From the definitions given earlier, it can be 
seen that there are broadly two types of political communication: 
traditional face-to-face (informal) and organized mass media. The two most 
important groups associated with these political communication systems are 
the traditonal network group and the urban elite network. Other groups 
distinguished by their characteristics and activities, are associated with 
either or. both types-of communications systems. They are emerging or tend 
to be emerging from either the traditional group or the urban network group. 
The urban elite is associated with the urban political environment, while 
the traditional group is akin to the rural political communication sytems in 
Nigeria. 
The five groups identified above have quite different characteristics and 
attributes. What determines their political communication in terms of 
participation, mobilisation and voting are these different characteristics 
and attributes such as the socio-political pnvironment (rural or urban), the 
population composition (homoegenous or heterogenous), education and 
religion. Other characteristics of the groups are associated with ethnic 
origin, occupations age, horizontal and vertical mobility and membership of 
social clubs. The term network group/system here refers to aggregates of 
individuals in the population who share similar characteristics and 
attributes that help them to participate in a particular way in the 
political communication system in Nigeria. 'Group in this sense is 
different from a group made up of numbers, say 1-10, because of its 
differing and contrasting charactpris tics. It is also dif f erent f rom an 
ethnic group which shares a common language and culture but whose members 
exhibit a variety of dissimilar characteristics. A detailed discussion of 
the concept of network of political communicatfon will be carried out later. 
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SOCIAL NETWORK STUDIES IN NIGERIAN URBAN CENTRES 
Adrian Peace (1979) carried out a network survey in Agege and Ikeja, Lagos. 
He focussed on the "migrants" involvement in dif f erent types of 
interpersonal relationships in the town, and in particular in "personal 
networks of home-town which comprises young men who have migrated f rom the 
same Yoruba town or its rural environs" (Peace 1979: 21). 
Unlike most African cities, he observed that in Agege and Ikeja, there was 
a general lack of voluntary associations. He suggested that the reason 
might be that there was a lack of pre-colonial institutions in Agega and the 
area is a heterogeneous community in which ethnicity was not entrenched 
"into the economic structure of the town". Also, the distance between the 
migrants' natal home and Agege was short, so that most of them 'retained 
close contact with their place of origin thus in part obviating the need for 
ethnic associations'. 
Under 
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the present economic orientation of Nigeria, a new pattern of 
interperonal netwofk in the cities is emerging. IT 'is a pattern which is 
influenced by self-employed men and women in business and trade. In order 
to maximise economic opportunities, they must build a wider network beyond 
kinship ties in the city. 
"They must ... cultivate an extensive network of personalized 
relationship with suppliers, journeymen, apprentices, clients and 
customers. This is not, therefore, a favourable economic context, 
for formal rule-organized relationships to flourish and prosper. 
The stress throughout is on competitive individualism and this 
emphasis Agege people in general carry over into other spheres of 
urban life. " (Peace 1979: 22-23) 
Prior to the development of a personalised economic network, primary network 
ties are established which in Peace's view were often negotiated by the 
parents of the migrants. Most of these primary network ties are kinsmen and 
elders. However, in time, the emigrant builds up or expands his network to 
others outside of his tribesmen. But, 
O#all migrants are quite emphatic that one's friends whatever their 
origin are of a qualitatively dif f erent order to one Is urban 
brothers, in town, these being the third and most important set of 
relationships, and the ones on which migrants are greatly 
dependent for support and assistance at all times. It is through 
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relationships between urban brothers that the major obstacles to 
individual well-being are met. These are appropriately described 
as personal networks characterized by the dense and multiplex 
relationships existing between members at any one moment in time. " 
(Peace 1979: 29) 
Here Peace's concept of 'social network' is very basic and purely 
descriptive and particularly employed to describe the migrants I movement 
f rom the rural to the urban environment. There, he establishes links with 
his tribesmen who are already living in the city. The individual expands 
his personal network through friendships. The more important network is 
that of the urban brothers and not his friends. His network concept is 
equivalent to tribal-mutual aid groups. However, Peace admits that his use 
of the term 'social network' in the study of migrants' behaviour in Agege is 
really only in an 'elementary descriptive sense' he made referrance to 
Mitchel et. al (1969). 
Peace's social network groups in Agege are a homogeneous groups in terms of 
wages, skill, ethnic origin and age. "The norm. is four or five although 
they range from between two and eight strong". Ethnic origin and economic 
aid among members of the group are the most important factors which bind the 
group together. Economically, "networks must carry unemployed meýbers on a 
recurrent basis". 
once a network of this character is f ormed, other network groups are 
connected and wider inter-network group relationships are established in 
Agege. Information about employment flows between ethnic network groups for 
the purpose of assisting new immigrant members. In certain cases, networks 
can extend information about available jobs in towns to relatives in the 
village. For instance, we saw earlier, that Igbos in Northern Nigeria were 
disliked by Northerners because they passed information about existing jobs 
to their relatives in the village in the East. 
While Peace's concept of network group in Agege can help us to understand 
the structural roots of ethnic ties in Nigerian urban centres which 
generates nepotism, conflicts and corruption, his concept is rather a weak 
base for the evaluation of a network of political communication where 
kinship ties play a part with other factors such as the mass media. 
Interpersonal political communication may involve members other than kin in 
the city. Peace's network group is rather too homogenous to consider others 
in their group. "Migrants say that urban brothers, as opposed to his 
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friends, trust one another, they are generous with one another and that 
between brothers everything is shared. " 
This lack of trust between ethnic groups in the urban centers quickly 
spreads to the villages via networks. Indeed lack of trust extends to all 
sectors of Nigerian society, a serious factor so much entrenched in the 
country's ethnic politics and communicaion that the politicans have used it 
further divide the nation and exploit it for their personal interest. 
We have seen earlier, that in the city, the elites and the elders offer 
initial accommodation and set about finding jobs for new ethnic members who 
arrive in the city. This 'benevolent' attitude enhances the popularity of 
the city elites both in the city and in the village, and in due course could 
have political implications/ consequences. The importance of this economic 
dependence on ethnic or kinship ties in Nigerian urban centres provoked one 
person surveyed to responde: 
"If you treat your brothers like other townspeople (in relation to 
debt) then you will be quickly lost. Brothers are the only people 
you can trust in Agege and if you are not generous with them, then 
you will not survive. " (Peace 1979: 35). 
While Peace could not discover the existence, of ethnic orgaaisations a mong 
the migrants in Agege, Lloyd (1974) showed that kinship organizations were 
wide spread in Ibadan - Western Nigeria. Perhaps one of the main reasons is 
that Agege is a post-colonial suburb of Lagos. As Peace noted, colonial 
institutions and policies which encouraged ethnicity could not affect Agege 
to the extent that they affected a pre-colonial urban centre such as Ibadan. 
Thus the degree of kinship network formation in terms of small or large 
ethnic organisations varies in accordance with the age and size of the urban 
centre and its distance from the village of the migrant. 
However, Lloyd's concept of social network is structurally and analytically 
more powerful than Peace's in the context of network of relationshp in 
Nigerian urban centres. 
On the basis of the individual, Lloyd conceptualizes him as the 'ego' who in 
his 'esocial network comprises the totality of his social relationship$ 
described with refernece to himself, it is thus ego-oriented or ego- 
centred. " (Lloyd, 1974: 133). 
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Lloyd then points out that in his wider definition of 'network,, it embraces 
"only those persons with whom the ego was in everyday contact and 
communication and to exclude those relationships with acquaintances which 
are but potentially or very rarely activated". 
His concepts of network was applied to the study of migrants I social 
behaviour in Ibadan. 
"Yoruba Urban migrants maintain intensive, or intimate 
relationships with their close kin, but may if these remain in the 
rural area, interact with them but infrequently. " 
In other words, the intensity of the network of relationships is dependent 
on the physical proximity to each other of the individuals in the network. 
Mitchel (1969) has shown that in the city the intensity of interaction 
between members of the network and their distant kin in the village is 
governed by kinship obligation rather than by proximity. 
The relationship between the rural kin and 
ýhe 
urban wo'rkmates network is 
described by Lloyd in terms of action or action-set (Lloyd, 1974, Mitchel 
1969). - Actionz-set or communcation-set ar6 those individuals and 
relationships which are mobilized for specific ends. Lloyd then aplied the 
concept of lactiori-set' to the relationship in the crises between the Igbos 
and the Yorubas. 
1* *9. in the case of a dismissed Ibo worker, two action-sets were 
activated -his workmates and the Trade Union Officials in order 
to fight for his reinstatement, and the members of his ethnic 
group to find him alternative employment. " (Lloyd 1974: 134) 
other 'specific ends' which involve the activation or formation of an 
'action-set' in Nigeria will be looked at more closely with reference to 
elections and the process of mobilization of electors' support. 
Lloyd proposes that network group formation in a traditional Yoruba 
community is possible under certain criteria which may include: kinship, 
age, and occupation because a person's network is confined to the 
individual's town or village. The problem of the type of network under the 
above criteria is that a network group is hardly different from a tribal 
group. It does not permit of a dynamic network analysis which would reveal 
the structure of the social, political and economic change, attitudes and 
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behaviour of different groups in the urban and rural areas. The criteria of 
dynamic change would be associated with education, horizontal mobility, 
residence as well as age, occupation and kinship. Education and occupation 
have, since the colonial period, produced a new breed of political actors. 
We should assess how strongly they still adhere to the kinship network for 
political mobilization and support. 
Lloyd maintains that because of geographical mobility, an individual's 
personal network in Nigeria has become extensive because siblings, parents, 
children etc. migrate to different urban centres and at the same time they 
maintain links which are governed by obligatory kinship norms. We noted 
earlier that there are new economic network groups whose members interact 
with other Nigerians without any consideration of kinship ties. Also, 
schoolmates or classmates, and professional groups now form extensive 
networks. In an analysis of the network of communication in modern day 
Nigerian society, these new patterns of association should also be 
considered. 
Lloyd, in emphasising the importance of kinship obligation in the Nigerian 
social network systeip, carefully outlined how. the urban poor and urban 
elites differently maintain network ties with their rural natal home. 
"The pressure on the poor to seek their ultimate social security 
in'the community and on the rich to identify with it, causes both 
to assiduously maintain those areas of their network in which 
individuals are separated from them by great physical or social 
(in terms of rank) distance. For while the poor seek to preserve 
their relationship with the rich, their potential patrons, so the 
rich need either the direct support of -the poor or else the 
approval of their equally affluent townsmen. Thus, in spite of 
the social differentiation produced by economic development, 
ascribed relationships of kinship and community remain very 
strong. " (Lloyd, 1974: 135-5) 
When this structure of kinship relationship is politicized, Nigerian 
political communication becomes strongly oriented towards kinship networks 
rather than the mass media political role. An exclusive concentration on the 
media leaves much unaccounted for in Nigerian political communication 
processes. 
During non-election periods, the urban poor generally maintain strong ties 
with their more illiterate kinsmen in the city. Constrained by povertyp 
they do not visit home as often as their rich tribesmen, many of whom in 
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addition to having enough money, also may have a car to visit the village on 
af airly regular basis. Their frequent visits to their natal home boost 
their individual network in the village, and strengthen their network 
relationship with the traditional sector. 
The ef f ects of colonialism in Nigeria are many and varied. Missionary 
educaton, Christianity, a colonial 'democratic' political system, the modern 
mass media, rapid economic change and industrial development, have all 
contributed to produce within a few decades in Africa, an egalitarian, 
atomized and individualistic population which depends on the mass media for 
information and opinion formation. But the strength of kinship ties, and 
relationships both between urban and rural areas, and between individuals 
and groups within them have forcefully withstood the powerful influence of 
colonialism in Nigeria. Kinship ties have become a sine qua none in socio- 
economic and political relationships in Nigeria and other African states. 
other significant colonial legacies in terms of this thesis also exist. 
From the early accounts in Chapter Three of colonial administration and 
policies, which were imposed on the traditional political system in Nigeria, 
it is clear that the later system was not stagnant as some modernizing 
theorists would suggest. But colonial policies conditioned and constrained 
the development of the traditional political system. The most active 
indigenous political actors during and after the colonial administration 
were the elites. These put further constraints on the traditional political 
culture of Nigeria, particularly after independence. 
During the colonial period, the relationship between the society and the 
government tended to be divided. The traditional socio-political system 
based on kinship and religion had adopted/assumed an alien political system, 
and a bureaucratic machine, which were incompatible. The ruling African 
elites tried to identify with both systems. Confusion emerged which proved 
to be to the advantage of the Nigerian elites or the nationalists. 
For instance, the system of indirect rule meant that the colonial officials 
ruled through traditional chief s or the emires. Indirect rule eroded the 
power of the latter. At the same time, the elites who could have 
participated in the colonial political decison-making were excluded. 
Consequently, both the traditional rulers and the African elites were 
dissatsified with colonial rule. Nigerians, therefore, resorted to kinship 
ties, ethnic organisations and modern communication - the press - to 
mobilise urban and village communities in the nationalist movement f or 
independence. Also, the attitude particulary of the missionaries towards 
traditional chief s and their practices, was one of condoning colonial 
racialist policies. As a result, some of the elites trained by the 
missionaries turned their back on them. Furthermore, the elites and 
traditional leaders became more united politically despite the differences 
in their religious beliefs and political philosophy. 
-ors among different groups in Nigeria, - the impact of Despite unifying fact 
colonial political ideology on the elites remained very strong. Western 
education entrenched in the colonial system resulted in a conscious pursuit 
by Africans to adopt the European political, social and cultural models. 
There was no selection or modification to accommodate major indigenous 
traditional political models. 
Furthermore, the impact of colonialization can be seen in the rapid 
urbanization in Nigeria. The initial creation of new urban centres 
reflected the economic need of the colonizers more than that of the 
colonized. The superficial attraction of the urban centre created an 
unprecedented village-urban migration which resulted not only in the 
development of urban slums, but also the emergence of an urban poor in sharp 
contrast to the urban elite. Industrial opportunities and administrative 
jobs were (and still are)- in short supply in proportion to the number of 
migrants seeking them. In terms of ethnicity, age, skill and creeds, 
Nigerian urban centres became highly heterogeous. Competition for jobs and 
state or federal government contracts, and housing etc. often intensified 
ethnic conf licts. Though colonisation and urbanization may not be held 
entirely responsible for the type of race relationships which developed 
between Nigerians in the city, colonial policies endorsed it and allowed it 
to become deeply rooted in the community. In particular, the colonial 
administration 'played a major role in stopping inter-tribal wars and 
enhanced geographical and economic mobilities between peoples and regions, 
but the cities they created became the means of new forms of battle - ethnic 
competition and conflicts. 
Af rican elites began to import not only European and American advanced 
technologies but also European and American media formats and 
professionalism into the political communication system. It is here assumed 
that the vast regions of Nigeria with their multiple cities created by the 
colonial authorities cannot be reached any longer by the simple symbolic and 
1.55 
traditional communication processes. The elites, therefore, insisted on 
western communication technologies, formats, training and professionalism. 
This thesis, however, does not undertake to discuss these issues in any 
detail. They may be more relevant to the study of the 'long-term' effects 
of political communication. 
While colonization has created the situation discussed above, one dominant 
historical question remains undefined by colonialisation. That is the ties 
between the elites and their places of rural origin, particularly in the 
communities where there were no pre-colonial cities in Nigeria. Very often, 
as we shall see in the empirical section of this study, the natal-homeland 
of a political elite became the core region in which a Nigerian political 
candidate wins the largest and often the only seat/following. Colonial 
policies helped to create historical movements in which a Nigerian political 
actor was forced to seek support in his own region. 
In this present/current research, political communication in Nigeria turns 
from looking at ethnic groups and their mobilisation, participation and 
voting patterns to an examination and an analysis of groups with identical 
characteristics and attributes, and their relationship with the political 
communication system during an election campaign. 
This analysis raises various important empirical questions. From studying 
these groups, an attempt will be made to discover the type(s) of political 
communication sytem that is emerging in Nigeria today. Previously, 
Nigerians were mobilised to participate in politics purely in terms of 
ethnic origin. The emergence of competing political leaders within an 
ethnic group, e. g. Ojukwu and Zik in Igboland, has thrown a new light on the 
understanding of a new political mobilisation in Nigerian politics. The 
political struggle is now identified with political conflict not only 
between ethnic groups at the national level but also between ethnic leaders 
at the state/regional and village levels. Political mobilisation andý 
participation cannot be assessed in terms of the mass media influencing the 
urban and the village electorate voting for one or a few ethnic leaders from 
one dominant ethnic group. The classical model of political communication 
in a new democracy states that urban centred mass media determine whom the 
electorate votes for in the modern political system. This concept is not in 
accordance with what is going on in Nigeria today, particularly with 
reference to the 1983 general election. Where the traditional and the 
modern political communication systems in Nigeria are intermeshing it is 
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likely that the traditional system as def ined above will become more 
effective in mobilisating political participants in both rural and urban 
communities in Nigeria. 
In view of this emerging pattern of political communication in Nigeria 
today, it is now important to study the impact of the mass media and 
traditional political communication systems together in order to assess 
their degree of influence on the audience. The audience should not be 
conceived of as sub-groups of ethnic voters and participants under one 
leader/one party representing different ethnic groups. The need is to 
examine different characteristic sub-groups within a larger ethnic group but 
mobilised by different political parties, e. g. NPP vs NPN, through two or 
more leaders from the same ethnic group. 
Existing data shows that five different groups exist and that these*are 
found in both urban and rural areas of Nigeria. It is important to realise 
that the groups have intra and inter social, economic, cultural etc. 
relaticas which form the core elements of political communication within and 
between them. Through these groups and their various activites, the two 
different environments are brought into a coptinuous relationship. in terms 
of the activities of the actors. 
VILLAGE/URBAN MIGRATION IN AFRICA 
Hobsbawm (1973: 20), Peter Lloyd (1979: 90) argue that "since the mass of 
migrants into the cities in many parts of the world consists of men and 
women from traditional peasant background, who bring into their new world 
the modes of action and thought of their old world, history remains a 
current political force. It would be unwise to neglect it. "' On the 
contrary, diuckman (1960: 57) believed that Africans who live in the cities 
will influence the life style in the traditional rural'areas. But I argue 
that both environments and the people in them influence' each other, 
particularly in the processes of modernization, industrializaton and 
urbanization. In the African context, there is a greater tendency for city 
dwellers and factors (of industrialisation and urbanisation) to influence 
traditional values and environments. 
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In Africa, so much adjustment is required either in the urban centre or in 
the rural areas according to the greater pattern of influence. It is in 
this process of adjustment that the initial impact of urban life is 
experienced by migrant Africans. 
"Every year hundreds of thousands of West Africans leave their 
homes to live and work, at least temporarily, somewhere else. 
Migration always requires some adjustment to the, new place, but 
the adaptation required of African migrants to the cities is often 
considerable. " (Peil, 1972: 126) 
The acute problems young migrants experience in the city and how this 
experience influences their future behaviour has been noted by Peace (1979) 
in Agege. 
"Most young migrants to Agege .... pass through a trying period of 
initiation into modern urban-industrial life. Many of the 
aspirations which they bring southwards to Lagos are quickly 
confounded and seem unlikely to be revived in the light of their 
early experiences. To some extent, the interpersonal 
relationships in which they become involved help mitigate the 
worst forms of hardship. " (Adrian Peace, 1979: 44) 
Peter Lloyd (1982: 75) suggested some reasons why migration from villagý to 
city takes place among young Africans. Low infant mortality, spread- of 
clinics and hospitals in the rural areas have brought about increases in the 
population to the extent that the land can no longer accommodate'the growing 
population. Others have suggested that the economic and social attraction 
of city life are the major factors which cause several young Africans to 
migrate to the cities. 
When individuals migrate f rom the village to the city, two main levels of 
associations are maintained with the former. In this study, the rural 
sector has two dominant groups: the traditional sector and the rural elite. 
Relationships with those who have migrated to the city are maintained either 
on an individual basis or through kinship voluntary associations. 
Communication between them at these two levels is often horizontal. By 
contrast, vertical communication through the process of information flow 
between rural and urban areas is maintained by the mass media. At an 
individual level, Peil (1972: 4) suggested that some urban migrants who 
planned a long stay in the city might return home if they failed to get 
jobs. Other migrants who visit home from time to time eventually return to 
the village permanently. When migrating to the cities "most African workers 
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expect eventually to return to their home town". Returning home is 
independent of whether the migrant acquired wealth in the city (Mitchell 
1961, Soper and Soper 1955: 16, Acquah 1958: 39, Meillasoux 1968: 78, Peace 
1979: 44, Peil 1972: 181, Lloyd 1979: 107-110). However, Galdwell (1969: 186- 
90) has reported lengthy stays in town without returning home. 
Members of all f ive groups show a tendency to return home or visit home 
occasionally. Among the urban elites (Lloyd et al 1967: 143) they 
"invariably assume financial responsibilities for their parents in their old 
age". The majority of African old people live in the village. Either they 
had lived there most of their lives or else they retired to the village 
af ter long years in the city. Peil (1972: 182) has shown that Africans 
retire to the village for good reasons: 
"Living in a village is much cheaper than living in town and there 
are relatives at home to look af ter an old man or woman if they 
become ill. Many people look forward to an old age of supporting 
themselves with small f arming and maintaining their sense of 
importance by being elders who can give advice to the young on the 
ways of living in a city. " 
Even when children are born in the city, their parents give them a very 
strong sense of belonging not to the city where they were born and bred but 
to their parent's home town. They, therefore, 'retain an allegiance to 
their father's or mother's home village which they may visit with their 
parents' (Peil 1972: 182). Besides the old people in the village, most 
members of African elites spend a large proportion of their income in 
financing the education of their brothers, sisters, nephews, cousins, nieces 
and distant kin who may live in the city or village. 
Links with the home town are in every respect strong. Among the urban elite 
Lloyd et al (1967: 145) recorded that in his interview among the Yorubas who 
lived in Ibadan: 
"Half the men have built a house in their home town - these tend 
to be older men. This house not only indicates an intention to 
retire to the home town, but also symbolizes the concern of the 
owner for the place of his birth. Those who have so built also 
tend to view with approval the activities of town 'improvement 
union' and such associations. They tend, too, to draw more of 
their close friends from their own ethnic group. " 
The younger the member of an elite, the less he is attracted to his home 
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town but as he advances in age, his community requires his leadership 
particularly in areas where there are a small number of graduates to lead 
the community. In general, older people are more drawn to their rural 
origin where eventually they may be involved in a small scale business, and 
particpation in local politics. 
While in the city, socio-economic interaction takes place between members of 
different groups. Peace (1979) in his study of Agege migrants. reported that 
bef ore a son leaves home his parents or relatives f ind an older kinsman to 
host him. "This role is filled either by a kinsman already resident at 
Agege or by a personal friend of a migrant's father or older relative". The 
act of caring for young immigrants in the city is highly regarded in the 
village and endows the host with much respect and honour. He stated that 
the older kinsmen 
"Do so in parý because this enhances their prestige and personal 
reputations in their place of origin. They become known as men 
who are concerned about the welfare of young men absent from their 
natal households. These reputations will stand them in good stead 
when they retire home as they invairably intend, and perhaps make 
a bid for a village title or more important position. " (Peace, 
1979: " '17) 
once young people who receive such benefits from their kinsmen and friends, 
are themselves settled in the city thye in turn render similar help to new 
arrivals from their hometown. In time, a wide range of network groups made 
of urban elites, young school leavers and urban poor are built up in the 
city. Each of them on an individual basis maintain links with the rural 
origin. The more each of these individuals spends time and money on his 
kinsmen, the more popular he becomes both in the city and in the village. A 
situation which indirectly reinforces ethnic politics and participation 
particularly when this network of kinsmen is politicized. However, "while 
in general migrants count as friends a preponderance of home-townsmen, this 
is not to suggest that they are in any sense encapsulated or cut of ff rom 
non-townsmen" (Mayer, 1961, Peace 1979: 29). But the crucial point is that 
in Nigerian urban centres a network of relationships based on friendship is 
weak. Lloyd (1979: 126), and Sheth (1968), maintained that relatives oblige 
themselves to assist the young migrants to find jobs in the city. 
"Hostility against the Igbos in Northern Nigeria was fuelled by beliefs 
(... ) that clerks or artisans in authority would write to their natal 
village for a youth to come to fill a vacancy". This is a process of strong 
link between urban and rural areas in Nigeria. 'Just as it is now widely 
recognised that the city immigrant arrives to be received by kinsman 
friends, so too it is stressed that the migrant retains close ties with his 
community of origin. He has one foot in the town but keeps the other firmly 
in his village. For this reason terms such as proletarian, which implies a 
sole commitment to urban wage labour, are, it is argued, inapplicable' 
(Lloyd, P. C. 1979: 133). 
The process of establishing personal contacts with the natal community by 
the migrants consequently leads to the formation of a voluntary association 
by members of the kin in the city. Collective efforts to establish strong 
links with the rural community by those in the city is much more emphasised. 
In*some African townships, the role of an association in maintaining social) 
political, economic and cultural links with the rural community may be far 
more important than the individual's connection with the natal community. 
The association in the city may be an extension of those already in 
existence in the rural areas: Lloyd considered than an, 
"*#. improvement association may exist at all levels ,f rom the 
smallest village through the district to the province. Perhaps 
somewhat uniquely, among the Igbo of Nigeria these associations 
have been structured in a hierarchical pyramid, leading to the 
Igbo State Union. Educated and wealthy men who were prominent in 
the higher levels nevertheless active members of their own village 
association - for most come from the village" (P. C. Lloyd, 
1979: 137). 
Other studies of P. C. Lloyd have shown the importance of ethnic unions and 
associations not only in the development of social networks of ethnic groups 
in African cities and their links with rural areas but also in the 
development of African modern politics, social and economic growth (Lloyds 
P. C. 1966: 27-40,234-359,1974: 127-133,1984: 83-91). Melillassoux (1968) 
described the entire life of the Bamako society as centred round voluntary 
associations. It was through the voluntary association that young men and 
women of Bamaco arrived to "build a progressive society". In terms of news 
in Bamato 
"Jeli and f une peole of ten come f rom Mourdiah during the dry 
season to practice a trade or simply to put themselves in the 
service of a wealthy urban family. some of them stay permanently. 
As one of their chores they serve as messengers among the urban 
dwellers from their home town. They keep the older men informed of 
news from home and f rom everyone else in town. Together with 
them, the elders discuss problems of general interest to people of 
Mourdiah settled in town and make decisions accordingly. " 
(Meillassoux, 1968: 78) 
Most importantly, he stressed that the association: 
"operates on the assumption that the people f rom Mourdiah who 
dwell in Bamako are still citizens of their home town. It is the 
prolongation into the city of village lif e and loyalities, that 
carries into town the concern and problems of the village... there 
are probably as many of these groups in Bamako as there are towns 
represented. They cover the entire city with an invisible 
network, reaching people at all social levels. To try to avoid 
such 'associations' is considered a mark of egotism, a rejection 
of the old customs and values, tantamount to breaking relationship 
with home. " 
A similar observation was made by Adrian Peace (1979) in Nigeria among urban 
migrants in Agege. He noted that several Yoruba villages were represented 
in Agege and most of the migrants from them formed groups, which he 
described as clubs because "the term 'association' would be far too 
grandioise a label for these". He argued that 'club formation entails not 
much more than a minor formalization of existing close-knit interpersonal 
relationships' which is the basis of a kinship network in the urban centre 
(Peace 1979: 41). 
Margaret Pail (1972: 175), in 'her study of patterns of village urban 
migration in Ghana observed that "ethnic associations are not as popular as 
seems to be the case in other Af rican countries. Only a quarter of these 
workers belonged to an ethnic or any other mutual-aid association. Ewes and 
Nigerians are most often members of such associations. " 
Modern mass media and traditional communications have combined to bring 
village and urban actors and activities much closer in Africa in recent 
years. There are now many modern roads, and "a few villages may have a 
transistor raido and see the occasional newspaper. - One or two of the 
elderly men may even be returned migrants from the city" (Lloyd, 1979: 106). 
With the development of television in all the states in Nigeria, virtually 
all parts of the country are reached by TV network broadcasts. The process 
of rural electrification and the fact that many elites and successful 
businessmen in Nigeria have plant generators in their homes in the villages 
provides kinsmen with the opportunity to watch TV programmes. 
The strong relationship between news circulation and African social 
organisations noted above has been recognised. 
(.. 
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"The African social organisation characterized by a strong sense 
of kinship, community and neighbourliness, naturally increased the 
scope of news circulated ... It was virtuous .. to visit relations 
and friends in their homes, 'eat from the same pot', and exchange 
the latest information. The sense of kinship and community did 
not exhaust itself in the individual town or village; on the 
contrary it was manifested in a much wider sphere in ... the 
attitude to relatives in other communities and the relatively 
harmonious relationship between people in one community and those 
in another. The extent of these connections and attitudes gives 
some idea of the scope of news circulation in indigenous' society 
by informal contact". He then argues that "a certain historical 
continuity exists between the modern newspaper and the indigenous 
systems of public communication. " (Fred, I. A. Omu 1978: 1) 
Nigerian political communication processes in relation to the five groups 
described above can be specifically associated with the village and urban 
envirorments. 
With particular reference to the Igbo rural and urban communities, the 
socio-political, economic etc. organisations are segmentary in pattern; 
which (Davidson 1965; Okigbo-1986) believed are "held together by family and 
religious ties". The interdependence of rural and urban communities through 
networks of kinship and communication cannot be overemphasised in most parts 
of Africa. 
In the study of political communication in Nigeria, the ties between the. 
rural and urban environments transcend contemporary change and developments. 
In the Igbo communities, an individual, whatever his or her attitude and 
characteristic is constantly tied to his rural community by descent or 
kinship. Okigbo (1986) unlike Omuo (1978) sees the ties not in terms of 
circulation of information between members of two communities but in terms 
of an individual's attachment to the land. The land becomes an important 
factor which ties an individual to his native village when he lives in the 
city. 
"The individual villager is expected to remain loyal to the 
community not only because it provides collective security, both 
moral and psychological, but also because the community safeguards 
all that is precious to the individual citizen especially land". 
(Okigbo, 1986: 14). 
The gatekeeper of the Igbo village community and traditions in this study is 
the traditonal group. But with the advent of colonisation, modern 
capitalism, Christianity, western education, etc. new groups and urban 
environments emerged. 
The ethics, moral obligations and curious Igbomen's attachment to his rural 
origin has been engrained in all aspects of his life. This particularly 
implies that whether he lives in the village or in the city, his activites 
are dependent or immensely influenced by the eng-rained ethical norms in 
which all Igbos are judged by their members. An Igboman's achievement is 
judged by how much he has helped his friends, relatives and, community - most 
of whom live in the village. Even in a modern capitalist economy which is 
concentrated in the city, the individual's attraction to the village remains 
very strong. The political structure is not independent of this tendency. 
Okigbo (1986: 16) notes that: 
"The Igbo Political structure has generated a parallel economic 
organization that is segmentary and atomistic (individualistic) 
but co-operative in the interest of the community. Each 
individual tends to act by himself in business and economic 
affairs but co-operates with the family and the community for 
social work. The political structure has produced an economic 
structure that cares for its young, poor, disabled, and the aged 
and inf irm. It has created a social security system that has 
stood for thousands of years. " 
Igbo political systems - modern or traditiona . 1. exist in relationship with 
its* members who are bound by moral codes and not by an absolute legal 
system. There is a constant and undefined allegiance to the community and a 
co-operation among kinsmen which forms the basis of the community. In such 
socio-political and economic structures , interpersonal communication to 
achieve goals and maintain social and political systems, emphases are laid 
on linkages between different groups in different communities (e. g. rural 
and urban). Kinship becomes a major factor that perpetuates the 
communication process among members who live in the village or city. 
In view of the above argument, I state theoretically that although the five 
different groups I have described have their marked and observable 
differences, there are strong networks of connectedness between them which 
in Nigerian politics becomes heavily politicised during election periods. 
Some groups might influence others more. They do so by using their social, 
economic and religous power which are more suitable for the articulation of 
modern day politics in Nigeria. 
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THE PATTERN OF LINKAGES BETWEEN RURAL AND URBAN ENVIRONMENTS AND THE 
STRUCTURE OF INTERGROUP RELATIONSHIPS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES 
U Urban political communication environmentl rban 
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Figure 1 
This diagram (figure 1) illustrates the pattern of political influence among 
the-five groups. The arrows show the direction in which political influence 
via communication is exercised among groups in the urban and rural areas. 
The thick arrows indicate the direction of stronger political influence in 
the association. On the other hand, the dotted arrows show the direction of 
weaker political influence in the communication linkages between groups in 
the two enviro=ents. 
This pattern of political communication and influence should be, therefore, 
seen as a two-way interpersonal flow. But differences exist in the degree 
of influence as a result of differences in the groups' social, economic and 
political power. However, where two thick arrows flow in opposi. te 
directions between different groups, they imply that the two groups involved 
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have balanced strengths of political influence on each other. Also, the two 
groups can obtain equal or identical political information from various 
sources or channels of communication. They may have comparable factors of 
political influence. This pattern of political communication and influence 
is associated with the urban and rural elites, and sometimes - in terms of 
political information - between rural elite and young school leavers groups. 
All other groups have stronger political influence on the traditional group. 
Their poor level of education, low social status and weak economic position 
make them vulnerable to external influences. But in democratic political 
communication, particularly during election periods, they form the most 
significant part of the election campaign audience. This is primarily 
because they constitute the largest political group in Nigeria and the rural 
areas where most of them live is highly contested by political leaders and 
their supporters. 
While 'kinship' ties, love for the 'land' aýd rural communities bind 
together the m, emberi of these five different groups, modern mass media which 
targets an anonymous audience also link rural and urban communities through 
information. 
Later, a theoretical framework will be developed which will be used to 
analyse empirical data from the most recent general elections in Nigeria, 
essentialy characterised by the general phenomena stated above. 
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CEAPTER TWO 
DEVELOPING A THEORY AND A METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYSING THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN NIGERIA 
Theories and analysis of political development in Nigeria both in the past 
and in the recent past have concentrated too much on the impact of colonial 
policies and administration on the political system - Aderibidge (1973), 
Olusanya (1973), Ikim (1974), Noli (1978), etc. The relationship between 
the system, the entire populaton and environment are studied and analysed in 
relationship with a particular group of urban elites. Similar observations 
have been made by Lidwi Kapteijns (1977) who states that the 
"preoccupation with political history was closely related to the 
overemphasis on certain social (elite) groups and the relative 
neglect of the ordinary people. "l 
The majority of 'ordinary people, in Nigeria live in the rural areas and 
fall within the categorical group of the traditional system while another 
group of them who bear similar characteristics live in cities - the urban 
poor. Therefore, by implication, Kapteijnls observation in relation to the 
broader definitions of politics and political communication in Chapter One 
implies that the traditional political communication system in Nigeria has 
suffered neglect. Recent political communication researches and 
publications reflect this trend, Luke Uche (1985), Kurfi (1983), Alabi 
(1983), Duyile (1979), and Graf (198? ). All these writers on mass media or 
political practices in Nigeria exclusively concentrate on the evolution, 
growth and the influence of the mass media on theý political system. The 
political system is discussed only in relation with the elite, the urban 
environment and mass media ownership and control. When the traditional 
pattern is mentioned, it is only treated in terms of historical development 
narrowed to reflect the trends towards elite politics. They tend to 
conclude that the modern political communication system has wiped out much 
of the traditional political system and communication. 
There, the structural root of the power of the mass media which springs from 
their unique capacity to deliver to the politician an audience of large size 
(Gurevitch and Blumler 1977) is not possible in Nigeria where the majority 
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of the electors can not articulate media political information. This is 
because the principle barrier to the influence of mass media political 
broadcast is to a greater extent with Nigeria - low level of formal 
education. This situation is in sharp contrast with the majority of 
industrialised nations such as the USA, UK, etc. where the level of literacy 
is very high and audience role can be researched and analysed in terms of 
what Blumler (1973) described as 'uses and gratifications'. Audience roles 
and orientations to political communication system can then be divided into 
categories of: "the partisan, seeking a reinforcement of his existing 
beliefs; the liberal citizen, seeking guidance in deciding how to vote; the 
monitor, seeking information about feature of the political environment 
(such as party policies, current issues and the qualities of political 
leaders; and the spectator, seeking excitement and other affective 
satisfactions" (Blumler, 1973, Gurevitch and Blumler 1977). 
If we apply these categories to Nigeria's mass media audience, 'partisan' is 
relevant to urban elite, rural elite and young school leavers, 'liberal 
citizen' exclusively to the elites and partly to school leavers, 'the 
monitor' can be associated with urban elite only, the rural elite and the 
school- leaver can be generally the 'spectators'. The. irony is that many 
elites iq Nigeria are politically 
'apathetic 
-because they resent political 
practices and development in the country. Some of them who would like to 
develop special interest in Nigerian politics fear to do so because of the 
persistent presence of the' army in government. ' They feel the risk is not 
worth taking. The above categories of political communication audience in 
the Nigerian context may be only superficially represented within the 
minority elites group. 
The 'state-centred history' of political communication. development in 
Nigeria, has created major problems in assessing, in academic terms, the 
real trend of changes in Nigerian political communication systems. Hodgkin 
(1976: 15) suggested some reasons for this unhelpful trend - namely, that the 
Nigerian researchers and writes tend to choose easy options to study their 
political development. Most works are based on documents which Igenerall .y 
tend to mirror the lives of the ruling families, to establish a working 
chronologyt dynasties. - He suggests that these have more and better dates 
than "the short and simple annals of the poor"; desire to explode the 
colonial stereotype, with its confused and confusing categories of the 
'tribal', 'primitive', 'stagnant' and the like'. 2 Wrigley (1971: 177-8) 
also made similar criticisms of African writers on political development. 
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Consequently, the'inability to look at politics, and political communication 
systems outside their relationship with the elite political activities 
has 
contributed to a major crisis in Nigeria's decision on the proper direction 
to develop her communication systems. Research and political communication 
theories based on 'certain elite group' are bound to distort the truth and 
lead to further crisis in the nation's political communication development. 
It is upon this narrow view of the relationship between politics, the media 
and the elites that wrong decisions are made, hence wasteful development of 
huge satellite and colour television networks were embarked upon in Nigeria 
in the mid 1970s. 
Some media professionals in the West have developed a critical view of this 
pattern of communication development in Africa, particularly Nigeria. 
"The very development of expensive television, available only to 
urban elites, has been questoned. Prestige projects abound; in 
March 1976 Nigeria announced the setting up of a national colour 
television network in a country where, as elsewhere in the 
developing world, even a black and white set costs as much as a 
farmer's annual income. Emphasis is often on production or 
transmission rather than on reception facilities" (Peter Golding 
in Curran et al (ed) 1977: 305). 
Perhaps the less emphasis on reception facilities is that Nigerian media 
decision-makers believe that communial watching of TV within family circular 
is very popularl. One TV set serves a large number of people at a time. 
Others who have criticised the pattern of media development in Africa in 
terms of programmes and professional training include: Head, S. W. (1954), 
Bamberger (1977(, Mytton (1983), Katz & Wendell (1970), Golding and Elliott 
(1979), Mackay (1964) and Katz (1973). 
Further sharp crticisms of 'media institutional forms developed in' 
developing nations have been made by Peter Golding " ... media institutional 
forms eeee grew as extensions and imitiations of those in industrialised 
societies ....... Uncritical transplantation of radio norms to television 
in developing nations has left a residue of inappropriate and unnecessary 
objectives; specifically "'the goal of non-stop broadcasting, the 
orientation toward an everybody audience, and the striving for up-to-the- 
minute news'. International transfer involved far more than organizational 
replication; it meant the wholesale acquisition of modes of practice, 
sjtandards and assumptions which came to displace discussion of possible 
'preferences or alternatives" Katz 1973: 282, Golding 1977: 295). 
To a certain extent . Golding, P. blamed some of these weaknesses of media 
development particularly in Nigeria on the pattern of education, training 
and qualifications of media journalists. 
The recent studies of some political historians and scientists - K. O. Dike 
and J. A. Ajayi, Alagoa and J. A. Atandu (1973: p. 309ff), Afigbo (1936,1973c) 
in oral history,, if carefully integrated with the works of Frank Ogbuajah 
(1972) on Oramedia could throw a new light into political communication in 
Nigeria. The 'state-centred' political communication and traditional 
network system could converge for the emergence of new political 
communication and research in Nigeria and other states of Africa. 
The major issue is that new research methods for analysing political and 
comunication activities and events are required. To understand the trend, 
it is not only the political changes and their relationship to one group 
(the elites) that should be examined. The economic, social and cultural/ 
religious relationships and ties etc., with various groups and-how these 
changes affect the ways these groups politically communicate should be 
studied at urban/village levels. It is important to bear in mind the stage 
of Nigerian eco-social and political development as a whole. - From Chapter 
One, there is clear indication that Nigeria is on the 'transitional' or 
'take off' stage, both traditional and modern political communication 
processes operate together. 
Thus, the problem of formal and informal political communication process 
which takes into consideration two distinct envirnments - urban and rural - 
becomes acute when we try to design a study of political communication, 
where the two systems by the two definitions, operate in one event, the 
election of leadership. 
This problem quickly takes us back to the problem generated in the 'People's 
choice' survey criticised by many, including Elihu Katz who comments that 
"&oe. the design of the study did nto anticipate the importance 
which interpersonal relationship would assume in the analysis of 
the data. Given the image of the atomised audience which 
characterised so much of mass media research, the surprising thing 
is that interpersonal influence attracted the attention of the 
researchers at all. --3 
By implication of different levels of interplay in political communication 
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of face-to-face communication, e. g. lobbying and mass media, Katz disagrees 
with the concept that the mass media were all powerful in directly 
influencing voting attitude. 
In Nigeria, modern mass media and the western political system, for instance 
the presidential system modelled on the US system, is comparatively new. 
Furthermore, the emergent political factors in these syst ems are also new 
and differently affected by the changes in culture, economy, and social 
life. Remarkably, unlike- most western nations, the relationship and 
differences between the new and the old systems at various aspects, are 
clearly defined within two different but interrelated environments - rural 
vs urban. 
The political actors in these two areas are identifiably different in terms 
of different attributes and characteristics outlined in Chapter One. 
However, their differences are obliterated by social, cultural and religious 
factors which are embedded in the traditional systems of Nigeria. For 
instance (Lloyd et al 1967: 148) observed that some traditional and modern 
associations in Ibadan embrace in their membership both the elite and the 
non-elites in Ibadan. "The Nigerian Women's Assoication does endeavour to 
bring together not only the wealthy but also the unschooled market women and 
the university graduates to promote schemes of social improvements 000"S 
In similar Women's Association in Owerri, Imo state, both the educated, 
semi-educated and non-educated women are members and they make substantial 
contributions in the social, economic and religious development of the 
state. These traditional binding elements, best described in kinship 
systems, do not only unify individuals but also the entire relationship of 
urban and rural activities obey the rules of kinship system. In Nigerian 
cities, it is difficult to envisage in mass media terms, atomised 
individuals directly influenced and changed by only masý media political 
broadcast. 
A further problem therefore, is how to develop a general and specif ic 
theoretical model to uncover the strength of the two political communication 
systems in which the five identified political, social and economic groups 
participate within and from the two environments. Socio-economically, the 
rural environment is more homogenous while the city is heterogenous. This, 
as we shall see later, makes Nigeria an interesting place to study in a 
political communication process. 
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The structure of the relationship between the two areas is more complicated 
if we try to apply the concept of what KatZ suggested was the solution of 
the problem with 'People's Choice', the concept., of two-step-flow of 
communication where the function of the opinion leader was essential. This 
is because factors of direct and indirect influences in Nigerian political 
communication are different from what exist in America and Western Europe. 
Further complications in the relationship between the two systems become 
problematic with the existence of formal and informal political information 
flow between and within them. Almond and Coleman (1960) noted that 
"the modern, mass, burdaucratically organised, political party has 
not supplanted the informal conteries of notables which preceeded 
it, but combines with this mdre 'primitive' type of structure in 
which amounts to a mixed system. -4 
As we have seen, in organised political communication, the mass media have 
not 'supported' the 'primary' communication systems. We shall discuss in 
Chapter Three that in the traditional political communication process, the 
activities of the chiefs and their representatives are organised, and 
symbolically formal and communicated particularly on special occasions. At 
other times the relationship is Politically less organised and informal. 
(The terms symbolic and face-to-face or oral political communication would 
be referred to as 'informal'. ) My concern is that Nigeria is typically a 
'mixture' of the two and it is important to reveal the balance by studying 
it as a state with political communication dualism. 
The theoretical model for Political communication therefore, must take into 
consideration the pattern of convergence between the two systems. Also the 
level of combination must be distinguished form other dimensions e. g. the 
level of mass media/formal and face-to-face communication within and between 
the two systems. This will enable us to distinguish between the type of 
relationships in traditional and modern political systems among the five 
categorical groups. 
The approach will further enable us to assess, in relation with the five 
groups, which elements or factors in the structure influence political 
participation, mobilisation and voting in an election campaign. 
The history of political communication research theory and data analysis for 
over 45 years, has developed vast areas of work, based on two main 
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theoretical models - 1hyperdemic' or 'pessimistic' thesis and in recent 
years, the convergence model and its derivatives that were central to most 
anthropological studies dealing with network of relationship among kinsmen 
or tribesmen in 'simple' societies. All these approaches have involved 
intricate and rather enmeshed accounts which should, as much as possible, be 
avoided in this thesis. The entangled theoretical approaches already in 
circulation are perhaps a result of the staggering range of interests and 
topics in the study of political communication both in the urban and rural 
enviro=ents. 
The problem of an adequate theoretical model to the understanding of 
political comunication is universal. Peter Golding and Graham Murdoch have 
noted that: 
"In reviewing the many critiques of communicaton studies that have 
appeared over the years, one theme emerges as central to all of 
them; the neglect of theory and underdevelopment of a conceptual 
framework to guide research. "5 
Peter Golding (1974: 79) recommends the study of Political communication in 
terms of long term (involving policy and ideology) and short-term (dealing 
with election campaigns and inferential structures) in the society; He also 
approves of a wider view of political communication in 'a more general 
perspective' which will emphasise vertical and horizontal communication in 
the media and the political system. His horizontal communication deals with 
informal interaction between top members of political and media 
organisations in an industrial socity such as Britain. In a transitional 
state like Nigeria, horizontal political communication embodies both 
concepts but more emphasis is placed on network of interaction (informal) 
among friends and kin, within and between rural and urabn centres. 
An example of hori tz onal /vertical Political communication in an industrial 
society is "seen from one of the less dramatic ministries in Whitehall the 
lobby correspondents appear as prominent warriors in the political battle 
who are producing stories that will be on the front pages tomorrow morning, 
where not only the public but other civil servants, industrial leaders, 
cabinet ministers, and the Prime Minster, will see them" (J. Tunstall, 
1971: 63, cited by P. Golding, 1974: 88). 
Indeed the problem becomes more acute and complex where the society is 
rapidly undergoing various changes in addition to cultural, linguistic, 
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religious, etc. differences that constantly tend to divide its members. 
Rapid changes in government tend to overtake ongoing research projects and 
render theories inadequate to explain unexpected new events. In response, 
the researcher embarks on easy options to deal and interpret his data in 
terms of their first value avoiding elaborate theories that might be more 
useful in his/her interpretation. Nigeria stands as an example of a 
developing nation with these problems. 
Perhaps communication research based on the mass media which draw their 
theoretical model heavily on the linear model, was imported into Nigeria by 
most media professionals trained or educated in Western countries, 
particularly America. 
"Large numbers of students from the Third World come to study in 
industiralized nations. Those that return take with them not only 
skills, but values and attitudes, and not least a receptivity to 
the men and machines they have learned to work with" (P. Golding 
in Curran et al (ed) 1977: 295). 
LINEAR MODELS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
"Probably, the earliest communication model was proposed by 
Aristotle, who specified the speaker, the speech and the audience 
as the constituent elements of communication act. --6 
But the Aristotlian model of human communication was based on 
mathematical logic in which 'meaningful interactions between 
individuals could be transformed to an equally rational close 
system of mathematics. t7 
The merit of the model however, lies in. its power to carry rational 
operation, solving algebraic problems. Also, early experiemental 
psychologists, economists, social and natural scientists utilised it in 
various ways. 
In the 1940s, the most popular political communication theory was influenced 
by the works of H. Lasswell, C. Shannon and N. Weaver. They aimed to 
discover the most 'effective' channels of communicaton. Their model 
consisted of 'who says what and in what channel, to whom, and with what 
effect'. The model theoretically contains five elements - through which 
information can flow in a linear pattern - source, transmitter, a channel, 
receiver and destination. Shannon and Weaver then-defined communication as 
'a process by which one mind affects the other'. 
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The historical background of such a concept of communication has . 
been 
pointed out by David Morely (1981: 1): 
"The emigration of the leading members of Frankfurt School 
(adorno, Marcus Horkheimer) to America during the 1930s led to the 
development of a specifically 'American' School of research in the 
forties and fifites. -8 
Until the late 1960s, the linear model dominated major communiation, 
development studies and then attracted major criticisms. But , detailed 
discussion on the criticisms cannot be considered in this paper. However, 
an outline of some of its merits and central weaknesses which render it 
inadequate to explain political communication processes in Nigeria shall be 
given. These shall form a critical base for seeking alternative models for 
data analysis in this thesis. 
These are only theoretical generalisations which do not intend to produce 
any contradictin between 'linear model' of communication (direct effects) 
and the convergence model. In particular, the reference to ex-Frankfurth 
school which deals with mass society theory is purely a historical reference 
rather than an attempt to destroy the composure of different models in which 
informatin theory could conflict with critiques of mass society and 
positivists ideas. 
The 'linear order' of the model portrays one-directional flow of information 
and message between the 'sender' and the receiver. But between them, lies 
instrumental device(s) or channels, indicative of the growth of 
communication media. In relation to our discussion on two dimensions of 
political communication in Chapter One, linear model is associated with 
'power', formal, centralised, professionalised, institutionalised, and 
state-controlled communication system. The urban environment with its 
heterogenous audience is a favourable ground for the system. McQuail, 
(1983: 7) points out that the model rejects 
0*00 multiplicity, smallness of scale, locality, de- 
institutionalisation, interchange of sender-receiver roles, 
horizontality of communication links at all levels of society 
interaction. " 
Thus linear model does not reflect the communication realities of rural 
comunities and only partially reflects the 'communication activiteis of 
'certain elite' groups in Nigeria. Even so, the strong ties between all 
- 
classes of elites and the rest of the population in terms of extended family 
and kinship network would make the model more redundant as a theoretical 
framework in the analysis of political communication in Nigeria. 
Linear model was developed in advanced nations where it has been assumed 
that elements of traditionalism have died out. 
Morley argues that the model: 
"ref lected the breakdown of modern Germany society into f acism, a 
breakdown which was attributed in part of loosing of traditional 
ties and structures and seen as leaving people atomised and 
exposed to external influences, especially to the pressure of the 
mass propaganda of powerful leaders, the most effective agency of 
which was the mass media. "9 
As we shall see later, the application of the linear model in the socio- 
political and economic studies of W. Schramm (1964); Lerner (1958); Pye 
(ed., 1963) was accepted widely only because their findings 'reflected the 
views held by media practitioners rather than the main findings of 
communication research at the time. ' (Hedebro 1979: 15). 
Another critical assumption of the model in evaluating the ef f ect of the 
message on the atomised, audience is that the receiver is prepared to receive 
the message and the sender has conceived that every message must have a 
"direct and powerful stimulus to action which would elicit immediate 
response. "10 
Katz and Lazersfield (1955: 16) therefore, criticised the model as too weak 
to explain actual political communicatin activities in a society. 
In Nigeria, the social structure does not allow for atomised individuals 
either in the cities or in the rural areas, for political information. The 
assumption implied in the model is that there is an active source which 
seeks to influence the masses via the mass media but in my view, this is 
checked by the greater forces of kinship network and organisation with 
socially enforced obligations. This structure of social system is rooted 
into all forms of human relationship in the rural and urban areas alike. 
One of the most recent political communication media in Nigeria believed to 
have a direct effect on the audiences irrespective of their differences in 
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age, residence, literacy, social and economic status is the television. The 
visual power of television tends to conceal the semantic problems poised by 
the linear model concept of direct effect. Besides, in Nigeria, where there 
are over 250 local languages excluding Arabic, English, French, the meaning 
of words is bound to create sharp differences from one cultural community to 
another who view the same political broadcast. Thus, the meaning or 
preferred reading which the sender would expect a Nigerian audience, assumed 
to be passive receivers, to accept could produce, in contrast, a wide range 
of negative responses. This also relates to the problem of encoding and 
decoding of media messages which are culture bound. Even in a 
linguistically homogenous society such as Britain, the problem of semantics 
and encoding and decoding of TV messages still persist. 
"The production of a meaning of message in the TV discourse is 
always problematic 'work'. The same event can be encoded in more 
than one way ... the message in e.. communication is always 
complex in structure and form, It always contains more than one 
potential 'reading'. Messages propose and prefer certain readings 
over others, but they can never become wholly closed around one 
reading. They remain problematic ... the activity of getting 
meaning from the message is also a problematic practice, however 
transparent and 'natural' it may seem. Messages encoded one way 
can always be read in a different wayo"11 
The semantic and the pragmatic level ofcommunication were either ignored or 
taken for granted by the linear model. 
In transitional or developing nations, e. g. Nigeria, several factors mediate 
between the media political output and the entire social systems. These 
intermediaries run from elders, village councils, chiefs, emirs, parents, 
relatives, co-workers, to religious and social organisations closely knitted 
by pluralistic nature of the society characterised by symmetrical exchange 
of information. 
The overtly and highly observable, decentralised and de-professionalised 
communication intraction are relegated by the model. 
A list of the general weaknesses of the Linear model has been summarised by 
Rogers and Kincaid (1981). 
A view of communication as a linear, one-way-act (usually 
vertical), rather than cyclical, two-way process over time. 
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2. A source bias based on dependency, rather than focussing on the 
relationship of those who communicate and their fundamental 
interdependency. 
A tendency to focus on the messages per se at the expense of 
silence, and the punctuation and time of messages. 
4. A tendency to focus on the objects of communication as simple, 
isolated physical objects, at the expense of the context in which 
they exist. 
5. A tendency to consider the primary function of communication to be 
persuasion rather than mutual understanding, consensus and 
collective action. 
6. A tendency to concentrate on the psychological effect of 
communication on separate individuals, rather than on the social 
effects and the relationships among individuals within networks. 
A belief in one-way mechanistic causation, rather than mutual 
causation which characterises human information systems that are 
fundamentally cybernetic. "12 
Crucial to this criticism of the linear model is the 'bias based on 
dependency' which influenced most studies in the sixties on socio-political 
and economic developments in the developing nations. The emphasis was on 
information which flows from advanced nations to third world countries for 
the latter's development. The works of Lerner (1958); Pye (1963) and 
Schramm (1964) and others are major contributions in this respect. 
Lerner's (1958) central hypothesis about the mass media and socio-economic 
and political development is that urbanisation induces an increase in the 
level of literacy and the latter in turn increases exposure and consumption 
of mass media; thereafter, development changes will rapidly take place 
thrugh the process of direct effect of the mass media information. This 
hypothesis assumed that in all regions irrespective of culture, languages, 
stages of technological development etc, once the media are introduced, 
there is a linear vertical relationship between urbanisation, literacy and 
rapid development acting independently of other social structures, 
unaffected by urbanisation and literacy. Then, when Russels and Schramm in 
1971 tested the hypothesis they found that 'basic variables of urbanisation, 
literacy, and GNP seem to be related in different ways, in the several 
regions, to the developing media. Thereupon, they concluded that regional, 
religious and geographically different political systems, and national 
policies and goals affect the use of and development of the media. 
Lerner, Pye and Schramm hypothesised that economic production and 
development are the key factors that led to urbanisation and literacy. And 
within the urban centres, the elites have high incentives (emphathy) for 
change and modernisation. Politically, they initiate and activate political 
movements and participation. The elites, in the process of development, are 
assumed to be isolated from the old system. They basically established a 
new relationship with the mass media because of their ability to decode 
information from them to achieve greater social, economic and political 
power. In the developing countries, the roles of the mass media were seen 
as teaching new skills from the cities to rural areas. 
In this light, Schramm (1964) postulated that the mass media would increase 
knowledge and skill and supplement for lack of skilled teachers and 
educational materials in the Third World countries. For political 
development, nation or states with multiple religious bodies, political 
systems, geographical diverisites, cultural and economic differences, the 
mass media would awaken national consciousness and awareness to enhance 
political integration. Where diversity of linguistic and ethnic groups 
exist, the mass media create a common language and mutual understanding. 
Furthermore, Schramm believed that 
ýhe 
mass media 
'are the most important 
stimulators of national awareness and political participation and social 
change. However, he made an important observation when he noted that the 
mass media could also serve a negative purpose by diverting national 
problems away from real politics. This can be observed in Nigerian 
politics, during election periods when centralisation and control of the 
media led to over-emphasis on political personalities rather than on 
political issues. 
Pye (1963: 229) expressed a very unusual view that in transitional societies, 
communicaion media and 'political mobilisation' can be useful if the 
minority elite control and direct their uses for development. 
"Some countries are at the stage of very early transition, all the 
instruments of communication must be directed to giving support to 
the legitimacy of the government and the administrative structure 
of the state which will in time be necessary for guiding further 
changes .... a small modernised elite, the wieght of 
communications policies should be on the side of protecting the 
freedom of these leaders and strengthening their influence 
throughout the society. "13 
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Though Pye's and Schramm's views on the role of the media and development 
are drawn from the basic concepts of the linear model,, there is a serious 
contradiction here between them. The control of the media by the political 
elites would possibly lead to neglect or diversion of political issues 
according to Schramm. On the contrary, Pye advocates total control of the 
media by the minority elites. This 'oligarchic' view of the media overlooks 
tribal, economic and cultural conflicts between the elites in power, in 
countries where ethnic political competition creates political struggle and 
instability. When the mass media is controlled by ruling elites in confict 
with themselves, it is their conflicting interests rather than the interests 
of the nation as a whole that are projected by the mass media. Nigeria is a 
clear case of this ill-advice on the use of mass media. 
For all these scholars, mass media and political development are seen in 
terms of economic and social change where the most crucial factor is the 
linear flow of information from the urban centres to the rural areas. The 
latter environment is seen as completely passive 
_and 
insensitive to changes 
until activated by the media information to respond to changes exactly the 
way the urban political elites would expect. Once information about 
changes penetrates the rural areas via the media, traditional institutions, 
traditionai media, rural occupations, kinship systems. change to a new 
pattern of socio-political and economic system to enhance. development. All 
developments are synonymous to Westernisation and industrialisation. 
Indus trialisation and urbanisation are emphasised and the level of econoic 
and political participation without any indication of the degrees of 
economic differences among the population studied. For the colonised 
countries such as Nigeria and other West African countries, the dominant 
role of the colonial autority, inherited by a few elite classes after 
independence was neglected. Thus, anything that went wrong in the society 
was blamed on the colonised or the masses in the urban and rural areas for 
either deliberately failing to accept or being unable to articulate the 
information about political, social and economic development and changes 
form the mass media. In generals traditiýnalism, ethnic sentiments are 
resistance to modernisation as a result of religion, customs, beliefs etc. 
These were emphasised as major factors for the failure of political 
participation and integration. The authoritive power of the media owners 
and failure of political elites to address themselves to the real issues of 
development are less discussed in the process of media role in development. 
2.14 
In particular, Lerner's model is deterministic: 
"After a country reaches 10% urbanisaton is there any significant 
increase in literacy, thereafter urbanisation and literacy 
increase together until they reach about 25 per cent; and once 
socieities are about 25 per cent urbanised, the close relationship 
of media growth is with increase in literacy. "14 
In fact, the linear model reflected the mode of economic thought in the 
period between 1940 to 1960s. The origin was related to what Morley 
(1983: 1) has already pointed out. The relationship of the model to African 
countries emerged from the success of Marshal Aid to Europe by America after 
the Second World War. The development of Africa, thus was seen only in 
terms of influencing African socio-political and economic attitude from 
Europe or America. The cities in Africa, were developed as socio-political 
and economic centres form which rural regions could be influenced for 
changes - changes that would enhance European and certain elite African 
interests. For instance, in relation to media professionalism in the 
Nigerian context, certain media practices in the Third' World need to be 
questioned. 
"The transfer of the ideology of 'professionalism runs parallel to 
the transfer of technology, which can be alternatively understood 
as the problem of technological dependence (Cooper, 1972). The 
media in the large-scale capital intensive form in which they have 
developed in urbanised industrialised societies, are classic 
'instances of this problem. Import-substituting industrialisation 
is designed to serve the market dominated by the elite consumers, 
V110 requrie the goods used and demanded by elites in 
industrialised countries. The technology for their manufacture is 
only available from these countries whose quasi-monopoly control 
of unique technologies is reinforced by the international patent 
system" (Patel, 1974, Vaitsos, 1972, in Golding 1977). 
The mass media were regarded as the main instrument for such changes. The 
one-directional influence of the media information to the population from 
the urban areas to the rural areas was so entrenched in the minds of media 
professinals that certain observations to t he contrary effect such as those 
of Mapper (1960) were not heeded. He stressed that"the media have little 
or no direct effect on people. Rather, they tend to reinforce attitudes and 
behaviours that people already possess. Their potential for change is very 
little. " 
When all the genuine criticisms of the linear model are applied to political 
communication in Nigeria, it will clearly show that -active political 
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participation of the rural areas is overshadowed by false assumptions of the 
direct ef f ect of the mass media. Radio in Nigeria could be an important 
impersonal medium for political participation in both rural and urban areas 
in Nigeria if other factors of inf luence such as kinship ties, money or 
ethnic unions are rendered politically ineffective as a result of any 
extraordinary and extremely unexpected circumstance during the election 
campaign. Even when linear model's emphasis on centralisation, vertical, 
one-way mechanistic causation and power base are applied to Nigerian elite 
political leaders and media control, the linear model would fail to reveal 
the structure of political communication. This is because there are 
persistent obligatory networks of kinship ties between the political elites 
in the city with their kin in both urban and rural areas. 
It is this tie that sustains their political power rather than the mass 
media. Thus, the linear model can neither help us to understand political 
participation in the city nor help us to 'approach any aspect of the same 
process in the rural areas. Its application becomes more problematic when 
the two environments are studied under one political event - general 
elections for the selection of national leaders. 
However', one of the potential merits of hyperdemic theAs' is its concept of 
'effect' of information or message on the receiver. Rogers and Kincaid 
(1981: 32) point out that this was a major break though in the study of 
communication which prior to the development of the model was predomiantly 
descriptive. 'Effects' thereafter initiated a new approach to the study of 
human communication and socio-political changes. Hence, Newcombe (1953); 
Gerbner (1956); Osgood et al (1957); Westley, B. and Maclean, M. (1957); 
Jakobson (1958) and David Berlo-(1960) etc., used the linear model in varied 
modified patterns in their researches. Berlo (1960), like Kapper (1960), 
introduced a new and dramatic change in the study of communication when he 
established that the audience was an active audience highly selective and 
hardly manipulated by the sender of the message. "The audience", he 
stressed "was a full partner in communication process., -15 
Furthermore, in 1973, Wilburn Schramm made a major departure from the old 
linear model tradition when he identified 'information sign' and the 
relationship among participants in the communication process as active 
receivers of messajes. Rogers and Kincaid (1981: 34) acknowledged that the 
most important derivative of Shannon and Weaver's contribution to the study 
of communication has been: 
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"The concept of information ( .... ), which provided a central focus 
to the f ield of communication research. It became the main 
conceptual variable around which the new intellectual approach 
began to grow. "16 
Thereafter, a wide range of concepts of 'information' emerged - information 
flow, knowledge gap, information gap, information inequality, information 
poor, communication gap, etc. 17 
The direct ef f ect of mass media output on the audience can not be totally 
swept aside particualrly in the industrialised, relatively individualised 
Western societies, where we have seen earlier that the media could. be the 
only link between the citizens and the government. In order that the 
audience be directly influenced by the media, it is essential that a large 
proportion of the masses are literate and capable of articulating media 
political output. Nigeria with only 15% literate citizens (African Woman 
No. 34 July/August 1981: 18) falls far short of this essential pre-requisite 
for media direct effect. 
In Europe and North America, recent political communication researches on 
effects, exposure behaviour, audience roles etc. haye modified the view that 
the media are all powerful and absolute prime moulder of public atiitude. 
"Uses and gratification" (Blumler 1973) tend to establish that audience 
members have their different orientations to political communication. On 
the short-term effect of the media Golding (1974: 79-83) summarises some of 
the main findings on the media and election campaigns in recent years. He 
concludes that: - 
"It is more likely that the media 'set the agenda' for political 
debate .... define the boundaries within which people think about 
and discuss political issues, and provide the symbols and 
explanations with which these issues are articulated. Thus the 
media mould public opinion, and indeed to a great extent media 
output is public opinion, or at least the most accessible index of 
what commentators conventionally refer to as publc opinion 
(Golding 1974: 834). 
Thus, the modified version of the linear model reveals that the media has 
direct effect on the audience but the contents of the media are also largely 
part of the audience's opinion of the real world. Political audiences are 
stratified, some obtain and are directly influenced by the media. These 
(opinion leaders) in turn directly influence the others in the community. 
Hence the 'influential theory' of a two-step flow of communication. The 
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process at various stages involves both horizontal and vertical flow of 
information among given members of the audience or community. 
"Those who are in the habit of talking about politics with family 
and friends do not constitute a separate, isolated part of the 
British culture. On the contrary, the information which the voter 
receives in communications of this sort will normally have had its 
origin in the mass media, even though it may have undergone 
various transformations along the way" (Butler and Stokes, 
1971: 266 in Golding, 1974: 84). 
Perhaps, one of the most impýrtant aspects of mass media direct or mediated 
ef f ect as we noted earlier is their unique power to reach a wide rnage of 
audience who are of ten hetrogeneous in character. Without the media, in 
most nation-states or even transitional nations, the politicians cannot 
reach a substantial size or proportion of the electorate for democratic 
political processes and participation. In this study, the apparent 
uniqueness of the media not only inform the individual audiences in the 
urban and rural areas on political issues but also bring the two 
environments together politically, economically and socially etc. Whether 
media political information influences the political behaviour of Nigerian 
audiences or not amidst alternative and even more traditional sources of 
political influence remains purely an empirical question to be examined 
later. 
In general, the theoretical and practical application of the linear model to 
socio-economic and political communication has attracted criticisms and 
rejections which outweight its merits. Some of its critics in more recent 
years include Berlo (1977: 2,6); Smith (1972); Bauer (1974: 319,1973: 142-3); 
Klapper (1960); Servaes (1985); Katz and Lazersfield (1955: 132); Hedebro 
(1979); Katz (1957); Rogers (1962a); Kincaid (1979); . Rogers and Kincaid 
(1981); Bordenare (1972); Brenda Dervin et al (1980,1982); Watzlawick et al 
(1967: 21-22); Chu (1976); Nolleneumann (1978); Freire (1973); Morley 
(1980: 1-2) and Stephenson (1967). 
The structure of socio-political and economic relationships between the 
urban and rural areas makes it difficult to apply the linear model in the 
study of the nation's political systems, mobilisation and voting during an 
election period. I agree that the development of modern political 
communication is f rom the city to the rural areas but at the same time I 
believe that the rural population are not passive receivers of the new 
system. They equally inf luence the outcome and the shape , etc. of the new 
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political communication systems as much as they are influenced by them. I 
would, therefore, advance an alternative political communication theory 
which I hope would be more adequate to explain the structure of political 
communicain in Nigeria in an election campaign, particularly in the 1983 
general elections. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONVERGENCE MODEL 
Charles Peirce, the English philospher, is described as the f ather of the 
convergence model which was based on sign language - semiotics (Rogers and 
Kincaid 1981); Gallie (1966). Rogers and Kincaid maintain that Peirce's 
semiotic principle only evaluates the reactions which meanings of speech 
utterance provokes. 
On the other hand, Gallie points out that 
"Peirce's insight captures the two basic principles underlying the 
convergence model, that information is inherently imprecise and 
uncertain ... communication is a dynamic process of 'development 
over time. "19 
Peirce's convergence model attracted the interest of early anthropologists, 
Mead (1934); Morris, Simmel (1922). Communication began to be seen as 
social interaction and exchange of meaning, particularly in the 
interpretation of signs, language, behaviour and symbolic interactions. In 
the sociological approach, the characteristics of individuals or groups 
participating in the communication process are relevant to the 
interpretation of meaning. 
On the other level, cultural interpretation of meaning was also emphasised 
in the convergence model. Sapire (1935) argues that individuals or groups 
engaged in communication processes are involved in: 
"a highly intricate network of partial or complete understanding 
between the members of organisational units .... reanimated or 
creatively affirmed by particular acts of a communicative nature 
which obtained among individuals participating in it. --20 
Gradually, the notion of mutual sharing of information among particpants in 
the communication process began to give rise to a psychological approach to 
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the study of group interaction. In political communication, power struggle, 
affiliation, aggression, manipulation, mobilisation, competiton, etc. were 
interpreted as psychological variables. Political actors were basically 
dichotomised into active and passive participants. Prominent in this 
approach were Gough et al (1951); McClosky and Schaar (1965); Hennessey 
(1959); Davies (1963); Milbrath (1965b); Almond (1954); etc. Karl Mannheim 
challenged the early psychological approach to the study of socio-political 
communication. In the 1960s, its criticisms began to gather strength - 
Watzlawick et al (1969: 21-22); Barton (1968); Lazersfield (1970); and Wilder 
(1979). 
From the psychological approach to the study of convergency in communcation 
process, Malcolm and Westely began to focus on the mass media in terms of 
roles, message, codes and channels. The approach generated a sociological 
view of mass communication in America. Irving Goffman, Paul Hare and Bale 
in various studies of small group exposure and interaction concentrated on 
socio-political aspects of human communication. The alienaton from 
'interaction'. the dimensions of 'social interaction' and 'how people 
interact in conferences' were important studies carried out by some of these 
scholars. 
The social cohesion of the group is maintained through interpersonal 
behaviour, group leadership and social obligation. But, beyond small group 
interaction, Jack Young (1981: 2) points out that "A major convergence in 
mass media analysis during the 1960s and 1970s has been the development of 
consensual pardigm theory. "21 
I 
In the consensual paradigm, he concentrated on the analysis of Inews' as the 
major element in which the real world of differet classes of a society are 
brought together. The problem with most of these studies of convergence is 
that individualss groups etc. in communication, formal or informal, are not 
from two different socio-political environments which are as distinct as the 
urban and rural conditions in Africa. 
THE CONVERGENCE MODEL AS AN ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE STUDY OF POLITICAL COMM UNI CATION IN NIGERIA 
The Linear model, as shown above is rejected for several reasons. Here its 
most important weakness. in the study of political communication in Nigeria 
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is that it f ails to reveal the structure of communication between the urban 
and rural system where various elements in them are interdependent and 
influence each other. 
The convergence model deals with evolutionary phenomena where two or more 
systems previously unrelated, began to develop certain real or apparent 
structural similarity in order to achieve certain goals. The goals could be 
economic, political, -social or cultural. Often, the two systems can 
converge to achieve a goal, yet each system retains its basic structural 
differences from the other. Hence, the tendency for the rural political 
communication system and urban political communication to move towards each 
other in election periods so as to mobilise the citizens for political 
participation, should not in the Nigerian context, be interpreted as an 
achievement of uniformity. The coming together (convergence) of the two 
systems show remarkable difference yet the 'object' of the convergence is 
achieved. The similarities are apparent but the two separate traditions can 
be studied together. 
CONVERGENCE OF POLICIES WHICH AFFECT BOTH RURAL AND URBAN ENVIRONMENTS 
1. The process of the convergence of traditional and modern political 
systems in Nigeria is historical. These can be considered at various 
levels: (1) Political policies which affect both rural and urban 
environments and systems; (2) Formal and informal socio-political and 
institutional organisations in the two systems; (3) The level of actual 
political and communication actors (network groups) in the two environments; 
and (4) Communication channels available in the rural and urban system. At 
the level of political policies, the historical moment in which traditional 
and modern politiical systems began to converge in Nigeria was in the 
colonial administration. Specific to the convergence of two traditions, was 
the development of Indirect Rule of Native Authority Systems. Opposition to 
it from certain sections of the country led to the development of 
reprsentative councils. These political developments were not restricted to 
urban centres only but also embraced rural politics as well. This pattern 
of development has remained consistent with modern day politics in Nigeria 
in which policies, ordinances and legislations have brought traditional and 
modern politics together. The urban environments, the rural settings and 
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the elites and traditional leaders (Emirs, Obast Elders) who participate in 
both systems are important elements in the convergence. In Chapter Three, 
the process of this dimension of convergence will be examined in some 
details. 
CONVERGENCE OF FORNAL AND INFORNAL SOCIO-POLITICAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS IN RURAL AND URBAN SECTORS 
2. Convergence at the level of formal and informal socio-political and 
institutional organisations in rural and urban areas is very important in 
the understanding of political communication in Nigeria. Formal political 
institutions include political parties, ministries, the court, the prisons, 
educational institutions, etc. - in sum, all are forms of state apparatus 
for the maintenance of law and order. Social institutions such as the 
family can also be politicised during election periods. These institutions. ' 
in their present forms exist both in the villages and in-the cities. They 
are linked by different activities of political actors from the five network 
groups- identified in Chapter One. Informal socio-political organisations 
such as Improvement Unions, voluntary ethnic unions, etc. are particularly 
important in political communication processes in Nigeria. Membership of 
these 'Clubs or unions may be based on different criteria such as members of 
the same kin, village, ethnic group, state, profession, religion, etc. The 
character and functions of these organisations may be a combination of 
traditional or modern elements. Besides, these organisations exist both in 
the villages and the cities. Irrespective of class - and status, once the 
basic criteria are fulfilled, individuals could become members. These 
organisitions can be highly politicised to form important channels of 
information flow. We have seen earlier from the studies of (P. C. Lloyd et 
al, 1967) in Ibadan, Western Nigeria, that both elites and non-elites 
belonged to the same organisation. They were not only concerned with the 
group's social, economic and political welfare in the city but also the 
improvement of the economic and social conditions in their villages where 
some of them hoped to retire at old age. Their organisation As a very 
strong link between urban and village politics. 
The convergence also involved formal and informal socio-political 
institutions in them. The actualisation and the most important aspect of 
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the convergence is the roles and functions of political actors in them and 
these are associated with different network groups in both environments 
without whom the urban and rural political communication system might not 
converge. Also, the identifiable network groups are directly associated 
with informal and formal communication channels which provide the basis for 
their political participation and mobilisation. 
CONVERGENCE OF NETWORKS AND INTERACTION OF POLITICAL ACTORS 
IN THE RURAL AND URBAN SECTORS 
One of the most important factors of informal communication and 
convergence of urban and rural politics in Nigeria is kinship or extended 
family networks which characterise rural and urban relationships. These are 
the fundamental elemnts of mobilisation, participation and voting. When 
kinship networks and ethnic organisations 'break down' as a result of 
division between political leaders within them, other factors of influence, 
mobilisation and voting may surface temporarily, e. g. moneyp but it does not 
displace ethnic political consciousness. . 
"In many of the new states of Africa, the tribe is still t, -he 
effective community and a principal vehicle of Political 
consciousness .... that the force of tribalism is far from 
exhausted is suggested by the experience of Nigeria and other new 
states where a resurgence of tribal rivalries has presented great 
obstacles to the process of nation building., '18 
Political participation and mobilisation in Nigeria have a strong 
relationship with kinship network ties and organisations. Upon these rest 
effective political communication. The different network groups 'identified 
earlier utilise them, as well as the mass media, differently. In the 
convergence of traditional and urban political communication systems, 
individuals and groups with personal political interests use these channels 
to delude genuine policies and the possibilities of designing alterantive 
political communication systems in order to solve national problems. The 
delusion could lead to apathetic political attitudes by certain elite 
groups. This situation has been noted by Rosenberg (1954), Rokkan (1962a), 
Almond and Verba (1963) and Erbe (1964). 
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Another group of political apathetics were identified by Lipset (1960), Bell 
et. al (1961). There were no voters described as isolated, illiterate, 
inarticulate and parochial. In Nigeria, ethnic and kinship ties in the 
cities and villages do not allow for isolated participants. They may be 
illiterate but they still participate actively. Other factors other than 
the parties' policies on issues influence them. 
COMIUNICATION CHANNELS AVAILABLE IN THE RURAL AND URBAN SECTORS 
4. Several factors influence political participation and mobilisation. 
The process has been shifting since the colonial period when particpation 
and mobilisation were motivated by a struggle for independence to stronger 
regional sentiment. Regionalisation of party-politics meant that one ethnic 
political party produced a charismatic leader who dominated the region's 
-politics using individuals, groups and numerous ethnic unions to mobilise 
ethnic political support. The rural and urban political participants in a 
particular region in Nigeria can obligatorily take part in politics thFough 
these unions. The use of Igbo. State Union in the 1960s to mobilise regional 
political support for the N. C. N. C. will be discussed later to il; ustrate how 
rural and urban politics converged. 
The level of actual political communication in which actors bring about the 
convergence of urban and rural environments- is perhaps the most important 
level in this study. At this dimensions, the five groups which have been 
identified to exist in both rural and urban political environments, become 
the central focus. Here, one of the primary factors which can bring about 
the convergence of rural and urban politics is the borizontal and vertical 
mobilities of the political actors. They are specific characteristics of 
the network groups which enable them to move from village to city and back 
again and during this horizontal movement, they gain new political ideas and 
adopt them in the villages or vice versa. Vertically, the bureaucratic 
elties associated with institutional decison-making are not permanently cut 
off from their relatives in the villages. As will be shown in Chapter 
Three, in the colonial period as much as today, the ideas and experiences 
these vertical mobile groups gained from the organised institutions, were 
used to run and influence ideas in traditional institutions and environment. 
Also, the established 'Progressive Unions' that act as socio-political sub- 
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systems in the urban and rural areas. They are indeed the embodiments of 
traditonal and modern politics through which urban and rural environments in 
Nigeria converge. In general, the five cateogrical groups in different ways 
are associated with the convergence of traditional and modern politics both 
between and within the urban and rural enviornments. The essential 
structure of the convergence is based on their linkages to different formal 
and informal institutions and organisations in the urban and rural areas. 
Also, different network groups are linked to friends, relatives, 
schoolmates, parents etc. in these areas. It is these linkages that 
constitute important political communication networks in Nigeria and the 
structure of political communication is face-to-face or interpersonal 
oriented. 
At this interpersonal level, Rogers and Kincaid (1981: 81) have defined 
convergence as 'a process in which the participants create and share 
information with one another'. But in the consideration of two political 
environments, these participants are assumed to- have different 
characteristics and attributes and these are reflected on the information 
they create and share. The kinship ties which bind different groups imply 
that at a given moment of political commupication, its content has both 
formal and informal structures. 
In this process, urban and rural political systems would start to converge. 
Katz (1966) points out that through the mass media , traditional and modern 
political systems can converge but he refused to state whether the rural or 
traditional groups were active or not. However, he points out that the two 
systems can converge through 'opinion leaders' who obtain information from 
the mass media and then use the information to influence or manipulate 
others in their interpersonal communication. He therefore suggested that 
the convergence model could be used in the study of political communication 
of two different systems. The main problem here is that Katz does not 
specify whether the two traditions are converging in the urban or rural 
areas or both. Futhermore, nor does he establish the premises of such 
convergence. At what period or through what events or elements are the two 
systems converging? 
In Nigeria, the election period is an event in which urban and rural 
environments converge through the activities of communication networks and 
actors, Each of the groups by its own chatacteris tics, is exposed to 
different communication processes to participate, be mobilised and vote in 
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the election. Some are more exposed to mass media than to informal 
communication, while others are relatively equally exposed to both. But the 
most important thing to be discovered is which ones influence the 
participants to vote. While the two political communication systems can 
mobilise urban and rural populations to participate in an election, they can 
also generate conflict, tension, competition and eventually usurp political 
violence to the extent that both rural and urban environments are adversely 
affected. Thus, convergence of political communication does not guarantee 
mutual sharing of political information for participation. At the 
individual level of communication, as sharing of information, different 
dimensions of mutualism can be identifed: (1) Mutual understanding with 
agreement; (2) mutual understanding with disagreement; (3) mutual 
misunderstanding with agreement; and (4) mutual misunderstanding with 
disagreement (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981: 56). But in a situation where 
different network groups from different political environments are involved 
in political communication processes, the term 'mutual' is problematic. In 
Nigeria where political communication either formal or informal, in the city 
or in the rural areas is characterised by conflicts, there-is either direct 
confrontation with opponents or avoidance. Avoidance is more likley in the 
rural areas because of strong kinship ties that transcend political 
elections. In the cities, groups confront each other in direct face-to-face 
situations and at the same time, the mass media institutions owned and 
controlled by different political groups embark on similar activities. 
I 
From the convergence model discussed, the following points are important to 
bear in mind; there are two political environments that at one time in 
history existed politically independent of each other but have begun to 
converge as a result of socio-political changes within political 
territories. 
Through them, village and urban politics converge. But at the national 
level there was political divergence because ethnic leaders could not 
mobilise political support from regions other than their own. 
In recent years, the emergence of new political leaders within ethnic 
regions has created a paradigm of political communications networks for the 
mobilisation of political support. The structure and dimensions of this new 
political communication has become central in Nigerian politics. 
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NETWORK ANALYSIS 
. 
Convergence is the. Premise of Network Analysis 
By definition, the relationship between network analysis and the convergence 
model of communication network according to Rogers and Kincaid (1981: 63) is 
that individuals are connected and linked by patterned flow of information. 
Such information-sharing over time leads the individuals to converge or 
diverge from each other in their, mutual understanding of reality. Rogers 
and Kincaid (1981: 77-78) presented different properties of communication 
network analysis. Crucial to their definition of convergence is the 
inclusion of social structure as a channel of communication. This takes 
place only when individuals in the system mutually share information. For 
the study of political communication in Nigeria, my concept of network and 
convergence differs in many ways from Rogers and Kincaid's. I propose that 
in Nigeria, there are two main levels of political convergence, (a) the 
level of socio-political environments i. e. the rural and urban, (b) the 
level of communication processes and channels. At the level of socio- 
political enviornmento the -migrants from village to the city (as already 
seen above) bring with them social and cultural values in the natal home to 
the city. They often form voluntary associations which in many respects are 
similar in function to those in the village, i. e. they have multiple 
functions, social, economic, cultural and political (Meilassoux 1968: 76; 
Lloyd, 1966: 32-33; 1974: 130-2). Consequently, the city becomes an extension 
of rural life. Also, many elements of city life which are introduced to or 
forced' upon the migrants such as modern industrial and office 
administrations, trade etc. which are completely different from farming and 
hunting in the rural areas are associated with the migrants who have brought 
with them rural values. 
In the socio 
' 
-political environments, individual and group activities are 
influenced by certain leading actors - the urban elites and elders - in the 
city they are the key actors who manipulate rural and urban values to 
converge and be perpetuated. 
"Among these West African peoples, ethnic associatins are iaost 
strongýy developed, one finds that' membership is virtually 
obligatory for all members of the group concerned, irrespective of 
education or status ... the elite; executive officers are the 
- 
literate; but those who are eldest or who have lived longer in the 
town hold the presiding of f ice. For the poor and semi-literate 
these associations provide the main sources of recreation and of 
social security in the town. " (Lloyd, 1966: 31-32) 
The ef forts of these elites and elders keep rural norms and values alive in 
the city. The growing new moderising elites gain more urban experience, 
earn sufficient money through industiral, administrative, business and trade 
activitiess they more efficiently organise their group to extend 
moderisation to the rural or natal home. 
"Urban men will involve themselves in af fairs of their home 
community when there is money available, from local reserves or 
government grants, for rural development and when opportunities 
exist for manipulating its spending. The greater peasant wealth 
and the existence of local government councils distinguish West 
African socities from those elsewhere in this respect". (Lloyd, 
1966: 32). 
Ind ivid ual_s /groups bring their ideas, wealth and knowledge to the village 
either during occasonal visits or when they retire. Thus organisations/ 
groups and individuals are agents of convergence of modernity and 
traditionalism in rural and urban socio-political environments in Africa. 
The hidden factors which are forcing rural and urban environments to 
converge are modern political development, education and economic and social 
changes. The term 'mutual' in the process of convergence of two traditions 
as used by Kincaid and Rogers, tends to hide some crucial elements of 
political, social and economic convergence in Nigeria. In particular to 
urban centres, intra and intergroup conflicts, opposition, stereotyping, 
neopotism, corruption which characterise the social and political systems 
can be omited if 'mutual' processes of convergence used by Rogers and 
Kincaid is applied to the Nigerian situation. 
At the level of communication processes and channels, we have seen that 
traditional ý_ommunication and news from newspapers converge in the urban and 
rural areas through the elites (Omu 1978). That is, through the educated 
leaders who also share traditional values with the non-educated, modern 
politics, economics etc. reach the masses both in the city and in the 
village, the process of two-step flow of information, and the "aware elite, 
called opinon leaders ... pass on" information through interpersonal 
networks to village and urban members of the group (Golding, 1974: 84; 
Lazarsf ield, 1944). Communication between urban and rural areas are two 
way processes and cannot be studied and isolated to one enviornment, the two 
0 
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enviornments simply co-exist. 
The relationships between individuals who operate in the media and the 
political organizations have been shown in terms of formal and informal 
processes of political communication. The converging point yet again of the 
two organisations are the elites. In general, the mass media communication 
networks play major roles in bringing together national policies awareness 
to village and urban environments. But there are degrees of differences 
which are determined by levels of education, political articulativenesso, 
availability of radio, TV sets and newspaper circulations. Closely 
associated to these, is audience hours of exposure to them for political 
information and its ability to articulate mass media contentl 
SOCIOIDGICAL THEORIES OF COMUNICATION NETWORKS 
The idea of network was an old concept which was rejuvenated and made 
attractive by sociologists (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981: 91) and anthropologists 
(Laumann and Pappi, 1976: 17-18). As early as 1902, Cooley analysed 'the 
social act' between two persons as 'a communication relationship' but his 
approach was not utilised becasue sociologists lacked adequate methodology 
to deal with 'dyadic relationship'. In 1934, Moreno developed. a methodology 
to analyse network variables. His methodology was based on "socio-metric 
measurement techniques and the sociograms that resulted from his data- 
analysis afforded the graphic realisation of what Simmel calls a geometry of' 
social relationship. " 19 Moreno's research, in particular, influenced the 
sociological approach to the study of network analysis in America. Within a 
group, the sociogram can be used to identify cliques, isolates and liaisons 
within the communication structure of a network. 
Implicit in much experiemntal research in the 50s in America were several 
concepts of network. This is because most of the research was based on 
small groups in which horizontal, face-to-face communication, was the 
characteristic feature. 
"In the early 1950st organisational scholars at the University of 
Michigan launched a tradition of research on network analysis of 
organisation communication (Jacobson and Seashore, 1951; Wiess and 
Jacobson, 1955,1956). In these investigations, a major thrust 
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was to computer-analyse interpersonal communication f lows among 
the members of an organisation, in order to identify cliques, the 
liaisons and bridges linking these cliques and other aspects of 
the communication structure. --22 
Most of these investigators discovered that when face-to-face (informal) 
'communication structure' was superimposed on formal organisation structure 
hitherto linconsistences' between the two were divulged. Elizabeth Bott 
(1971: 314) has identified different areas of network concept in American 
studies in the 1950s and the late 1960s, which have also been recognised by 
others including: (a) diffusion and communication flow - Katz et al (1963) 
and Mitchel (1969); (b) graph theory - Barnes (1969b) and Mitchell (1969); 
(c) kinship ties - Elizabeth Bott (1971); (d) friendship ties - Lazersfield 
and Merton (1954), Eisentradt (1956), Cohen (1461), etc.; (e) neighbourhood 
and friendship - Aexlrod (1956), Bell and Boat (1956-7), Adam (1967a), etc.; 
(f) social networks - Katz (1958,1966), Cohen and Marriot (1958), Jay 
(1964) etc. In the 70s new interest in network analysis on organisatonal 
communication was heightened - MacDonald (1971), Shoemaker (1971), Allen 
(1970), Betty (1974), Rogers and Agar Wala (1976), Rogers and Kincaid 
(1981: 96). 
The work of Charles Kadushin (1966,1968) was particularly interesting 
because of its relation to the works of British anthrop'ologists which formed 
the bases of network studies in Africa. Kadushin's concept is of 'social 
circles' in which memýers of a group establish a stable relationship because 
they are bound together by common interest. Today, the sociological 
approach to network analysis has become very popular with varied interest by 
Americans. They range from the study of small villages, city slum areas, 
medical innovation and family planning to application of new agricultural 
techniques among farmers. 
In Britain, network studies had also flourished in the 50s. John Barnes 
(1954) and Elizabeth Bott's (1955 and 1957) research initiated a new 
dimension in the study of communities in Britain. Bott (1955: 316) 
acknowledged that she as well as Barnes was influenced by the work of the 
English anthropologist, Max Gluckman. It was Bott and Barnes I works, and 
that of Mitchell Clyde, which 'contributed to the resurgence of 
communication network analysis I in Europe and elsewhere but exclusively 
became the source of reference, directly or indirectly, for the 'Manchester 
School' (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981: 95). 
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It was also from Manchester that the first African studies emerged. While 
"Max Gluckman is the 'point of source of .... network', it has been Mitchell 
himself who mobilised the use of the network idea in a variety of field 
situations, particularly in Africa .... ". That the African studies drew on 
Barnes' concept of network was altogether an important development, because 
until this time South of the Sahara, the concept of network used by early 
anthropologists had been merely metaphorical. 
"Several authors credit Barnes' (1954) article as the turning 
point in shifting the network concept from metaphor to 
analysis. --23 
Historically, it is important to note that Boussenvain from Leiden and 
Amsterdam Univerities joined the Manchester scholars in the survey of small 
rural and urban communities in Africa, using Barnes/Bott tradition too. 
Their survey concentrated on micro network analysis of social relations to 
understand their respondents' network behaviour in "its totality, as part of 
an interrelated system of behaviour". Then, Rogers and Kincaid (1981: 95) 
point out that Sunlike sociologists and social psychologists; the 
anthropologists were not so wedded to utilising individuals as units of 
analysis, or to using computers to handle quantitative data. " 
While the studies in Africa by social anthropologists concentrated on 
kinship, friendship and neighbours within and between rural and urban 
communities, in Europe and the U. S. A., two network orientations were 
utilised: (a) group and formal organisational interaction as noted above 
which is characterised by face-to-face communication; (b) the use of mass 
media to link socio-political power structure with individuals, groups,. 
organisations and communities. The media network was vertical and 'power' 
and 'influence', based communication. There were implict and explicit 
concepts of the linear model involved in the communication structure, 
Central to the Manchester approach is the contribution that we do not study 
network but we use network to understand human activities and behaviour 
(Jeremy Bussenvain (1968); Mitchell (1969); Rogers and Kincaid (1981); Bott 
(1971); Sanjek (1974). Once the two aspects are clarified, it would be 
possible to correlate group characteristics and attributes with available 
communication channels such as newspapers (requiring a moderate or high 
level of literacy), radio (requiring no formal education insofar as the 
receiver belongs to any of the language communifties used for broadcasting), 
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TV (access to sets) and then face-to-face communication. The approach helps 
to assess how individuals /groups use these channels for socio-political, 
communication. 
In contrast the metaphorical approach was beset by conflicting definitions. 
To escape from the problems the anthropologists suggested that the concept 
of network should be separated from other human activities such as kinship, 
politics and ritual. They favoured network analysis in the process of 
understanding human relationships within a given environment or condition, 
to see how relations influence behaviour. This is merely a study of network 
as human interaction. But what are the contents of interaction that 
influence behaviour? If network is separated from 'kinship', politics, and 
1rituals1q it means as Rogers noted, that indiviudals or groups involved in 
the interaction cannot be analytically utilised as units of analysis in 
order to determine changes in the relationship. The neglect of network 
content and concentration on shared communication interactin among members 
of a community was the core problem early anthropologists faced in Africa - 
a problem of structural/functional analysis in which network was 
characteristically applied. This metaphorical concept, Mitchell noted, was 
, one of the characteristics of Radcliff-Brown's studies. The latter defined 
network as "actually existing social relationship". 24 
A further weakness of the metaphorical use of*social network and interaction 
was pointed out by Mitchell in terms of its inadequacy to explain: 
"Social network as a specific set of linkages among a defined set 
of persons, with the additional property that the characteristics 
of these linkages as a whole may be used to interpret the social 
behaviour of the persons involved. "25 
This concept of network using the individual as the unit of analysis, 
implies that in analytical terms, it is the characteristic of the linkage in 
the network system rather than the characteristic of individuals/ persons or 
groups involved in the interaction that should be emphasised. There are 
two serious problems with the metaphorical use of network. It is a serious 
limitation in network studies if the characteristic of the linkage is 
emphasised at the expense of the characteristics of those involved in the 
linkages. This is a failure to note that individuals in a network are 
characteristically as dynamic as the linkages themselves. For instance, an 
individual can be linked to his kin in the village through ethnic unions and 
organisation, to. his political party through friends, co-workers and the 
mass media, while others in the 
; 
ystem can do the same through one or two 
channels and not all available communication networks as a result of 
enviornmental, economic and social differences, e. g. education, Also there 
is a failure to realise that these individuals can be aggregated to form 
groups/systems based on their socio-demographic identity or disimilarities, 
so as to study the wider communities and the wider network linkages between 
them. 
But Clyde Mitchell argues that metaphorical concepts of network can be 
expanded into analytical usage when committed to the works of Barnes (1954); 
Elizabeth Bott (1955 and 1957). 
"The relationship of the linkages in a network to one another is 
taken to be a salient factor in interpreting social action, ... is 
one of the steps whereby the metaphor of a social network is 
expanded into an analogy and made analytically useful. "26 
This indeed, could be regarded as the major contribution of the 'Manchester 
School' in the study of network which was applied to African communities. 
Roger Sanjek (1974) points out that: 
"a consensus is now established that network is an egocentric 
concept, referring to the interaction of a single person eee. As 
an individual passes through the course of his life, he makes new 
relationships and ends or reactivates old ones, continuously 
allocating his time and resources to himself and others. In a 
total sense, the temporal bounds of a network are set by an 
individual's birth and death; the spatial bounds are set by his 
movement. In sociological terms, an ego's relationship with them, 
compose his total network. -27 
Sanjek's criticism of the egocentric approach was made on Epstein's (1954) 
ethnographic study of Chanda's social network in Zambia. Epstein's approach 
to linkage has strong reference to a particular ego (Chanda) and his links 
with others in his community. In a community, a person has friends, some 
friends know each other and others are not connected by the. same friends 
directly but through the friends' friend. Drawing on Barnes (1954), 
Epstein points out that: 
"not every link in the network possesses the same density .... Chanda does not interact with everyone in the same network with 
the same degree of intensity. There are those around him with 
whom he has close ties and who are also more closely knit together 
than others. There are also others again with whom his ties are 
more or less close, but whom he sees less frequently and who are 
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strangers or have onl7 tenuous links among themselves, for 
example. Thus, there may be a relatively high degree of 
connectedness amongst those with whom Chanda interacts in terms of 
social class, or amongst those he counts as kins, but as between 
the two categories themselves, the degree of connectedness may be 
slight .... the network may not be connected in 
its totality, but 
highly connected in its parts. Those people with whom Chanda 
interacts most intensely and most regularly and who are-therefore 
also likely to come to know one another, that is to say that part 
of the total network which shows a degree of connectedness, I 
propose to speak of as forming the effective network: the 
remainder consitute the extended network. -28 
This passage contains some important definitional -innovations. 'density,, 
'intensity', 'closely knit', 'connectedness', 'total network', 'effective 
network', and 'extended network'. 
These concepts enable us to study the flow of communication not only between 
different villages or towns but within a whole national context. 
"The network as a whole theref ore, provides a covert or informal 
structure composed of the interpersonal links which spread out and 
ramify in all directions, criss-crossing not only the whole of the 
local community, but knitting together people in different towns 
and country (Epstein, 1954). 
It should be remembered that the individual partitipantst the networks of 
communication and indeed Nigeria itself are in a dynamic condition. Nigeria 
is -constantly described as a society in transition and taken as an example 
of the conflict between traditional communial life, the village, the network 
of kinship, a participatory culture based on collective life, a non-linear 
view of time by which history and tradition co-exist with the modern 
industrial life based on money, private ownership, the nuclear family, 
bureaucratic control and the dream of personal success. The conflict has 
usually been described in a polarized monolithic way. But perhaps the 
extraordinary characteristic of the Nigerian situation is that 42 it never 
becomes a matter of 'either/or', a laoded choice; change, the conflict 
between traditional and modern is lived in all its complexity and- 
fragmentation. 
The indigenous cultures defended themselves relatively against the onslaught 
of colonialism. The European missionaries, administrators and soliders etc. 
could not overnight destroy their culture which in essence was not 
identified with architectural monuments, libraries or complex economic 
structures but with community relations and' internalised everyday 
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activities. Nigerian culture survived at the village level most. 
At the same time the variety of ethnic cultures in Nigeria has ensured that 
there has traditionally been a cosmopolitan as well as a village 
consicousness. The growth of industry and urban settlements both confirmed 
and contradicted this inheritance. The seduction of city life is the 
antithesis. of the austere and regulated village -life. Yet this excitement 
ties with sensations of alienation which keep alive the emotional need for 
continuing attachment to the home village. Thus as Nigeria changes, it does 
not change its pattern of community relationship, new networks link in with 
the old and the whole community, urban and rural, maintains the vibrant 
dynamic - 
My analysis will not, then, concentrate on mapping the structure of channels 
of communication from the perspective of individual participants as though 
they were static but rather attempt a statistical 'snapshot' of the dynamics 
of communication. In order to do this, I intend to aggregate the 
individuals into mutually exclusive groups with respect to four variables 
(residence, age, occupation, and education). Ethnicity is excluded because 
the data were collected largely in one region of the country. As is often 
shown, the smaller the city e. g. Owerri the more likely most of the 
respondents in the survey would come from one tribe. The analysis of data 
will show the patterns of interaction between groups and the way in which 
they use the media. This is not unlike the approach of Barnes, of whom 
Mitchel says, 
"To describe an order of social relationships which he f elt was 
important in undersatnding the social behaviour of the 
Parishioners in Bremnes, such as groups based on territorial 
location or on occupational activities ... in the morphological 
features of the network itself and their implications for social 
behaviour rather than in the flow of communicatin through the 
network, through communication-flow is noted excludedý. by Barnes 
approach. -'29 
These kinds of groups, as Sheingold noted: 
"constitute social structures which exist independently of the 
perceptions of discrete individuals. The information an 
individual receives, may emanate from others with whom he is not 
in direct contact and of whom he may not be aware. "30 
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In other words, as Clyde Mitchell (1969: 16) points out, A is in direct 
contact with B and B is in direct contact with C, but A and C are not in 
direct contact. Yet, information about C reaches A through B and vice- 
versa. Hence, A and C are aware of each other but not in direct contact, 
Sheingold (1973: 15) notes that attributes of the aggregate groups may be 
more important than individual attributes, in determining the likelihood of 
new information reaching an individual. This is the basis of Mitchell's 
ne. twork- concept of reachability, which he described thus: 
"the degree to which a person's behaviour is influenced by his 
relationship with others often depends on the extent to which he 
can use these relationships to contact him through these 
relations. --31 
(reachability is the same as 'mesh' in Barnes terminology). 
In an open society such as Nigeria, during the election period, individuals/ 
groups through the information they gather in their direct and indirect 
contacts, can state fairly accurately not only the political influence and 
effects face-to-face communication, mass media and other factors had on them 
but. also similar 
' 
impacts of these factors on other. people in the community. 
Reachability also has an imporiant analytic function as we shall see later, 
on the influence of relatives in the village on those in the city, even 
though temporarily they may not be in direct contact on a daily basis. 
Harries-Jones in Mitchell (1969: 329) looked at the attributes of individuals 
in a study of political organisation in Zambia. They stated that the 
'particular qualities' of participants or 'actors' such as organising 
ability, closeness to recognised authority, or the ability to extend 
'credit' to others, are more important in establishing a leader than a focal 
position of communication in any given neighbourhood. 
Sheingold believes that distinction between participants and catgories of 
communication systems are necessary and once individuals are aggregated, it 
is necessary to discover: 
'Ounder what circumstances and by what process can new social and 
political movements (or parties) reach potential supporters who 
are socially isolated and poorly exposed to the media? '-32 
This is an important question in the context of political communication 
networks in Nigeria. The changes in socio-political movements also affect 
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the entire system3, as noted in Chapter One. Consequently, social and 
geographical mobility become an important aspect of political communication 
where linkages between the rural and urban environments could no longer be 
the function of individual interactions in their socio-political movement 
but also the function of the mais media. Of course this raises a new 
question: what is the outer limit of a system of communication? 
The matter was clarified by Mayer (1961), who in his study 'Red Migrant in 
African Townships', states that the limit of hypothetical network can be set 
on the basis of kinship among certain red migrants who 'encapsulate' into 
close network of interpersonal relationships to maintain network linkages 
with the tribal rural homeland. In this study, the organisation of ethnic 
unions in the cities among kin, are equivalent network structures that link 
village and urban particpants in Nigeria. Thus, linkages between towns and 
villages are established even though the patterns between them are 
different. 
The role of ethnic associations in the integration of rural and urban socio- 
political groups and organisations in Nigeria, particularly among the Igbost 
was a remarkable political communication -channel bef ore the civil war. 
These ethnic or clannish socio-political and economic organisations spread 
out in all rural and urban areas. Todayq. the extent to which they are used 
politically - mobilisation and participation - during elections is becoming 
very ambivalent as a result of changing political relationships among the 
Igbos, as well as government's attitude towards them. , 
In the past, these ethnic unions constituted very important political 
communication networks of connectedness between cities and villages. Thus, 
in Igboland, there are three levels of likages 'between the rural and urban 
politics: (a) the individuals through their socio-geographic mobility; (b) 
the mass media political broadcast; and (c) the ethnic voluntary 
organisations. While they link villages and cities, they also connect 
groups and individuals within the two environments to different political 
parties -a process that influences participation and voting behaviour. 
Adrian Mayer in his studies of election campaigns in India and Africa (1962, 
1963 and 1966) developed the term 'action-set' or communication-set, to 
describe the political activities of "temporary groups recruited through 
various channels to serve some short term end. " In the more precise 
relationship between the 'communication-set' and the political candidates, 
Clyde Mitchell states that .. 
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"Adrian Mayer (1966: 108), illustrates .... the diverse linkages of 
the I action-set I of the candidate in the election. The links 
between the individuals (sometimes groups) are distinguished by 
their content3, between one or more of the following: kinship, 
occupational, caste, state, economic, religious links, and so on. 
Mayer goes on to say that while the outgoing relationship may be 
diverse, the incoming links have all the, same content support 
for the candidate in the election. "33 
Perhaps, one of the most important properties of 'action-set', is its 
'content',, which means that the role of an organisation can change from 
economic, social and cultural to political. This also applies to 
individuals and the mass media. The political content of the #action-set' 
varies according to the extent the political candidate sees it as a 
potential linkage between it and the electorate for mobilisation of support, 
hence, its temporal nature to serve for election 
, 
needs. But this need is 
overgeneralised by Bott (1968: 317) whointerprets Mayer's concept of 'action- 
set' as "a temporary group reunited through various channels 
io serve some 
short term end 
My view is that ethnic unions and mass media. organisation transcend the 
election campaign. They can only be described, particularly ethnic unions, 
as 'action-sets' in the process of politicisation when their role becomes 
more politicýl than sbcio-economic or cultural. In Nigeria, they are 
continuously political irrespective of election campaigns or not, but there 
is a balance between their political roles and other functions at an 
election period. The most temp6rary level of 'action-set' is the individual 
level, where party candidates recruit the unemployed young people for 
various political activities. 
Harries-Jones in Mitchell's (1969: 309) study of political communication 
among the Mikomfwa communities in Zambia, reported that when political 
activists formed a new action-set, they were dismissed from the U, N. I. P. 
party. The new group then embraked upon an underground political 
communication movement to set up their own party. 
I have argued that the traditional rural communication system and the urban 
network systems are not discrete and opposing socio-political structures but 
that emerging networks of communicatin link traditional and urban 
environments. In a time of heightened political participation, as with a 
General Elf-ction, the interaction of these networks with and through the 
mass media may perhaps be best demonstrated through an analysis of 
particular social groups in the society. 
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First however, it will be helpful to take a closer look at some of the 
concepts which will be ivolved in its analysis: 'action-set', 'total 
network's 'density', 'linkages', 'connectedness', Ireachability', and 
'rang'. 
I LINKAGES 
Barnes (1954) makes a crucial point that groups are linked by lines and on 
the lines are actual people who initiate linkages. But Barnes does not tell 
us who these individuals are, their special characteristics and how we can 
distinguish them. 
From our earlier discussions, linkages are 'nodes' or cliques within the 
same network. Their main function is to connect different individuals, 
groups or wider geographical environment to a political system. This is 
broadly the national political communication, network role of linkages. 
Narrowly, and within group political communication, -. linkages can become 
complex but mainly horizontal and face-to-face in character. There is a 
general. involvement and everyone is linked directly-to one another. Leaders 
tan easily be distinguished from followers by the number of links between 
them and others in the system, while linkages between groups tend to be 
vertical and single-stranded. These are important in the analysis and 
interpretation of political communication activities and involvement which 
entails face-to-face access to political party, other rural and urban 
communities, other political leaders, the mass media institution, etc. 
In Igbo communities, the egalitarian, individualistic and competitive nature 
of the communities should be viewed as an important factor that determines 
the effectiveness of linkages (nodes and cliques) during election time. For 
a wider community beyond small villages to be involved in a national 
leadership election in a transitional society such as Nigeria with a high 
percentage of illiterates, the mass media political broadcast cannot achieve 
nationwide political participation. The elders, emirs, obas, village 
councillors, club or ethnic union leaders, committee or all the members of 
voluntary associatins could decide which other communities and organisations 
outside their own to link with, in order to mobilise political support for a 
particular political candidate. In the smallest socio-political unit in a 
patriachal kinship system such as Imo state in Nigeria, parents and 
relatives constitute important linkages (nodes 'and' cliques) to other 
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families in the communities to influence their children to vote for a 
particular political party candidate. 
As we shall see later, with the two different interrelated political 
communication environments, village/city, the linkages can even become more 
important than the "total network" concept as it was used by Mitchell 
(1969); Barnes (1954); Bott (1957); Sanjek (1974: 589); Howard, M. and 
Skinner, E. (1984: 4); etc., because it is the linkage that maintains the 
relationships with an individual when he moves from the village to the city, 
city to city, or city to village. On another level,, the linkage between 
ethnic organisations in the village and in the city forms an important 
political communication network which structurally reveals how particular 
ethnic groups and communities vote for a particular candidate. 
Linkages, nodes and cliques, are 'ties' between environments and political 
participants, they are essential ingredients in the kinship political 
structure of communication. Its political implications in the maintenance 
of strong socio-political and economic ties between urban and rural African 
and other transitional political communities cannot be over emphasised. 
Friedl in her study of social interaction among Greeks, states that "the 
role of kinship ties as mechanism for maintaining urban, rural connections 
is extensive and permeating. Nor does a change in social status from poorer 
to wealthier Greek peasants, or to any other more prestige giving position 
result'in the rupture of kinship ties and obligation,, " 35 Banton (1975) in 
his study of Freetown, West Africa made similar observations, and also Lucy 
Mair in her various studies in Nigeria. 
Individuals on the 'line' as links are important political communication 
ties between village and urban population in Nigeria. This can be 
demonstrated with the pattern of inieraction between relatives who live in 
the city and their kin in the village during election period. Frequency of 
visits between relatives and friends within and between cities and villagest 
vary widely but the movements are highly observable. When visits become 
more frequent, soical, political, economic or cultural reasons are behind 
them. Thus, to understand the structure of communication, the linkage bears 
the content of the communication itself. 
At another level, ethnic unions could perf orm. similar individual linkage 
functions through their leaders, selected members or all the members. The 
socio-political role of ethnic unions" formed the core investigation of 
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Audrey Srýochls (1977) study in Nigeria. She recognised the strong 
relationship between village and urban politics through ethnic/kinship ties. 
"The evidence of the Ibo indicates that when all other f actors are 
equal, the ethnic identity assumed in a particular situation is 
the most relevant for political participation. 1136 
On her investigation of the role of ethnic union with particular reference 
to Mbaise in Imo state, she discovered that in the rural areas, members of 
different villages "learned to co-operate with one another and to 
communicate on political matters when political unity provided the 
incentive. " But beyond the rural level, Mbaise people who lived in a city 
such as Port-Harcourt (in former Eastern Nigeria) formed a single and strong 
Mbaise union which overshadowed the clan divisions that existed among them 
in the rural villages. 
"Outside of the home area, the more inclusive Mbaise identity 
increased in importance, relative to the otherwise predominantly 
clan division. In the more complex, heterogenous political areas 
of Port-Harcourt and Eastern region, persons assumed the Mbaise 
identity. Just as the exigencies of political participation 
divided the clans in Mbaise, it united them in the larger arena, 
where Mbais4ý position as the largest cohesive community in Eastern 
region eliminated the necessity for joining a division alliance 
and thus conferred certain advantages.,, 
39 
This observation is a characertistic of all the Igbo communities. But at 
national political levels, their unions could ýemerge as the most important 
political linkage that mobilises support for a political party. For 
instance, before the Nigerian civil war, Igbo state union was more important 
in uniting all Igbos in various parts of the country in being N. C. N. C., in 
far greater effective ways than N. C. N. C. party or the mass media. Zik, in 
particular, benefited from the support of the Igbo State Union much the same 
way as the N. C. N. C. Indeed, nationally, the Igbo State Union and the 
N. C. N. C. were politically synonymous. 
Unlike the observations of Gluckman (1962: 8); and Barnes (1954: 44); 
Frenkenberg (1966: 257) states that in Large urban areas, 'large numbers of single- 
stranded relationships' exist which make it difficult for people to meet and 
that their activities are therefore 'comparatively isolated' from each 
other, in Eastern Nigeria, e. g. Imo state, the formation of ethnic unions or 
voluntary associations not only eliminates clashes and divisions that might 
exist between villages, but also strengthens ties between members of the 
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same community in the city f or socio-ecopolitical participation. The 
kinship tie which is the underlying structure, is essential in the 
understanding of political communication. 
The danger in such large scale single union linking the political activities 
of ethnic rural and urban groups to a particular ethnic natonal political 
party is that one or two political leaders from either ethnic union or the 
ethnic political party e. g. Igbo State Union and N. C. N. C. (M), could use 
the organisations to dominate regional politics, intensify inter-ethnic 
political competition, weaken natonal political development and prevent the 
growth of a nation-state political system (perhaps some of the reasons why 
the government has checked the development of such Unions in recent years by 
law). Secondly, when another political leader with opposing views and 
tendencies emerges through union and party network linkages, the emergent 
leader is suppressed or illegally 'removed' from the political scene. The 
case of Harries-Jones (1969: 309) studies cited above, is one example. But 
where the emergent new leader is powerful, and among various communities 
charismatically equivalent to the dominant leader, ethnic unions would 
either be actively split into two in support of the new political leader or 
the old leader, or become politically passive by concentrating more on 
economic, social or cultural activities during elections, or they could 
completely disintegrate, die out and new ones formed. The Zik and Ojukwu 
factions, and the formation of Ikemba Front are in fact some of the most 
important factors of network of political communication underlying changes 
within ethnic politics in Nigeria during 1983 election. The effect within 
Igbo communities was dramatic and the consequence as will be empirically 
illustrated, was the split of Igbo electorates between NPN and NPP, 
championed by'the two leaders in the last general election in Nigeria. This 
trend in political communication development, brings us to another important 
concept, that of 'Action-Set'. 
ACTION-SET OR COMMUNICATION-SET 
The concept of 'action-set' Mayer (1966: 108) and Mitchell (1969: 21) 
developed from Barnes (1954) as discussed earlier, has a major role in the 
understanding of recent and, in part, past political activities in Nigeria. 
Harries-Jones Zambia studies have showen that there is a direct and indirect 
assocation in the political mobilisation process between the political 
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candidate, and the action-set. Individuals or groups or organisations can 
act as communication-set. Their main function is to mobilise political 
participants behind a candidate. In Nigeria, where there are numerous party 
agents and organisations, the candidate could build up multiple or diverse 
linkages to mobilise political support. Mayer (1966) distinguished many 
features of action-set but the most important is that a wide variety of 
bases for linkage are involved. Indeed, major criteria are kinship, 
political party, religious sect, etc. 
The most important feature of action-set in Nigeria unlike what many authors 
and observers have recorded elsewhere, is that it is both permanent and 
temporary. The temporary action-set or communication set are individuals or 
temporary groups such as the Ikemba Front formed during the election. From 
the individual recruitment, they formed bands of thugs and large numbers of 
them were young and active school leavers. High-way robbers were also 
employed by different political parties. It was reported that during the 
last general election, the number of reported armed robberies dropped 
dramatically. But after the elections, the trend began to rise again. The 
degree to which thugs could disrupt the election campaign in Nigeria could 
be so high that it was highly. speculated that one of the reasons to expel 
illegal immigrants before the 1983 general election was to avert major 
disruptions. 
At the organisational level, action-set is more permanent because the ethnic 
unions, clubs, etc., still carry out community projects for the rural and 
urban areas when the elections are over. They become 'action-sets' during 
elections to assist the political candidate to mobilise various communities 
for political support. The concept of action-set emphasises communication 
between political candidates and various levels of action-sets depending 
critically on reachability. 
REACHABILITY 
Most of the African studies have been restricted in the application of the 
concept of reachability to individual contacts with others in the network 
system. But as has been pointed out earlier in the discussion of linkages 
of urban and village political systems, characterised by vertical and 
horizontal communications, when the two environments (urban and rural 
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settings) are interrelated, the concept of reachability can be immensely 
usef ul. Its richness is its ability to assess quantitatively communication 
flow during election campaigns between and within towns and villages. In 
relation to this view, factors which influence reachability's usefulness, 
have been set out by Mitchell on the condition that: 
"If a large proportion of the people in a network can be contacted 
within a relatively small number of steps then the network is 
compact in comparison with one in which a small proportion may be 
reached in the same number of steps. -38 
In this process and in relation to the structure of horizontal and vertical 
communications, two types of political communications based on reachability 
in Nigeria can be constructed: (a) those who can reach-each other more 
frequently, easily and directly without instrumental or human 
intermediaries, e. g. the media, and the opinion leaders and group leaders; 
(b) the specific use of the intermediaries such as the mass media, political 
actors, group leaders to reach the electorate as well as the political 
leaders, the political candidate, reaching the electors through 
intermediaries. 
Here the concept of reachability brings about the process of two-way-flow or 
exchange of political communication and information between leaders and 
followers using the mass media, group leaders, individuals, etc. as 
intermediaries. On another level, the concept is an examination of 
political communication where the environment and participants are directly 
linked but political actors do not use the intermediaries. Reachability can 
be considered at various analytical levels, groups, organisations, cities 
and villages, individuals, as stated earlier, in the process of political 
information flow, "where A is in direct contact with B and B with C but not 
A and C". This hypothetical network structure is important in the 
understanding of the relationship between the parties, the action-set and 
the various communities (masses) and how voters are influenced by direct 
contact with the candidate and his agents as opposed to indirect contact 
with them through action-sets (individuals, organisations or the mass 
media). The way people in Nigeria, who live in the cities and the villages 
are reached during elections varies rather slightly. 
Nigerians, particularly the rural poor, are not interested -in political 
party and candidate manifestos and policies but the immediate financial 
rewards they can obtain. Also the politicians do not present the electors 
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with clear manifestos and policies because Nigerian politics is established 
on ethnic setiments and alliances. Where immediate financial pressure is 
not put on the politicians, the second most imporant result of contact 
between the politician, action-set and the masses is the charisma of the 
politician. Mayer (1966) observed that in Africa, several competing 
charismatic figures and action-sets build up linkages within the same 
community for mobilisation of voters. By implication, the politician has 
direct contact with his electors and the mass media only to boost his 
political image among his people where he draws and can only draw his 
political support because of ethnic sentiment. During the last civilian 
government, members of the Federal House of Representatives were accused of 
neglecting their duties'and spending most of their time outside the capital. 
A member of the House once interviewed by Radio Nigeria, Owerri, stated that 
some representatives could not stay in Lagos attending to official duties 
while others were in their local constituencies 'offering money' to the 
electorate to vote them into power again. 
Some of the major problems in Nigerian politics begin to emerge when 
political leaders, the communication-set and the electorate are intensively 
localised for a natonal leadership election. There-is a dramatic shift from 
the process of mass media reaching a wider geograhical and heterogenous 
community to the small homogenous community where face-to-face communication 
predominates as the chidf vehicle for political information. 
Secondly, the emergence of several leaders, and action-sets with different 
party affiliations and interests and the fact tht each leader and his 
action-set can reach their electorate in a few 'steps', leads to the use of 
illegitimate processes of election campaign. Effective political 
communication becomes the function of face-to-face contact rather than the 
use of organised mass media political information. This process has 
intensified corruption at election time in Nigeria. Both the urban and 
village electors through the direct contacts with politicians and their 
local agents can state fairly accurately the extent of corruption and in 
particular the use of money during elections to influence voters* MY 
observations indicate that this could be the most important factor in the 
general elections in Nigeria in 1983. 
The process generated considerable personal and group conflicts both in the 
cities and in the villages. Here agýin, we begin to recognise the 
distinctive characteristics between urban and rural networks which were 
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observed by Barnes (Network and Political Process, 1966), that the denseness 
of network relationships of friendship and strangers or even, of patron and 
client that help to fill in the relatively sparse urban network. In 
Nigeria, elections are dotted with conflicts, thus friendr; are less reliable 
than relatives in the village, hence most people go back to participate more 
actively in their rural areas than in the city. This is particularly so in 
Igboland where city states did not-develop before the colonial urban cities 
were created. This is in sharp contrast with Zaria, Kano, etc. in the 
north, Ibadin, Oyo, Benin, etc.. in the west. The village/urban structures 
in Imo state are still very distinct in all respects. The nature of the 
conflicts thereupon compelled political participants/ actors - leaders and 
voters to make choices between friends and relatives, city or village and 
mass media or free face-to-face communication and began to address itself to 
the diminsion of what Barnes described as "total-network" to determine the 
extent of all political communication in all the systems - rural as well as 
urban. 
TOTAL NETWORX 
The original source of this term was Barnes (1954) in his study of Bremnes 
0 
'A Norwegian Island'. He sums up the Islanders socio-cultural activities 
thus, 
"In Bremnes society, what is lef t is largely, though not 
exclusively,, a network of ties of kinship, friends and 
neighbourhood. This network runs across the whole of the society 
and does not stop at the parish boundary. It links Bremnes folk 
with their kinsmen and friends in other parishes as well as 
knitting them together within the parish. -39 
In Nigeria, the concept of 'total network', brings into focus the 
relationship between an individual or group who migrates from the village to 
the city and how relationships are maintained or developed in the two 
environments. Ties between migrants in the two environments are socio- 
political and eco-cultural. In the election period, the economic contents 
of the ties are closely assoicated with the entire political campaigning 
process. But the effectiveness of the total network depends on the social 
relationship between participants.. That is, extended family structure as it 
prevails in Imo state, Nigeria, could become one of the most important 
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political communication factors or effective mobilisation of political 
support, In one total-network of political communication, parents, 
relatives, friends, co-workers, the media and money, all in varied and 
quantifiable degrees, influence the political behaviour of the particpant. 
In this process of political participation and mobilisation, we can 
distinguish what Mitchell has described as Irecognisable relationship' 
designed on a temporary basis to achieve certain goals. e. g. political 
support and relationship based on recognised right and obligation. These 
are useful concepts which help us to understand the structure of political 
communication and influence in urban and rural politics in Nigeria where 
relationships and other factors of political influence are varied. 
We should remember also that permanent linkages do not presuppose proximity. 
Mitchell (1962: 25) points out that "there are many circumstances where an 
intense link with. a. person living some distance away can become an important 
factor in the behaviour of an individual". Also Srinivas and Beteille noted 
that "many of those who have left the village continue to influence its 
social lif e in a number of ways ... Several of them send remittance to 
relatives in the village every month. -38 Philip Mayer also reported that 
tribes (kinsmen) who live in the same town maintain an intense relationship. 
Similarly, Peace and Lloyd in their studies in Nigeria have recorded the 
same pattern of relationship among urbanites and villagers in Nigeria. 
I have argued that the 'intensity' of political communication in Nigeria, 
can be analysed at two major levels, the level of group affiliation as 
illustrated by the study of Audrey Smoch within Mbaise and Abriba 
communities and at the level of the individual who constantly maintains 
links with relatives in the village and new friends; co-workers, social 
clubs, etc., in the city. In and between village and city, political 
communication processes can be fully examined through group or individual 
linkages. 
Summary of the Major Propositions to be tested in the thesis 
In Chapter One different definitions and analyses of classical conceptions 
of political communication were presented. Also, critical reviews of 
orthodox concepts of political communication based on industrial or 
developed nations mass media research and studies were discussed. 
In questioning the relevance of some of the concepts in relation to Nigerian 
political communication, I have proposed in Chapter Two, a new theoretical 
and methodological approach which which can help us to understand political 
communication processes in Nigeria. I have shown some differences between 
advanced nations and Nigeria. These differences call for different 
approaches to the study of political communication. The thesis will discuss 
the structure of changes in terms of what existed, what has changed, and 
what caused the changes and their impact on the new political communication 
system in Nigeria. The section on historical changes will examine the 
structure of political communication in the pre-colonial administration. 
Various factors which have affected the pre-colonial systems of political 
communication and how and why these old structures /systems persist despite 
the introduction of mass media will be discussed. The history and 
development of party politics and the mass media will be discussed and will 
focus on different groups in the country particularly the elite. 
Nigeria as a transitional nation has two systems of political communication, 
the traditional and the modern mass media communications system. For 
political processes e. g. election campaign, the politicians and the 
political communicators use the appropriate combination of different 
channels of communication to reach the electorate. More often, different 
media are used to reach different categories of political audience. 
In this thesis, I will attempt to discover how certain identified groups in 
the communities expose themselves to different communication systems. I 
will also compare the degree of exposure with the degree with which the 
audience participated and voted in the 1983 general elections as a result of 
media political information. I propose that in Nigeria, exposure to 
political broadcasts does not necessarily imply an effective impact or 
influence on the audiences' electorial behaviour. 
In order to eliminate false assumptions on the influence of different 
channels of political communication in Nigeria, relational data analysis 
will be used to determine the actual relationship between different channels 
of political communication and different political participants. Besides 
different media channels, other factors of political influence peculiar to 
Nigeria such as kinship association, friendship, relatives, immediate 
financial reward, school/class mates will also be examined statistically. 
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These indeed are vital factors of the interpersonal network of political 
communication which if ignored in any investigation on how Nigerians 
politically communicate leave a hiatus to be filled by false assumptions. 
The thesis shall demonstrate that modern mass media are more urban centred 
than the traditional pattern of political communication which is akin to 
rural villige areas. The extent to which the mass media and traditional 
political communication systems form an appropriate mixture of political 
communication in the urban and rural areas in relationship with five 
mutually exclusive groups will be illustrated. In particular the dominant 
position of the elites in the sphere of mass media for political control and 
participation shall be compared with the same elites use of traditional 
communication networks to influence and mobilize the communities for 
political action. The bases in which the elites are inevitably compelled to 
use both traditional and modern media to participate and mobilize others to 
participate in Nigerian politics shall be fully explored. The vital roles 
and participation of the illiterate masses in rural and urban area make the 
processes of interpersonal, symbolic and traditional networks of political 
communication very important in Nigerian politics. The pencultimate socio- 
political structure which defines, and- determines the vital roles of 
interpersonal network of communication in Nigerian politics is the kinship 
structure and associations. It is this structure in regard to communication 
and politics which will be explored throughout this thesis. 
Also the thesis will not ignore the roles of individuals e. g. local leaders, 
electors, etc. in the communities. Charismatic leadership based on kinship 
af f iliation shall be emphasised. Some of the impacts of these leaders on 
the masses shall be discussed to show the nature of relationships between 
voters during election campaign. Participant observation of the 1983 
elections will be used to show how the relationship between members of a 
community can be weakened or strengthened during elections depending on the 
roles played by local- political leaders. At this level of political 
relationship, I shall show that kinship network ties rather than the mass 
media influence the pattern of the electorates' political behaviour. Other 
sources of political influence and participation other than kinship ties and 
the mass media will also be investigated. 
On the basis of theoretical explorations and investigations, some 
conclusions will be drawn to represent a general structure of political 
communication in Nigeria particularly in Igboland in an election situation. 
These will include the structure of the relationship between rural and urban 
areas and communication channels. 
From the 1979 to 1983 general elections a few major changes in political 
communication in Nigeria will be revealed e. g. the role of ethnic unions, 
relationship with the different states etc. Statistical evidence that 
indicates the new pattern of-politics particularly among ethnic groups will 
be used to access the new political tendency. The role of the mass media in 
the process of reinforcement of traditional patterns of political conflict 
in Nigeria will be shown. 
The relationship between ownership of media reception facilities, exposure 
influence and voting will be examined and interpersonal political 
communication influence and corruption will be shown in its relationship to 
the networks of political communication and influence. 
come comments will be made on political personality and the role of the 
actual policies proposed by political groupings. The functions and relative 
importance of political communication in each of the five groups in the 
study will deserve some remarks before any suggestion and recommendations 
are made on the proper approach to the study of political communication in 
Nigeria. 
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NETWORKS OF POLITICAL COMMICATION IN PRE-COLONIAL NIGERIA 
In the pre-colonial Nigeria, the political communication systems, in 
general, could be described as traditi6nal. Economic, socio-cultural and 
religious activities were closely integrated with politics, and 
communication was characterised by oral and symbolic means. In 
correspondence with our definition in Chapter One, the political system was 
seen as a set of 'processes of interaction' or as a subsystem of the social 
system interacting with other non-political subsystems, such as economic, 
cultural and religious systems etc. 
However, the forms of political communication between different pre-colonial 
communities in Nigeria were of ten distinct and sharp particularly between 
the three major tribes in the three major regions - Hausa/Fulani in the 
North, Igbos in the East and the Yorubas in the West. Within these regions, 
there are also numerous political comunication cultures peculiar to their 
peoples. Some of the outstanindg minority ethnic groups who have become 
important political groups in Nigeria today are the Tiv, Nupe, and the 
Kanuris in the North, the Ibibios, Efiks, and the Ijaws in the South-East; 
the Edoma and the Benins in the South-West. In the pre-colonial political 
communication systems, some were more advanced than others, such as the 
emirates of the North and the Oyo-Benin kingdoms in the West. 
HAUSA/FULANI PRE-COLONIAL POLITICAL COMK[JUICATION NETWORK SYSTEMS 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Muslim world, particularly 
around the Mediterranean and the Middle East, felt challenged by the rising 
power and influence of Christianity from Europe. Hence, spiritual 
consciousness began in the form of religous and political movements to re- 
establish the power and influence of Islam. Wahhabiyya of Arabia, Sanusiyya 
of Cyrenacia, -Mahdiyya of Eastern Sudan and the three jihads leaders of 
Western Suden in which Northern Nigeria constituted the largest part, Othman 
Dan Fodio, Hama Bari and Alhaji Umar were outstanding leaders of such 
3.1 
movment. 
In the Western Sudan religious political movement, the jihads leaders were 
mainly Fulanis. There are many speculations to the origins of the Fulanis. 
Orginally they were not a part of Northern Nigeria. C. I. Temple, once 
lieutenant governor of Norther Province of Nigeria, offered some tentative 
suggestions about their origin. He suggested that they came from North 
Africa particularly from the Hyksos, Egypt or elsewhere in the Middle East 
or the Canary Islands. The most accurate information about the origins of 
the Fulanis could have been obtained from the learned writers of Bello, the 
son of Dan Fodio. Curiously enough and despite his learning, he ordered 
the destruction of Hausa/Fulani records, which if kept intact today could 
have provided original and vital information about the history, origin and 
politics of the Fulanis in the nineteenth century. The fact however, that 
the Fulani leadership could read, write and keep records, meant that they 
were advanced in political information beyond the oral medium. Their 
penetration into Hausa city-states of the North accelerated political and 
religious movement beyond the original Hausaland. 
The original Hausa political georgraphy was believed to have spread over 
Sokoto, Kano, Zaira and Bauchi. Before the arrival of the Fulanis into the 
region, the Hausas remained more or less a distinct race. It was 
speculated that Hausaland consisted of seven states (city-states) of Kano, 
Rano, Zeg-Zeg (Zaria), Daura, Gobir, Katsina and Zomfara. Prior to the 
spread of Mohammedanism, the Hausa people were mainly pagans. 
Between city states, mutual defence cooperation existed and administratively 
they were loosely confederated. They were relatively autonomously 
independent city-states but within the region and at any particular point in 
time, one state was reckoned to be more powerful than others through the 
rise of one in such pre-eminence but saw the decline of another previously 
holidng such esteem. It was military supremacy that one city state became 
pre-eminent over others. 
Burns (1978) noted that: 
"Zaria conquered the pagan countries to the south and subdued the 
Bauchi, Gobir, fought and held at bay by the Nomad tribes of the 
Nortern desert, while Kano fought without success against Bornu. 
From time to time armies overran Hausaland, while about the year 
1513, Askia the Great, king of Songhia, conquered Katsina, Zaria 
and Kano and made them provinces of his empire. "l 
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The major political conflict between the Hausas'and the Kanuris before the 
advent of the Fulanis in the region was slave raids, boundary disputes and 
little ideological differences between them. 
The Fulanis were peaceful immigrants to Northern Nigeria and their entry 
into the region ushered in a new and revolutionary dimension in the city 
states, political, judicial and social communication in, the region. 
"A form of government grew up based on the doctrine of Islam, with 
well organised fiscal system and a highly trained and learned 
judiciary administering Mohammedian law with ability and 
integrity. Each states was ruled over by its king, assisted by 
the usual ministers of oriental government. -2 
James Coleman (1965) suggested that the Fulanis conquered the Hausas in two 
phases with two methods: 
"A gradual infiltration of the Hausa kingdom over a period of 
centuries, and then military conquest. The Fulani imperial 
superstructure was loosely organised and highly centralised, and 
towards the later part of the nineteenth century, the emirates 
became increasingly independent. In certain respects, the Fulani 
overlords, like the Mandu dynasty of China, tended to become 
culturally assimilated to their subjects. -3 
So far, we can distinguish two political groups in Nigeria, 
ýhe Fulanis who, 
characteristically, were learned and religious in Islamic doctrine. They 
entered the region from the outside, bringing with them their doctrine and 
knowledge. On the other hand, the native Hausas who were not literate but 
had an organised political system on city states criteria. Through 'gradual Q 
assimilation' the two socio-political systems converged but the natural one 
became a dominant political system. How did the Fulanis became assimilated 
into the Hausa communities over the centuries? 
By occupation, the Fulanis were nomads while the Hausas were farmers. But 
with time and through the network of kinship and development based on 
marriage, the differences between them became more obscured. This was a 
situation which prevailed among the elite Fulanis and the argicultural 
peasant Hausas. The content of the network of communication was socio- 
economic and subsequently cultural. But as time passed by, the Hausa 
aristocracy began to utilise their education for political purposes. Many 
of them became teachers, judges, scribes and advisers to the Hausa 
aristocracy. The gradual proces of assimilation implied that most of the 
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Fulanis could speak Hausa as well. Yet another group of the Fulanis, 
decided to reamLa characteristically distinct and culturally tended to 
identify themselves with the old forms of Fulani cultural values$ and did 
not intermarry with the Hausas either. The group claimed descent from the 
true Fulani stock. This descent consciousness is a form of quasi-city- 
state-consclousness which has soma Important Implications in today's 
zLLaorlty ethnic political Identification in Nigeria, a factor which is 
considerably Important In the agitation for 'more state creation'. Also 
within Hausa/Fulani political oligarchy. the Inational consciousness' is a 
part of the sentiment towards ruling class Identity in the region, 
The structure of political relationship In H&U3a/Fulani communications at 
this time had assumed both vertical, horizontal and isolated network 
systems. The elite Fulants were horizontally linked to the masses throuh 
the network of kinship ties (marriage etc. ) while at the same time through 
their political administrative funciton in the Hausa aristocracy, they 
maintained Institutional and vertical communication network with the 
authorities. The group that vas totally isolated from the Hausa 
aristocracy were the cow-Fulanis, yet through Islamic religion, it was 
linked to the Fulani elite. This structure of network of relation between 
different groups in Hausa/Fulani communities is important in the 
understanding of the network of religio4s and political alliances which 
altered the Hausa political system before the British arrived. 
For many years. the FulanLs remained a subject race within the Hausa 
aristocracy until the rise of Othman Dan Fodio and the jihad of 1804. In 
the communities. the different groups of Fulanis were aware of the practical 
problems of living together with the pagan Hausas and under the autocratic 
power of the Hausa aristocrats who were also pagans. Some ardent Fulani 
Muslims* thought they were educated and could still share political power in 
the Hausa political administration,, rejected associations with Hausa 
aristocrats. They devoted such of their time to the ordinary Hausas, 
teaching and converting them to Islam. This group was called the Borroroje 
Fulani. But the Fulani Ciddat through their teaching and association with 
the massest biased and instigated the latter's mind against the corrupt 
ruling class. The very nature of their face-to-face communication with the 
masses who were less educatedv was an Important communication network In 
which religion and socio-polItIcal justice were the main content of 
Influence. 
3.4 
The effective network of communication between the Fulani Gidda and the 
converted and non-Muslim Hausas became so strong that in due times the Hausa 
masses began an open confrontation with their Hausa rulers. Kinship and 
religious ties were the basis of unity among the Hausa peasants and the 
Fulanis. 
"Muslims objected to the conscription into pagan armies to fight 
brother muslims; they hated the practice of selling muslims into 
slavery; they despised the sultants for their sacrifices and 
belief in spirits, for the luxury and sinfulness of court life as 
well as the severity demanded from the commons. They complained 
about the judgement In the courts, and bribery and corruption in 
appointments to office. Most important of all, the merchants 
disliked the heavy market taxes, vhile the nomads hated the tax an 
C&ttle. -4 
The scholars, particularly the 'wanderers', convinced and indoctrinated the 
masses that the Koranic laws were abused by the ruling Hausa aristocrats. 
Consequently, both practising and non-practising pagan Hausa joined in a 
mass movement against the ruling class. They asked for reforms from above 
and sorted leadership among themselves, which obviously came from the 
'wandering' Fulani scholars. Among them was Othman Dan Fodio. He condemned 
corruption, unjust government and the oppression of the poor and the weak, 
socio-political ideology* which won him the support of the masses to carry 
out his political reforms. Under his command, the Jihad was directed 
against the pagans, and also those who were lukewarm to Islamic doctrine. 
The Jihad went beyond the justice and religious doctrine it advocated, but 
with easy conquests and victories won over a short period of time, the Jihad 
became a territorial political and economic conquest mission of what became 
known as Sokoto Caliphate. Bornu, which was a Muslim state, was attacked 
and conquered in 1808 but later regained its independence under the military 
skill of Sarkin Muslamig El Kanemi. Many Hausas joined in the Jihad for 
socio-political reasons and not religion. 6 
In spite of the abhorring aristocratic behaviour of the Hausa ruling class 
by the masses, Fodio never advocated for the use of violence and he avoided 
bloodshed to achieve political and social justice. He idealised and 
advocated the rule of negotiations, discussion. meetings, dialogues and 
common agreement between the rulers and the ruled. The content of all 
communication and the decisions on just society was based on Islamic rule. 
With the Sultan of Gobirs Bawal Fodio negotiated for religious freedom* 
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release of Muslim prisoners and tax reduction for all the citizens in the 
emirate. At the death of Bawa, his son Naf ata came to pbwer and under the 
pressure from strong Hausa pagans, he withdrew all his father's agreement 
with Dan Fodio. The followers of Dan Fodio, including the already highly 
integrated network of Hausa peasants with the Fulani Gidda, rebelled against 
the Hausa ruling class and civil war erupted. This was the start of the 
jihad, a religious and political revolutionary civil war which has had 
remarkable political impact on Nigerian political systems till today. 
By 1877, the entire Northern region including the powerful Yoruba city-state 
of Oyo and Ilorin in Western Nigeria, had come under the direct control and 
administration of these emirates. For instance, Bello aimed at 
strengthening his own position and limiting the influence and power of his 
army. Like his father Fodio, Bello emphasised the rule of law and order 
under the principle of Islam. While he tried to control the army who were 
largely Fulani scholars, through the Mallams, he made the public aware of 
their religious, political and social importance as the pillars of Islam who 
uphold the principles of Islam by their teaching. It was through thia small 
group of elites that: 
"the Fulanis were able to maintain their rule for a hundred years, 
a comparatively small number of aliens governing a subject people, 
is a proof of their outstanding ability among the West African 
tribes. -5 
Having conquered a vast region during the jihad, one of the major problems 
faced by the Sultan of Sokoto was how to develop a network of political 
communication in order to ensure effective control and administration. 
Checking the inlfuence and power of the army made the military option a real 
and vital alternative. Besides, within Sokoto itself, Bello was confronted 
with internal divisions and problems; thus he deciaed to maintain good 
relationships with the emirs. This was a mutual understanding guided by 
Islamic principles. Relations with the Sultan of Sokoto was not a 
domination and exercise of power but religious alliance. This is one of the 
weaknesses of face-to-face communication whre wide goegraphical areas cannot 
be reached effectively and on time, to regulate and control political 
behaviour through information flow. 
In view of the problem, Bello created a confederation of states* within the 
caliphateo Member states should not attack each other and when any member 
was attacked by an outside state, all members should come to her aid. All 
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the states of the conf edera tion were united by loyalty to the Sokoto 
Caliphate. Tribute taxes were sent to Sokoto. Perhaps one of the most 
efficient systems developed by the administration was the tax collection 
system. It could have been one of the best in Africa at this time. 
"Every form of handicraft had its special tax: smiths, dyerss 
weavers, leather makers, salt-makers, canoe-men, hunters, 
fishermen, ferry-men etc. In some places a liquor tax was 
imposed, in others each date palm or beehive paid its toll. 
Prostitutes, dancing-girls and gamblers were taxed by one or 
another chief. Sellers in the market had for the most part had to 
pay royalties on the weavers they sold. Traders paid toll at 
every town which they passed. To all these and many other taxes 
added the guisua or present which every man had to bring when he 
came to see his immediate superior, more especially at the 
periodical festivals, together with arbitrary levies in cash or 
kind, irregular times' without trial, and forced labour for 
building the city walls or the houses of chiefs. "6 
At this point in time, Hausa/Fulani political system became overtly more 
stratified. Militarism was deemphasised, and legitimacy was based on 
loyalty to the authority accoridng to the order of Islam. The power of the 
authorities was economically sustained by the masses' labour and there was 
no direct communication between the rulers and ruled except through the 
Malams who formed the block of local administrators and teachers of Islamic 
rules and law., 
While the new political and social relationships were being established 
within and between the large empire of Sokoto Caliphate after the jihad, the 
jihad awakened new political consciousness in those states outside the 
Sokoto Caliphate. This was comparatively the same as the political 
consciousness inspired in the Cermans and the English by the French 
Revolution. In the case of the jihad, those most affected were the Bornu 
empire, North East. of the Caliphate, and the Yoruba kingdoms immediately 
soutil of the Niger. Borun's years of commercial domination along the Benue 
and centi; al Sudan was challenged. Border and territorial conflicts were 
intensified, yet among these Islamic states, the Sokoto's principle of Islam 
attracted great interest to its neighbours. For instance, Dan Fodio, Bello 
and Abdullahi wrote about 200 books and pamphlets which had great impact on 
their neighbours outside the confederation as much as it had on those within 
the Caliphate, 
This was an advanced form of written communication which was not obtainable 
in any other part of pre-colonial Nigeria where oral and folk media were the 
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only basic political and social communication. The writings embraced a wide 
range of subjects including office administration, religion, policy and 
decision-making processes, judiciary and equity, law and order, agriculture, 
craft, etc. Written information therefore was responsible for the 
uniformity of law and order, religion and political practices in the North. 
Organised information system partly made it unique and ideal for Lugard to 
apply the system of indirect rule in the region. The flow of information 
was from the Hausa-Fulani superstructure to the mases, but the roles of 
educated Malams in the midst of the public was necessary to impart the 
written knowledge. In the political system, the Malams acted as the 
linkage, nodes and cliques in the network of association between the ruled 
and the rulers. 
But Islam was a more important relationship between the socio-political 
Malams in the communication network than effective two-way flow of political 
communication which could not be maintained between two different classes, 
the ruling class and the masses. The actual power of the ruling Fulani 
after the jihad was unchallenged because the Fulani Malam. has two important 
obligatory ties with the ruling class- (a) kinship and (b) religion. These 
two network ties between'the ruling Fulani and the Fulani Malams (teachers) 
were lacking between the Fulani Gidda and the Hausa aristocrats before the 
jihad. Non obligatory relationship between them justified the Fulani Gidda 
mobilising the masss against their rulers who were overthrown through 
political but apparent religious movement - the jihad. 
THE KANURI PEOPLES 
Besides the Hausa-Fulani . another 
important and highly centralised 
governemnt in the Northern Nigeria in the pre-colonial period, was the Kanem 
or Bornu empire. It wis mainly composed of the Kanuri tribe in the North 
East of Hausa-land. The inf luence of the empire was once felt by many 
tribes of Southern Sudan and Sub-Sahara regions. Most of its political 
tradiions, were simil: ar to those practised in the Hausa-Fulani empire, and 
even more alike after the region adopted Islam. 
"Af ter the adoption of the Muhammedan religion in Bornu, the 
system of law and taxation closely approximated to that in f orce 
in Hausaland. "7 
It was not the Fulanis who brought the Muslim religion to the Kanuri people. 
The Kanuris became Muslims centuries bef ore the advent of the Fulani in the 
North of Nigeria (Coleman 1965, Banton, P. A. 1913; Nisbet, 1905). The 
principles of Islam and its political culture was fully entrenched into the 
Bornu political system long before the revolutionary jihad movement began. 
From this point of view, the centralised system of government in Northern 
Nigeria preceeded the Fulani jihad political culture. The Fulanis merely 
displaced the ruling class but did not alter the structure of political 
system. Thus, to describe the true structure of political communication 
system in the pre-colonial Nigeriao the era of Fulani domination or the 
Bornu Muslim system could only reveal a phase in the political development 
in Nigeria. 
It will suffice to briefly describe the political system of some of the old 
city-states in Northern Nigeria before the advent of Islam in the region. 
One of the oldest Hausa states and one of the last to be affected by the 
Fulani jihad and the revolution was Zazzau (Zaria). It had a stratif ied 
socio-political culture. Broadly speaking, the city-state of Zaria was 
divided into two main classes, the 'free' and the 'unfree'. Within each of 
the main divisions, there were sub-divisions or categories of socio- 
political groups. For instance, in the 'free' socio-political group, three 
main subsystems could be identified: 
a) The royal class 
b) The bureaucratic class 
C) The commoners 
This socio-political structure still exists in several communities in 
Northern Nigeria. At national and local government levels, they are 
described as 'traditional rulers'. The royal class is the aristocratic 
group and possesses the highest political power. They are the ruling class 
from where all the successive emirs to the throne are selected by 
inheritance. The bureaucratic class is composed of men with high offical 
positions and they are often appointed by the emire and they include 
administrators and palace officials. The commoners are composed of the 
petty bourgeois - locally called 'Falakawal, the artisans, the farmers, the 
artists and petty traders etc. Socio-politically, these are less 
significant group but Hausa by birth. They were closely associated in their 
daily activities with the 'unfree' class made up of slaves and eunuchs who 
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were either traders or captives during the inter-tribal wars and slave 
raids. 
The social stratification consequntly, bears with it an ordered status and 
role allocation in the entire political system of Zaria city-state. Whether 
'free' or 'unfree', every member of the society played a part in the 
political system. But the emanicipated or the 'free', particularly the 
aristocracy undertake the more fundamental political, socio-economic 
decisions and their dominant roles are attached with honour and respect from 
the general public. The unemancipated categories were assigned to the more 
general and instrumental duties. Politically, or otherwise, Zaria society 
and power was very unevenly distributed to all classes and in most cases the 
ideological and major decision-making positions are held by the free class. 
Despite this unevenness of power distribution, the concept of power among 
Zaria peoples was relatively dynamic which implies that internal and 
external influence on the system could generate some observable changes over 
time. The structure of relationship between differ ent classes allowed 
horizontal flow of information which could guarantee changes thus, 
"one is little surprised to see a diffuse power structur *e 
i7n which 
the Malams, the chamber officials (composed of enunuchs and slave 
officials) feature. "8 
The 'diffused power structure' is located within different city-state 
apparatus for legitimisation of power. These included the police, the 
prison, the court, educational institutions, the religious organisations and 
the family itself. These institutions served cohesive and coercive roles 
for the maintenance of law and order within the city-state political system. 
The more coercive institutions such as the police and the army, were more 
closely associated with the royal class and themselves constituted an 
important part of the powerful class. The king (emire) was the head in the 
council of decision-makers who are drawn from all classes of Zaria society. 
Every decision is constitutionally made and the council does not operate on 
the principle of non-monarchical autocracy nor on one class consensus. The 
power of the constitutional monarchy is very crucial and essentially at 
different stages of decision process, set a balance with the state council 
of the city-state and this in turn generates a check on the other 
authorities within the council of the state and the centre of Zaria 
communities. 
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This structure of political relaionship in pre-colonial city-states in 
Nigeria puts into the concept that in all traditional societies, political 
communication is informal. Some tend to use the term informal as 
disorganised, random engagement in political discussions and decisons 
between the rulers and the ruled. The Zaria pre-colonial political system 
clearly indicates that the society was well organised in its socio-political 
relationship Decisions were selectively organised. But the ruling class 
engaged in face-to-face communication wihtin formal organisation. This 
structure of political communication is identical to the lobby among MPs in 
modern day politics as well as decision-making among Cabinet Ministers on 
key issues. Information on these issues do not reach the public through the 
media but via oral communication. A more relevant characteristic of 
political communication in traditional society such as Zaria has been 
pointed out in Chapter One, in which Pye (1963: 24) states "that 
communication is not systematically organised, there is a lack of 
professional commentators and participation is as a result of political 
position or social organisation and information flow according to the line 
of social hierarchy and individual and individual's relationship with others 
in the community. " He further stressed that 'the process in traditional 
societies was not independent of either the ordering of social relationship 
or-the content of the communication. ' 
By implication therefore, the flow of poli: tical inofrmation in Zaria society 
was from the ruling class decision-making group headed by the emire to tlie 
commoners and the 'unfree'. But at all levels, comunication was 
characterised by face-to-face comunication and three was a relative absence 
of professional communicators. The village head who was a member of the 
ocuncil, acted as a leading politician and a communidator to his community. 
Indeedq this stucture in varing degrees constituted the pattern of political 
communication in all pre-colonial societies in Nigeria, both among the 
Yorubas, the Igbos and the minority ethnic groups. 
THE YORUBA PRE-COLONIAL POLITICAL CONKUNICATION SYSTEM 
The political headquarters of the Yoruba people was at Ile-Ife, which was 
perhaps a large and powerful empire. But Oranmiyan foundýd the new Oyo, 
while his father or grandfather Oduduwa was still the ruling king of Ile- 
_________________________________3.1t 
Ife. Ajaka succeeded Oranmiyan. It was during the reign of Shango that the 
headquarters were moved from Ile-Ife to Oyo but the latter still remained 
the spiritual centre of the Yoruba people under the spiritual custody of the 
Oni. 
The king of Oyo is ref erred to as the Alaf in and when Shango was the 
overlord of all the Yoruba chief s, his authority was exercised as far as 
Accra, the Niger, and Dahomey. Like the Sokoto Calipahte, Yoruba kingdoms 
were composed of numerous city-states. The states in time began to split 
and new states emerged from the old. This was as a result of a series of 
wars that broke out among the Yourbas. Fulani mercenaries were invited by 
different Yoruba clans, and the once powerful states of Yoruba kingdom broke 
up into several independent states. By the end of 1850, four new states, 
Ife, Ibadan, Ekiti, and Ilesha emerged. Ibadan gradually became very 
powerful and was able to check the further penetration of Hausa/Fulani 
soldiers into Yorubaland. Ibadan also spearheaded a new leadership in 
Yorubaland, a new political consciousness awakened by the jihad, in which 
the Yorubas were united to resist the influence of Hausa-Fulani. 
The politilcal systems of the Yorubas in the pre-cqlonial period in 
comparison to Hausa/Fulani system was semi-organised and differed from the 
latter in many respects. A description of one of them hopefully would 
reveal the major characteristics of pre-colonial Yoruba political system and 
the structure of communication within it. Oyo af ter the decline of the 
political power of Ifeq became the most important political kingdom bearing 
all the significant characteristics of Yoruba pre-colonial political 
communication systems. 
"Oranminyan had chosen Oyo as his capital because it was a fertile 
sector of the Savannah belt, with good access to the Niger and 
caravan trails leading both from North and East to West. It was 
also strategically placed to defend the new kingdom against the 
neighbourhing powers of Borgu and Nupe, and was one of the 
terminations of the caravan trails from the Notth ... the 
establishment of twin kingdoms, Oyo and Benin, which until the end 
of the nineteenth cnetury were to remain two of the most powerful 
kingdoms on the West coast ... an empire that controlled most of 
Yorubaland. "9 
The administration of the Yoruba political system was under the direct 
influence of the Alaf in (the king of Oyo and the suzerin of all clans of 
Yoruba tribe). Like the Zaria city state, there was' a council of state, 
made up of selected elders from all the Yoruba states. But unlike the 
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autocratic emire of Zaria, the Alaf in was controlled by the council of 
elders. These elders till today are very powerful traditional groups in 
Yoruba politics. At the beginning of the 19th century the rule of 
primogeniture (eldest son inherits all) was encouraged but later was 
abandoned and replaced by very complicated and rather peculiar ritual 
processes of selection or appointment of kings. In addition, there were a 
number of chiefs or councillors of state, the ward heads of Oyo city, who 
were directly under the leadership of Bashorun - the Prime Minister. These 
had one type or the other influence on the king. 
The complexity of the Yoruba political system lies on the peculiar structure 
of leadership. For instance, the prince who was the eldest son of the 
Alaf in, . at the age of eighteen would 
be persuaded to take his life by 
suicide and often he was forced to do so. This was enforced by the council 
of elders, chief councillors and the Prime Minister in order to safeguard 
the king from any plot by a son ambipious for the throne. Also, most of the 
senior army officers and commanders were slaves and eunuchs, because they 
had no legal right to rule nor anyone in their line to inherit the throne, 
hence they had no ambition for power. In general, suicide among the Yoruba 
was regarded as an honourable death. Thus not only the eldst son but 
several other members of the Alafin family were required to end their lives 
by suicide particularly at the death of the Alafin. Some took pride to die 
with the Alafin who 'was considered Ekeji Orisa-companion of the gods, as 
well as owner of the land and lord of life' (Peter M. Williams 1960: 362). 
However, the socio-economic and political administation of Oye empire was 
virtually carried out by three eunuchs, the Osi Efu - of the left and 
minister of political affairs - who often died with the Alafin, the Ona Efa, 
the Eunuch of the centre and the minister of justice, Otun Efa, the Eunuch 
of the right who was the minister of religious affairs. Enf orcement of 
suicide was not restricted to the members of the Alafin family. *ThIe cabinet 
ministers could be persuaded to do so including the Alaf in himself, though 
he was regarded as holy, thus his subjects were not allowed to touch him. 
But if he refused to commit suicide, particularly when he became either too 
popular or unpopular with his subjects, then the Mesi of Oyo took measures 
to defy, him and then eliminate him. The community could not regard the 
event as assassination. 
"The main check on the power of the Alaf in was held by the Oyo 
Mesi who, if they felt the Alaf in had exceeded his powers, could 
14-1 
divine that all was not well between the Alaf in and his spiritual 
double and force him to commit suicide by presenting him with an 
empty calabash or parrot's eggs, or more directly by informing him 
that he failed to conform to precedent. However, the Oyo Mesi 
were restrained from abuse of this power by the fact that one of 
their members had to die with the Alafin. " 
A late development to check the abuse of power of Alaf in, the elders, the 
council of chiefs and the Mesi Oyo, was the introduciton of a 'secret 
society' known as the 'Ogboail, a cult or socio-political club which has 
great influence on the political class in Yorubaland. We noted in Chapter 
one, that Lloyd , P. C. (1967: 270,271) emphasised the importance of 
association and internal structure of organisation in the analysis of 
political system in Yorubaland. He maintained, unlike Brown and Fortes 
(1940: 1-15), that it was through this organisation that the structure of 
political power and changes could be understood. It was also through this 
structure of organisaton which defined the political system that the 
efficient network of political communication to operate the system was 
maintained. The communicaiton process between the Alafin, the ministers and 
the communities of the Oyo empire involved different levels of network of 
relationship but each level of interaction was specificially characterised 
by face-to-face, communication. There was complete lack bf written 
information on politics and religion matters such as was found in the Sokoto 
Caliphate political system where Bello, Fodio, etc. provided such 
informatino in written form. The Malams then based their teaching to the 
communities on their writings. 
While the emirs of the north built a netowrk of communication between 
themselves and the public through the Malamsq the Yoruba ruling class were 
linked to the public through the secret society - the Ogboni and other 
similar organisations. The historical development of such socio-political 
organisations have formed the basis of regional and ethnic political 
participation in modern Nigerian politics. It was the inf luence of such 
ethnic organisations that perhaps led the Igbo State Union as a 'back-up' if 
not the 'backbone' of the Igbo party, NCNC, before the civil war. Indeed, 
the basis of understanding Nigerian social organisation is the grasping of 
the essentials of her complex political communication process, Lloyd in 
his studies of Yoruba politics seems to grasp this fact. 
Recently (1984: 4) Professor B. O. Nwabueze in his famous 1985 lecture writes: 
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"the politics of modern Nigeria had produced a pan-Igbo 
organisation - the Igbo State Union. In the heady days of nascent 
ethnic nationalism, the birth of the Igbo State Union was a 
logical development. It had its counterpart in the Yoruba State 
Union (there were also other pan-Yoruba organisations like Egbe 
Omo Odulawa and Egbe Omo Yourba), Ibibio State Union, Idoma Tribal 
Union, Igbirra Tribal Union, Ijaw Progressive Union and Bornu 
State Union. All of these have lamentably suffered demise in 
1966 along with the First Nigerian Republic. A decree of the 
Federal Military Government (FMG) in 1966 has dissolved and 
proscribed them specifically by name. Altogether twenty-six named 
tribal or cultural unions were so dissolved and proscribed. " 
However , going back to suicide and politics in the Yoruba empire, another 
important person who could be persuaded or forced to commit suicide was the 
Kakanf o of 
. 
Oyo, the supreme military commander, of ten a slave or a eunuch. 
At any one time there should be only one Kakanf o in Oyo. If the empire 
(Oyo) was defeated in a battle, the Kakanfo was forced to commit suicide. 
Different Kingdoms under the empire paid tribute to the king of Oyo as the 
emirs to the Sultan of Sokoto Caliphate. Dif f erent chief s ruled over 
different small communities but for effective communication and control 
purposes, the Alafin appointed a number of Ajele, (the king's eyes) who were 
endowed by the king with power to control. local chiefs for the king. The 
Ajele were proclaimed by the secret society (sango cult) as possessing the 
power to invoke the god of thunder and lightening to threaten the life and 
property of local chiefs who refused to pay tribute to the Alafin of Oyo. 
(Note here that in the Sokoto Caliphate, the emirs who refused to pay 
tribute to the Sultan of Sokoto faced the anger of being expelled from the 
confederation. When their city-state was attacked by non-members of the 
confederation, they did not recieve assistance from others. ) It was also a 
sign of disloyalty to the sultan and to Allah (God) who 'appointed' him 
Muslim leader. Here, the similarities were that the content of association 
between the chiefs/emirs and the king or sultan was economics, guided by two 
different types of religion, Muslim ad Paganism. The content could be 
politicised by the deliberate decision to persuade a disloyal member to be 
killed by the gods or suicide or to be militarily defeated by members 
outside the confederation of the empire. 
Some aspects of the complex network of political relationships in pre- 
colonial politics were observed by Crowder and illustrated with the Oyo 
empire. 
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"Government at Oyo was a delicate balance of power between the 
Alafin and his palace administration on the one hand and Oyo Mesi 
and the more representative Ogboni society on the other. The 
division of power in Oyo is nowhere better illustrated than in the 
composition of the army. The head of the army was Kakanf o, and 
was directly responsible to the Alaf in, while the army was raised 
by the Oyo Mesi as wardheads. The Alafin himself was represented 
in the battle by the Osi Eka. "11 
The importance of lorganisations' as observed by Lloyd (1967) in the 
political systems, of the Yoruba was also noted by Crowder (1978: 41), who 
pointed out that the 'various cult groups' or 'secret' societies, which 
flourished in most Yoruba kingdoms had a restraining inlfuence on the abuse 
of power. 
THE EDO PRE-COLONIAL POLITICAL COMHUNICATION SYSTEH 
Another important and second most populous tribe of Western Nigeria are the 
Edo-speaking people, who 
I 
occupy the South Eastern part of Western Nigeria 
and are heavily concentrated, particularly around the old kingdým of Benin. 
The original Edo tribe inhabit Benin city and speak Edo proper. The off- 
shoots of Edo are Isoko, the Ishan, the Kukuruku and the Akoko. These are 
different small linguistic groups but are socio-culturally intertwined. 
Historically, there is a speculation that they were an offshoot of Yoruba 
stock and several of their existing socio-political institutions are similar 
to those*of Yoruba. Some politicians or social leaders of Benin reject the 
notion that Edo people constitute an important part of the old Yoruba 
kingdom. A feeling exploited by the NCNC leaders to assist the leaders of 
Edo people to create Mid-West region in the 1960s. This weakened the 
political power of the Western Regon at the federal level. Awolowo and his 
party have not forgiven the East for this. The creation of Mid-West had 
several important implications for the politics of Nigeria. 
However t the pre-colonial kingdom of Benin was powerful and had advanced 
political organisation, artss town or urban development, years before the 
Portuguese arrived there in the fifteenth century. 
"Benin was a well organised kingdom and the government was 
thoroughly effective ... Oedo (Edo), the metropolis of Benin, was 
prodigious, large, taking up about six leagues of ground in 
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compass ... there are thirty very great street, most of them 
prodigious both in length and breadth, being twenty fathom wide 
and when the Portuguese visted Benin at the end of the 
fifteenth century, they found a powerful kingdom. At that time 
the kingdom of Benin was the most centralised state on the Guinea 
Coast. It once included Lagos, ... smaller Edo-speaking sub- 
tribes ... and ... the Ika sub-tribe of the Igbo. "12 
The historical relationship between Benin and Oyo has been indicated above. 
The first dynasty of Benin was estabished in 1300 by Eweka 1, son of 
Oranmiyan of Ile-Ife. Eweka appointed chiefs called Enogie who carried out 
the state socio-political and economic administration and there were chiefs 
in different villages. Besides the Enogie, there was the council of state 
made up of six hereditary members with such political power that they could 
defy the authority of the king. They were called Uzama (king makers). 
Under the reign of Eweka I, they were so powerful that when the king died, 
his son the Ewedo, Crower (1978: 45) noted: 
"decided to transfer the capital from Usama to its present site,, 
so as to be rid of the councillors of state3, whose powers were 
becoming almost as great as his own. " 
In Bening he systematically tried to limit the powers of the king makers in 
the council state. In order to win the popular support of his subjects, he 
established a new political communication network through the Lyase 
(communication officers). Through these comunication officers, the king 
could mobilise the popular suppot of the masses against the king-makers and 
the power of the latter was gradually weakened as the king became more 
popular and powerful. 
ogun succeeded Ewedo but was overthrown by the Uwaifiokun but the latter was 
murdered by Ogun who took the title of Ewuare who renamed Benin, Edo, in 
rememberance of his faithful slave who saved his life from Uwaifiokun, his 
political adversary. After the reign of Ewuare, subsequent successors to 
the throne took the title of Oba of Benin. The ruling class were made up of 
the Oba and his royal family which is hereditary. The Eghaevo Ogbe (town 
chiefs) controlled by Lyase and the king's political and socio-religious 
advisors were non-hereditary. These groups could rarely enter into 
political confrontation with the Oba. Between them were the palace chiefsp 
completely loyal to the king who acted as buffers between the Oba and his 
political officals. 
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The state activities were divided into three broad divisions in relation to 
three general categories of political, social and economic activities, The 
royal family were directly in control of the military and essential 
political decision-making processes. The chiefs, Iyase etc. were involved 
in social and religious functions while the commoners were engaged in 
farming, slave raids, hunting and fishing. From the information Crowder 
obtained from a native of Benin, Mr. P. Igbafe, 
"The Obas of Benin solved the problems of administering the 
outlaying parts of the empire through chiefs without encountering 
the problems of disloyalty as did many other African kings. 
Chiefs were not given single blocks of territory, but a series of 
villages scattered in different parts of the empire, so that they 
could not build a coherent base for revolt. "13 
Socially, the Edo tribe is highly stratified, as much as its political 
organisation was hierarchically and highly centralised. The first social 
stratification is the ruling class and then, like most African states the 
societies, age group follows. Age ranking order starts from the youth 
(iroghae), the middle-aged (ighele) and the elders (odio). The initiation 
from one state to another takes several years and the initiations which is 
associated with particular. social functions, mastering of cultural norms, 
values and consensus is the embodiment of Edo philosophy of personality and 
political leadership. 
Edo villages are scattered as in most other tribes in Nigeria but the 
heaviest concentration of the population lives in the walled city of Benin. 
It is in the village that the rule governing the society in relation to age 
is emphasised. The elders hold both political and social position 
considered crucial for the existence of the society at any time. During the 
slave raids and inter-tribal wars, the villages were vulnerable to frequent 
and sudden attacks. The army under the military command of the 'Ighelel had 
great influence and power in the village. 
The Ighele, despite his military power) would not challenge the authority of 
the village elder who was responsible for the appointment of Ighele from one 
generation of af amily to the other. The Ighele would eventually become a 
village elder and a group of village elders were the village law makers. 
Decision making was the function of the elders and the village chiefs. In 
this case, influencing decision was dependent on the dominating personality 
of either a chief or an elder. These roles were fundamentally important 
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outside the city of Benin where the king and associated royal authorities 
could not make every decision or influence it directly. Elements of 
democracy exist in all groups of Edo society and the distribution of power 
and decision-making involved a large proportion of the population. 
The majority formed the cultural masses and power resided with the elitist 
class, hereditary and non-hereditary chiefs. The political and social 
status of the Uzama was felt by all but he was, with others, loyalist and 
favourite of the king. The town chiefs and the village elders were 
ideological and institutional representatives of the power and they stood 
for the interest of the poor. The town chiefs could number about nineteen 
and were headed by four chiefs known as the "four pillars of Edo". The 
prime minster was chosen from among the four chiefs. He was influential an& 
was fairly independent of the monarchical authority and must be popular with 
the masses. He was elected by the chiefs; his position as prime minister 
put a check on the institutional monarch. All members of the royal family 
as well as the traditional chiefs had great respect for the common people of 
Edo. All in power met when necessary at the Council of State and members 
consisted of the Usama, the Lyase, the Palace Chiefs, the town chiefs and 
the aristocrats, the king acted as the chairman. Laws, constitutions and 
major military and political decisions were made by the council under the 
supreme authority of the king. 
The Edo of Benin historically is important as a pre-colonial 'stratified, 
centralised and aristocratic society in Nigeria. Despite its complex 
political structure, the Edo culture was relatively aesthetic and 
artistically very creative. 
"Under Ewuare, carving in both ivory and wood was greatly 
encouraged. Indeed, his reign, the last before the arrival of the 
Europeans, is remembered in Benin as one of the greatest in its 
long history . *. What is remarkable about Benin, and indeed Oyo, 
is that both of them were purely African states, whose growth was 
stimulated by contact with neither Islam nor Europe. "14 
In all these pre-colonial city states of Northern and Western Nigeria, there 
are clear distinctions between the cities and the villages in their 
environmental structure. They are described as kingdoms where the seat of 
the government was often located in one of the major cities. The King or 
Emire lived in them with the royal officials. But the surrounding 
population were connected to the city political system through an organised 
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network of chiefs and village elders. The royal families were kinship-based 
while their village representatives were selected by the king. The chiefs 
and elders were the principal communication network channels between the 
king and the people. At all levels of political communication network 
channels between the king and the people, face-to-face and symbolic rituals 
were used. Although the political systems were centralised and organised, 
there was a general lack of written or highly organised communication 
network whereby the authorities, e. g. the royalty, could communicate with 
the public without local representatives. Military and religious aspets of 
politics were important in the city-states in the pre-colonial organised or 
centralised political systems in Nigeria. 
THE IGBO PRE-COLONIAL POLITICAL COMM1JNICATION NETWORK SYSTEMS 
The Igbos occupy the south east of Nigeria with dense evergreent heavy 
equatorial rain forest. In the northern fringes, however, the dense tangled 
mass of vegetation begins to fade away into opent semi-savannah vegetation 
of Northern Wawalands in Anambra state. The climate and vegetation played 
an important role in the structure of socio-political organisations of the 
Igbos which was completely characterised by small village activities. The 
village-groups were the limit of political communication' activities. But 
several villages, from eight to twelve, constitute what is known as rural 
towns. Some have pointed out that the vegetation and harsh humidity of the 
region prevented the penetration of the Hausa/Fulani in the region. 
Secondly, the Tiv warriors, north of Wawa, were too powerful for the 
Fulani/Hausa to conquer in order to have access to the interior of Igboland. 
The second largest ethnic groups in the region are the Ibibio and the Efik- 
speaking people on the far south-east border with the Cameroons. Also in 
the region are the Ijaws of the mangrove swamps and delta regions of the 
South-east coast. 
The Igbos are a homogenous tribe in terms of language. But the language, 
Igbo, has peculiar dialectal varieties which are impossibly difficult to 
articulate by Igbos from the wider geographical distance e. g. an Igboman 
from Owerri may find it *difficult to understand Wawa or Abriba. Some 
Onitsha and Ngwa people may find it easier to hold a conversation in English 
than in their common language because of dialectal problems. 
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In the pre-colonial period, the communities were very autonomous, with 
absolutely no centralised government, particularly the villages in the 
hinterlands. Onitsha and Oguta had quasi-centralised government which had 
some aspects of the Benin political system. In particular, the complex 
structure of Igbo pre-colonial and social systems was very problematic to 
early European anthropologists. in comparison to other tribes in Nigeria. 
It was its social organisation rather than the apparent lack of observable 
political system that constituted the problem. Indeed, Igbo politics, as 
shall be seen in this work,, is submerged into its social structum, it 
makes no sense to study Igbo political behaviour independently of its social 
structure and behaviour. Early inadequate study of Igbo social organisation 
and structure and how the network of social or kinship system- resisted 
external influence has resulted in some contradicting, if not extremely 
mixed attributes which have been associated with the Igbos"of former Eastern 
Nigeria. 
"In the Eastern region, the dominant people were the Igbos, for 
long ... savage and untameable, but extremely hardworking and 
intelligent, with a thirst for education, as soon as it came 
within their reache"15 
Audrey Smock (1971) in her study of Mbaise and Abiriba in the hinterland of 
former Eastern Nigeria observed the complex socio-political arrangement in 
Igboland. 
"The multiplicity of ethnic unions, formed to further the interest 
of villages, clans, and the whole of Mbaise, reflected the complex 
patterns out of which the fabric of Mbaise society was woven. "16 
Whatever view is held about the Igbos and their political behaviour, I 
believe that extended family and kinship structures are the fundamental 
element that shape Igbo political behaviour. 
I will now attempt to describe these social arrangements so that various 
political and communication processes can be adequately located at different 
periods of time within the social structure. Structurally, several families 
of parents, brothers, sisters, cousins, nephews, uncles, etc. live together 
in a large compound. They are often referred to as a family. Most of these 
kinsmen who live together on one compound (premises) call each other 
brothers, sisters, mother, father. These are not strictly biological 
brothersq sistesr, parents etc. They are what Mitchell (1969) referred to 
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as Iclassificatory brothers', sisters, etc. The origin of such 
classif catory "brother, sister" nomenclature in the Igbo communities has 
been revealed by Nwabueze, B. O. (1985: 12-13). He recalls that the "advent 
of the modern government in Igboland, slaves and their descendants formed a 
large element of the societies of most communities. They even outnumbered 
(and still do) the free borns in some of the river basin communities 
When "slaves became cheaper" Isiclei, E. (1983: 95) "the number of slaves 
increased vastly". Nwabueze (1985: 13) concludes that as a result of large 
numbers of slaves in certain communities, the society became polarized. 
"For slaves were without any legal rights whatever, being the absolute 
property of their masters and as such subject to their power of control and 
disposition". They were oppresssedg denied basic rightst humiliated, often 
used for sacrifices and could not intermarry with the free-born. "Over a 
period of time, the slaves and their descendants began to be assimilated 
into the lineage structure of the communities. The assimilation proceeded 
upon a social fiction whereby slaves and their descendants were regarded as 
having originated from the same ancestral stock as the free-born, so that 
terms implying kinship, such as "brother" and "sister" were used between 
them and the free-borns. " A few compounds of about ten make up a kindred 
and about six to eight clans make up a village. The degree of obligation 
between members of a village varies from nuclear family to the clan level of 
relationship. The degree of obligation is highest at family and kindred 
level. The obligations are both social and economic and they form the basis 
of strong ties which define the durability of network linkages between 
individuals or groups when they move from the village to the city. The 
social and economic content of this linkage can be politicised during 
election period, even when those in towns are not in frequent face-to-face 
communcation with those in the village. 
The village is not the highest level of socio-political activities in the 
rural areas in Igboland but village-groups called towns. James Coleman 
(1956: 30), and Green, M. (1947) were unable to distinguish between village 
and groups of villages that make up a town in rural areas. 
09... the basic social unit among the Igbos and Ibibios has been a 
single extended f amily or a kindred composed of several such 
families and the largest political unit has normally been the 
village ... Although the Igbo nationality is the second largest in 
Nigeria, it is divided into 30 sub-tribes, 69 clans and some 500 fairly autonomous villages or village groups. 9617 
ft , 
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169 clans' and 'some 500 fairly autonomous villages' can be extremely 
misleading in the understanding of social structure in Igbo communities. It 
is inconceivable to assume that the entire Igboland is made up of only 500 
automous villages. The village is not the largest political unit in 
Igboland, both in the traditional and modern political system. For 
isntance, Ikeduru local government until Buhari takeover of the government 
in 1983, was made up of f if teen towns and each town is made up of several 
villages. Eziama is one of the, smallest towns in Ikeduru and alone is 
composed of eight villages: Umuopa, Amaehi, Ogada, Amamba, Umuagwu, Owuzu, 
Umigwe and Unuchime. Each of the villages in turn is mde up of several 
kindreds; for instance half of the kindreds of Umuopa is made up of Umumeka, 
Umuoporowoba, Umuikepuru. Note here that each of the kindred's name starts 
with the prefix 'Umu' (sons of), then the names of the great ancestors*of 
that kindred: Meka, Oporowoba, Ikepuru. In all the f if teen towns in 
Ikeduru and in most Igbo communities, the structure of kinship organisations 
and system of nomenclature in realtion to the great ancestors are the basic 
characteristics that distinguish one village from the other in Igboland. 
This has been politicized today in the process of states creation and new 
boundary formation. The Prefix in those areas where Igbo communities have 
been absorbed by non-Igbo speaking states, are changed. 
"It is as well to note that some of the Igbo border communities in 
Benue State as well as those in and around Port Harcourt now 
strenuously disclaim their Igbo identity. The disclaimer is 
manifested in practical terms by the latter changes in the names 
of their villages by prefixing them with an IRI, so that 
Umuokoroshe becomes Rumuokoroshe, Umigbo becomes Rumigbog Uninmasi 
becomes Rumumasi ... The intention is to make them not look or 
'sound like Igbo names" (Nwabueze, 1985: 4) 
Since the Igbo society is kinship-based3, the family is the most important 
centre of all' activities. The political organisation and social 
relationship starts from the family and expands in magnitude via the 
kindred/village to the town level. The problem f aced by some of the above 
mentioned writers, particuarly Coloman, was that he f ailed to distinguish 
what Nigerians refer to as 'towns'. In the Nigerian context 'town' has two 
meanings: (a) towns made up of several villages such as Eziama, Amakohia, 
Amaimo, Okwu, Uzoagba, etc. which make up Ikeduru local government and (b) 
town which refers to urban, e. g. Lagos, Ibadan, Owerri, Port-Harcourt, Aba, 
Kano and Zaria etc. These are townships that lost their traditional village 
pattern'and became, over a long period of time, centres for trade, commerce, 
industry, and administration. Some of these village towns are old 
traditional towns of Nigeria with very little change since colonisation. 
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In the study of the Igbo social and political organisation and culture, we 
must always distinguish betwen village towns and cosmopolitan towns. In 
the discussion of political and communication pattern of Nigeria and 
Igboland in particular, this structure of population composition plays an 
essential role in both historical and contemporary analysis of political 
participation. Many Western writers have often omitted this important 
structure of Nigerian social and political organisation and arbitarily 
divide the society into village and urban population distribution. Once the 
essential social structure is misconceived, then the pattern of power 
structure within the society will be misplaced, control and circulation of 
information essential to power structure consequently follows the 
misconception of power structures. In order to correct the misconcepts, let 
us furthermore examine Coleman's study of Ngwa in Igboland. 
"Even though the village has normaly been the highest level of 
recognised common authority, there have been times when 
consciousness of wider unity existed, or could be awakened. "18 
Then he went on to explain this 'wider unity' which in practice is a county 
or district by the time he conducted his research. Today, Ngwa is divided 
into three local governments each as big as Mbatitoli/Ikeduru local 
government. The three local governments include Aba, Obioma Ngwa and 
Isialangwa local governments. Becuse Coleman failed to understand the 
pattern of social organisation in Ngwa, he could not distinguish and make 
clear what he meant by 'village groups' and 'villages'. 
Most Ngwa clan (more than 100,000) is a case in point. Most Ngwas 
are united by a belief in a common ancestry. According to clan 
legends, the original Ngwas cross the Imo River and settled in a 
place called Ekeleaforq which became thereafter the annual place 
of meeting for all senior Onye-mue ala's representing the 15 
village grou s and 215 villages into which the clan was 
fragmented. "1? 
To start with, the 'villages' were not 'fragmented' but organised. What 
Colman called the '15 village groups' are what I have referred to above as 
village towns and his 1215 villages' were villages made of kindreds. A 
number of village units form a town. A diagram can illustrate the pattern 
more vividly: 
e 
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Rural Community Organisation of the Igbos 
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The town in the pre-colonial era was effectively the highest political unit. 
Several towns then form a local government such as Ikeduru local government 
or Ngwa, mentioned by Coleman. Perhaps one of the main problems of Coleman 
in distinguishing villages from towns was the similarity in the geographical 
settings. In most rural populations in Nigeria, the geographical settings 
of villages and towns in the rural areas are virtually the same but their 
social and political organisations and functions are completely different. 
The core of Igboland is made up of the present Imo state and Anambra state 
and both of them contain 44 local governments and on the average, each is 
made up of 12 towns, so it is impossible to state that Igboland is only 500 
autonomous villages. since some of the Igbos, unlike the Hausa/Fulani and 
the Yorubas, lack centralised government, yet have a political culture based 
on social organisation, it is absolutely essential to have a detailed 
knowledge of the social structure. 
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The apparent lack of centralised government in Igboland does not imply that 
the form of socio-political authority for the maintenance of law and order 
is lacking as well. But there is a gradual diminishing pattern of authority 
relationship from the extended family to the village town level. Socio- 
political authority and degree of solidarity is highest at the family level. 
this is because the Igbo society is an egalitarian and comparatively 
individualistic society. But individualism does not exceed the extended 
family level. 
The pre-colonial pattern and today's political communication systems within 
the basic structure of -Igbo rural population has witnessed slow changee 
because of the emphasis on network of kinship ties and relationships. 
People of common ancestors live in the same vilalges as they did before the 
colonial period and their basic realtionships have remained obligatory which 
tends to resist modern changes. Thus, an account of the old political 
system is a review of a historical kinship politics in the past and in the 
present. Where the government was centralised during the colonial period, 
colonial administration altered or modified it. The distribution of power 
shifted form the traditional rulers to colonial authority. 
But in Igboland, the distribution of power has been strongest at the family 
level. Parents are the key to legitimate family authority and hard to 
question from outside. Next in authority are kinsmen of the same ancestor. 
The village also has important influence on its members. Political 
decision-making at this level remains very important, In every village, 
there are a group of elders who preside over the village council. Most of 
the members are the Oparas (first sons) of respective families. In the 
absence of the Opara, the son represents the family. Generally, these are 
the elders of the village who share collective power and their knowledge of 
the village history and the village towns in social, economic and politics 
in the past, is at their finger tips. Nothing about this is written but it 
is passed on to future generations through music, tolk tales, moonlight 
stories etc. Their reference to the past in order to reach a compromise 
during serious discussions are expresssed idiomatically and peculiar 
manipulation of symbols and gestures accompany the idioms and proverbs. But 
during political discussions, everyone is allowed to attend and make a 
contribution. 
"The egalitarian power structure manifests its true nature in the decision making process. Important decision making begins with 
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the lineage which at once a reference to ... a political unit. 
The corporate lineage is represented by a meeting of all component 
families, the latter sending their seniors as delegates. Consent 
and consensus are the principle which animate the process and 
outcome of decision-making. Lineage meetings are headed by an 
'Okparal who only exercises normal ritual leadership symbolised by 
the Ofor. " (Oha, 0.19 p. 58) 
The egalitarian, individualistic and libertarian ethos of an Igbo man which 
governs his social, political and economic behaviours have been noted by 
Nwabueze; who states that: 
"His individualism is apparently a product of his social and 
political system in which the village-group was the largest 
political unit and in which within the village-group authority was 
diffused among the heads of the numerous families, lineages and 
the villages. The society was an egalitarian one in which 
everyone counted equally and was entitled to a say in public 
affairs. The Igbo was therefore very little inhibited by 
authority or by any strateification of society based on birth. 
Unlike the Hausa/Fulani, he was unhindered by a war religion and 
unlike the Yoruba, unhampered by traditional hierarchies. " 
(Nwabueze 1985: 7, Chinua Acheba 1983: 46) 
On occasions of very crucial socio-political decisions, the process of final 
dicision can be verý prolonged and argument can be very sharp. The 
attendants are given fair chance to express themselves before making a 
unanimous statement, They may even f ail to agree. Oha made similar 
observations: 
"Af ter the symposium ends, village elders retire to deliberate on 
the village mood, the village disposition. On the return of the 
elders, a man chosen for his wisdom and eloquence presents the 
assembly's decision. If the assembly accepts it, the elders' 
interpretation is approved by acclamation. If otherwise, it 
disapproves by booing. "20 
The 'assembly' is a composition of most men, women and children in the 
village. The leadership of the elders is devoid of an iota of 
authoritarianism. They must always make sure that whatever final decision 
they reach, it must be that 
. 
generally accepted by most people in the 
village, otherwise they will' be turned down and other groups such as younger 
men from organised age groups or women's assemblies would take over decision 
making processes where the elders fail to satisfy general opinion. There is 
no single authoritative figure or group in Igbo society. 
3. 
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When a village cannot resolve a political social or economic issue among 
themselves, the case goes a step further. This time to the towa council 
which is made of elders from different villages. In the pre-colonial 
period, this was the highest political organisation in Igboland. In the 
town council such as Eziama town, each village is represented by two or 
three elders irrespective of size and population of the village. The town 
council is well organised, with a chairman as the head of council for a 
period of one year and an election would be conducted to change him and all 
his officials who worked with him during the period. He and his officials 
are allowed 'to stand for a re-election. The village representative elders 
are also changed after a period of one year. 
In time of dispute when the village failed to resolve problems such as a 
land dispute between members of the same kindred, or between villages, the 
town council often intervenes at the appeal or invitation of the disputants. 
There is no individual who can claim that he has absolute power to preside 
and resolve the case. Every state in the process of reaching a solution 
entails unanimous agreement by all the members of the council who are also 
aware and sensitive to public opinion on the issue. 
Within the council and also from the assembly of men, women and children who 
attended the meeting, an outstanding personality can emerge to dominate and 
influence the opinion of the public gathered there and thus the decision of 
the council officials. His knowledge, sincerity and outspokenness on the 
very matter in hand are essential prerequisites which give him the chance to 
dominate opinions. This does not mean that on another occasion when a 
different matter is being discussed, the same individual who dominated in 
the previous meeting would do the same, unless he provides the council with 
a leading and sound knowledge and judgement once again. But in Igbo 
society, itý is often difficult to find one person dominating in this way. 
The spirit of competition, individualism and egalitarianism decentralises 
information and knowledge. Everyone acquires them in one way or the other 
without any central authority regulating the distribution which would 
confine them to certain groups or individuals. In centralised states. 
information is controlled and used for political and economic advancement by 
those who have access to them. 
Also the selection of*the elders by different villages make any individual's 
domination in the council difficult, because those selected to represent the 
village are acknowledged wise men who are quick witted, difficult to 
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dominate or manipulate. 
The village which many have misleadingly regarded as the highest political 
unit in Igboland is a medium range political unit between the smallest 
political unit - family - and the largest - the town council. In the pre- 
colonial time the town council was called in Eziama, Ofor Asato (the 
gathering of the eight villages). Indeed the structure of the villages in 
relation to the town is sociologically and politically a form of confederacy 
and each confederate is composed of delegates of which the majority are the 
first sons of various families in the village. The town (Obodo) is the 
federation within which the highest political decision processes are carried 
out unanimously. Broadly speaking, any decison that is not unanimously 
agreed upon is unacceptable. 
Another misleading approach to the study of Igbo political culture is the 
over-generalisation of the composition of Igbos, geographicaly and 
historically. The Igbos and the political system I have described so far 
are closely associated with the Igbos in the hinterland, that is those who 
live beyond the confines of the River Niger and the Oguta Lake basin. The 
over-generalisation about the Igbo political culture has classified the 
Igbos in terms of other tribes in Nigera as stateless society which implies 
lack of any form of central political organisation. My attempt to divide 
the Igbo tribe into two groups is to argue that some Igbos haveý long before 
the Europeans came to the area, organised central government. The Igbo with 
centralised government had a chieftaincy system while those without 
chieftaincy are relatively autonomous yet politically effectively organised. 
The five cultural divisions set up by Forde and Jones can be a useful 
approach, but too broad to reflect in depth the two social and political 
systems in Igboland. Forde and Jones' divisions are Northern or Onitsha 
Igbo, Southern or Owerri Igbo, Western Igbo (Ika Igbo, on the western bank 
of the River Niger), Easter Igbo or Cross River Igbo and the North-eastern 
Igbo - Wawa of Enugu Ngwa. This classification is ideal for detailed 
ethnographic and historical survey of Igboland but may distort facts in a 
study attempting to local historical and contemporary political and 
communication changes in a tribal society such as Nigeria. 
Professor B. O. Nwabuezu identified two types of Igbo communities - the Igbo 
hinterland and the Igbo river basin areas. 
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Having described the autonomous village-groups' political organistion of the 
hinterland of Igboland, let us examine Igbo communities with kingship 
systems bordering the river basins. In Nzemiro's study, four such 
communities were identified - Oguta, Onitsha, Obomari, and Aboh. 
Awo- 
Idemili, with a quasi-kingship system, should be included in this group. 
Geographically these communities with some other smaller communities form 
part of what is known by most Igbos in the hinterland as 10ru people' or 
specially INdi Orumiril (people who dwell near or along the river banks). 
"They are small communities bound by a common riverine culture but 
politically autonomous, each constituting a small kingdom and 
resisting political domination by any neighbouring group. " 
(Nzemiro, 1972: 3-4). 
These Igbo kingdoms, unlike the Yoruba kingdoms and Hausa/Fulani empires, 
were small, restricted and very autonomous poitically. Their political 
system is similar to the Benin political kingdom. The Onitsha and Obomari 
people are believed to originate 'from Benin or the Igala who moved south- 
east from the present south-western. part of Nigeria to inhabit the area 
along the Niger delta region. Legend holds that they left the old Benin 
kingdom as a result of internal conflicts and unrest.. The Onitsha Igbos are 
believed to have common ancestors with the people of Benin (Nzemiro, 1972: 7, 
Crowder, 1978: 45-46). 
Onitsha poitical organisation represents an ideal system common- to all 
riverine - Ogbaru Igbos, modelled on Benin kingship. A brief account, of 
Onitsha kingship, i. e. the Obi and his chiefs, will give us a clear picture 
of political systems in the riverine Igbo communities. 
The Obi of Onitsha is derived from a common ancestor, remote to the throne. 
The Obi was head of the community who was endowed with the authority to 
distribute power and chieftaincy titles to his subjects as he pleased. His 
own power superceded that of everyone in the land and was politically, 
economically and spiritual the greatest. The Obi, relatively, was 
mythif ied to the level of gods and he was the ecopoitical and social ý focus 
of this subtribe of Igbos. His position was sacred, engulfed with myths and 
elaborate ceremonies and rituals. 
His council of chief s had no limit to the deveotion they gave him which 
further shows the secular-political aspect of the kingship in Onitsha. The 
emphasis laid on the different aspects of the kingship varies from stage to 
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stage in the life span of a reigning king. This is important to reinforce 
in the minds of his subjects symbolically, the importance of the king as a 
representative of the values, norms, consensus and other traditions that 
hold the tribe togethr as a people. 
In every respect, the Obi remained the absolute head of the tribe, the sole 
power distributor and the chiefs in the community were appinted and 
confirmed by him and the eldest son could only succeed him at his death. No 
matter how old he was, the Obi never abdicated for his son, for he was 
looked upon as a god; his physical qualities might be weakened by old age 
but his subjects believed his mental capacity remained active and 
productive. He commanded and received the highest honour in the society. 
His royal symbolism buttressed his secular authority and this royal insignia 
could be classified into two main categories. The first category of 
insignia he benevolently shared with his chiefs to enable them to officiate 
in smaller localities on his behalf, particularly as the king was not 
allowed by tradition to appear in public very often. To maintain his aura 
as human-made-god, rare appearance in public consolidated these values. 
Othex. insignia to Obi was exclusive to himself which was essential to 
distinguish him from his chiefs and also to enable him to control every one 
of them, no matter how powerful. 
The king received gifts and tributes from his subjects including the chiefs 
and other personalities within 
' 
and outside his kingdom. He distributed 
honourable titles to his subjects who in turn paid fees for them. Groups, 
clans, and kindreds gave him various forms of tributes, some ritually 
symbolic of the clan/group in the forms of cows, rams, goats, sheeps, 
leopards, etc. No form of tax was imposed on the subjects as obtainable in 
the Hausa/Fulani political culture in the pre-colonial period. In all the 
Igbo communitieso there was a lack of institutional legal forces such as the 
police or prison as in the Fulani/Hausa emirates. 
The general picture of the Igbo political culture in the pre-colonial period 
was based on and characterised by large or small numbers of autonomous 
communities. The basis of unity and group existence centred on cosmological 
practices and beliefs as well as respect for the elders who perpetuated the 
traditions. 
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In the Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani empires, the use of force was necessary. In 
Igboland, as I will quickly show, this did not occur but the great belief of 
most Igbo, communities in cosmology reinforced their sociological and 
economic links between heaven and earth and held the communities together. 
Where one community was spiritually powerful, it used it to extend its 
authority over other neighbouring communities: 
"The Nris or Aros may have wielded some authority over a 
considerable part of Igboland, but their authority ... was purely 
spiritual, not political. In matters of government, each village- 
group or clan existed and functioned as an autonomous entity, in 
no way subject to control by its neighbours. " (Nwazueze, 1985: 2) 
In order to understand the process of Igbo cosmology and its social, 
economic and political implications in the communities, it is imperative to 
consider the Igbo traditional relgion in some detail and relate the conent 
of the discussion to Igbo pre-colonial politics in particular. 
The Igbo cosmology attracted the attention of some early anthropologists, 
Basden, 1938; Meek, C. K. 9 "The Igbo people" and Talbot, P. A., "The people 
of Southern Nigeria", 1926. In their studies, they revealed three main 
constituents of Igbo traditional religion - the supreme being, divinfties 
and ancestors. Though týese are the principal basic structures underlying 
most Igbo traditional religion, either in the centralised system or in the 
realtively autonomous villages in the hinterland, the practices and beliefs 
vary widely from place to place. (It is not my intention to go into 
details of the variations). The most important approach will be centred on 
pointing out the general relationship of Igbo political sytem characterised 
by several autonomous communities which are held together by heterogenous 
religious practices and beliefs. 
The impact of Christianity on traditional Igbo religions has been highly 
noticeable. In spite of the impacts in many communities, the basic 
characteristics of traditional African religion still persist, particularly 
among the older generations. 
For instance, Eziama, like most Igbo communities, is totally patterned on 
the segmentary model of political organisation and ideally represents a 
typical Igbo hinterland community. Christianity since the colonial timeq 
has imposed itself on the traditional religion of Eziama yet the old forms 
still linger. In this account, I am going to omit some of the features of 
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religious beliefs and practices in this community, which are not 
particularly important to understand the relationship between traditional 
politics and traditional religion. 
Since a small number of the inhabitants of Eziama still practice traditional 
religion, I will use the present tense to describe and analyse religion in 
relation to politics. 
a 
The traditional religion as much as Christianity or any other religion, 
invariably in the minds of beholders creates internal strong feeling that 
they are invisible forces which determine the fate of all the human race. 
While men liveo they are all the time subject to the control of invisible 
forces. These forces are spirits and there are good and bad spirits. 
Within the relatively autonomous villages, there are smaller but important 
spirits to the natives, such as Ala and Umunne. They are very much loved 
and cherished by the community and kindreds or lineages becaus they are 
believed to be responsible for fertility, particularly Ala. Kinship ties 
are emphasised by common Umune - the spirit that binds all members of the 
lineage together. Strictly, Umunne forbids incest, murdert stealing, 
blackmail and falsehood and deceit among kinsmen. Those involved in the 
violation of Ala or Umunne rules have cursed themselves, for they may not 
have children, good yields from their farms, and are often plagued with 
incurable diseases. They die miserable and poor. 
In an egalitarian Igbo society, where competition and social mobility are 
ingrained in the culture, people naturally conform to traditional law and 
cosmological order willingly which promote their individual and collective 
economic bargai. ning processes, social and political prestige. The use of 
human force to maintain civil obedience and order is rendered weak as the 
fear of the repercussion of the cosmological force far supercedes those of 
organised human forces. 
Another spirit closely related to Ala is the Ahiajoku, the god of yam, 
cocoyam, una, cassava and all crops and vegetables grown in farms. Since 
the Igbos in the pre-colonial period were exclusively and entirely 
agriculturally-based communities, the god of form became very important in 
the economic survival of the society. 
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Ahiajoku makes the land fertile and guides the farm products. Anyone who 
steals from the neighbour's farm is punished by Ahiajoku in many different 
and serious ways. 
In every walk of lif e in Igbo society, the divinities operate and they are 
conceptualised to such a degee that everyone is very conscious Of their 
existence and participation in whatever he does. The degree of 
individualism is reinforced by these beliefs and practices and everyone goes 
about his duty. His action is justified in the fear of the gods first, who 
see all, he does, then the individual develops political, soical and economic 
relationships with others in the community on the fear of the gods. This 
implies that cosmologically, the Igbos communcated with the spirits before 
establishing material relationshps with other humans in the society. 
Ecopolitical and social linkages are twofold, with spiritis and then with 
humans. 
All the divinities are offered sacrifices at different times and the type of 
sacrifice varies widely in kind, quality and quantity. Some of them are 
offered daily sacrifice such as kola and wine to Ala and Umunne of a family. 
others may be periodically and annually at great festivals. Great festivals 
are fixed by priests of the deities and they organise and lead in all the 
ceremonies. 
In Igbo society, as described above, disputes and political decision-making 
processes involve wide community participation. When disputants - 
individuals or groups, fail to reach an acceptable decision on a matter, an 
oath often resolves it. The particular diety on which an oath-taking 
process is conducted is ritualistically invoked to dispose of the life of 
the person who swears falsely with a fixed date which varies from weeks to 
months, but normally within a maximum of one year. At times, the god is 
asked to punish anybody who swears falsely some other way than by death. 
If, at the end of the fixed period announced at the time the oath was taken, 
nothing happens to the person who took the oath, the accused proclaims his 
innocence or right over the disputed matter by a celebration. Most people 
in the village and his distant kin are invited to the celebration. Gifts 
and presents in cash and kind would be given to him but if he is wealthy, he 
gives (out) to the community part of his wealth. The celebration may be 
comparable to wedding or naming ceremonies in Igboland. But if the person 
dies within the fixed period, little sympathy is expressed over his death 
and everyone would blame him for taking his own life by false oath. 
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Ofar is an important instrument which has ritual power. It is the signature 
of the elders which endorses an oath and this is placed on the ground in 
front of the god (represented in carved wood) or shrine after an oath has 
been administered. 
Another important spirit in the Igbos religious worship is the spirit of the 
ancestors. To them, the ancestors belong to both worlds of the living. and 
the world of the spirits. And at all times like other spirits, they take an 
interest in human affairs but in their own case they are more concerned with 
their own families. Ancestors do not interfer in the affairs of other 
families because the Igbos believe that every ancestor is to defend and 
protect his own family. Particularly, ancestors intervene in the spirit 
world on behalf of their families to stop any wicked acts by gods. The 
ancestors in the mind of the Igbos ever reamin the invisible head of the 
family or kindred and as such honoured. They are in time of need invoked to 
help the family and it is the head of the family who communicates with the 
ancestors of the lineage for good health, more children, long life, peace 
and prosperity. Some writes like Kopyloff have argued that Africans do not 
worship their ancestors: 
"Ancestor worship is semantically inappropriate, analytically 
misleadingg and theoretically unproductive. "21 
This is not true, but the difference is that, unlike the gods, the ancestors 
can be reprimanded for keeping aloof to lineage or family problems when they 
persist for a long time such as death of young children in the family, 
continuous poor harvest, illness, etc. The juju men may be consulted to 
find out what ails the ancestor when they become aloof to prolonged 
problems. They, like the spirits, require the lineage to offer them some 
sacrifices. Ancestors are also believed to reincarnate in babies born to 
the family and unusually one ancestor can reincarnate himself in many 
babies. 
The Igbo cosmological philosphy in relation to the Supreme Being, divinities 
and ancestors are basically the same but the approaches of worship differ, 
particularly where a form of central governemnt existed such as in the 
communities under the Obi of Onitsha. The differences are located within 
the ritual exercises rather than in beliefs. 
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In Onitsha, the myth of the sacredness of the king implies that he must not 
be unnecessarily exposed to danger, easily reached, and complicated 
protocols are essential in order to see the Obi in his palace. The kings of 
Onitsha, Obomari, Agboh, Oguta, 'Odola, should not weep, be angry or 
sorrowful for these are seen as weaknesses akin to ordinary man, they are 
deified and capable of communicaion with the gods and ancestor for their 
subjects' and communities' needs. 
Sacred offerings are often made in the morning, periodically and in spcial 
annual festivals by the kings on behalf of their kingdoms. They are the 
only ones qualified and 'holy' enough to approach and communicate with the 
spirits -a gesture of their combined political and spiritual superiority. 
The subjects believe that the offering made by thý king would be readily 
acceptable by the gods, their request heeded to, to alleviate their 
suffering in many ways. 
"At Abo, the Obi of f ers annual sacrif ices to the cults of Ikenga 
and Ofo on behalf of the past Obis. This is done at the Uje 
festival, his annual yam festival when he entertains the Onzele 
and members of the Igbo title association. Again, he must offer 
an annual sacrifice to the shrine of Isu Osimili, the goddess of 
the Niger. This sac#fice is offered in the presence of the Otu- 
Imese whose head is the Ikogwe, and who are delighted to officiate 
at this annual sacrifice. The shrine, located in the middle of 
the Niger, belongs to the goddess that gaurds the Abo water 
front. "22 
The goddess can only accept the sacrifice through the hand of the noblest of 
all men in the society - the king - and this goddess also laid down rules 
which dwellers along the bank of the rivers she guides from overflowing must 
obey. The only person she communicates to directly to pass on her rules to 
the people is the king. Anyone who breaks the law would be heavily fined or 
punished by death sentence. These laws of the gods transmitted by the king 
are part of the society's legal constitution. The sacredness of the 
functional roles of the king lie in his power to make sure that these 
constitutions are complied with by all his subjects. As in the Igbo 
hinterland of relatively autonomous or segmentary social and political 
organistion with no central authority, the invisible forces investigate the 
action of everyone and order is maintained without a recourse to the use of 
force. In Obils communities, the kings are attributed with the mythical 
power and can discover a crime in the community. 
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"He is spiritually in communion with the past Obis of Onitsha, 
imploring them to guide him in leading the people. At the end, 
the Ada (senior daughter) purifies him (Ijucha Ahu) with a chicken 
and prepares him for the great annual festival which his people 
pay him homage. "23 
The festivals, like in hinterland Igbo communities3, are socially, 
politically and economically an integral part of the community. They 
consolidate the strength and the political power and spiritual leadership 
f or the king. There are occasons when all the subjects pay respect and 
homage to their king whom they rarely meet or see, Association with the 
gods and ancestors are received by the ritualistic use of various cults and 
in all, the king presides as the head of all the functions and ceremonies. 
"The festivals have specific political connotation which re- 
emphasise the role and importance of the king and his chiefs in 
the state. "24 
The structure of po litical communication network in the -pre-colonial 
political systems in Igbo communities was the direct and indirect linkage 
with the cosmological power. The invisible gods controlled the communities 
through the kings, i3lders and the Okparas of the family. Conflicts were 
resolved not on the basis of fear and legitimate power of the king to, impose 
corrective laws on the offenders but by individuals' and groups; 
conceptualised fear of the invisible gods. The kings as much as their 
subjects, were all in fear of the anger of the gods if they broke the law of 
the land. Igbo individualism and egalitarianism are based on this fear of 
the gods. Politics and religion were closely allied and the basic forms of 
communication across the society and with the gods was oral and symbolic 
means. 
The content of network of communcation was not so much on the politics of 
regulation and contol of legitimate power but symbolic religion. The 
extended family and network of kinship ties were the socio-political 
premises in which all forms of network of communication revolved. It is 
therefore, important to consider religion as politics in the integration of 
kinship network in pre-colonial political systems in Nigeria. Religion here 
implies both pagan and Islamic worships. 
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DISCUSSION 
Despite the immense diversity in pre-colonial communities in Nigeria, 
certain salient similarities existed between the communities. Most of the 
communities engaged in agriculture and production was partly for subsistence 
and partly for small local community markets. Pagan and Islamic religions 
were predominant and trade has reached different advance stages in different 
regions. 
However,, religion was the most powerful unifying political element in all 
the pre-colonial communitiest though in the North it was mixed and Islam was 
at a more advanced stage. But, before the Fulani entered Hausaland, the 
principal religion like in Yoruba or Igbolands was pagan religion but the 
system of centralised government was already in existence before the Hausas 
were Islamised. 
"Kings and their machineries of government might appear to be 
Islamisedq but the priciples of Suanic royal power reamin pagan 
... In the last resort, the authority of a king, and the 
legitimacy 9f the force he could use to maintain his authority, 
derived from his acceptance by his subject as the descendant of 
the founding ancestor of the people. Thus the king, with the help 
of the priests associated with him, became the unique means of 
establishing, via ancestoral spirits, a right relationship between 
the people and the supernatural forces on which the people's life 
was dependent. "25 
Politically, relgion plays two main roles (a) positiveg cohesive and 
integrative functions and (b) negative, destructive and disintegrative 
forces. 
The doctrine of Mohammedanism in Hausaland was a new doctrine of faith which 
was addressed to one group, -the Hausas, by the Fulanis. But it is wrong to 
assume as many writers have done that all Fulanis were Muslims. 
"The Pastoral Fulanis (boroje) were pagans. " Fage (1978: 77) 
The Hausas, at whom Islam was directed, were not strictly homogeneous. In 
terms of political organisation and power structure, the society in the pre- 
Islamic period was already heterogeneous, i. e. class system had already been 
established between the ruling class and the peasant. But in. 'terms of 
religion, it was a homogeneous society - all were pagans. 
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The important question is, how did Islam bring about integration in such 
politically heterogeneous class society? The core emphasis should be 
centred on the elements which created discontent between the political 
classes - before religion resolved these elements of discontent, and how the 
discontent was politicised. 
The Fulanis as strangers in Hausaland, did not have much the desired social 
and political rights in the Hausa community particularly the settled 
farmers. They paid tribute and heavy taxes to Hausa rulers for grazing on 
their land. They got little remuneration from the Hausas whom they helped 
to fight their wars and educate their children. The Fulani boroje who were 
also pagans like the Hausas, were excluded from the ancestoral cults because 
they were strangers. The Hausa peasants as already mentioned were oppressed 
by the ruling Hausa aristocrats and the wandering Fulani scholars maintained 
close network of association with the oppressed Hausa peasants and preached 
to and taught them. The instrumental approach of the Fulani elites was 
their law and knowledge of God. The law of God, according to their 
experience, emphasised social and politicial justice to all in , the 
community. In this case, the starting pont for integration was that all 
actions should be. drawn and based on communion with Allah (God). ' This 
relationshp superceded any conceivable interhuman relationship. In other 
words, the content of total network linkage in the community was religion. 
This doctrine of Islamic faith was intensified with the oppressed group - 
the Hausa peasant pagans - and communication between the masses and the 
aristocrats became difficult. But communication between all the Fulanisj, 
i. e. the boroje the wandering scholars and torodbe (Fulani Muslim clerical 
class) who were employed in the aristocratic palaces as clerks, lawyers, 
teachers and judges, was not severed. All the Fulanis were tribesmen and 
strangers who identified with each other irrespective of differences of 
occupation accepted. Those in palaces were able to associate themselves 
closely with those living with Hausa peasant famers. 
"They could ... communicate with those in their own language, yet 
some among the Fulani clerics became some of the most notable Arabic scholars of the Western and central Sudan. As such, they 
could also communicate with the Tuareg divines. These were also 
scholars born of, and living in, a pastoral society, one result of 
which was the spread of the Qadiriyya to the Fulani clerics. "26 
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Having developed vast network communication links with all classes in the 
society, the Fulanis set out to mobilize the support of the masses against 
the ruling class who had denied them full social and political rights and 
participation. In the context of Islamic doctrine, the Hausa autocratic 
aristocrats had no legal justification to rule and ought ot be challenged 
and repalced so as to establish a just society where all in the name of 
Islamic brotherhood could enjoy equality in all respects. 
", ** in the boroje lay widely spread reservoirs of manpower, 
already accustomed to the use of force, whether in self defence or 
in the service of others. They were also free from contamination 
by the society the Fulani clerics u-ished to reform or destroy, and 
they were linked together by the same nexus of kinship, and by a 
common language that the clerics themselves could use for their 
effective mobilization. "27 
Tension began to build up when the ruling class suspected the content of 
religious preaching of the Fulanis to the Hausa peasants. Initially, the 
intention of the preaching was less precise which resulted in greater 
tenslon between different classes. 
For religious integration to take place in a society under the leadership of 
a small alien elite, such as the Fulanis, they must have formed a strict 
highly organised and well-disciplined network group. Reaction from outside 
should not, shake the organisation to disintegrate from achieving its 
objective. A firm, solid and religious elite could then set out to achieve 
this purpose either by coercion or cohesion and surprisingly, the Fulanis 
achieved religious and political integration as described above through the 
combination of the two forces. 
Over a long period, they established mutual and cohesive relationships with 
the peasant Hausa who were the main social Political opponents of the ruling 
class. With the support of the peasants, the reserved army of Fulani 
nomads, who were particularly denied civic rights by the ruling Hausa for 
many years, the Fulani elites staged a jihad -a holy war. 
However, one of the most important and salient instruments of the success of 
the jihad which many historians have ignored was printing. It has been 
estimated that the Fulani clergies such as Usman Dan Fodio, Abdullahi and 
Muhammad Bello wrote and published over 260 books and pamphlets on religion, 
law, philosophy, historys politics and poetry which were orientated twoards 
Islamic principals. ihese did not only have a strong impact on the 
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immediate environment (subjects within the emirates of Hausa/Fulani) but 
also reached and influenced states outside the Caliphate. 
Their writings in terms of communication and influence spread faster than 
the jihad itself. This situation was comparable to the writings of Martiner 
Luth in German and Small, C. points out that: 
"Whether or not the original 95 theses on indulgences which Luther 
nailed to the door of All Saints I Church in Wittenberg were hand- 
written, they were very soon in print ... and carried the igniting 
spark of the Reformation throughout Germany ..,, by a stroke of 
magic he found himself addressing the whole world. "28 
Indeed, Usman Dan Fodio achieved similar doctrinal power in the name of 
Islamic religion through written communication and military conquest. 
"In view of the piecemeal manner in which the empire initiated by 
Usman Dan Fodio had been constructed, and also of its vast size, 
it was a two months' journey to cross it from north to south and 
three to four months from west to east - its control and 
administration were not a simple matter, One thing was not in 
dispute, namely, that under God, supreme authority rested with 
Usman and his heirs, who bore the titles of Shehu or Shaykh, 
Sarkin Musulmi ond Caliph. -29 
One of the most important factors which helped Islam to penetrate into such 
a wide area by written communication was that Hausa and Fulani (the 
languages used in the publications) were widely spoken in the area. Many of 
the books also written or translated into Arabic were commonly used by the 
Muslims of Kanem. empire in the n. orth-east of Hausaland. They were the 
second largest ethnic group in this region and wee most affected by the 
teaching of Usman Fodio. Like in Germanyl Small, C. further remarked: 
"Perhaps the most significant point about this series of events is 
that the theses, and many of the pronouncements that followed 
them, included the appeal to the Christian Nobility of the German 
nation which was the chief manifesto of the German Reformation, 
were printed in the vernacular - either translated from Latin or 
written from the start in German. "30 
and through printing in local language, John Sleidan noted that 'German 
eyes' were opened and 'enlightened' knowledge was brought to the rest of the 
world and 
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"Each man became eager for knowledge, not without feeling a sense 
of amazement at his former blindness. '-31 
Also the use of Hausa by both pagans and Muslims meant that the language was 
a sacred language which was used to convert them. The converts did not feel 
alienated in the doctrine they were persuaded to accept. They found the 
conversion natural in terms of language. 
Doctrine has several integrating powers via communication processes. One of 
the most effective ways of communication is by the meaningful interpretation 
of the language used. Encoding of messages for persuasion must take 
precedence over all things but the experience of the group who were aimed at 
to decode the message. 
In the pre-colonial southern societies of Nigeria, the political implication 
of cults cannot be over-estimated. The congregation of kinsmen, clans and 
tribesmen -before the tombs of their ancestors - if known - and other 
symbolically deidcated places for their worship in the communities under the 
" the elders, chiefs and kings, cannot be only dialectical leadership oý 
imagination of cosmology and philosphical religious thought, but also vital 
political communication network bytems in which the communities were 
indirectly linked to the gods through their leaders. 
Leadership in spiritual worship has shown both in contemporary society and 
in historical times of the great Gnostic teachers - Shankara, Ramakrishna, 
Bodhicharma, Huineng, Duineng, Duishis and Honen, as illustrated by 
Pythagoras, Empedoches, Plato and Plato and Platinus, that religious 
teaching and authority were complementary. Leadership was also the most 
powerful political influence upon followers. 
Today, several leaders have emerged both as religious leaders and political 
leaders. Outstanding among them is the present leader of Iran, Khomeini 
Ayatollah Ruhallah; the Sikh leaders of India have now taken up a political 
emblem rather than a spiritual banner. The Rev. Jesse Jackson's political 
popularity among Black Americans has its roots in religious leadership, 
while Pope John Paul Ills religion has acquired for him - rather than having 
to ask for it - the power to intervene and neutralise political tension 
worldwide, e. g. in Poland and in South America. 
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Back to our traditional society, intellectual analysis of groups in a 
society often tends to separate people by class, tribe, caste and clan, etc. 
once one traditional religion is established and remains pure of 
contamination from outside, the entire worshippers have a greater tendency 
to be united strongly under one leadership irrespective of class, caste and 
culture. 
The consultation of far distance oracles and cults such as the Aro Chukdu or 
Igwe Ka ala of Umunoha united the worshippers of f airly diverse background, 
culture and dialects. Forms of cult worship integrated and developed inter- 
relationship, checked social differences and broke down class divisions into 
two - the masses and the spiritual leader who was also the political leader, 
such as the Oba of Onitsha, the Alaf in of Oyo and the Oba of Benin. These 
leaders communicated direclty to the spirits on behalf of, and for the well- 
being of, the society. Cults therefore bind and animate the masses via the 
kings or the elders. 
Onitsha people would not believe that any sacrifice which was not offered by 
the Oba was acceptable to the gods. And in all the annual rituals and 
ceremonies, the Oba, the Obi, the Alafin or the elders led the ceremonies 
while they remained as legitimate political leaders. Furthermore, religious 
ceremonies did not represent a specific momeqt of existence of the tribes 
and their needs but the entire life and continuity of the group was believed 
to be determined by these rites. 
Although some daily but minimum rites were common by individuals and groups, 
in more organised kingdoms of Onitsha, Benin or Oyo, the class structure and 
political leadrship and power began to emerge as the more important 
ceremonies were carried out seasonally or annually. Complicated and 
elaborate annual cultic practices were reserved for kings*$ chiefs and elders 
who also held greater political power. In this case, the religious 
practices of the pre-colonial southern Nigeria tirbes were not different 
form the ancient worships of Israel, Egypto Japan, Italy and Greece, etc. 
The degree of religious function emphasised the extent of political power 
and influence of the leader. 
As we have seen so far, in pre-colonial Nigeria, religion was everything, 
It was difficult to draw a line between the social, political, economic and 
religious life of the people. In every respect, each supplemented the 
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other. The activities were highly interwoven. Perhaps, this was the common 
characteristic of all pre-colonial states in Africa*and Jack Herbert Driberg 
carefully observed the life of the Lango, a tribe in East Africa. 
"It cannot be too of ten emphasised that religion is a much more 
important factor in the secular life of primitive people than it 
is with civilised communities - indeed, it is the most important 
of all. It enters into all their family and social relations, 
into their most commonplace activities and their daily occupation, 
in short, there is no, aspect of native lif e which has not its 
religious significance, and which is not more or less controlled 
by religious rites or prohibitions. -32 
Thus, in the pre-capitalist but subsistence agric-economy of Nigeria, 
religion was the major integrating political factor and the main medium of 
expression of unity. Either in the city-states of the Muslim north, the 
kingdoms of Yoruba/Benin west, or autonomous communities in the east, 
religion symbolised the entire life of the people and the main content of 
all the total network in the system. 
In pre-colonial communities religion transcended political power. For 
instance, a shrine for cultic rituals could represent and also form part of 
communities' property for'wealth, social and political power. They were 
also subject to the rulers. and sanctions laid down by religion over the 
community. 
Though all these communities practised religion, enormous differences 
existed in the acts, hence their attitude towards the outside 'world', i. e. 
people outside their own. communities, became overtly negative. 
Consequently, tribal resentment that has plagued Nigerian political and 
social institutions can be located in differences in religious practices. 
Religion is an inner state or intrinsic factor which can be very subjective. 
Its political integrative value cannot be realised until the subjective 
values are made manifest in experience or communicative forms. Religious 
experiences take off effectively via communication channels. In 
traditional societies the predominant communication channels were immediate 
- oral and face-to-face communication, gestures, symbols and signs, printing 
in the case of Hausa/Fulani, and painting in the case of Benin works of art. 
All these could be articulated, substantiated and verified, through various 
cultural systems in the society. In the process of sharing religous 
experience via communication, specific attitudes by the communicating group 
are developed iowards the world and those outside the group. Every 
characteristic attitude developed by the group whose entire life revolves 
around the faith is constantly stimulated by religion from generation to 
generation. This attitude normally would be directed to the outside world - 
which may or may not share the same view. Views can only be made known at 
points of contact between different people. Attitudes through spirit of 
religion sharpen, determine, create and regulate communication of ideas, 
values, norms and consensus with other people. 
As we have seen already, the jihad expressed a negative attitude towards 
non-believers in the doctrine of Islam in pre-colonial Nigeria. Thus, 
religious attitude was not only an indication of spiritual influence but 
also political movement. 
Power structure and the development of modern historical philosophy has been 
pointed out in the works of Hegal, Baader, Kant, Schelling, and also Ernest 
Troeltsch who particular noted that: 
"the attitude towards the 'world' which is determined and 
motivated by a characteristic religious experience influences 
men's appreciation of the basic concept of haman existence and the 
form of human activity., *33 
Also Max Weber has made a useful contribution through typological study of 
different religious attitudes to the 'world'. The varying degrees of 
conception, interpretation, appreciation - optimistic and cheerful 
evaluation of the 'world'. or pessimistic and bleak view of it followed a 
differential attitude towards the-society by the beholders of these views. 
As the Islamic brotherhood in the north has persisted-since the pre-colonial 
period by excluding those who are not Muslim 'brothers' and was less 
affected by colonial rule, as will be shown later, let us consider further 
the Igbo and Yoruba cosmology which was affected by the Christian religion 
during the colonial period. Indeed, -the traditional Yoruba and Igbo 
religions have comparatively died out as a result of Chris.. tian relgion and 
other Western influences, particularly education. 
The cosmic order among the Igbos and Yorubas was well organised in a 
comprehensive mythology that embodied normative elements which transcended 
mere speculations. The cosmic,, moral and ritual order placed binding 
network ties between the entire communities of Igbo and Yoruba lands. Ii, 
1ýqs 
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Igboland particularly, the rules of cosmic relationship with communities 
were the only expression of political and social reality upon which the 
Igbos could secure themselves as a people and a political group as such. 
Normative systems - rules, legals, and aesthetics of every individual were 
regulated and revolved round the cosmological belief. Since, as pointed out 
earlier, there was no clear boundary between the social, political and 
religous life of the Igbos, cosmological association predominated in 
everything, thus as Hambly, W. D. Malinowski, William and Seagle have noted 
in their studies: 
"Themis represented the order of the World as the gods desired it 
to be and thus developed into a binding social force. She 
personified 
' 
the collective conscience, the social sanction, the 
social imperative which was at first diffused, vauge, inchoate 000 
later crystallised into fixed conventions cut distinction between 
civil and criminal or between law and custom does not emerge until 
a later stage. --34 
Like the Greek society, in Igbo and Yoruba political system "Law, indeed, 
was one aspect of religion. " (Harrison, J. E. 1912: 526; Granet, M. 1930: 247) 
The major differences in pre-colonial tribes of Nigeria were in social and 
political organisations. In communication terms, the only form of 
communicaiton in Igbo and Yoruba societies was oral, immediate face-to-face 
communication. 
"Given an equal mastery of the languages, the oral exchange is 
intrinsically symmetrical. All individuals have an equal capacity 
to initiate exchange, an equal capacity to avoid and terminate 
exchange, an equal capacity to determine the content of the 
exchange and the terms of any discussion. There is also an equal 
capacity to store and retrieve information from past exchange. 
All individuals are equally exposed to such exchanges and have 
equal access to the means of operating them, since they required 
no more than a common language or code and normal physical 
condition of voice and ear. "35 
In the Hausa/Fulani caliphate both written and oral commications were used 
and they had a wider and better organised political system. In the 
caliphate, social and political organisational structures were also more 
complex and each group did different tasks but all were consistent with 
common Islamic principles. However, the degree of religious and political 
participation and function were highly differentiated. Comparatively, with 
the Igbos at this period, there was a minimum of such differentiation and 
diversification of functions and political roles by members. Igbo 
- -- --- 
communities were simple, small and autonomous, but characteristically unique 
in structure and political and social systems. 
In the Hausa/Fulani emirates, social and political division were vertical, 
while in the Igboland it was horizontal. The Yoruba/Benin organisation was 
second to Hausa/Fulani political organisation, but less autocratic because 
the powers of the kings wer controlled by the people through the chiefs who 
could persuade the kings to commit suicide if their power was suspected of 
being too much or they became unpopular with their subjects due to acts of 
cruelty or tendency towards despotism. 
In Igbo society, individual achievement and age determined political 
participation and status. In Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba/Benin, inherited 
position determined status and prestige and thus political power. And in 
these societies except the Igbo communities, traditonalism and hierarchical 
organisation 'froze' members at various strata of their society. 
Consequently, communication processes and information diffusion followed the 
vertical and hierarchical order and 
"We can therefore expect the development of - relations of 
communication which impose a ritual or jurisdical symmetry of use 
on intrinsically symmetrical means., -36 
Therefore, different sets of values and information would be received and 
they were controlled for power in the society. The power structure here was 
similar to ancient Imperial Rome. 
Contrary to Igbo society, power was extended as physical force, individual 
achievement, intellectual superiority, outspokenness for justice and 
"&9e power, which is the ability to control, is f ree-f loating in 
human society, and may become associated with any one of many 
distinguishing attributes with physical strength (Estimo), age (Adamanese) with being the first-born son of the first-born son (Polynesia), with knowledge (Zunis), psychic gifts, or valour in 
war, or with being born with a caul. -37 
In the north, division of labour had already been advanced and differences 
in ranks established. The simple dichotomy of kings and rulers prevalent in 
the south were replaced in the north by the three or four social strata - 
the sultan, the emirs, the Malams and military peasants (farmers and 
artisans). The relative power of these strata were determiend by the amount 
_______ 
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of power each stratum had at its disposal to exert on the community. It is 
important to note that class stratification is always determined by internal 
structure and organisation of the society. Power, status and prestige 
acquired through heredity favours class stratification and in such a 
society, political stability would be more likely than in societies where 
the criteria for power and status/prestige are determined by individual 
achievment, strength and intelligence. Intrigues can be employed to oust 
those in authority. The hereditary systems are more conservative and 
autocratic and could be prone to dictatorship, while the former society 
(decentralised) is more radical and responsive to changes. 
It is a too narrow approach to characterise pre-colonial societies in 
Nigeria and their political systems solely on religion. This will make the 
societies appear very static. Another common characteristic of the 
socieities as mentioned earlier was agriculture, which is a very good 
indicator in stages of social, political and economic development. (We are 
not concerned with economic development and changes. ) But in all the pre- 
colonial Nigerian societies, political communiation was exclusively 
interpersonal direclty or indirectly with religion as the principal linkage 
content in the network of relationship between kinsmen, the ruled and the 
rulers. Islam was and still is central to Hausa/Fulani politics, cults and 
oracle organisation was common to both the Igbo and the Yoruba political 
systems. Specifically, the Igbo communities were primarily concerned with 
the cosmological forces to regulate their socio-political relationship. The 
strongest socio-political force which regualted political power among the 
Yoruba was the spiritualisation of sucide. In all the systems, kinship 
network structure was the base on which all socio-political relationships 
were established. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COLONIALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW SYSTEMS 
In Chapter Two, I proposed that one of the processes of the convergency of 
traditional and modern political systems in Nigeria is at the level of 
political policies which affect both rural and urban areas. I also pointed 
out that this process is historical. The historical moment in which the 
two political systems converged was under the early administration of the 
British in Nigeria. 
This dimension of convergence may not be crucial for the analysis of data in 
today's political communication network systems in Nigeria, but the 
background is important because it was the colonial administration that in 
particular initiated 'the coming together (convergence)' of two different 
political traditions in Nigeria. In chapter two, we have seen the structure 
of political communication in a purely traditional system in which religion 
and kinship subsystems constituted the major political communication 
content. With the exception of Hausa/Fulani kingdoms in the North where 
Islam and written information had advanced a stage ahead in political 
systems, other parts of Nigeria in the pre-colonial period did not converge 
with any new and different political system. 
The apparent convergence of the traditional and modern system began in the 
late nineteenth century with the domination of the Royal: Niger Company in 
the Niger Delta areas. The trading companies combined commercial, military 
and political administration in these areas. As European powers, 
particularly -Germany, France, Spain, Belgium and Portugal, began to*develop 
and expand economic interest to Africa at this period, Britain also began to 
encourage, in particular, the Royal Niger Company to expand its interest and 
influence to the North and West from the Niger Delta areas. 
"While encouraging traders and missionaries to pioneer up the 
Niger, she took more active steps to secure the Yoruba rule by 
conquering Lagos in 1851 and formally annexing it in 1861. As the 
pressure of internal rivalry increased in the 1880s, Britain 
claimed three spheres of influence in: Lagos and Yoruba 
hinterland, the 'oil Rivers of the Niger delta, and the vast 
territories of the Islamic emirates in the North. "I 
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The influence of Sir George Goldie in the amalgamation of British trading 
companies in order to take effective economic, political and military 
control of Nigeria in the wake of European interest in the country was 
strengthened by Queen Victoria's 1887 charter. By this charter, the company 
was made responsible: 
"for the overnment of the River basins and the whole of 
Hausaland. .. 
I 
The processes in which modern systems were introduced in Nigeria under the 
British trading companies' administration encountered problems and 
resistence at two major fronts: (a) internal; (b) external. Internally, 
there were several uprisingsl for instance, the company's well organised 
army which was disassociated with trade, were confronted in the South east 
of the Niger by the local army of Obi Anazonwu of Onitsha. The Obi also 
rejected the teaching of the missionaries and: 
sea series of well-planned loots of missionary stations and trading 
factories-3 
were carried out against the Goldie administiation. Further north, Bids and 
Ilorin waged war against the trading Company. Goldie also faced the 
overwhelming task of suppressing the slave trading activities of the Fulani 
in the North. 
In general, slave raids seriously hampered the free-movement of people and 
goods and, in particular, barred access to the flourishing market in the 
Borno kingdom. Thus, one of the initial problems of convergence of two 
traditions in Nigeria was horizontal communication in which geographical 
mobility, that creared linkages between different people, was restricted. 
The most important factors of such linkage by those in authority were 
economic (trade) and religion (Christianity). Externally, the aggression of 
the French an the German forces, along with the internal confrontations, 
compelled the British on 1st January, 1900 to assume total control of Lagos 
colony and the protectorates. Militarily, the West African Frontier Force 
largely made up of Africans, was strengthend to protect the country against 
external aggression and also to suppress any internal uprising, Within the 
Nigerian context military, commerical, political and religion (Christianity) 
in the hands of -alien powers, now began to be separated and defined to cope 
with the prevailing new situations. Thereupon, a new political arrangement 
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based on division of roles and duties began to emerge in contrast to the old 
systems. where the chiefs, emirs, elders etc. were the social, political, 
economic and spiritual leaders. Between 1901 and 1906, the entire Sokoto 
Caliphate was conquered by the British but the emirs ruled the people 
directly while the victors ruled indirectly. 
In the North, the process of apparent convergence of two political systems 
as early as 1906 were achieved first by what Ernest Gellner (1983: 42) 
described as "a political group with military orientation and dedication". 
And this was "perpetuated by societies strongly committed to warfare, either 
because their tribal form of life includes a leading stratum committed to it 
or for such similar reason". 
In the case of the British conquest of the region - which was the second 
phase of Hausa integration of a new political system, British interest was 
orientated towards industry and trade but maintained by 'military machine'. 
Hence, in the process of the convergence of a traditional and modern 
political system, one of the subsystems emphasised under the British rule 
was economics. The new economic subsystem generated new forms of political 
relation and struggle between the rulers and the ruled. 
Another important aspect of the old system and the new system was religion - 
Christianity. It was a popular reason among certain strata of the Europeans 
to initiate a coming together between African and European traditions. Hugh 
E. Egerton (1855-1957) stated that: 
"The motives which prompted the European nations to enter upon the 
f ield of colonisation were ... the desire to convert f or the 
church, and the desire to win wealth for themselves. Unhappily, 
the missionary zeal soon exhausted. When it was f ound out that 
the unknown lands were peopled, not by civilised communities ... but by savages weak for the most part in body and in mind, the 
work of religion was left to the priest, and laymen more and more 
confined themselves to the material side of the conquest. "4 
Religion, as seen in Chapter Two, was fundamental in the African traditional 
political system and constituted an important aspect of the persistent 
belief by early Europeans "that peoples of tropical Af rica were 
fundametnally different from the rest of mankind. "5 
Generally, therefore, in the study of the convergence of two political 
traditions in Nigeria emerging specifically from the colonial period, were 
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economicq religion and, to a certain extent,, military subsystems which 
became very important major characteristics and which also distinguished the 
two subsystems. These also can determine the political relationship between 
traditional and modern political systems. 
Unlike the gradual assimilation and fusion of Fulani political tradition 
with the Hausa traditional system, the convergence of the Nigerian pre- 
colonial political system and the European modern political system was 
achieved by military force. The consequence was that behind the new 
political system, the old traditional pattern persisted more or less trongly 
through tribal and kinship networks. This military character of the 
Nigerian political system was not so much on the grounds that the British 
wanied to satisfy their trade ambition, the external (French attempts to 
occupy Bornu) and internal confrontation had to be militarily resisted, but 
because the prevailing situation in Europe and the character of individuals 
engaged in early colonial administration in Nigeria made military action 
inevitable. 
Fage (1978: 388) noted that military rule has had a formidable base in the 
politi. cs of Nigeria because those who laid the. foundaton in Nigeria and 
Africa in what is known as civilised government, were generals of the 1914- 
18 war. The Victorian conquest of Africa at this period demanded Europeans 
with military experience to serve on the continent. Besides, after-World 
War 1, there was a general demobilisation of soldiers who began to look for 
civil employment. Such experience, Fage (1978: 388) points out, was a useful 
qualification for a colonial governorship. Fredrick Lugard was an example 
of such an ex-serviceman. In 1894, he came to Nigeria to assist George 
Goldie who was also an ex-military officer. When the British took over the 
administrative roles of the Chartered Royal Niger Company, Lugard was 
appointed the Commander of the colonial army and the governor of Northern 
Nigeria between 1907-12. For a couple of years he was in Hong Kong as a 
governor. He returned to Nigeria in 1914. In the same year he amalgamated 
the north and south of the country. Ajayi noted that the amalgamation 
undertaken was: 
in the process of trying to establish effective rule over 
different peoples of Nigeria that the artificial nature of initial 
democrations of territory became obvious. "6 
Implicity, as with Nigeria, different political systems existed and in 
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addition to these an entirely different political system was imposed on the 
already multiple systems. Ajayi further commented that the amalgamation of 
different peoples and political, social, and cultural systems has "been one 
of the most crucial events in Nigerian history e9e undertaken essentially 
for the convenience of the British administration and the Nigerian peoples 
were not consulted. " (Ajayi, 1978: 633). Bretton (1962: 124), describes the 
amalgamation as "one of the greatest acts of gerrymandering in history. " 
In defences, Lugard argued that the amalgamation was necessary in order to 
reduce the cost of administration of the Northern and Southern protectorates 
and also to bridge the economic gap between the more flourishing southern 
coasts and the vast but less economically well off North. While the 
amalgamation was the apparent convergence of dif f erent - political sytems in 
Nigeria, Ajayi points out that the I .... interlocking chain of connections 
did not make Nigeria a united country'. The economic rather than political 
integration of the amalgamation was made clear by Lugard. 
"The scheme of amalgamation adopted in Nigeria was designed to 
involve as little dislocation of existing conditions as possible, 
while providing for the introduction later of such further changes 
as were either foreseen, but not immediately necessary, or might 
be suggested bý future experience. "T 
In the concept of convergence as defined in chapter twoq our discussions so 
far in the early colonial administration ýshow that different political 
systems existed independent of each other in Nigeria before the colonial 
era. The colonial system becomes a dominant political culture. The 
ýmalgamation was a crucial moment in which different traditional and modern 
European political systems converge, but more importantly each of the 
systems within the total political system in Nigeria potentially remained 
active and unaltered. Yet in their original state they were subject to 
changes which would only enhance economic growth within a fragmented 
political system. Here is the irony of political convergence under colonial 
administration where weak and disunited political groups were pressed 
together for economic expansion. A weak political system is prone to and 
exposed to both internal and external exploitation, culturally, economically 
and socially. 
What is important in the 'convergence' of different political systems in 
Nigeria at the level of the 'amalgamation' is not amalgamation itself but 
the systems of rules operative under it which were dichotomised into direct 
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and indirect rules. Their application by the colonial authorities differed 
from one traditional political system to the other. Coleman states that: 
"Although the British authorities vigorously pursued the policy of 
working through the developing traditional systems, there were 
great differences in its application. In general, the policy was 
most successful where there were identifiable traditional 
authorities commanding effective control over centralised 
structure of government .... considerable greater difficulty was 
encountered in the case of the dispersed tribal societies .... for 
here the traditional political system was less clearly articulated 
and political process much more subtle. "8 
The most important region in Nigeria where the Indirect Rule System could be 
efficiently adopted was in certain parts of the North predominantly 
dominated by Hausa/Fulani (in chapter three various traditional political 
systems have been fully described). 
INDIRECT RULE IN NOTHERN NIGERIA 
In 1900 af ter the declaration of the protectorates, Lugard embarked upon a 
systematic method of ruling the Hausa/Fulani comunities through their emirs. 
ýhis was as a result of an efficient traditional political system which 
existed in the North before the advent of British colonisation. There was 
no better alternative political system which could be introduced to govern 
the vast region of the old caliphate which had embraced the Islamic faith, 
and 
"Under its influence they had ... developed a well organised 
fiscal system, a definite code of land tenure, a regular scheme of 
local rule through appointed District Heads, a trained judiciary 
administering the tennets of the Mohammedan laws. "9 
In order to contain opposition, in communities where resistance was 
encountered during the conquest of the North, old leaders were replaced with 
new leaders, new laws were passed and carried out by the leaders. The new 
leaders could no longer exercise 'inherent' authority, but the colonial law 
enabled them to carry out responsibilities within the communities. 
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In 1903, the North was divided -into 14 provinces and each had a Resident 
officer with advisory capacity only and he was trusted by Lugard. Political 
communication was maintained through 'chains' or lin'kages between the 
Governor and the ruled. The absolute intermediaries were the Resident 
officers and the local emirs. At -the most local levels, the convergence of 
traditional and modern politics revolved round the level of political 
association between the Resident Officers and the emirs. But the emphasis 
on the relationshp was economic rather than political. Lugard made it clear 
that the "basis of the whole system .... supplied the means to pay the Emir 
and his officials. The district and village heads are effectively 
supervised and assisted in its assessment by the British staff. "10 
Perhaps, it is not the overt non political content of the indirect rule and 
its great economic emphasis that should be considered most important, but 
the response of the people to the system. The concept of the 'Nigerian 
system' or 'Indirect Rule' based on social class overlooked the most abiding 
factor between leaders and followers - religion. The presence of Resident 
Officers who were not Muslims in the local comunities, but 'lords' over the 
emirs, produced resentment by the masses. And in the city-states such as 
Kano, Sokoto, Zaria etc., where the supervision of the traditional rulers by 
the colonial authorities was most direct and overt, there was a new pattern 
of de-urbanisation. There was a trend in geographical mobility from the 
cities to the rural areas. Following this trend, the villages became the 
new administrative units. 
"The village is the administrative unit land' it is not always 
easy to define, since the security to life and property which has 
followed the British administration has caused the exodus from 
cities and large villages, and the creation of numerable hamlets, 
sometimes only one or two huts, on the agricultural bands ... they 
reorganised the authority of the Emirs, and are ready to listen to 
the village head and the council of elders, on whcih the Nigerian 
system is based. "11 
This new economic development had certain important political communication 
implications and economic consequences. The development of inumerable 
villages as a' result of city/village. migration and the continuous presence 
of Resident Officers in these remote villages intensified the rejection of 
Western values. The Islamic laws and values during the crusades had already 
equated these values with Christianity. Through the teaching of Fodio, 
Bello etc., the Muslims had rejected Western values before colonisation. 
Thus, traditional politics closely associated with a religion became more 
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entrenched in the indirect rule system, not because the colonial authorities 
found it the most attractive or encouraged it, but because the ruled 
rejected the new system. 
The adherence to village heads and elders implied that under the new system, 
these heads remained the political, social, economic, cultural and spiritual 
leaders. Political communiation as def ined earlier consequently remained 
traditional. 
In order that the colonial authorities might influence and change the 
village direct, without the necessity of expensive intermediaries such as 
the emirs and Resident Officers, the development of radio was encouraged 
despite the argument, as we shall see in chapter six, that radio stations in 
Africa were "a waste of money on an extremely expensive, relatively new 
invention" (Armour 1984: 30). This was an application of - the concept of 
linear model of thý mass media on colonial Africa which failed because the 
network of kinship and obligatory religious ties which characterised the 
rural communities and the entire Muslim North remained powerful means of 
political communication. 
The notion that once Europeans came into contact with Africans, the impact 
of their advanced political systems, social, cultural, etc., would have 
"disintegrating effect on tribal authority and institutions, and 
on the conditon of native life ... tribal system break-up ... 
nothing could infuse new life into it. And with the rapid changes 
the native character has deteriorated ... and the old village 
discipline and respect ... gone. The old order of tribal society 
is dead, dying or doomed"12. This could be highly questionable. 
The concept of the influence of Europeans on African socio-political life is 
similar to Morley's (1981: 1) observation about the "loosing of traditional 
ties and structures" where people Fere "exposed to external influences, 
especially the presence of the mass propaganda of the powerful leaders". A 
concept which he pointed out ý7as developed by the Frankfurt school of 
emigrants (Adorno, Marcus, Horkheimer) to America during the 1930s, which 
formed the foundation of the historical development of the linear model of 
political communication. The socio-political and economic development 
studies of Schramm (1964), Lerner (1958), Pye (ed., 1963) were based on the 
same concept as shown in chapter one of this thesis. On the contrarys the 
indirect rule in Nigeria became direct rule by 'indirect means' in which the 
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economic interest of the colonial authorities strengthened the position and 
salary of the Emirs. They became absolute rulers among their rural 
subjects. The external influence of the colonial power had partial impact 
on the local heads. Bishop Tugwell maintained that through indirect rule in 
Nigeria, the lives of the masses were: 
"robbed of all initiatives, or desire for progress - intellectual, 
social, moral, religious or political .... The Emir who is 
appointed by the government is the instrument of the Resident. "13 
Indirect rule only facilitated tax collection; political and social life of 
the people for many generations after the contacts with the Europeans 
remained unchanged. Ajayi (1980: 633), therefore, stated that the 
"basic idea of Indirect Rule was to preserve as many of the 
traditional institutions as possible and to use them as agents of 
colonial rule to maintain stability by discouraging social change 
and yet encourage just enough economic development to produce 
revenue to run the administration. It was a policy of expediency 
full of contradictions and difficult to maintain in practice. "14 
The tax system established in the North in the pre-colonial period was the 
most important factor that encouraged the developmbnt' of the native 
authority system. By 1946,116 native authorities and 59 treasuries were 
established in the region. Between 1953 and 1954, these treasuries 
collected over E5.7 million. The most important ones were Kano (E797,723), 
Sokoto (E513,324), Katsina (E437,243) and Bornu (E381,610). The large sum 
of money involved in the treasuries led to the appointment of supervision 
staff and rigid rules, which were only relatively relaxed by 1954, were 
imposed on expenditure. It was only after the availability of large sums of 
money that the economic motives of Indirect Rule or a Native Authority 
system in Nigeria became politicised. Political economyq similar to those 
of Western industrial systems applied in Lagos colony, started to be 
introduced in Nothern Nigeria. The convergence of two political traditions 
began to show some apparent close similarities and associations The 
activities of traditional authorities and institutions which constituted the 
core of the Native Authority System began to be contradictory when the 
treasury funds were directed towards the establishment of modern schools, 
colleges, hospitals, printing press and public works. Departmental 
administrations were created to manage and control these activities. These 
divisions of labour in the development of modern economy brought about the 
separation of religous, social, economic and political leaderships 
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previously held by one person - the emir, the sultan, etc. in the community. 
The introduction of modern institutions such as education, mean that some of 
the important aspects of traditionalism could be eroded or give way to the 
new institutions. It was through these institutions that some degree of 
convergence was achieved. But the Islamic autocracy held the erosion in 
check for a long time. 
Amongst the modern institutions, education played an important role in the 
convergence of traditional and modern politics in the region. Initially, 
the separation of native authority leadership and relgious heads in the 
Hausa/Fulani community was impossible because the assignment to a position 
of authority within the system was based on inheritance, and the emirs 
virtually dominated the entire power structures. But as time passed by, 
appointments were based on merits. Education and experience in civil 
services became important criteria for political leadership in the 
communities. 
Then institutions and political actors became elements of political 
convergence because these institutions and political actors were developed 
into- representative institutions based on achievements and merita. 
Politically, between 1946 and 1953 three levels of political power 
structures could be identified in Northern Nigeria: 
a) The central colonial administration which was dominated by the 
colonial authorities with a greater tendency towards economic intreest 
in the regions rather than political development. But the model of 
the central political sytem in Lagos colony became an important 
component of the convergence of traditonalism and modernism in 
Nigerian politics. Also it was because of the success of the colonial 
economic policy - taxation - that modern institutions and political 
elites were created. 
b) The ascribed native authority system dominated by religious leaders. 
As their authority in communities checked rapid development into 
political modernisation so also did the constitutional representative 
politics led by the new elites limit the power of the emirs. 
C) The representative party political group adopted the colonial 
political model but were for a long time excl'uded from the colonial 
decision making process. 
I 
Then, the understanding of the political convergence between these levels is 
dependent on the structure of network linkages between the political actor 
and the institutions involved. For instance, in the emergence of party 
politics in Northern Nigeria, a considerable number of Native Authority 
officals became members of the party - Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). As 
a result, the authority of the colonial powers was sought and in 1952 the 
Native Authority Ordinance, which previously endowed the emirs with 
considerable power and privileges, was amended. The so-called superior 
Native Authorities under the new amendment became chiefs-in-council and were 
able to abide by the majority decision of the party. 
Most members were elected. Party policy became geared towards a decision- 
making process which guaranteed to represent popular opinion of members and 
the masses and not the authoritative view of the emirs. One important 
factor in the development is that most members of the Native Authority 
system were members of the political party. The convergence of the two 
models implies that the Native Authority system was structurally extended 
and. broadened to include educated Northerns as well as the other tribes who 
were not Hausa/Fulani in the region. In 1953, the "Strangers" who lived in 
. 
Sabo Garis (strangers quarters) in various cities in the North formed their 
own representative councils. 
While most of the party and council headquarters were located in the urban 
areas, members were elected from both rural and urban areas. The previous 
members of the Native Authority system such as the emirs, who were also 
important party leaders such as Sarduna of Sokoto, did not lose their power 
as traditional village and urban leaders in Sokoto province. Thus, such 
leaders became important linkages between rural and urban politics. In 
times of a general election within the new political structure, they were 
capable of creating an extensive network of political communication betwene 
the two environments for political mobilisation, participation and voting. 
In chapter five, we shall consider the relationship between NPC and the 
development of mass media for socio-political actions in the region. 
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INDIRECT RULE OR NATIVE AUMIORITY SYSTEK IN WESTERN NIGERIA 
We have seen in chapter three that the traditional political system of the 
Yorubas was a combination of Hausa/Fulani and Igbo traditional systems. 
Technically, it could be an important system of a 'democratic socialism or 
restricted autocratic system. ' Though the Obas, the Emirs or sultan of the 
North were a political class, the former, Hailey (1938: 460) points out, did 
not 
-possess the measure of personal command which the Fulani rulers 
had acquired and had been made effective through the agency of the 
District Heads who were their direct representatives throughout 
the territory. The subdivision of the Yoruba kingdom possessed a 
large measure of autonomy under the leadership of the hereditary 
families. "15 
The check on the powers of the Obas or the Alafin by his subjects as 
explained in chapter three, was a major setback in the introduction of a 
Native Authority system in Yorubaland. What was required was a re- 
organisation of the structure of political power in the traditional system. 
The 'power of the Obas over their subjects was recognised as absolute and 
endorsed by externdl power - the Royal Niger company in 1892 and 1893. 
Indeedg the earliest form of Native Authority system was introduced in the 
South by George Goldie. But while he legitimated the authority of the Oba 
so as to control his subjects in absolute terms, he excluded the Oba from 
eco-political decision-making in the Royal Niger company. 
The advent of modern education in Western Nigeria by missionaries and the 
return of ex-slaves from America, had already provided a large number of 
elites before the official proclamation of the Native Authority system. 
This created an initial problem for the Native Authority system to function. 
Not because these elites confronted the colonial authorities, but on the 
grounds that the traditional rulers felt dissatisfied with those who 
legitimated their power and at the same time exlcuded them from economic and 
political decision-making in the region. Hence, the traditional rulers 
began to identify with the new political elites who wanted a representative 
system of government, based on merit at regional and federal levels. 
Therefore, indirect rule, in effect, unified the traditional and emerging 
new political elites against the colonial authorities. The impact of modern 
education to produce new political groups that would enter into political 
struggle for power with the traditional rulers was reduced by the 
introduction of Indirect Rule. 
Another problem in * effecting the Native Authority system was the lack of 
available sources of regular revenue to guarantee the salaries of the Obas. 
A direct taxation system in the North provided the means to pay Northern 
Emirs, but such a system of taxation did not exist in Western Nigeria. 
In 1918, the Native Revenue Ordinance which was introduced in the North a 
year earlier, was extended to Western Nigeria. Instead of alleviating the 
problem, the Ordinance created a new conflict in which the separation of 
power at local level between the local authorities and the local traditional 
chiefs and Obas was impossible to define. This was because both the elites 
and the traditional rulers rejected the principles of- a Native Authority 
system. The agitation of both for the replacement of a Native Authority 
system led to the establishment of the local government council system 
modelled on the British (local government) system. Politically, both the 
elites and the traditional rulers were elected or appointed to the local 
government system. Consequently, both the elites and the traditional rulers 
became more closely integrated at local level. At representative level, 
beyond local politics, the larger local governments became dominant 
political groups in the region. 
Areas outside Yoruba - main Provinces such as Warri, Asaba, etc. where 
previously there were no political leaders above family and clan level, 
councils of elders constituted 'an important political group. In these 
areas, the councils were in multiples of ten, highly fragmented and 
disproportionately scattered throughout the region. This was 
administratively expensive and difficult to run. In 1947, smaller councils 
scattered within the same geographical areas were grouped together and their 
treasuries accounted for large revenues. This process reduced the number of 
-local councils from 137 in 1945 to 53 in 1951. 
But, it was not until 1948 that the Colonial Office saw the need for the 
development of local government councils and then encouraged the system. 
They helped to appoint local chiefs as ceremonial heads and the colonial 
official inspected the political and financial activities of the councils. ' 
By 1951, Lagos formed part of Western Nigerian Regional government but after 
1951, it was directly administered by the central government which was 
divided into three Districts. Local chiefs helped in tax collection. 
Between 1953-4, Western Nigeria's total revenue expenditure was about E2 
million and the Regional ireasuries' revenue was about E5,000 - E275,484. 
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The big cities such as Ibadan, Oyo, Benin, Egbu, etc., had the largest 
revenues. It was the availability of these revenues and the expansion in 
cocoa production that'helped Western Nigeria to embark on rapid developments 
in local hospitals, roads, schools, colleges, electricity, water supply, 
etc. The expansion in education produced large numbers of elites and as the 
council members were elected, the majority of them were these educated men. 
In many respects, they overshadowed the ceremonial traditional chiefs in the 
Districts. 
The slow development of the Western system of education in the North, on the 
contraryt meant that similar development in the North was dominated by 
traditional rulers. Also, Western Nigeria wholeheartedly embraced Western 
values, the urban centres that developed during and before the advent of 
colonialism were rapidly expanding. The process of migration was from the 
rural to urban centres hence the cost of running numerous small local 
governemnts scattered throughout the region, was reduced by the merging 
together of small ones. The localisation of politics and the mutual 
political activities between the elites and the traditional rulers within 
these councils, helped to produce a unique political leadership in the 
region. The development of a party political system proved to be beneficial 
for a political leader who required only to be linked to local government 
leaders and these in turn would mobilise the local communities behind the 
leader. Furthermore, the rapid urbanisation in Western Nigeria made the 
political mobilisation of Westerners by a political leader comparatively 
easy. The rural areas only responded to the trend of city political 
activities. Because of the long history of Yoruba cities before 
colonisation, traditional politics w ere already entrenched in them as much 
as in the village. During the colonial administration, these traditional 
values remained an important part of Yoruba politics. The elites maintained 
the kinship network system which were par to the urban politics and which 
were not required to be transferred from the rural areas through the network 
of rural/urban migrants. Ihese elements combine to make the Yorubas the 
most "traditionalist' tribe in Nigeria today. 
In the sense we have def ined convergence of two traditions geographically. 
In Western and Northern Nigeria where city-states or urban centres developed 
before the advent of colonialism, the convergence of two different political 
systems were between colonial metropolitan and city-states. The networks of 
convergence were colonial officials, local elites and the-traditional rulers 
who participated in the various political activities. Awolowo's strong 
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tendency to develop modern mass media as early as possible in Western 
Nigeria is part of the political elite concept that the city audience could 
be reached directly and be manipulated by the mass media. The process of 
Native Authority and local government systems in Eastern Nigeria contrasts 
sharply with the Northern and Western, particularly with the former. 
INDIRECT RULE OR NATIVE AUTHORITY SYSTEK IN EASTERN NIGERIA 
While the aristocratic and explicitly traditional political system of 
Nothern Nigeria provided the ideal system for the functioning of Indirect 
Rule, the democratic socialism or restricted autocratic traditional system 
of Yorubas only provide a partial success of the system. The extreme or the 
polar opposite of the Hausa/Fulani system in Eastern Nigeria totally 
rejected the system of Indirect rule. Alternatively, direct system of rule 
was tried. As described in chapter three, the social structure of Igbo 
communities made its success impossible. Green-(1947) observed that: 
"The social structure was marked by the absence not only of 
hereditary chiefs, but of all personalities who would claim an 
inherent right to the allegiance of any large group of people. 
Authority was usually distributed among kinship heads and the 
members of title-holding societies, and the group of people who 
were accustomed to look at a common source of authority was very 
often no wider than that inhabiting a small village. --16 
Though Green made a similar error as Coleman (1960) in - that the highest 
political organisation in Igboland is the village rather than the village 
towns, the absence of a hereditary chief was a crucial factor that made 
indirect rule difficult in Eastern Nigeria. This applies most explicitly 
to the hinterland beyond the riverine areas of Niger Delta as described in 
Chapter Three. Onitsha and Oguta had a kinship system but did not develop 
any form of tax system. 
Before 1906, most villages and towns in Igboland were extremely scattered 
and there were no cities comparable to Oyoq Benin, Zaria, Kano, Sokoto, 
etc., in other parts of the country from where a centralised authority 
exercised power over the rural areas. Igbo villages and towns were 
characterised by conflicts, slave raids and intertribal wars. This 
seriously restricted horizontal or geographical mobility which in turn 
impeded communication between peoples. There was no local army, and no 
central administration that would require taxpayers' money to maintain - 
crucial odds for Indirect Rule. In spite of these, the colonial 
administration implemented the 1906 Ordinance No. 7 in Eastern Nigeria. The 
Ordinance provided for the establishment of councils or courts made up of 
appointed local heads but their authority was superceded by the District 
Officer or Commissioner. The egalitarian, individualistic and achievdment 
orientation reflects a dominant leadership, the colonial authorities wisely 
considered these factors before appointing members of District councils. 
"In many cases care was taken to choose ... men of good local 
standing; in others, however, more consideration was given to 
purely personal. qualifications, such as experience of service 
under the administration. "17 
The appointment of men who were associated with colonial administration f or 
local government councils could not cause much conflict because there were 
no triditional rulers to be displaced by the appointment. The convergence 
of the modern political system and the traditional type were realised 
through these men. The strict adherence to achievement which was the major 
characteristic of Igbo leadegs4ip, by the - colonial administration 
ameliorates any early opposition to the introduction of the Native Authority 
system in the Region. Leadership structure was not considerably altered 
provided those appointed would not remain in power permanently. 
Between 1925 and 1926, direct taxation was introduced and newly created 
Warrant Chiefs became tax collectors. Taxation encountered little 
opposition in the first year, hence it was extended to women. But Owerri 
and Calabar women expressed their anger riotously and great resentments were 
directed to Warrant Chiefs. 
Furthermore, the fragmented nature of Igbo communities based on villages and 
small towns, as highest units of political organisation, made tax collection 
and the application of the Native Authority system very difficult. Between 
1948 and 1956, there were 245 Native and subordinate Native Authorities in 
Owerri Province only. 
The composition of local councils from 1948 of Warrant chiefs, village 
elders and large numbers of elites who were members of the 'Progressive 
Union' altered the structures of the Native Authority system in Eastern 
Nigeria. The first obstacle to the adoption of a Native Authority system in 
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Igboland and amongst the Ibibios in Eastern Nigeria was provided by the 
Progressive or ethnic unions. The elites within the council as well as 
members and leaders of the 'Progressive Unions' paralysed the functioning of 
the council which 'represented' the interest of colonial administration. 
The unions and their elite elements became principal agitators against the 
introduction of the Native Authority system. Because of their education, 
the elites were regarded as the leaders of their communities by the colonial 
authorities, and the communities also accepted them as such. Having become 
appointed by the authorities to the local councils which they opposed, they 
crippled it from the inside. The leader of the District commission who was 
an alien in the community was conveniently disregarded by the local leaders 
in the council as well as the Progressive Unions. 
The political advancement and economic growth in Yorubaland was attributed 
by the Igbo to the rapid development in modern education. For the Igbos to 
meet the advancement of the Yorubas, education was given a very high 
priority and those who obtained it were recognised as local leaders. The 
elders appointed by the colonial authorities into the council were 
overshadowed by the elites. The council and not the unions were regarded as 
'a symbol of imperialism from which every true African must seek relgasel I 
(Haily 1957: 467). The emphasis on modern education and the role of 
Progressive Unions in promoting it, is not so much the consequence of 
Indirect Rule but the struggle of the Igbos to meet the Yorubas who have 
advanced far ahead socially, politically and economically as a result of the 
lack of it in Igboland - Thus, the convergence of the modern political 
system into the Igbo traditional system came from Western Nigeria. 'Also, 
Mackintosh (1966: 213) noted that the unrepresentative nature of the Native 
Authority system was seen by the Igbos as a major factor that prevented them 
from catching up with the Yorubas in social, economic and modern educational 
progresso 
In order to make progress, that character of the Igbo Political system based 
on representation was emphasised in place of the Native Authority system. 
Between 1947 and 1950 legislation was passed to established county councils, 
urban and rural districts. Membership to these councils was on elective 
basis only. The success of the legislation was shouldered by two main 
organisations: 
a) The national council for Nigeria and Cameroon 
b) The various Improvement and Progressive Unions 
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The most important of them was the Igbo State Union. The Unions were more 
traditional but had strong orientation towards modernisation while the 
political party was a symbol of a modern political organisation. In the 
convergence of modern and traditional politics to achieve economic progress 
in the Eastern Nigeria, the roles played by elites in these organisations 
were important. At the beginning of the Native Authority system, War (1967) 
observed that: 
"It was difficult for young educated men to make their voices 
heard ... therefore they formed political groups in towns, 
sometimes tended to regard the. chiefs and their grey-headed 
councillors as relics of the past and a brake on the country's 
progress. All towns in British West Africa were simmered with 
political activity; with clubs and discussion groups and embryo 
parties of all kinds. "18 
But in Eastern Nigeria, the network of kinship ties and the extended family 
networks of relationship between various groups made it possible for them to 
belong to the voluntary organisations which spread throughout the villages 
and towns. In both ethnic organisations (unions) and the political party 
(NCNC), the elites were the leaders. Also in the county councils and 
district cojuncils which were now elective,. the elites became the majority 
members. The dominant position of the elites in these institutions began to 
pose a major problem. The most important question was how to service these 
modern and quasi-modern socio-political institutions that require a good 
number of th educated class to run them. 
With the fall of indirect rule, and the poor development of direct taxation, 
the colonial administration believed that: 
"The ambitious schemes now in view for the expansion of education 
will in particular prove to be impossible of achievement without a drastic change in the system of local taxation. **19 
But to the surprise of the administration, other major ethnic groups, and 
some West African countries, educational and economic progress went on in 
Eastern Nigeria with amazing rapidity. The development of ethnic and 
voluntary unions and clubs provided not only financial support to potential 
individual students, but also provided funds to build schools, colleges, 
roads, bridges, hospitals and public health centres, etc. For instance, 
smoch (1977) reported that Mbaise Ethnic Union in Eastern Nigeria: 
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"Originate the schemes for the creation of the Mbaise county 
secondary school and the Mbaise county joint hospital. At one 
time, it loaned money to students to finance university education. 
When it discontinued these loan scholarships, it instituted a 
secondary school scholarship programme. The county council 
awarded small grants to secondary schools in Mbaise managed by 
voluntary agencies. --20 
Recently the considerable importance the Igbos attached to modern education 
has been summarised by B. O. Nwabueze: 
"Perhaps the most outstanding quality of the Igbo is his innate 
receptivity to new ideas and adaptability to change which, under 
the stimulus of Christianity and Western education imported into 
Nigeria by the modern government readily triggered in him an 
obsessive desire for self-improvement and modernity through 
education. Western education was the stepping stone to employment 
and political power. It opened a whole new vista of opportunities 
for the acquisition of wealth in commerce and industry. The Igbos 
were quick in grasping the value of Western education. The drive 
for education thus became the driving force in the Igbo society. 
A whole community would team up to build a community school and 
finance its courses, to institute a scholarship scheme for its 
sons and daughters, and even to establish a secondary school or 
college. A parent would slave and deny himself all comforts in 
lif e in order to send his child to school; his ambition was to 
make good in his child what he himself lacked. He might be a 
peasant farmer, h poor illiterate or'semi-literate iýarpenter, or 
blacksmith, but his dream was to live' to see his son become a 
cleric or even a lawyer, doctor or engineer. And once 
successfully trained, the child accepted it as a family obligation 
to train his brothers and sisters. (Nwabuexe, B. O. 9 Ahinjoku, Lectual, 1985: 6) 
There was in terms of economic roles a strong relationship between the 
ethnic unions and the local councils. This was because the elites within 
the two organisations influenced decisions in them. Besides, the need to 
develop local communities was the primary aims of both the unions and the 
councils, thus political differences and the need to levy taxes as directed 
by the colonial authorities were rendered weak. 
These activities increased: 
"the level of education in the communities ... and relative status 
positions of some groups altered sufficiently to effect a Vossible 
change in leadership. "21 
For political advancement, leadership in both council, union and NCNC at one 
level became integrated and Smoch (1977: 186) further noted that 'the same 
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men ... who held office in the ethnic unions were likely to seek membership 
on local government councils. Even major politicians sometimes secured a 
place on the county councils, to augment their other base of influence'. 
Having confidently established political influence by direct membership and 
participation in rural and urban politics, the elites who dominated regional 
party politics produced the popular 1950 Eastern Nigerian local government 
Ordinance which in the view of Mackintosh (1966: 214): 
was a pioneer measure, which foretold the end of philosphies 
and practice that held the stage for nearly fifty years. Its 
repercussions outside Eastern Nigeria were considerable, for 
influencing later legislation in the Gold Coast (1951) and in 
Western Nigeria (1952). "22 
At regional level, the dominant form of political communication within the 
union, council and NCNC was face-to-face interaction. But different unions, 
clubs and councils were linked by leaders and selected committees. The 
relationship between them was not only political but also social, cultural 
and economic. Thus, in the understanding of political communication in 
Igboland, the content of communication should be understood. It is 
sometimes very difficult to distinguish whether the comunication content was 
political, econoýic or social. This is because memberships were based on 
kinship and leadership on merit. There was no limitation to leadership 
either for local economic development, e. g. Progressive Union or local 
government council based an election or political party representation. An 
individual in the community who fulfils the requirement by achievement could 
be the local community president for the Progressive Union, social club, 
local council leader, etc. one of the most important achievement criteria 
for leadership at various organisations and institutions in Eastern Nigeria 
was modern education and its impact Coleman (1966: 115) writes that it: 
"did not merely facilitate the emergence Of a separate class, it 
endowed the individuals in the class with the knowledge and 
skills, the ambitions and aspirations, that enabled them to 
challenge the Nigerian colonial government and ultimately to wrest 
control over the central political power from it. By the latter 
achievement, the Western-educated elements place themselves above 
the traditional African authorities in the new Nigerian political 
sytem. Thus, within the short span of two generations, Western 
education made possible merely complete reversal in the status of 
Nigerian political leaders. The rapidity of upward mobility in 
this revolutionary transformation is possibly unparalleled in 
history.,, 23 
4.20 
It is important to note that in Eastern Nigeria, the concept of traditional 
rulers in the strict sense of traditional politics exemplified above with 
the Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba systems, were totally absent in the hinterland 
areas. Metiocratic values based on education tended to be the absolute 
condition for new political status among the Igbos. Since the colonial 
period, it has become both an economic and political factor. The emphasis 
put on it has reinforced kinship and ethnic ties rather than weakening the 
system as many would expect. One of the strengthening ties between rural 
and urban population is the 'obligatory' duties among kin. Most parents 
and relatives, and not the government, educate their children. This 
strengthens the ties between them even when the young educated class move 
out from the village to the city, they are still linked to the relatives in 
the village by obligation. Also the unions exist both in the villages and 
the cities, and membership to them are based on kinship. Hence, urban and 
village politics can be linked through these voluntary organisations. We 
have discussed their roles above. In the study of Igbo political 
communication, these social structures are crucial in the understanding of 
the structur e of political communication. Once their essence is lost, it 
becomes difficult ýo analyse Igbo political communication behaviour. 
At the national political level, the system of native Authority was seen by 
the elites as an obstacle to progress (AJayi 1983: 633; Coleman 1965: 114; 
Hickey 1985: 3). Their agitation to it led to regionalisation of 'the 
political system and created a new dimension of network of political 
communication between the urban and rural areas. Because of ethnic 
political parties, mass media, as will be shown in chapters five and six, 
developed along the major ethnic parties in terms of ownership and control. 
Eco-political competition between ethnic groups at national level has also 
created immense political instabilityg nepotism and corruption, Political 
elites are generally accused of these. In the colonial period, they were 
councillorsq party leaders and union leaders. Their corrupt behaviour 
became almost endemic. This is because the vast regions of Nigeria could 
not be adequately supervised by the colonial administration. There was no 
real political communication system that would reflect the structure of the 
society, hence, 
"the councillors, af ter an initial period of correct behaviour 
embarked on corruption and nepotism. Voting themselves 
unreasonable allowances, placing contracts to their personal 
profit, ignoring the advice of their staf f and in many cases 
dismissing them in order to replace them with their own relatives 
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or with 'sons of the soil', they deeply embarrassed their own 
government and brought an idealistic into disrepute. "24 
Thus, obligatory kinship ties do not merely intensify political 
communication in face-to-face processes but also breed a high level of 
corruption, a system which in the case study of this thesis, shall be 
examined in detail. Because of the regionalisation of party politics and 
mass media development in a situation where the kinship network is 
particular strong irrespective of 'class' (educated and non educated), or 
residence (urban or city), there is serious doubt as to the direct influence 
of the mass media as the main agents of politics. In Chapters Five and Six 
we shall discuss the development of mass media along party lines to see 
their relationship with the federal and regional governments in different 
political periods in Nigeria. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE PRESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY POLITICS IN NIGERIA 
In Chapter One I pointed out that structural changes in Nigeria generate a 
series of new political groups - rural and urban elite. Correspondingly, 
new political communication systems are centering on these elites. The 
question posed in Chapter One was the extent to which the new structure of 
political organisation, the new party system and the new forms of political 
communications are emerging. 
In this chapter, the attempt is not so much to give a detailed historical 
account of the evolution of mass media and party politics, but to see in 
historical terms how the new systems are closely associated with a 
particular network system identified in Chapter Two. The question of the 
extent of their relationship for political participation requires empirical 
answers which will be provided in later chapters. Meanwhile, various 
aspects of convergence and network of political communication will be 
discussed in relation tu-the five network groups and political actors. 
THE PRESS IN NIGERIA 
One of the main and very important features of mass media as channels that 
link all network groups, both in the urban and rural areas, as anonymous and 
heterogenous committees, is their former organisational structure. As 
instruments of power - political, economic or social - those who initiate 
their set-up are always men in power and with certain authority. 
For instance, the initiative to establish radio stations in colonial Africa, 
and in Nigeria particularly, was taken up by such authorities as: 
Andrew Cohen, Assistant Under Secretary in charge of the Af rican Section of 
the Colonial Office, who as Charles Armour pointed out, took the: 
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"limelight as the driving force among the officials drawing up the 
master plan for the co-ordinated political, economic and social 
development of the African colonies, but he was not a lone figure. 
He had his place in the top management hierarchy of the colonial 
office; above him were the joint deputy under secretaries of state 
- Sir Sydney Caine, .... and Sir Charles Jeffries. "l 
Other media, e. g. TV or the press, from the initial stages of their set-up, 
the poor (which includes illiterate villages and the urban poor) were 
entirely excluded from the decision to establish radio stations. What is 
important in the new relationship between the organised media of political 
communication and network groups is that ownership and control rest with a 
specific elite group - the political elite. Also the development of 
political parties and their leadership is closely allied with the elite. 
The political elite determine the extent of the relationship between 
ýedia 
particularly broadcasting and the state. 
Many writers have illustrated that in Nigeria the development of political 
parties and press are uniquely entwined. One could not be accounted for 
completely in both historical and contemporary forms without the other. 
(Graham Mytton 1983: p. 117; Nwakwo, R. L. and Kurian; . 1982; William Hatchten, 
1971: p. 144; Duyile, D. 1979: pp. 1-25; James Coleman, 1965: pp. 227,346-347, 
etc. ) 
The relationship between politics and the press or the media in terms of 
development is not my main concern. What I intend to show is * that the 
relationship between the press, radio and TV, . the Political system, the 
political actors and the classified audience can be seen as a netvork of 
associations or relationships. 
Though the press has been an important medium in Nigerian political 
development and changes, its characteristics - format, content, formal 
English style, overt critical tendency and uninvestigative journalistic 
presentation of 'facts' - orientates it towards a particular network group 
in Nigeria. 
Early history indicates that the first newspaper (Iwe Irohin) in Nigeria was 
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published by Rev. Townsend, a missionary, in December 1859.2 But the first 
printing press in Nigeria was "installed by the Presbytarian Mission when 
they arrived in Calabar in 1846" (Omu 1978: 7). - The historical background of 
the first printing press in Nigeria was closely associated with Exeter (a 
city in the south west of England) where the brother of Rev. Townsend was a 
newspaper publisher. It has been illustrated in the early chapters that 
the missionaries were involved not only in converting Nigerians to 
Christianity but also in educating them formally to read and write. The 
newspaper was subsequently introduced to inform the educated group about 
thier own environment and the world beyond their small and large 
communities. Information about trade was common, and gradually the issue of 
slave trade abolition which the missionaries advocated featured prominently 
in the newspapers. The missionaries believed that the slave trade could be 
abolished "by means of evangelical Christianity, utilitarian civilisation 
and commerical development... " (Omu 1978: 6). 
We have noted earlier that intertribal wars, slave raids, and slave. trade 
threatened to annihilate the entire population of certain Yoruba towns and 
villages. In the light of this perhaps, Abeokuta, which possessed a unique 
Yoruba language led Townsend to publish a newspaper in a native language. 
Thus the early Nigerian press informed different groups in the communities, 
using standard English, 'Pidgin' and vernacular. It was argued by some 
early newspaper*editors that the education and information Africans received 
disorientated the elite from M-rican culture and basic socio-political 
relationship with the rural and urban masses. 
"Everything is conspiring to force upon the Anglicised African the 
necesity of re-aligning himself with his people f rom whom his 
training has divorced him. The past ... has abundantly shown that 
when divorced from his people his position is one of 
disqualification and ineptitude. The African with all his defects 
possesses a mind which is clear and unobstructed by visions of 
varying and conf icting interests by reasons of the simple life he 
lives oo* He must know that no man said the last word for the 
world and it may be that the despised life customs of the African 
will after all prove to be the most potential good for man. "3 
It is wrong to assume that the first educated Africans were the mission 
elite and though' missionaries began the first printing mission in Nigeria, 
early newspapers were not pro-European missionary education. The early 
newspaper attacks were not overtly political but on the efects of western 
education on African culture. It wýs not the Africans who were educated in 
Africa by the missionaries who realised the consequences of Western 
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education on African culture but the Black Americans who returned to Africa 
from South and North America af ter the abolition of slavery. The direct 
attack on mission education by Black writers and publishers such as John 
Payne Jackson who is acknowledged as the setter of African journalistic 
enterprise is important in the development of press and politics in Nigeria. 
Though I disagree wiht his overexaggerated view about the impact of Western 
education on Africans at the time of his writing, because his concept of 
African elite culture was parochial and devoid of clear understanding of 
kinship bonds between non-educated and educated Africans, he made the 
colonial authorities relax on the content of the influence of the press 
until it developed and became politicized. 
When John Payne Jackson started his weekly Record newspaper in 1891 , the 
tribal war in Western Nigeria, particularly Abeokuta, forced him and other 
Yorubas who were repatriated from Brazil and Sierra Leone to remain in 
Lagos. Also, the Abeokuta pagans' persecution of missionaries forced the 
latter to remain in Lagos. Thus Lagos became the hub of Nigerian incipient 
politicsq commerce, trade, education, journali 
, 
sm and most important of all, 
cultural and political changes that would eventually penetrate the vast 
interiors of the country. Perhaps it was this historical importance of 
Lagos in the development of modern communication in the face of changing 
social, economic, cultural and political orders in Nigeria that made Turner- 
Byron in 1949 to recommend that broadcasting in Nigeria should be modelled 
on Lagos. Though agreed on the regional development of broadcasting, he 
nevertheless wanted it to be regionalised. 
But in Lagos, the press created a network of relationships between 
classified groups of elites, such as those educated by the missionaries, who 
through religion and education deculturised Africans; these Africans were 
critised by other groups of educated Africans outside the influence of the 
missionaries but with practical experience of political and religious 
practices akin to the West - from America. The potentially religious and 
political masses of the interior were excluded from what was discussed in 
the press. When the intertribal wars were checked by direct intervention of 
the colonial police and the army, the missionariest traders, teachers, etc., 
moved from the coastal areas, particularly Lagos and Calabar, to the rural 
areas. The characterisics of the urbanised groups, their formal education 
and the characteristic of the dominant medium of information, the press, 
began to bear seriously on the rural socio-political, economic and cultural 
systems. The relationship between the urban and the rural population 
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constitutes an important aspect of the convergence of two models 
in the 
network of subsequent political communication in Nigeria. 
We have noted that the first printing in Western Nigeria by the missionaries 
was started in Abeokuta -a city-state - in Western Nigeria 
in 1859. In 
terms of African urban development, Abeokuta was a mixture of urban and 
village communities, in tribal population, purely homogeneous, serving 
mainly Yoruban-speaking peole with a few Europeans and missionaries; there 
were virtually no other tribes in the city-statd of Abeokuta. 
The 
introduction of the press and the existence of traditional networks of 
communication as permitted by linguistic and socio-cultural homogenity can 
be regarded as the start of convergence of two different communication 
systems in Nigeria. It was the civil disturbance there that shifted the 
press activities to Lagos. 
We cannot talk about isolated individuals or groups directly influenced and 
changed by the exposure to the new medium because of the strong kinship ties 
and obligations which characteristically bind the groups together despite 
their dif f erences in education (the press exposed only a small section to 
the new socio-political information system). The press also became an 
additonal mode of communication for thd emerging new elite group. 
In Nigeria, the press forms the basic structure where the ideas of the 
mission-educated Africans and educated ex-African-slaves from America 
converged to resolve differences - mainly cultural - and to start a new 
network of relationships which made educated Africans aware of the. nature of 
colonialism. The new network of relationships could not exclude the rural 
and urban masses during the nationalist movement at the time when the role 
of the press was essential. One of the principles of democracy is that the 
opinions and support of the masses must be mobilised for political power. 
Despite the economic interest of the British government in colonial Africa, 
this principle was entrenched in the system. Jackson, J., a moderate 
nationalist and comparatively pro-British journalist, writes: 
"They were proving themselves by far the best colonizers. " (R. W. 
july, 19680 p. 351) 
(he severely criticised the high-handedness of the French and the Germans in 
Africa) 
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"by extending to their subjects the full liberties and privileges 
of English democracy, the British government and its people had 
inspired the love and affection of the Negro everywhere through a 
uniformly kind and humane treatment and through the efforts of 
that great nation to dominate injustice imposed upon Negros by 
other countries. -4 
While education was expanding from the coasts to the interior, the modern 
democratic system of government as introduced by the British folowed its 
direction. The nationalists used the press to create militant and national 
consciousness, though early nationalist agitation against colonialism was 
not for immediate independence but for political participation and decision- 
making through representation. 
"We are not clamouring for immediate independence ... but it 
should be borne in mind that the present order of things will not 
last for ever. A time will come when the colonies on the West 
coast will be left to regulate their own internal and external 
affairs. -5 
17he Nigerian press in the period of European contacts, changes, etc. gained 
ground for many years in its format, and freedom to express socialo cultural 
and political views before it actually became nationalistic and agitative -of 
colonial practices and administration. This pattern of press politics began 
when coionial administration under Lord Lugard assumed more dictatorship, 
with severe and one-man control policies: various agitative, incisive 
newspapers emerged and most of them directly attacked the colonial system. 
Though for various reasons several of these newspapers lasted a few months 
to a few years, Lagos Weekly under different editorial chairmen, existed 
long enough to experience and actively particpate in the political changes 
form 1891-1930.. For instance, J. P. Jackson, though pro-British, alleged 
that the Britishq under the pretence of protecting the interest of native 
chiefs, by direct interference in the interior traditional politics and in 
disturbances, particularly in the south through direct rule, were trying to 
gain control of all the protectorate, so that eventually in 1914 the north, 
ruled indirectly, was amalgamated with the south, and ruled directly, to 
form what is known today as Nigeria. Once the two traditionally, culturally 
and politically different parts of the regions were amalgamated, colonial 
policies and practices became more confused and politically difficult to 
manage - common constitutional laws to govern the two regional groups were 
regarded by the southern elite as a mockery of Africans and African pre- 
colonial institutions. 
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It can hardly be said to be reasonable ... to take the laws of one 
set of people to def ine the laws of another set of people whose 
customs and usages are quite different, nor is it rational to set- 
up the law and its interpretation of one community as a standard 
by which the law of another community is to be governed. "6 
This was particularly in reference to British social and land tenure laws in 
1912 and 1913. 
The two most important newspapers bef ore 1914 were the Lagos Weekly Record 
and the Lagos Daily News. From the editorials of J. P. Jackson, it can be 
inferred that he was a man who wrote on general matters and liable to 
flexibility in his opinion about the specific way British administration in 
Nigeria should be conducted. He internalised his admiration for western 
rationality and endorsed many aspects of British social values and justice. 
Though he criticised the deculturalisation of Africans through religion and 
education, he was a man of twin cultures and was consistently uncertain 
which one to accept. Thus frequent generality and unspecified goals 
characterised his editorials. - He could best be described as a cultural 
nationalist who tried to link African family kinship networks to the form of 
government that should ýe ideal in Africa. He believed that Christianity 
and Islam should be Africanised. This pattern of editorialism is important 
in the development of press and politics in Nigeria. The tendency was to 
direct press content to the cultural conditions and needs, not only of the 
urban environment, but also of the rural population, where the culture is 
intact. The practical question is how to asses sthe degree of the impact of 
the early newspaper on different groups in Nigeria. Whether the press was 
produced, owned and consumed by a particular network group and how the 
newspaper information influenced different groups other than the elite in 
the urban centres remain important questions that will be answered in later 
chapters. 
It was af ter 1914 that the political climate of Nigeria changed. The 
realities of British colonialisation in Nigeria became a thorn in the f lesh 
for both the colonisers and the colonised. Newspapers, new journalists, new 
newspapers and largerreaderships emerged as a result of the wider spread of 
Western education. The Nigerian Chronicle was launched in 1908, edited by 
Chris Johnson, The Nigerian Times and a host of others also emerged and all 
of them aimed at the colonial governemnt and more particularly were critical 
of Lugard. 
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The crucial point here is to identify the cause of criticism of Lugard's 
administration by the African journalists. The North differed considerably 
from the South and Western education and culture had a greater influence on 
the Southerners than on the Northerners. The nationalist press was 
concentrated in the hands of the southerners and centered. in Lagos or 
Calabar. There was cultural divergence' between Lagos and Calabar, but while 
cultural divergence also prevailed in the South, education and religion 
obliterated the difference and unified the elites who used the press to 
attack the political systems. 
To them Lugard was an embodiment of British colonialism and he was accused 
of views unsympathetic to African culture, of being cruel, uncompromising, a 
military dictator who frustrated every effort for negotiation or for a 
balance of power. But because of the long term existence of newspapers and 
their absolute control and ownership by Africans, it was impossible for 
Lugard to annihilate 'them. He simply described them as "scurrilous local 
yellow press" and "publishers of columns of venomous abuse often bordering 
on seditions or libel. 1v7 
There are two important questions here. Were the Nigerian 'Journalists, 
right to think that Lugard was an embodiment of British colonialism with 
regards to press freedom? Secondly, was Lugard's counter-attack an 
expression of his weakness to deal with the press and thereby enhanced its 
power and public credibility? The press in Nigeria during the colonial 
period was a great opponent of the government, Though the less powerful 
group - the colonised controlled the press - any counter-attack on the press 
would perhaps enhance its power. By attac 
. 
king the press in Nigeria, Lugard 
made it a vital organ of opposition for the nationalists. He endorsed its 
power, and the nationalists utilised it effectively. 
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However, on the question of embodiment of British colonialism, we must 
recollect that Lugard was an ex-serviceman, his rule was more or less 
'dictatorial'. characteristic of his training and profession. Even in 
modern-day politics, many people yet believe that ex-soldiers do not easily 
make good politicians. 
"Mr. Alexander Haig, the four star general and former U. S. 
Secretary of State who declared yesterday he would run for 
President, is an experienced but headstrong military man who so 
far has yet to master the art of being a politician". (Lionel 
Barber, Financial Times, Wednesday, 25.3.87, p. 3) 
Lugard was 'headstrong' and at time ruled against the instructins of the 
Colonial Office in London and in particular to the dislike of the British 
'liberal politicians and public. With regards to press freedom in Nigeria at 
this period, "... the Colonial Office ... would never tolerate any 
infringement of the right of the press to be as libellous and seditious as 
it pleases. " (Perham 1960: 591; Omu 1978: 189). Thus the Chronicle on its 
attack on Lugard's amalgamation stated that a general attack would be 
mounted accordingly "we promise him that we shall do so fearlessly, 
consciously, constitutionally and with the power we ' possess" (Chronicle, 
14.3.13,3.9.13 in Dmu 1.978: 205). 
But Golding and Elliot (1979) have revealed that the pressure on Lugard not 
to impose more repressive measures on the Nigerian press was more 
insignifcant from the Colonial Office than from liberal communities in 
Britain who put such pressure on the Colonial Office: 
"In fighting the battle for the liberal freedoms the Nigerian 
press placed the local administration in a considerable dilemma. 
Aware that press liberty was in Junius' ringing phrase "the great 
palladium of the British freedoms", Nigerian journalists courted 
support from liberal British opinion, and the Colonial Office was forced to restrain the more , repressive of its officers. In looking at the offences which led to the 1909 Seditious Offences 
Ordinance, one Colonial Office official was struck that much worse 
things are said and done in Ireland and no action is taken" 
(Golding & Elliott, 1979: 29; Omu 1979). 
African journalists were not fighting a battle of individual freedom but a 
"national freedom from colonial rule" (Wilcox,; 1974: 76) which perhaps won 
them popular support from the liberal British population. 
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The Nigerian journalists - elites trained in different walks of life other 
than journalism - were aware of the conflicts between Lugard and the 
Colonial office. They merely politicised the press by actively using it as 
the only political voice to mobilise local opinion and the support of more 
liberal communities in Britain. Lugard by attacking the press simply 
reinforced its political power and validity. 
Secondly, that Lugard acknowledged that the Nigerian press had a Imonstrous 
freedom' was a clear psychological indication that he himself was powerless 
to check it. Omu (1978) points out that his powerlessness to control the 
Nigerian press was expressed by Lugard's speech on 16th October,, 1913. 
Lugard thought that the education given to Nigerians was responsible for the 
pattern of press attack on the government. 
"Stressing the need for character training in self discipline, 
self-control and truthfulness in Nigerian schools, he averred that 
education had not brought 'happiness or contentment to Nigeria if 
the performance of the newspapers was taken as a criterion. To 
his mind, it should be the aim of the education system "ýo train 
up a general who shall exchange this bitter hostility for an 
attitude of friendly co-operation. " (Lugard, April 6,1914, in Omu 
1978: 189). 
But the Second World War offered Lugard an opportunity to impose 
restrictions on the Nigerian press. However, the impact was very limited 
because the Nigerian pressmen voluntarily imposed retrictions on itself, a 
wise decision which did not only please Lugard but also the British liberals 
at home. Many leading Nigerians and the general public were in full support 
of the British fight against Nazism and at the end of the war Nigeria 
pressed hard for independence. 
We have seen above that Western education and the emergence of 'new Af rican 
elites were very important results of colonisation. Colonialism made the 
African education system which in turn provided the Africans with the first 
indigenous elites. The elites and the nationalist press "formed both the 
weapon and the vanguard of the battle" (Omu 1978: 227) for representative 
government and independence. 
it was the need to change the political system which forced the elite from 
concentration on the cultural aspect of European influence on Nigeria to 
politicisation of the press, which began to take notice of the general 
public whose support would guarantee them the required political change. In 
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this light, Haratio Jackson's radicality and attack on the Governor 
General's administraiton when he assumed the post of Chief Editor of the 
Lagos Weekly Record is clearly and fundamentally political and a major 
change in Nigerian press attitude. 
"politically ... it will be our duty to educate or enlighten 
public opinion ... while a corresponding obligation is entailed to 
place continually beofre the eyes of the government ... so that 
mutual reapproachement between the governing body and the governed 
may be established, which is the keynote of a systematic and an 
enlightened form of government. -8 
It now appears that the colonial authorities , the Nigerian elite and the 
unclassified general public were linked through the press 
for political 
enl. IlLghtenment, participation and change. But which groups of the 
'public' 
were influenced by the press for these changes? 
When the Nigerian press became political, ethnic differences, reinforced by 
the 'divide and rule' policy of the colonial power, could have rendered it 
ineffective. But another important network group did not remain passive to 
the political needs of Nigeria though their orientation was more on general 
African needs than any specific country.. 
In 1926 European businessmen based in Nigera started the Nigerian Daily 
Times in which the London-based Daily Mirror had a substantial share. The 
N_igerian Daily Times was mainly commercially oriented in content and tended, 
as one would expect, to be political neutral. But because the growth of the 
press from this time on was basically natonalistic, restricion to 
commercial-content-only and neutrality-to-pressing-issues, such as political 
change, could bring pressure to bear on its existence from the readership 
point of view. The Daily Times suf f ered as a result of its stand and 
contento This encouraged other newspapers to embark upon overt political 
expression which found favour with the reading public. Hence: 
"The press in English-speaking West Africa grew up in a 
nationalist tradition: newspapers were the 9 mouthpieces 
of 
emerging, campaignings nationalist politicians. " 
Nigerians who stood against colonialism and used the press to express their 
views constituted another important group that strengthed the press as an 
effective medium of political information. In fact, their papers reduced 
any tribal overtones during the early days of a nationalist movement. In 
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1932, for example, Duse Mohammed Ali, an 'Egyptian intellectual, started The 
Comet. In every respect The Coment was devoid of traces of ethnic reference 
but seriously and genuinely addressed the isue of colonialism and national 
and international problems in Africa without ethnic bias. Coker, 1968: 19, 
noted that The Comet's international content influenced certain elite groups 
in Nigeria so much that the Lagos Youth Movement changed its name to the 
Nigerian Youth Movement. The Nigerian Youth Movement was a political group, 
its cause of liberation was encouraged by the United States' endorsement 
against colonialism, through organised political movement. Also, in London 
and other major European capitals and cities, decolonisation was advocated 
by Europeans. All these outside reports on world opinion about colonialism 
filled the papers such as The Comet. The editorials emphasied racial 
aspects of colonialism, which the Nigerian reading public abhorred. In this 
light, Awolowo concluded that: 
", and the end of the nineteenth century, the driving force of 
nationalism in Nigeria was not loyalty to Nigeria as such, but 
racial consciousnes as Africans. "10 
The Comet, which carried considerable foreign news closely relited to 
colonialism and racism was important in linking the urban elite with world 
views. The Comet brought "a wide experience in journalism, a sense of 
detachment and goodwill of his many readers and admirers throughout the 
world". It was "... an influence organ of international politics and a 
source of inspiration and challenge for the emerging new leaders of Nigeria 
who had visions of an independent nation which would occupy a proud place in 
the international community" (0mu 1978: 68). But since as a result of 
Colonial practice with its direct and indirect rule, the politics of Nigeria 
transcended the urban centres to local regions. What is important is to 
examine not only how the nationalist used the press to confront the colonial 
adminstration but how they used the information they had and the press to 
mobilise political support beyond the city to the interior regions of the 
country. 
The most appropriate step was to form a centralised organisation which would 
link the cities and villages through processes and channels of political 
communication. I have noted elsewhere that in Nigeria: 
to 99. as national consciousness began to grow, political parties began to emerge. Thus the first national political party of 
Nigeria was formed by students ... In the spring of 1944, students 
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at Kings College Lagos struck in protest agains the use of their 
dormitories by soldiers; seventy-five were expelled, and eight 
were drafted into the army. Thereupon, the Nigerian union of 
students, frustrated by the lack of a centralised organisation 
which could co-ordinate the political activity of the existed 
groups, called a meeting at Glover Hall in Lagos. At the meeting, 
on August 26th, 1944 the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon 
was creat*ed ... the 
; 
CNC. "11 
The emergence of a political party as clearly stated here suports the theory 
in Chapter Two that both the development of the press and political parties 
centred on the elite. I have stated elsewhere that the first president of 
the NCNC was Terbert. Maculey and Zik the party's first general secretary-. 
While the pressq because of its political role, could overcome tribal 
splits, political parties which aimed at the sharing of actual power in a 
nation culturally, socially, religiously and traditionally, split could not 
endure together. The tribal differences which caused the split of the 
Nigerian Youth Movement formed in 1936 apparently became actual political 
splits when the NCNC was formed and Awolowo was excluded from the leadership 
role '.. n it. It was the Youth Movement split that resulted in the formation 
of the Action Group (AG) led by Chief Obafomi Awolowo. 
At this point in time two main political phases in the history of Nigeria 
can be-distinguished: 
a) The separate ethnic military resistance (as recounted in Chapter 
Three) of native Nigerians against European traders and colonial 
of f icials. This aspect of military ethnic nationalism has not been 
thoroughly examined as an aspect of political growth. The ef f orts of 
men like Jaja of Obobo, Dior, Eleko and Samori to preserve the 
culture, tradition and political system of old Africa came under the 
heavy weight of European military superiority. They were virtually 
rooted out and brought under colonial control. 
b) The phase of press and political party nationalism in which the elite 
did not reject European political culture and value but through 
education and religion endorsed them. The problem they faced was that 
the system they accepted excluded them from participation and 
development in it. 
The leaders of West Africa at an early stage of indigenous political party 
formation under the -colonial rule, as W. July (1968: 376-8) has showns 
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displayed identical European educated characteristics - S. Williams, H. 
Carr, H. Macaulay in Nigeria, James Brew or C. Hayford in Ghana (then Gold 
Coast), S. Lewis of Sierra Leone, etc... They regarded European political 
systems and culture as superior to African, then sought to change. them. 
Indeed, it was the attitude of educated Africans towards traditonal African 
political systems and cultures that induced the new political elite to 
exclude the traditional groups from the development of party politics in 
Nigeria. Most of these new political leaders used the press to popularise 
their political power. In particular,, the persistant confrontation by 
Macaulay gained popular press attention - The Lagos Weekly Record, Nigerian 
Gazette Extra-ordinary, The Lagos Daily News, etc. ... all covered his 
arguments and popular support was behind him. July (1968: 390) pointed out 
that Macaulay depended entirely on newspapers to make his case and arguments 
public. 
The departure of Macaulay from Nigerian politics saw the emergence 
, 
of a new 
nationalist political elite who meticulously incorporated the press and 
politics as integral and inseparable parts in Nigerian politics. As a 
journalist and a. poiitician, Macaulay's newspaper. approach to politics both 
in content and organisalion was meant to link the educated, semi-educated, 
the poor and the rich to politics of national liberation. In addition he 
started the West African Pilot in order that he could use it to mobilise all 
sectors of Niger ia against colonialism. For him independence was beyond 
tribal sentiment and his slogan was that Africa must be liberated. With 
this ideology his newspapers were designed to be read nationwide. Jones- 
Quarley noted that the West African Pilot blossomed into every corner of the 
country . as the champion of the common man the teacher 9 the trader, the 
clerks ... 
12 
Even Zik's traditional political opponents publicly admitted the political 
mobilizing power and the inspiring political -consciousness of Zik's 
newspapers. Anthony Enahoro acknowledged that the West African Pilot 
represented and expressed the political views of the poor, unlike newspapers 
before it that mainly served the interest of the intelligensia. Even more 
so his greatest political opponent, Chief Obanfomi Awolowo, described the 
West African Pilot as: 
to a fire-eating and aggressive nationalist paper of the highest 
order ... it was naturally very popular, the very thing the youth 
of the country had been waiting f or. Newspapermen in the employ 
(sic) of the 'West African Pilot' were better paid and they 
assumed a new status in the society. Civil servants, teachers and 
mercantile employees resigned good and pensionable posts to lend a 
hand in the new journalistic awakening. "13 
I 
The style of the West African Pilot therefore shifted the political role of 
the press from representing the political views of the elite to those of 
other political groups natioýwide. For a medium to be politically 
effective, its content should and must be realistic meaning-coded to reflect 
the view of the wider audience and most important, the generality of the 
audience should be capable of meaningfully decoding the message. Another 
aspect of the West African Pilot attracted people of different walks of life 
to 'lend a hand' in its political 'awakening'. 
The prestige and status attributed to the West African Pilot workers and 
wider-national readership led to a formation of Zik's conglomeration of 
newspapers in major Nigerian cities from where they could be easily 
distributed to rural sub-regions. The Eastern Nigerian Guardian was 
established in 1940 at Port-Harcourt; in 1943 the Nigerian Spokesman 
, 
and 
Southern Defender were set up in Warri - Western region. The Comet which 
was bought from Mohammed Ali, was moved to' Kano in Northern Nigeria, 
the paper the first Northern daily English newspaper in Nigeria. In 1949 
Nothern Advocate was set up in Jos by Zik. Newspapers, by content and 
distribution, were now-able to connect Nigerians horizontally and vertically 
for, political action. The issues covered by most of them were national. 
The popularity of Zik was assured in Ghana before he started the West 
African Pilot in Nigeria. 
- 
"With his popularity assured in a period of great opporunity 
provided by the absence of serious and respectable political 
newspapers, Azikive dramatically stirred the newspaper scene with 
a formula of striking techniques and rhetoric ... For the large 
population of the people in and outside Lagos who for years had 
yearned for an effective purveyor of popular views and sentiments, 
for a symbol of increased political awareness and sophistication, 
the eloquent and sensational tone of the Pilot and its pugnacious 
political Journalism marked the beginning of a new era. " (Omu 
1978: 240) 
At this point, it is helpful to classify the different types_of the media in 
Nigeria according to their content. Before the introduction of TV in 1959 
there were: 
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a) Radio (as we will soon see), owned and controlled by the colonial 
authorities as a political counter-medium against pressures, 
allegations, etc. made by the nationalist newspapers. 
b) The politically neutral or aloof newspapers, eg the Daily Times, the 
Daily Express owned by foreign agencies. 
C) The nationalist newspapers with immense anti-colonial political 
content but in specific terms addressed to a particular minority but 
poltically powerful group - the intelligensia and urbanised. 
d) The nationalist newspapers, which addressed their political messages 
to all groups and all regions of the society irrespective of power, 
status, nationality, creed, colour, ethnology or race. 
These differences were bound to create different problems for the newspapers 
and the radio as well as in national politics. In order that the radio 
could effectively refute the nationalist newspapers and mobilise political 
support, it had to increase broadcasting hours in hundreds of Nigerian 
languages, otherwise its listening audience would be too small. The 
colonial powers would have to make available in the market cheap radio sets, 
but considering the state and conditions for employment, most of these sets 
would be bought by the elite. Other problems such as actual gathering of 
information in the rural areas, where the majority of Nigerians live, and 
editing and broadcasting news in local languages would be delegated to 
natives. They could phrase and structure the news content in such a way 
that listeners would cast doubt on the content, and credibility of the 
medium would be destroyed by its broadcast. If broadcasting remained in 
English, the colonial powers would only be addressing the elite, who wanted 
them out for many reasons. Radio messages would not give what the listener 
wanted unlike newspapers. Cecil King who in 1947 bought the Lagos Daily 
Times at a cost of E46,000 believed that his success in Nigeria would rest 
on giving the reader 'what he wants'. 
The financial cost at the time was heavy for the colonial administration to 
set up powerful short wave radio frequencies to cover the whole country. On 
August 11th, 1949, the colonial office agreed to allocate E295,000 to West 
Africa, out of El million set aside for the establishment of radio stations 
in British colonies. A substantial (and possibly the highest) amount was 
devoted to Nigeria. The technical contract, which was also expensive, was 
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taken up by the BBC, including the running of the organisation. 
Because of various social, climatic and traditional factors, investigative 
reporting proved difficult for the colonial broadcaster beyond, the cities, 
who had to depend on newspapers for information. Where such was lacking, 
radio broadcasting could be sketchy, speculative and haphazard. 
The neutral newspapers f aced the problem of readership because they were 
hesitant to take a stand on the burning issues of the day, such as political 
participation of Africans in the colonial adminstration, and eventual 
independence. As political consciousness rose among Nigerians through 
nationalist newspapers, the commercial exploitation by British privately- 
owned firms that owned the Daily Times and Daily Express were exposed. 
The nationalist newspapers were not without problems. The West African 
Pilot and associated newspapers faced the problem of distribution and 
storage. 
"His first business and printing premises were in one of the most 
congested corners of commercial Lagos, Market Street. Later he 
moved into -slightly more suitable and spacious quarters in Broad 
Street, part of the property of Sir Adetok Umbo. Barrister 
Ademola complained that the operation of Zik's printing presses 
and other machines was a source of nuisance to him on account of 
constant noise and vibration, --14 
The nationalist journalist faced possible prison terms by the colonial 
authority but this had positive results in the end as it increased the anti- 
colonial movement. While the nationalists were barred from operating a 
wireless station, the government set up its own press. Opposing tribal 
parties and groups did the same. Nwankwo and George Kurian noted that: 
"The mid-forties witnessed a growing challenge to the hold of the 
Zik's dailies as well as older newspapers. The government had 
established a press of its own with a clutch Of newspapers in 
tribal languages and the Nigerian Citizen in English. The Action 
Group Party founded a new daily in Lagos called the 'Daily 
Service' which joined forces with the 'Nigerian Tribune' in Ibadan 
to form the Amalgamated Press of Nigeria. Thus, on the eve of independence Nigeria had three large newspaper chains, two private 
-and one official. "15 
If we consider the relationship between the three main tribes, the three 
main parties, their political leadership and ownership of the press at this 
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time, we should not consider the Zik and Awolowo newspaper chains as private 
but as regional and tribal political parties I newspapers. The colonial and 
Northern government spoke with one voice in certain periods of the colonial 
rule. A situation which angered some Actioa Group ministers to a point of 
not associating themselves with the Northerners.. 
"We refused to associate ourselves with Africans who have not got 
the guts to speak their minds" said Brode Thomas. "I am not 
appointed as an imperialist minister to do the will of the 
imperialist agents in Nigeria" said S. L. Akintolla. 16 
Between 1943 and 1950, the Northern Peoples' Congress (NCP) was formed. It 
emerged as a political party through a series of changes. Its initial aim 
was not to fight for national independence but io withstand the political 
domination of the Southerners. The founders were Mallam. Sulud Zenger, Ammu 
Kamu, Tafawa Belewa and Sarduna of Sokoto -a descendant of Usman Dan Fodia. 
After independence, ownership, control and the role of the press shif ted 
dramatically from national political consciousness to regional ethnic 
political bias. 
' 
The North in particular embarked upon a defensive mode of 
publication: the first Northern newspaper, the Gaskiya Ta Fikwabo (Truth is 
worth more than Penny) was particularly associated with defensive 
editorials. Mamman Daura, 1971: 39, noted that its main purpose was to 
protect the interest of Northerners who were faced with the more politically 
and educationally pow--rful Southerners. Furthermore, Daura said that: 
"The North believed in controlled modernisation and emphasised the 
need for changing society to adopt modern methods without 
destroying its own qualities. The South believed in an unthinking 
gallop towards everything European and Western without considering 
its relevance and its dangers to the community. " (Darama Daura, 
1971: 39) 
Though this statement bears some truth about the concept of modernisation in 
Nigeria as a whole, not specifically the South, ideological differences 
between the North and South were stronger in the late f if ties and early 
sixties. If the south 'believed in an unthinking gallop towards everything 
European.. ' why did the nation embark on an image making project between 
1975-81 when the North was predominantly in control of the economic and 
political systems in Nigeria? 
However, I believe that the ideological differences which exist between the 
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North and the South were rooted in the differences in. education, religon and 
various aspects of culture and traditional tendencies towards or away f orm 
the West or Arab States. In particular, political and communication 
modernisation between the North and the South and convergence of 
traditionalism and modernity in the federal political structure of Nigeria 
were very much the result of different understandings in the two regions as 
to how actually the Western media and political systems operate. The 
differences could have been rooted out or at least minimised if Lugard's 
administrative policies, as we noted in Chapter Three, had not reinforced 
and widened the differencese 
The divisions between the regions (now states) have created problems of 
ideological commitment to all governemnts in Nigeria. The 1975 Constitution 
Drafting Committee found it difficult to deal with the problem of political 
ideology in the constitution. The then Head of State, General Murtala 
Mohammed admitted his inability to deal with it: 
"Until all our peoplep or a majority of them, have acknowledged a 
common ideological motivation it would be fruitless to proclaim 
any particular philsophy or ideology in our constitution. " (New 
Nigeria January 22,1976).. 
The comment shows how unreal Nigeria is as a result of the amalgamation of 
different peoples. The constitution is meant to organise Nigerians in one 
common purpose. The absence of a common ideology makes this vital aim 
impossible. Shehu Malami writes:, 
"There is really no organised society of human beings without an 
ideology. An ideology may be minimal or it may be comprehensive 
and total. It may be minimal in the sense of embracing only the 
most basic moral principles defining the reciprocal expectations 
in the behaviour of members of a given society, without which that 
group of people cannot live peaceably together. " (Sunday Times, 
February 29,1976). 
This does not mean that Nigerians have no code of ideology but they are too 
different to be one. One of the major forces that pull them apart from the 
centre - briefly, there are three main ideologies prevailing in Nigeria 
today. Socialist ideology superficially equated with Orthodox Marxism in 
which the government should make socialism a sort of unchallengeable and 
all-encompassing political religion in Nigeria. Some have misunderstood the 
difference between national economic develoment and ideology. They regard 
'ideology as a panacea to all the political and economic ills in the 
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society. The third school of thought do not want to talk about ideology, 
e. g. Murtala Mohammed as cited above. They oppose any ideology adoption in 
Nigeria but emphasise the need for: 
"Social Welfare and development schemes prgrammes of injecting 
mobility into public life etc. " (New Nigeria, January 22,1976) 
In fact, political changes and policies beyond the level of allocation. of 
federal controlled resources were of low priority in Nigerian politics. 
This is because of regionalisation of political power and resources. The 
control of federal assets and resources and the policies and decision to 
allocate them through. organised bureaucracy required a trained and highly 
educated manpower. It is at this point that the notion of galloping 
"towards everything European" associated with the South is no longer 
relevant. The real differences between the North and the South begins to 
surface. In self-contradiction, Daura writes: 
"the then Northern government was subjected to pressure by the 
Northern elite not to let the North suffer ... the new Nigeria 
where paper qualifications were the primary criteria in the 
distribution of jobs, the North was at a great disadvantage. So a 
government- paper, the 'New Nigeria' was necesary to: (i) get 
across the view of the Northern elites and mobilise them in order 
to achieve its I oals; (ii) fight the Northern case in all disputes 
at the centre. - 7 
The role of the media or the press meanwhile marked the beginning of a 
dangerous shift in the political communication in Nigeria, a shift in which 
the original function of the press was to mobilise the entire nation against 
colonial administration to regionalisation of the media, political leaders 
began to use the media to make national demands which only favoured their 
regional governments. The media at regional level played divergent 
political roles, not in the sense of rural/urban political communication 
processes but in the terms of regional interests agenda-setting. 
In Chapter Three, I outlined the major differences between the three major 
tribes and suggested that these differences were sharp and thus condemned 
the Lugard's 1914 amalgamation of the North and the South as one political 
entity as irrational. The differences make a basis of unity difficult as 
Gowon once stated. The product of the amalgamation in Nigeria has also been 
described by a leading Nigerian politician as a mere geographical 
expression. These remarks may be questioned if we compare Nigeria with some 
stable nations in -the world today who were once sharply divided by similar 
problemst e. g, Belgium, Switzerland, Russia, Britain, etc. 
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Many newspapers were very equivocal in their outright condemnation of 
Lugard's planned policy for amalgamation, Chroniclep 14 July 1909; Lagos 
Weekly. Record 5 May 1906; and after the amalgamation, the attack 
intensified, Lagos Weekly Record from 4,14,15 and 15 Feb, 1914; Lagos 
Standard, Nigerian Daily Times, etc. 
"It would be fascinating to speculate on how the Nigerian press 
and people would have reacted to the amalgamation had it been 
carried out by a popular governor like Gilbert (after Lugard's 
position as the creator of the Northern System as an undesirable 
administrator in Lagos and yet as the chief amalagamator, helped o 
cast a shadow upon the amalgamation and to stimulate opposition to 
his administration which in the words of a newspapers ws 
characterised by 'a multiplicity of laws which were not only 
depressing in their outlook and irksome in their provisions but 
were also intended to break the morale and discourage the 
legitimate aspirations of the natives for social expansion. '" 
(Lagos Daily Record, in Omu 1978: 205) 
On 23 May 1914, Lagos Weekly Record and other national newspapers mounted 
vigorous attacks against Lugard's amalgamation policy and described'it as an 
attempt to "perpetuate that autocratic and despotic sway" (Omu 1978: 207) 
"identified with the notorous Northern Nigerian System". 
While the political roles of the press were obvious at this time, Nigerian 
newspapers performed other functons. The regional political parties 
development was a later development in the colonial administration in which 
the outcome was press and political growth in relation to the historical 
structure of ethnicism in the country. Though all newspapers in Nigeria 
appeared to have attacked Lugard's amalgamation of the North and the South 
of Nigeria, there were also major emphases on public enlightenment through 
the' press on issues of industrialisation, commercialisationt modernisation, 
health and educational progress of Nigeria. 
on 17th August 1929, Nigerian journalists assembled and formed the Nigerian 
Press Association. A resolution was passed in which there was an agreement 
that: 
"the time has arrived for the formation of a Nigerian Press 
Association and that the principal objectives of such an 
Association should be to safeguard the interest of the local 
press, raise its tone, to develop political thought and direct 
opinion on lines that would lead to the industrial, commerical and 
educational progress of the country" (in Omu 1978: 238). 
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But unfortunately, many historical and contemporary differences between the 
members of the Association, particularly their political biases resulted in 
the collapse of the Association in 1930, only shortly after its formation. 
In the pre-colonial period, there were no existing newspapers in any form in 
the Southern part of the country. All forms of communication were either 
interpersonal or symbolic. 
Early newspapers began when Nigerians came in contact witý European traders 
and missionaries. If 
"African churchmen occupy a significant place in the history of 
the early newspapers. For not ony were they some of the best 
contributors and columnists but also leaders of thL- Nigerian 
church' movement founded and edited many important newspapers in 
our period. The Standard Chronicle Times of Nigeria Yoruba 
News Eko Akete, Eko Igbehin, Kleti Ofe. 9 the Daily Telegraph, and a 
few others were owned and edited by African Churchmen. " (Omu 
1978: 256) 
From 10th November 1880 when the Lagos Times was founded by R. B. Blaize, a 
wealthy businessman and edited by Dr. Mojola Agbebi and W. E. Cole, both 
associated with the Anglican Church in Lagos, about 80% of all the creative 
literature in Nigeria produced by 1920 was contributed by Churchmen. This 
was a reflection of the impact of mission education in Nigeria. Ironically, 
they were not all pro-missi6naries, for many of them entered into printing 
and journalism to enlighten the public on the danger of cultural alienation 
emanating from the missionaries' negative attitude towards African culture. 
Their interest in the media was a 'revolt against new policies and practices 
introduced by the missionaries and the subjugation of Africans by imperial 
European forces'. 
In the event, some early African churchmen became strong African cultural 
nationalists. Ajasa formerly Edward Macaulay dropped the latter* names 
"under the influence of the cultural nationalism of the late nineteenth 
century" (Omu 1978: 44). Also Gabriel Adeoye Thomas for similar reasons 
changed his names to Adeoye Denign in 1908. He was the owner and editor of 
New Age Herald (1910-1913-? ). Kitoyi Ajasa was a lawyer by profession but 
started his own weeky newspaper, Nigerian Pioneer on 18 January 1914 to 
December 1936. His co-editor from 1915-25 was Irving. As we shall see 
shortly, "the first editors in Nigeria were hardly professional journalists" 
(Michael Echeruo 1973). 
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But some of the early newspapers they edited were more concerned with trade 
and commerce than with politics. Their content covered information on these 
both at local and international levels. Shipping forecasts were regularly 
covered and religious issues occupied some space. With the termination of 
the slave trade and raids, national security was improved, communication and 
transport expanded, 11and the transformation from a retricted to a modern 
economy, the growth of pre-European Urban Centres was accelerated and the 
rise of new centres stimulated" (Coleman 1960: 72)i Thus newspapers began to 
circulate outside Lagos. In the 1920s and 1930s provincial newspapers began 
to appear in Port-Harcourt, Calabar, Enugu, Benin, Onitsha, Ibadan, Abeokuta 
etc. 
Politically, the antithesis of colonialism began in most major Southern 
Nigerian cities when the educated class inspired the rise of nationalism. 
Their main discontent with the colonial administration was that the 
authorities denied them political participation in the colonial 
administration. Several of these agitators between 1920-34 were liberals in 
outlook and only made the moderate demand of a fair chance in the colonial 
administration. 
most of the newspapers between 1920-34 which made moderate attacks 'on the 
colonial administration could be associated with the Liberal Youth Movement 
- Nigerian Youth Movement* Some of the newspapers associated with this 
period were the Lagos Weekly Record owned and edited by the Jacksons; 
Nigerian Pioneerp by K. Ajasa; J. B. Davies' newspaper, Times of Nigeria 
African Messenger (1921-1928) by E. S. Ikoli; Eko Ekete, edited by Adeoye 
Deniga; Nigerian Daily Times Nigerian Advocate Iwe Irohia Osose Nigerian 
Daily Telegraph; Nigerian Daily Mail West Africa Nationhood and the Comet 
etc. 
outside Lagos, Aurora was published at Calabar by W. Coulson; Nigerian 
Herald at Onitsha. Between 22 May 1923 and December 1937 Dawn was published 
weekly at Aba, Calabar, Enugu and Port-Harcourt. ERba National Harper 
ciruclated on a weekly basis at Abeokuta; and at Port-Harcourt the Nigerian 
Observer was edited by R. L. Potts-Johnson. The 
-Nigerian 
Echo at Aba, 
Nigerian Weekly Dispatch at Onitsha, etc. 
From 1944-1950s the political ideology of the Nigerian elites changed f rom 
liberal nationalism to militant nationalism. The most dominant Nationalist 
in this philosophy was Azikiwe. The Militant Nationalism represented the 
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rise of positive nationalism (New Nigeria, April 19,1977). From the 1940s 
the broad-based nationalism of African and West African began to narrow down 
to meet up with the national and local needs of Nigeria. The main concern 
'-government and national political was on the attainment of sell. 
participation. The attack on the government policies became more severe by 
the press. Unfortunately, the Pilot the leading nationalist newspaper, 
entered into a feud with the Daily Service and the confrontation between the 
newspapers weakened Nigeria's national political strength. A feud between 
the Pilot and the Daily Service was directly or indirectly a tribal feud 
between Yorubas and Igbos, or between NCN and AG or between Zik and Awolowo. 
Political party and regional/ethnic tendencies began 1. -o generate a peculiar 
economic interest among the nationalists. Economic "interest rapidly 
replaced the emerging spirit of national freedom. 
"The nationalist bourgeoisie of the NCNC were af raid that the 
revoluntionary upsurge of Mist Nationalism could alienate them 
from the economic base, that is, that they could not establish 
their economic base by a political action which could offend the 
British whose economic class wanted an indigenous ally. The 
British therefore had to split the national. bouregeoisie into 
hostile camps as it did in'India and in Nigeriý through the ethnic 
ties. " (New Nigeria April 19,1977). 
The South was the most af f ected in the split namely between the Yorubas and 
the Igbos whose leaders were the most active in the nationalist movement* 
This was the beginning of regional nationalism which persisted from 1947- 
1966. At this point, it is important to note that the colonial 
administration had a national newspaper behind it. Michael Echeruo (1973) 
writes that: 
"When the Mirror-group bought up the Nigerian Daily Times in 1947, 
it was widely believed that the purchase had been engineered by 
the colonial office to counter the appeal of the Service and the 
Pilot as organs of nationalist political opinion. It is a good, 
story to believe! The paper certainly had the kind of patronage in the 40s and 50s from government and from foreign commerical 
circles (through privileged news breaks and advertisements) that 
the Lagos Observer enjoyed in the 1890s. " 
While I Nzimiro (1977) believes that the British deliberately split the 
Nationalist, Omu (1978: 247) maintains that S. L. Akintola contributed to the 
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regionalisation of nationalism and the crystallisation of intergroup tension 
and animosity which characterised Nigerian political development for a long 
time. 
In my opinon, the regic%nalisation of nationalism and politics cannot be 
attributed entirely to the making of individuals or the colonial 
authorities. But ethnicity which is the basis of socio-political and 
economic relationships is an ideal situation for such a political tendency 
to*develop. A situation which is politically so fragile that anyone seeking 
political power and control can exploit. Britain only exploited the 
situation to discourage a forceful militant nationalism. On the other hand, 
individual nationalist politicans also exploited ethnicity to enhance their. 
regional political power. For instance, in the later case, the same elites 
who started the Nigerian Youth Movement were also the same people who 
started the Action Group political party and Yoruba nationalism. 
Nzimiro (1977) points out that "They shifted their grounds just because they 
realised that they could not win political power through mass organisation 
because the NCNC philosophy had become the potent force which brought the 
people of Nigeria ... under ope nationalist organisation. " 
Nzimiro does not only blame the British. for the development of tribal 
nationalism but accuses the Action Group, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa Yoruba 
Methology and in particular, the Yoruba leader, chief Obafemi Awolowo. 
Nzimirio then emphasises that what was foremost for the Yoruba was their own 
regional unity, the protection of their own chiefs and interest so that 
future generations of the Yoruba will have a secure place in Nigeria. 
We have seen earlier that from a cultural organisation the Northern Peoples 
'Congress (NPC) emerged and represented all aspects of the Northern 
Feudalism. Like the Yoruba, NPC believed that its interest should 
overshadow the central government interest. Despite this concept, the NCNC 
under Zik continued to engage in militant nationalism but could not longer 
rely on the support of any Yoruba organisation. The Igbo State Union 
supported Zik and the NCNC party. Nigeria seemed to have stabilised. into 
regional power structure relatively autonomous from the federal governemnt. 
The federal government seemed almost dependent on the regional governments. 
The 1951 legislation endorsed the power of regional governments to control 
ýolitical parties and administration. Similarly, the press,. became part of 
this regioaalisation: 
"With few exceptionsg the newspapers were qwned or supported by 
the rival political parties (mainly the National Council of 
Nigerian Citizens [NCNC] and the Action Group EAGI) and it is one 
of the ironies of Nigerian history that in a crucial decade 
in the 
nation's developmentq a period which witnessed the taking of 
political and constitutional steps, which led inexorably to 
independence, the newspapers were completely immersed in the 
vortex of partisan politics and were in no position to prepare the 
people for the challenges of independence and national unity. 
" 
(Omu. 1978: 247) 
Even on the eve of Indpendence, Omu noted that major newspapers associated 
wiht the three major tribes and parties. That is, the Pilot, the 
Dai 
Service and the Nigerian Tribune were engaged in a 'vicious combat and 
interpersonal communication .... I 
We have noted above that 'party-led media system will produce a higher 
proportion of 'one-sided' political content, tending as a result to activate 
partisan role orientation among members of the audience as well as selective 
exposure mechansism'. In the Nigerian context the media, particularly the 
press, became an outlet for inter-ethnic conflict and confrontation in every 
respect. In the newspajer industry, the destructive role of the 
iress, under 
the control of journalists and editors who were checked by politicians knew 
no limits. The journalists themselves became instruments of disunity in 
Nigeria. But press maturity in party politics in the Nigerian context does 
not imply regional coverage of political issues where they are controlled, 
nor even setting the agenda for political participation. It simply 
emphasised political personalities against any other political question. 
The masses became disappointed and journalists are over constrained by 
political leaders. Golding (1977) reports that many Nigerian journalists 
"saw their future elsewhere in public relations, the civil service or 
commercell. 
Indeed, entering and leaving Nigerian journalism from or for other 
profesionas is rather historical. Most of those who started the press 
industry during and soon after colonisation were men trained in professions 
other than journalism. Only Zik, Ernest Ikoli, James Bright Davies, and 
Thomas Horatio and a few others were exceptions. 
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In terms of this thesis, those involved in the development of the press in 
Nigeria were the elites and the elites who could be described as political 
elites. Some of them were wealthy businessmen such as John Payne, the 
Jacksons, Blaize, George Alfred, Adolphus Asurke and Blakall Benjamin. 
While others belonged to different walks of life by training and profession; 
some of them were also the owners and editors of certain newspapers. Robert 
Campbell was a printer and an educationalist; N. T. King a medical doctor; 
Owen Macaulay a printer, a linguist and an historian; Christopher Johnson 
was an economist and a lawyer and his brother and co-editor a Methodist 
minister; Adamu Animushau was the leader of the Jamat faction of Muslims in 
Lagos; Kitoyi Ajasa a lawyer. 
This trend of non-prof essional, journalists as editors of the early Nigerian 
papers continued after the 1922-3 Clifford's constitution when the press 
carried out more political propaganda against colonial policies. Dr. 
Richard Akimwande Savage, a medical doctor; Dr. J. Akulade Caulerick was 
also a medical doctor (surgeon) and politican; Herbert Macaulay a civil 
engineer and poli tican; Duse Mohammed Ali a playwriter, actor and 
journalist; Awolowo a lawyer and politican, at a later date edited the 
- Service. Though. these were not professional journalists, 
"Any student of the Nigerian Press scene over the 100 year is 
struck by the sharp discontinuities in the tradition of Nigerian 
journalism, by the fact that the newspapers of today cannot claim 
to be the organic successors to those of the 1860s, the 1890s, the 
1920s or even the 1940s. - For those decades were the high moments 
in the history of the Nigerian Press when newspapers and their 
editors staked out. a place for themselves in the national life and 
acted as those who believed there was a purpose in having a Fourth 
Estate. Announcing his editorial policy on September 12,1863, 
the editor of the Anglo-African declared: 'The Anglo-African was 
established to promote the interest and 
, 
welfare of Lagos and its 
peoplep and not to serve those of any party, 'but in all questions 
to advocate the side of right - right, not in the estimation of 
this man or thatt but in the estimation of its editor. "' (Echeruo 
1973: 49) 
What is crucial in the current debate of the role of the media and politics 
in Nigeria is that strong regionalisation of the media weakens the centre by 
direct pressures from the regions to conform to their individual. needs. And 
because the regions are distinctly different, messages cannot be meaning- 
encoded and meaning fully-decoded for generalised impact on the audiences. 
Cultural, political, social, etc. values are important in decoding media 
messages. These are the very ingredients upon which media agenda feed, i. e. 
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what they reinforced. The wider the differences in value attached to them, 
the more difficult it is for the media to represent the interest of the 
nation particularly in developing states. 
For instance, the issue of setting up regional radio houses, which was 
opposed by Benson in 1961, generated opposition against him by all the 
regions and their parties. Between July 29th and August 2nd,, 1961, Ian 
Mackay noted from the evidence produced by Benson, the minister of 
broadcasting in Nigeria, how difficult it was for the NBC to serve the three 
regions and different political parties. The NPC (press release of July 
29th) the NEPU (press release of July 31st) NCNC letter from the Acting 
National Administrative Secretary to the NBC director-general of July 30th 
and the Action droup press release August 2nd (all in 1961) show that each 
of the parties accused NBC of partiality and partisanship. The NPC itself 
was even more vocal and more threatening. 
"The Northern Peoples' Congress has expressed grave concern over 
the continued discrimination of the Nigerian Broadcasting 
Corporation against the government of the North as well as the 
NPC. It is surprising to note that the Director--General of the 
BNC, who is strongly biased and deliberately allows discrimination 
to continue, is now coming to the North- to bid farewell to the 
people of the Northern region. "18 
This is a clear indication of how regionalisation of Political communication 
networks' is capable of generating disproportionate ethnic politics in the 
dif f erent regions. The regional press - the Eastern Nigerian and the 
Nigerian Outlook established in 1955 represented the interest of that 
region, as well as its main poitical party, the NCNC. The federal 
government was respresented by the NBC and the 
, 
Morning_ Post (1961), the 
Sketch (1964), the Western Region and Action Group (AG), and the New Nigeria 
for NPC. 
In this new process of media development, national interests were highly 
marginalised by editorial content. The general content of the press began 
increasingly to reflect and reinforce ethnic values and interests. But this 
process should not overshadow the fact that within each ethnic group, the 
press represented more accurately the views and aspirations of a particular 
network group - the elite - who had ambition for power and had to shape the 
content of the media in order to win the support of their own ethnic 
communities. Hence at regional level the media expressed one voice, one 
support for the politician: Nigerians usually call them political 
heavyweights. In the North, Saradunq of Sokoto represented the region 
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through the NPC, Dr. Azikiwe f or the Igbos in. the East through the NCNC and 
Chief Obafomi Awolowo for the Yorubas in the West through the AG. At the 
centre, there were different voices reflecting the views of each ethnic 
leader, with no substantial evidence of a concern for national unity and 
integration. At the centre, stereotyping conflicts, oppositon, extreme 
divergences of opinion impoverished constructive politics. Worse still, 
each ethnic leader was extremely popular in the region of his origin but 
beyond this politically moribund. 
The strong ethnic political interest also put pressure ori the existence of a 
federal newspaper such as the Morning Post. Unlike radio, newspapers depend 
on readership to survive. Luke Uche claimed that the Morning Post became 
defunct in early 1973. Its circulation had fallen and the federal 
government was running it at a great deficit. The Nigerian audience of the 
Morning Post had eventually revolted against reading the federal government 
bulletins and press releases that overtly contained only pre-government news 
that became characteristic of the contents of the Morning Post. "The Post 
'died' because it took its audience for a ride. It failed to recognise that 
it had a nationally based audience, hence an element of objectivity in news 
content was essential in presenting all sides to controversial issugs that 
wer quite sensitive when the nation was faced with a crisis of idenýity and 
legitimacy. "19 
Uche's comments here should be taken seriously, though he fails to tell us 
what type of government was in power when the Post 'died I, but he did 
implicitly point out an important development in political communicaiton and 
the media in Nigeria in recent years, the fact that the majority of those in 
power in 1973 when the Post 'died' were soldiers drawn from a particular 
region of the country - the North. 'Crises of Identity' are an important 
political communication issue in Nigeria. Those who control the centre, 
either civilian elite as the 1983, government showed or the military elitel 
have the greater tendency to represent the ethnic identity of their 
particular ethnic group. This is a political direction instituted by 
politicians when the English were still in Nigeria as the governing power. 
Many Nigerians believe that the direction has not changed even with the 
army, a 'reality' which has led to the development of a slogan stereotyping 
the army as civilians in uniform. 
Events and new political developments such as the creation of states are 
further affecting the function of the press in Nigeria. Crises of political 
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identity are shown in the media as shifting from the federal level to state 
and local levels. In 1979 the qivil government was shown to be in control 
of certain states and each state had its own radio, TV and press. 
Politically states under one party tended to agree on several political 
issues while those outside the ruling party not only attacked the federal 
newspaper views, but also opposed the views of those states , 
under them. The 
media, therefore, tended to intensify regional/state conflicts, federal and 
state and . 
vice versa. The regional/state political communication 
development tendency in Nigeria is historical and has virtually become 
endemic, eating deep into the marrow of the nation's political communication 
system. The historical moments in which this political communication 
orientation began in Nigeria shall be reviewed at the end of this section. 
This role of the media in recent times during election campaigns will be 
examined empirically in the case study of the 1983 geneal election in 
Nigeria in this thesis. 
I feel that the political influence of the press in Nigeria has been somehow 
overstressed particularly in the voting behaviour of the electorates. In 
1982 for instance, Electoral Act, section 120, became law and the National 
Advisory Council (NAC) was set-up to monitor government -owned mass media 
content because the authorities believed that the mass media were as 
powerful as "a bullet" and could direclty influence the electorates, voting 
behaviour in the way and manner the originator of media messages desired. 20 
This is the concept of the political influence of mass media in Nigeria 
which most of the political elite have come to accept. I seriously question 
it. In contrast, I propose that the influence of the media is marginal in 
electoral behaviour and voting in that country, The concept of the 
hypodermic model applied to Nigerian media and political influence is part 
of the transfer of Western communication model which is inadequately applied 
and wrongly imposed on communication structures in Nigeria. 
Evne though I have argued that the press influenced the nationalist movement 
the level of education in Nigeria was very low: between 10-15% of the total 
population could read or write and only one newspaper, the one most passive 
about the independence struggle, was written in the local language - Hausa. 
How could the press then mobilise the entire nation behind the nationalists 
to win independence? 
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Through selective exposure to the media, the media can influence the 
attitude of some of the 15% of Nigerian elites. In the words of Peter 
Golding (1974: 84) already mentioned earlier, there is a process of "a 'two- 
step flow' of communciation, in which media material is attended to most 
actively by an interested and aware elite, called opinion leaders, who then 
pass it on through networks of interpersonal communication. These 
interpersonal networks stabilise attitudes over time and act as filters for 
mediated information. " 
I believe in the Nigerian context, that it was through the network of 
interpersonal communication that the small number of the elite were able to 
influence their relativesl king friends and workmates, using the information 
they obtained from the press. Kinship ties between those in authority and 
the very poor rural population made a very important structural network of 
political communication that determined such popular support. My study has 
not examined the influence and direct effect of the press on the population 
during the nationalist movement, but the 1983 general election will help us 
assess the actual effect of the press and other media on the electorate. 
Between 1979-83, several political, leaders owned and controlled newspapers, 
eg Chief Abolia - the National Concord; Chief Awolowo - the Nigerian 
Tribune; Jim Nwaobodo - Satellite etc. They used these papers to attack or 
expose the negative aspects of their opponents, If the press had had a 
direct effect on the electorate, we would expect more Igbos voting for a 
Yoruba leader or a Hausa, or Yoruba for an Igbo or a Hausa leader. What is 
important about network analysis of political communication is that it 
throws light on the available and alternative channels of communication 
which compete through association to influence voting behaviour. In this 
study, we shall see how these alternative sources of influence - friends, 
relatives, money, etc. compare with mass media - radio, TV and the press. 
Luke Uche and other leading Nigerian mass media scholars seem to endorse the 
hypodermic model. For instance, Uche writes: 
"During the 1964 general elections, the mass media (radio, 
televison, newspapers) of the federal and various regional 
governments announced false election result figures that favoured 
the political parties of the government they represented. This 
led to wide-spread rioting, thuggery and arson in the Western 
region of Nigeria. "21 
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Would it be enough in any Nigerian city or village for people to hear a 
radio broadcast which did not favour their expectations and then embark on 
such violent action as above? The concept does not tell us about the rules 
of political leaders who were disappointed by the result of the elections. 
What is the ethnic composition of the rioters? What were the previous 
relationships between local political leaders, the ruling party and the 
rioters? Riots must start in a particular neighbourhoodq city or village. 
Were they the first to obtain the information? Who received the information 
first? What is his position in the community and what interpretation did he 
give to the media message? All these and a host of other f actors are 
neglected in the concept of direct effect of media. 
In fact, the nature of political violence in Nigeria is entrenched in the 
system: 
"Violence is close to the surf ace in all political campaigns in 
Nigeria, South as well as North. Four NCNC-NEPU supporters 
accompanying Dr. Azikiwe on his tour of the North attacked; seven 
NEPU men hospitalised following fight after the tour stops at 
Nguru; eleven democratic party of Nigeria and the Cameroon and 
NCNC men charged with breach of the peace at DPNC meeting in 
Enugu, Eastern Region following fighting iind damage to Action 
Gr; up helicopter. NPC member of the Northern House of Assembly 
(AI4. Cigari) sentenced to two years imprisonment for assault on 
Action Group organising secretary; Governor-General Robertson 
makes broadcast calling for an end to violence; all public 
processes banned in the Western region from November 26 to 
December 8 ... --22 
Long lists of such violent incidents were made by Schwartz in one election 
only. The North seemed in the pre-1966 election to have been more 
politically I volatile I. From the Police Report 1959 Kurfi noted that "of 
the 27" disturbances and major incidents "during the year, 14 stemmed from 
conflicts between political parties, and of 'these, 12 were in the North". 23 
It is wrong to assume that the press or radio at this time were soley 
responsible for the intensification of the conflicts between political 
parties. It is important to compare as we shall see in later chapters the 
various sources of political competition and conficts in Nigeria during 
election period so that the degree of their differences can be stated to 
reduce speculation and over-generalisation of the role of the media in 
election campaigns. I have pointed out elsewhere in this thesis that one of 
the main problems of African politics is that those in power like to remain 
in power using all possible means to do so. Consequently, opposition gorups 
also employ various means,, legitimate and illegitimate to gain power so 
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that, as Kurfi, A (1983) illustrated with the 1959 and 1979 general 
elections in Nigera, nobody - ie no political actor - acknowledges the 
legitimate power of a declared winner. What follows is that the loser 
employs violence to express his opposition. Kurfi pointed out in the 1979 
general elections, Awolowo strongly believed he had won the presidential 
election and not Shagari. He appealed to the High Court but lost his case. 
As a leader, of a major ethnic group, why did he not use violence as was the 
case in 1959 to oppose the NPN leadership? Kurfi correctly stated that 
violence, which characterises all Nigerian elections, was minimised in the 
1979 general elections because the campaign: 
lowas carried out under the watchful eyes of the military rulers 
and was therefore much more restrained and almost devoid of rank 
violence'. Furthermore, Nigerians appeared to have learned a 
bitter lesson in 1959,1964 and 1965 when several lives were lost 
and valuable property damaged or destroyed and many people 
detested repeat performances of the ugly episodes of those years. 
The spirit of 'politics without bitterness' expounded by Al Haji 
Waziri Ibrahim, leader and presidential candidate of the GNPP, 
generally prevailed throughout the country. "24 
Kurfi then buttressed his points by a particular observation made by 
Professor Jqan Herskovits of New York State University who visited Nigeria 
during the 1979 general elections: 
"During that (senatorial) and subsequent elections, a tour of the 
polling places revealed scenes of impressive order: queues, 
scarcely an argument, and, most of all, no violence *a, Most 
striking was the contrast with the 1960s when thugs frequently 
broke-up political meetings, arson and murder were common, and 
intimidation was the context for voting itself. "25 
In the 1979 general elections, Kurfi reported that only a few major 
incidents such as the stoning and smashing of the windshield of the 
helicopter carrying Chief Awolowo at Aba, Imo State (a repeat performance of 
a similar incident at Enugu in 1959) was reported and roundly condemned by 
most Nigerians. Another incident was reported in Plateau State where a 
party activist died as a result of a nail ... stuck in his skull ... On the 
whole the rules of the game were observed by most Nigerian politicians 
during the 1979 election campaign. 26 
These conditions which prevailed in the 1979 general elections are crucial 
in the understanding of election campaigns in Nigeria. In terms of the role 
of the media, particulary in generating political conflicp and violence, the 
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prevailing atmosphere controls and determines what the media reflect. They 
do not create political violence by simply reinforcing socio-political 
conditions which can lead to violence. They reinforce the action of 
political actors in their network of relationship with their different 
participation, voting and violence in Nigeria. Most political leaders in 
the 1979 and 1983 general elections had under their control more mass media 
network - press, radio, TV, telephone and journals - than in the 1959,1964 
and 1965 elections. Yet violence was greatly minimised as a result of 
socio-political conditions, not because the media set the agenda for the 
election. 
As much as I have argued theoretically that the media do not create 
'political violence during elections but reinforce the existing political 
mood of the nation, particularly that of political leaders, I shall 
empirically illustrate that in actual election participation and voting, the 
mass media, despite their control and ownership in Nigeria, do not directly 
inf luence voters. If they do, their direct infuence is restricted to a 
particular sector of the population and only to a certain extent. Other 
alternative influences indicated above compete seriously with the media, 
particularly in the Imo State, Nigeria. Even so, not all the media have an 
equai amount of direct or indirect influence on a particular group. The' 
role and development of the press, and other media from the time of 
nationalist and political party development in Nigeria can be exaggerated 
and lead to misleading theoretical conclusions if the structure of 
interpersonal relationship, social structure and political and economic 
conditions in Nigeria for a period of time are not accounted for. 
In the next chapter, I shall account for the develoment of political radio 
and TV in Nigeira which, in many respects, has tended to the centralisation 
and regionalisaton of'state orientation. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RADIO AND TELEVISION AND NIGERIAN PARTY POLITICS 
A: RADIO 
This chapter aims at demonstrating that radio, like the press$ evolved* from 
and centred around elite political communication needs. 
At the time . of its introduction into the political system of Nigeria radio 
was exclusively owned and controlled by the colonial authorities. 
Throughout the colonial rule in Nigeria, radio remained the most important 
medium in which the authorities communicated with the masses. Broadcasting 
in most African countries began as a service to settle communities, bring 
them news of the colonial homeland and establish valuable links within the 
communities ... Aware that external 
broadcasting services from Moscow were 
well ahead of. Britain's, the Colonial Secretary appoirited the Plymouth 
Committee to "consider and recommend what steps could be taken to accelerate 
the provision of 
ýroadcasting services in the Colonial 
'Empire, to co- 
ordinate such services with the work of the BBC and to make them a more 
effective instrument for promoting both local and Imperial interest. - 
(Colonial Offices 1937j, p. 1 in Golding & Elliott 1979: 40). This was an 
important need which the colonial authorities followed up urgently as early 
as they could despite what was argued at the time by many officials in 
Britain and the colonies that setting up radio stations in Africa was a 
"waste of money on an extremely expensive, relatively new invention. "I But 
a clear understanding of the medium's main characteristic as a network of 
communication which can penetrate different strata of a population and 
geographical boundaries pushed men such as Arthur Creech Jones (1946-1950), 
Andrew Cohen, Sir Sydney Caine, Sir Charles Jeffry, Ormsby Gore and Lord 
plymouth, who were associated with the colonial office and the British 
administration at the time, to approve , 
radio broadcasting in Africa 
regardless of the cost. Mass media professionals such as R. Foot, Oliver J. 
Whitley, J. B. Clark, Grenfell Williams, etc. of the BBC worked hard to 
establish radio broadcasting in Africa. 
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A few years later, Rosalynde Ainslie stressed the importance of radio in 
Africa, thus: 
"In Africa, where rates of illiteracy are among the highest in the 
world, radio is practically indispensable to modern life. 
Newspapers may reach the educated in the cities and the towns, but 
f ew in the villages. Television, where it exists, may excite 
those within the radius of a transmitter, if they have access to a 
set. But for the mass of people, workers in the towns and 
peasants in the countryside, radio is the sure means of contact 
with the rest of the country, and with the outside world. Access 
to a radio station is thus, next to control of armed forces, the 
most urgent necessity of Government. Democratically, it is an 
instrument of power... "2 
Ainslie's point is crucial in understanding radio as a powerful medium of 
political communication. Applying his notion of categorical audio audience 
to our network groups, identified in chapter two, every member of the Africa 
community who has access to a set would be directly influenced by radio 
broadcasts. But as I have argued elsewhere, it is not exposure to a medium 
that is important but the format of and the content of the broadcast 
themselves. The most important in this respect is the ability of radio to 
use various local African languages as well as standard English and other 
European languages, e. g. Freneh, to broadca'st in Afiica at relatively little 
additional cost. 
Katz and Wedell (1977: 33) also point out that in Africa broadcasting is 
expected "to help in the fight against illiteracy, linguistic diversityO and 
regionalism in order to forge a shared national identity, a higher standard 
of living, a higher standard of social justice". In the'Nigerian context, 
they noted that "Disquiet over the cultural goals of broadcasting has also 
begun to be discussed ... " because the country's major problem since 
independnence "has been to integrate the disparate regions and tribes that 
were combined for administrative purposes by Lord Lugard at the turn of the 
century. " 
In the network of political communication, it is this linguistic variety and 
long distance coverage of radio broadcast that makes it a great political 
mobiliser and agent of political information. "Radio networks have been 
expanded in almost every country and have overcome many of the problems of 
terrain and distance" (Katz & Wedell 1977)., Ainslie concludes that: 
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"Radio is therefore an intensely serious affair, and not an 
entertaining luxury. In rural Africaq it is often the single 
means of receiving news - news of regional, national or world 
events, of government and policy decisions. It is also the main 
vehicle of social education: advice on health, on farming methods, 
on civic responsibilities and voting procedures. "3 
This second function of radio can be true when radio is compared with 
television and newspapers but may be theoretically and quantitatively 
questionable in comparison to oral communication in Africa - that is,, I 
subscribe to the view that radio is the second main communication medium in 
Africa. But when we consider political communication from traditional 
rural pattern to urban political communication changes and development, 
radio holds the key to the process. In this light then, Ainslie argues that 
radio is "seen as an essential instrument of national development" and "is a 
comparatively new phenomenon". 
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In comparing radio and television in terms of communication channels through 
which information can flow between government and the people to ensure 
national political- integrations Katz I Wedell contend that "the media must 
reach out to the whole population. In the case of radio, this coverage has 
been achieved to a considerable extent, In the case Qf television, it has 
hardly begun. 
The basic similarities between the development of Radio and TV according to 
Golding (1974: 32-33) is that "they arose after the Industrial Revolution and 
required the mass urban public and technological advances that 
industrialisation has induced. They have been unique, too , in that f or a 
substantial period in broadcasting history the monopoly of production and 
distribution was held by a state-controlled body. " 
Historically, it was during the colonial period that essential instruments 
of new political orientation and development were ushered into African 
political system as I have pointed out in Chapter Three. The important 
direct relationship between the role of radio in the new political system 
and national development was that the new medium was generating the new 
political elite and at the same time confronting it. For instance* Armour, 
stating the importance of radio to the colonial authorities as well as the 
confrontation between political leaders/nationalists in Nigerian party 
politics, wrote: 
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"In October 1947, Grenfell Williams had written to Whitley at the 
colonial office: 'Nigeria, in spite of its problems, or perhaps 
because of them, will probably be almost the most important 
colonial area during the next few years and here, at all costs, 
Public Service radio should be established in preference to the 
commerical system. 1-5 
This implies that changing political circumstances immediately af ter the 
Second World War pressurised the colonial authorities to change the contents 
of radio broadcasting from those of cultural and social civilization and 
commercialisation of African communities to heavy political content. "After 
the war colonial authorities in Britain began to reconsider broadcasting in 
the light of growing restiveness in some areas" (Golding and Elliot 
1979: 41). The broader political awareness of Nigerians after the Second 
World War became converted into an intense demand for participation in the 
colonial administration and was fuelled by the activities of Nationalists 
through the press. Radio as the only voice of the government became heavily 
politicised as much as the press. Hence constitutional changes in the way 
that the Nigerian Radio Service operated were needed so that radio could 
cope with the new political situation. Armour noted that: 
"From his arrival in Lagos in January 1951 , Chalmers had intended 
to work towards the establishment of a broadcasting corporation 
modelled on the BBC. His f ears about popular interpretation of 
the status of the Nigerian Broadcasting Service were enforced in 
March 1953 by the reactions to the refusal of the Chief Secretary 
Arthur Benson to allow Chief Awolowo to reply over the air to the 
Governor's broadcast following the constitutional crisis when the 
Action Group (AG) and the National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameroons (NCNC) members walked out of the House of 
Representatives in Lagos. " 
It was after this incident that the nationalists and their political parties 
began to press the colonial government to regionalise radio by setting u 
radio stations in the three major regions in Nigeria. The motion of Chief 
S. A. Adegbenro of the AG in March 1954 attracted popular support among 
political leaders in the Federal House of Parliament. He demanded that NBS 
should be changed to NBC, arguing that NBS was modelled on the BBC which did 
not reflect the course, aspirations and needs of Nigerians. On August 23rd, 
1954, a bill was passed to this effect and on April 1st 19579 NBS became NBC 
(Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation). Besides this non-Nigerian cultural, 
political and economic content of NBS modelled after the BBC, a second 
argument which was put before the colonial authorities was that the NBS was 
accused by the nationalist press to be the mouthpiece of the central 
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government and in order to remove the press criticism the government should 
regionalise the radio. 
But T. W. Chalmer stressed and recommended "that radio ... is the most potent 
mass disseminator of culture and information that the world possesses, and 
the object of bringing it to Nigeria is to assist in the development of the 
country in every possible way and in an orderly fashion. Our aim in 
broadcasting therefore must be to assist those processes that go towards the 
making of an enlightened democracy. One of the most powerful weapons in the 
radio armoury is impartial news and information programmes which must 
develop as rapidly as possible" (quoted in Mack, 1964: p. 14; and in Golding 
and Elliot 1979: 41). 
Mackay (1964) noted that the intention was to form a Nigerian broadcasting 
corporation on the general model of the BBC but owing to the circumstances 
of Nigeria it is proposed to have three independent regional setups with 
regional autonomy subject only to the overall control of policy by the 
Broadcasting Corporation of the whole country. 
But Peter Golding and Elliot. (1979) state that the breakdown of the 1957 
constitution and the assertion of regional autonomy could not allow for the 
adoption of radio development in Nigeria as recommended by Turner-Byron. 
However, Chalmers' recommendations were accepted and the Nigeria 
Broadcasting Service began in 1957. 
From the above argument important facts about rado and political party 
development in Nigeria begin to surface, Radio, if the argument of changing 
it from NBS to NBC can be empirically represented as accurate,, has not 
played a unifying political role in Nigeria because it did not reflect on 
the socio-political and cultural realities of Nigeria. As a medium capable 
of linking Nigerians to Nigerians irrespective of tribes, creed and 
residence, politically it failed. Nigerians were linked to the colonial 
authorities and then to the world outside-Nigeria by radio (NBS). 
Taking into consideration the regional differences in Nigeria, discussed 
earlier and restated by Mackay above, the NBC would be expected to play 
divergent, disintegrative political roles in Nigeria. My main arguement 
would be that radio became orientated towards reinforcing regional political 
and social interests which are embedded in ethnic Political nationalism in 
Nigeria. Because of the multiplicity of languages which characterised 
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different ethnic groups within the regions, radio created more political 
divergence. Unlike the press as Kurian and Nwankwo noted which used one 
language - English, "geographical location and circulation patterns 
influence the Nigerian press more critically than ownership". But the 
pattern of language structures, leadership and political party tendencies in 
Nigeria make radio an important regional political medium. 
Besides the internal political shape of Nigerian radio during the colonial 
period, it was suggested thqt the British were anxious to control the 
influence of communism in Africa through the use of radio which could expose 
the 'dangers' of communism to all social and economic groups in Africa. 
"For some timeg wep in consultation with the Foreign Office and 
the Commonwealth Relations Office, have been planning the measures 
which could be taken to combat the growth of communist influence, 
not only by direct counter propaganda but also and perhaps chiefly 
- by the positive projection both of the accurate appreciation of 
the democratic point of view and the principles upon which our 
civilization is based. Among these measures is the development of 
boradcasting in the colonies ... Broadcasting offers ... the best 
medium available for us for covering the ground; the press helpful 
though it may be cannot be used in quite the same way. "9 
Besides in the 1930s the Colonial dffice was aware that Russian external 
services from Mocow were well ahead of the BBC's similar services (Golding 
and Elliot, 1979). 
Basically, Nigerian and African radio broadcasting developed as much as tha 
press as a confrontation medium in which the British could combat communism 
as well as counter internal nationalist political movements. 
on the internal politics, having by law converted radio broadcasting "into a 
statutory corporation" to "devoid it of both government interference and the 
propagation of the views of the ruling political parties"10, NBC regional 
political function became an important political medium in Nigeria,, The 
1956 broadcasting ordinance stressed the political implications of 
broadcasting in Nigeria and emphasised the need for impartial coverage of 
political broadcasting by all the parties. Various guidelines were laid 
down to secure the national character of broadcasting in the nation to 
promote national unity and integration; most of these proposals ended in 
disappointments and frustration because the political parties in which radio 
became an important medium developed rigidly along ethnic and regional 
lines. 
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It was in the 1950s that it was anticipated that radio broadcasting would be 
established on the three main regions but not to be regionalised. But the 
idea was "gradually eroded by the facts of Nigerian political life". 
Eventually it became clear to the colonial authorities that "political and 
social development of the Regions will mean that regional broadcasting will 
play an even more important part than was originaly anticipated" (Colonial 
office, 1954: 119, quoted in Golding and Elliott, 1979: 42). 
In addition, the content of the radio broadcast at regional level was 
stipulated by the broadcasting ordinance of 1956 to meet the requirements of 
different regions where the stations existed. A factor difficult to 
reconcile politically with the concept of Nigerian political unity and 
integration. Luke Uche points out that the "greatest setback to the concept 
of Nigerian unity occured when each of the three regions of the federation 
established its own separate broadcasting system. "ll But it is the 
regionalisation of the content which so much caused the set back for it is 
from this aspect of the development that the domination of personalities In 
Nigerian broadcasting rather than politicl issues can be understood. The 
external relationship between the broadcasting and regional government was 
very f undamental. Peter Golding in Curran (ed. 1977: 291) has emphasised 
that -, *, colonial history has enormous implications for analysis of the 
structure and role of the media in the Third* World. Most importantly it 
means that accounts of the media in a single country which make no reference 
to an international context of the dependence are empirically and 
theoretically barren". 
The validity of this statement becomes clearer in his later works in Nigeria 
when he demonstrated some of the implications of -foreign jointly owned 
broadcasting stations in West Nigeria. Golding and Elliot 1979: 41) showed 
that the colonial administrators were warned of "the readiness of 
manufacturers to extend their markets for both transmitting and receiving 
equipment to West Africa. While the BBC undertook to supervise the 
manufacture of its own equipment, "manufacturers were eager to secure export 
outlets, while hedging their bets by joining the campaign for a commerical 
second television service in Britian". Elsewhere, Golding has the close 
relationship between advanced nations and the Third World media developments 
in terms of the transfers of media professionalism, historical transfer, 
education, training and qualifications. All these often shape the content 
of broadcasting and structure of organisation of the media in Africa and 
other Third World countries. Schaller, H. I. (1970), Mattelart, A. (ed) 
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(1979), Katz and Wedell (1957) have made similar observations. 
Commercial interest of the overseas partners seems over-riding and at times 
even to conflict. In West Nigeria such partnership was entered into between 
H. G. and Overseas Rediffusion Ltd. "Initially the venture was run in 
partnership with Overseas Rediffusion Ltd. who had been involved since 1952 
in the development of NBC's wired radio service in the region. Increasingly 
the political objectives set for broadcasting by the regional government 
conflicted with the aggressive commercial ambitions of Rediffusion, and the 
government bought out the company in 1961. " (Golding and Elliott 1979: 43). 
We have noted that each of the regions. was dominated by one political party 
and political leader. The parties controlled the medium and the political 
leaders regarded it as the channel through which their ethnic group would 
know them and support them, a notion which led so many writers on Nigerian 
politics and media to conclude that without the mass media support, a 
politician in Nigeria stands to lose. 
Other political implications of regionalisation of radio broadcasting can be 
, revealedi We. should recall,, as stated in chapter three, that indirect rule 
in the North protected the interest of colonial administration against the 
nationalist influence of that region from the South. 
Regionalisation of radio through a demand curiously made by the nationalist 
influence reinforce such interest. Since radio uses local languages broad 
national content of broadcasting would include various arguments put forward 
by nationalists and this would have 'direct' impact on the Northern masses. 
The consequence would result in faster destabilisation of colonial 
administration. We shall see later how the colonial authorities split the 
nationalist and increased antagonism between them through the media. 
Experience has shown that in Nigerian urban centres where different ethnic 
and linguistic groups live and work, regionalisation of the cntent of the 
media, e. g. radio and TV, has led to political media impoverishment of the 
ethnic groups who come from outside the region. In the 1980s radio 
recording machines and cassettes from USAq Europe and India were very 
popular with the non-Hausa /Fulani speakers and cultural groups in Kaduna, 
because Northern broadcasting programmes did not satisfy their needs. They 
simply played their tapes. Ironically, these tapes bear Western values and. ' 
not Nigerian. 
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Two explanations are possible: Western education has influenced Southerns so 
much that media entertainment has captured their interest towards the West. 
Secondly, the lack of adequate facilities for producing video films locally 
gives no alternative choice. 
Politically, the media having been regionalised, they integrate rural 
populations with a section of the urban population who have the same 
regional, cultural and linguistic characteristics. Radio in particular 
selectively links a particular ethnic urban group with its similar rural 
population while isolating other groups in the region. In the network of 
political connections, the role of radio and face-to-face communication in 
Nigeria become fused at the village level but sharply disintegrative in the 
city. The differences widen the further one moves from one's own urban 
centre and village to another. 
Eventualy as we shall see with the 1983 general election datat urban 
politics and rural political communication could not transcend ethnic 
geographical -zones. Those politicians who, as the nature of Nigerian 
political system described in chapter three, offered no alternative but to 
base their political support on ethnic mobilisation and strengtho therefore'. 
utilised the regionalisation of the media, particularly radio, to perpetuate 
their own interest and shape Nigerian politics along ethnic participation 
and voting lines. 
This structure of political media and their danger to political stability in 
Nigeria was stressed by Mackay before the 1966-1970 civil war: 
"The sole responsibility of regional broadcasting is to radiate a 
regional image and that cannot encourage the artistic endeavours 
of Nigeria as a nation. The setting-up of regional corporation 
does not bring about the competition. That can only be achieved 
by setting-up a number of corporations having national coverage 
and offering a range of programme which would benefit the countrys 
There is no sign of that in Nigeria. Whatever the benefits - and there are benefits - the cost is too high and the danger exists 
that divided control in a developing society may prompt regional feeling instead of encouraging the desire to live together and act together. "12 
Radio would therefore tend to intensify ethnic conflict by over- 
concentration on regional issues which Politically do not attract the 
interest of various groups or individuals outside a tribe. Since Nigerian 
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politics is based on competition with immense conflicting interests and 
bitterness, regionalisation of issues in radio broadcasting which transcends 
ethnic boundaries generate ill feelings between ethnic groups, not only 
between the elites who define the media content and set the agenda, but also 
between the poor in cities and the village peasants. The young unemployed 
school leavers often justify their acts of thuggery on behalf of ethnic 
politicians who exploit the situation. An important understanding of the 
way in which political relationship between groups in Nigeria operate is 
seen in the statement of Obasango in his nationwide radio/TV broadcast in 
the 1979 elections that politicians should not exploit the feelings of the 
young. 
This 'feeling' would be minimised if at the national level political parties 
competed with one another. The tendency would be for them to use radio to 
discuss national issues and problems, how best they could solve national 
problems. Personalities and ethnic party interests would therefore be de- 
emphasised becuse they would not appeal to the electorates. Thus radio 
would become an important channel of national political participation and 
voting. Individuals and groups would be exposed to different media by 
virtue of their different characteristics and attributes which enable them 
to understand media political messages. 
The debate on regionalisation of the media in Nigeria, which is believed to 
contribute to the disorienation of political participation from the centre 
could be a weak explanation of the real nature of political communication in 
Nigeria.. If political parties are ethnic-based and the kinship system 
persist as the most important determinant of political participation and 
voting, the role of the media could be less important than they are assumed 
to be in Nigerian politics. It would even be more difficult to envisage how 
centralised national radio/TV networks would represent the interest of all 
the region or states without complaints of media bias in representing those 
interests. 
"*** It is potentially dangerous if the NBC is used to stifle 
criticism, to voice only the thoughts and the aims of a particular 
group of people who, for the time beingo are in political power. It may be all very well to have political control of broadcasting 
so long as one's arty is in power. It is not so funny when one 
is not in power. **1ý 
This is a clear statement which illustrates the relationship between the 
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political party in power and the mass media since independence. In 1983, as 
will be seen later, the NPN, the ruling party, was seriously accused by 
other parties of exclusive use of federal radio/TV and press, both at 
federal and state levels. Such protest and accusation were noted by Mackay 
between July 29th to August 1961 by NPCj NCNCq AG and NEPU parties in 
various ways against NBC. 
Under Gowon's regime the number of NBC stations increased from three to 
twelve corresponding to the twelve states created by him. It was under the 
Mutala/Obsango government that NBC was restructured to FRCN (Federal Radio 
Corporation of Nigeria). Pressure was put on the government to allow 
advertising on the FRO but the government resisted the pressure and argued 
that ads would disrupt the use of radio as a medium of government campaign 
for development. With various political changes in Nigeria, particulary the 
creation of states, radio broadcasting stations followed the same trend. By 
the time the first civil governemnt took over power under PNC government in 
1979 to 1983, there were 48 radio broadcasting stations and 19 state 
governments in Nigeria. By law, individuals or organisations are not 
allowed to own radio broadcasting stations, thus all of the 48 stations were 
owned either by the federal government or by the state government, The 
ownership and control of these broadcasting houses has been summed up by 
Luke Uche, thus: 
"The FRCN, which is owned and controlled by federal government 090 has its own state stations in each of the nineteen states of the 
Federation. At the same time each of Nigeria's nineteen states 
has its own radio broadcasting station. This is totally 
independent of the FRCN affiliate in each state ... For political 
reaSOnSp all the radio stations are located at both the federal 
and state cpaitals. "15 
This structure of governments' (federal and states) radio is important in 
the understanding of the role of radio in Nigerian politics. 
Luke Uche clearly states that: 
"The Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) is undoubtedly 
one of the most powerful political and social institutions of 
Nigerian society. It has played a role that is second to none in 
the political leadership power struggle of the country,, "15 
Uche's comment sounds plausible and falls in line with other media theory 
assumptions in most African studies. However, there is evidence to 
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substantiate these assumptions have not exceeded speculations and where the 
statement bears some relationship to the political realities in Nigeria, it 
is based purely on the media institutions and their relationship with 
political leaders and parties. We have noted in this chapter that the 
primary aim of the colonial office in establishing radio broadcasting in 
Nigeria and elsewhere was political and social in order to inform the masses 
of decisions concerning them and to enable them to participate in the 
system. These aims were not by the regional/state and federal governments 
after independence. In fact, the most important expected role of the media 
is to mobilise the masses for political support during the election period 
and beyond. 
Since the audience is the targetv statements about the political importance 
of the media in relation to the political leaders without reference to the 
responses, impacts or influence of the masses, who decides, who rules in a 
democratic system may be only theoretically valid. The characteristics of 
radio as I have argued earlier makes it an important medium for-political 
participation in Nigeria. 
The ownership of 'radio stations by federal and state governments and the 
relationship between differený states and 
'the 
ruling party, NPNj who 
controlled federal stations in Lagos/Abuja and other states provide very 
curious political communication in the last general elections, The curious 
phenomenon is embedded in the constitutional requirements of the Nigerian 
type of 'presidential' system. 
The constitution states that in each of the 19 states, the candidate who 
should be the nation's president must secure at least 25% of the votes -a 
requirement which generated a lot of obscure debates on what is 25% of the 
votes. However, the importance of this in Political communication and the 
role of radio is that the president must be at least 25% effectively popular 
among all different sections and tribes of Nigeria. From my observation, it 
is difficult to produce such a political personality in Nigeria. 
Concentrating on Imo state, where the fieldwork was conducted, this is what 
prevailed: 
The handover of FRO stations to state governments was a great problem to 
the NPN who aimed to capture at least 25% of Ibgo votes in Imo, state. Imo 
state proves -an interesting case because it illustrates how the media and 
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other alternative sources of influence and political mobilisation between 
two national parties, NPN and NPP, operated in Nigeria. 
In view of the authorities awareness of the power of radio, before the 1983 
general elections, the ruling party established a new FRO station at Owarri 
to compete with IBS (Imo State Broadcasting Service) which was acquired by 
the state according to the military decree. IBS was broadcasting constantly 
news which were overtly pro-NPP and direct attacks were made on NPN policies 
and personalities. Ironically and by law, IBS during major natonal news 
broadcasts relayed the federal news bulletin. Some of the news and news 
talks, relayed by IBS were contradictory to IBS original views and comments 
about politics in Nigeria. The majority of Igbo listeners in the city and 
village I spoke to were not confused by the two. They were able to 
distinguish the different news broadcasts. This is because IBS would make 
it clear where the news was coming from. This ability of the locals to 
distinguish sources of radio information made it more important for the 
ruling party to set up FRO stations in those states that were not 
controlled by it. The purpose politically was to employ locals who would 
understand local issues concerning the local communities, so that news, 
comments, news talks, magazine programmes etc. would attract their interest 
and attention as much as those of the state-owned network. 
My interview with Chidikabo Abarikwu in the News & Current Affairss Radio 
Nigeria Owerri, and a number of staff at IBS Owerri revealed that most staff 
of the IBS made up the Radio Nigeria Staff Owerri. This localiSation of 
f ederal radio at the same level as the state radio in terms of workers and 
the audience the two stations addressed on political matters* particularly 
in an election period, constitute an important phenomenon in the 
understanding of politics in Nigeria. It is difficult to explain the 
relationship 'between media instituions, the political content of their 
information and the nature and characteristics of the local audience from an 
institutional level only. 
Here political communication involves virtually everything the communities 
believe and do. For instance, the drift of IBS workers to build up Radio 
Nigeria controlled by an opposition party led by a Hausa/Fulani leader 
cannot be explained in terms of political ideology. It is assumed that 
attractive wages, working conditions, etc. offered by the federal governemnt 
were the main factor in the drift. Similarlyl, Federal Press, TV (NTA) at 
Aba and Owerri were serving the same purposes using local employees. This 
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localisation of mass media in every respect and the split of Igbo leadership 
noted earlier are very important facts which can only be explained in terms 
of network of connectedness between individuals in the community and between 
groups and individuals to the available media. 
From my particular observation, communication at all levels in the urban and 
rural areas, was characterised with overt conflicts and competition because 
media and politics were so localised that everyone was involved for 
political, social and economic reasons. Every available system of political 
communication was employed because every category of individuals and groups 
was involved. 
In such an environment of political communication, it is important to 
discover how the masses react to the media networks. 
Since within one ethnically dominated state, different media organisations 
were controlled by two different political parties NPN and NPP and both of 
them employed the same tribal or ethnic groupq from the masses viewpoint, we 
should discover the actual role of the media. The roles during election 
campaigns would include the creatign of more ethnic, class and social 
conflicts which as we have seen surface strongly in all Nigerian elections. 
Furthermore to avoid over-generalisation, as I believe that different media 
have different characteristics which enable the different groups I have 
identified in this study to be directly or indirectly influenced by them, it 
is necessary then to find out which medium, radio, TV, newspaper or word of 
mouth resolves or intensifies the conflicts. 
As politics and the media are especially localised, the masses through 
direct involvement and participation can have access to sources of media 
political information and, hence, are able to dispute it. The relationship 
between them and the journalists and the editors through kinship system 
discussed in chapter two are close, thus their audience have as much access 
to information as the broadcaster. Here then, political information by the 
media can be assessed in terms of reliability as reported by the audience 
and not only by the broadcaster. 
Exposure to these media is also important during an election period. In 
Nigeria a number of factors influence it, eg ownership of a radio set and TV 
for instance may not explain exposure to them. The reason is that kinship 
allows for communal viewing, sets were provided by individual members of a 
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f amily. Hence, there may be a small number of radio sets, TV sets but a 
large number of viewers. A newspaper bought by a relative can also be 
circulated among many. 
Under these circumstances, the relationship between organised media and 
informal political communication are close. Much of what happens during an 
election campaign depends on inter-related socio-political and economic 
structures. The role of radio, other media and alternative factors of 
political influence can then be distinguished and described. 
In the next sub-chapter (Six B) I will look at the development of TV as part 
of the problem of political change and development in Nigeria. The relation 
in the development is tied to regional,. ethnic or 'states' politics that 
have become localised. The impact of television will be assessed in 
relation to its main characteristics and the characteristics of the audience 
who consume it. 
a 
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B: TELMSION 
THE EVOLUTION OF TELEVISION AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN NIGERIA 
While radio ownership and control in Nigeria diverged f rom the centre 
(federal) to the three major regions, the evolution of television in Nigeria 
began from the regions and spread to the centre. 
"The regional governments were always ahead of the f edera 
administration in the prestigious race to establish television. 
Spurred on by eager European and North American companies, mainy 
African states had television services very early in tha 
develoment of the broadcasting systems. Based in Ibadans the 
Western Nigerian government's television service proudly bears the 
motto 'First in Africa'. In fact the television service in that 
region actually started before the radio service, the former in 
October 1959, the latter in May 1960". (Golding and Elliot, 
1979: 43) 
The reasons for such an unusual development of a medium which is assumed to 
be politically- powerful have been based on two different. ideas. Dympna 
Edoga-Ugwuoju sums the reasons up thus: 
"**9 Western Nigeria, in 1959, decided to set up its own regional 
broadcasting, -The reasons for this decision vary. Some describe 
the development to the allegation that Awolowo, the leader of the 
region, was denied an opportunity to respond to an attack on him 
by a colonial officer. " 
. (details already noted in Chapter Five). The second reason was a political 
and Ugwuoju notes that: 
according to the Minister of Information$ television was 
needed as an aid to education, "l 
But Awolowo refused to state his reason for starting TV broadcasting in 
Western Nigeria in 1959. The silence made the Political implications more 
obvious. We noted in chapter four that Western Nigeria through the boom 
sales of cocoa in the world market in the pre-independent period was the 
richest region in Nigeria. Its economic strength gave more political 
bargai. ning power to the region. The allocation of national revenue and 
resou . rces favoured her tremendously. To enhance further the wealth of the 
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region taking advantage of, urbanised areas in the west very close to Lagos, 
regional TV would yield to a party that owns it with immense revenue f rom 
advertising in which TV has a greater advantage than radio or newspapers. 
on this commerical debateg Edoga pointed out that industrial growth was in 
evidence; in addition, there was a market to be exploited by commercial 
broadcasting. 2 
The environment in Western Nigeria provided opportunities for TV 
commercialisation as well as political broadcastng and propaganda in heavily 
urbanised centres. Typical of Third World areas, "e**a split between the 
'public service' and commercial forms of organisation, between government 
and advertising financial support, and between carrying degrees of state 
control began to show in the West and other parts of Nigeria in media 
institutions. 
In terms of both radio and TV, the content of a Western Nigerian 
Broadcasting Corporation (WNBC) at Ibadan was more commercial than even 
political: 
"The Ibadan-based services continued to be more commercially 
sophisticated than other Nigerian services, employing popular 
programming and market research to a far greater degree than 
elsewhere. As is usual in smaller broadcasting organisations the 
news department is common to radio and television, and is one of 
the six departments in the corporation. The relationship to the 
regional, Western State, government was analogous to that of NBC" 
(Golding and Elliott, 1979). 
Through UNESCO's promotion of the use of TV for academic purposes could 
easily lead other regions to believe that the pioneer WNBS-TV established in 
Ibadan in October 1959 was for educational purposes, as the then Minister of 
Information of that region stated. For this reason, educaion as the 
strongest elite base for political leadership and participation in Nigeria 
was bound to generate similar interest in other regionss particularly the 
Eastern region. 
Edoga believes firmly that if the reasons were only educational and 
commercial, too much politics would eventually be introduced into political 
television in Nigeria. 
other regions rapidly followed suit: Eastern region under NCNC established a 
TV station at Enugu in 1960, NPC at Kaduna in 1962. The last to join the 
6.17 
race was the federal government who in 1962 set up a television station 
in 
Lagos. Two years later, in November 1964, to reinforce the importance of 
television as a new medium for African education, UNESCO organised a 
conference in Lagos on "The Introduction and Development of 
Television in 
Af rica". Delegates from several Af rican countries attended. Rosalynde 
Ainslie sumarised the recommendations of the conference thus: 
"a** that televis ' 
ion in Africa should be used as a force for 
national unity, for social and economic development; ... it should 
regard its education role as a priority and make its resources 
available to schools, for the training of teachers, for literacy 
programmes, and for programmes on national development projects. 
Use should be made not only of studios, but of videotape recording 
and f Jim units in order to portray the lif e of the people 
throughout the country; ... teachers should be adequately trained 
both to use education television and to take part in planning 
education programmes.,, 
4 
Ainslie, then, reported that by 1965 twenty-one countries in Africa had 
started television broadcasting. From UNESCO's recommendationj television 
emerged in Africa as a multipurpose medium in rapidly changing communities 
from 'primitive' ways of doing things to modernisation processes. Nigeria 
being an outstandingly extraordinarily complex country in Africa which 
totally embraced such changes, the impact of television since 1959 on the 
society varies from one aspect of the changes to another. 
From*personal observation, I have a greater tendency to repudiate the notion 
that television has revolutionised Nigerian politics. As a powerful medium 
of communication, because of its combined visual and verbal structures, its 
political influence in multilinguistic, culturally diverse, higher 
proportion of illiterate population and rapidly urbanising communities, TV's 
political impact can be misplaced. The view that TV can directly change 
people has led to the high politicisation of television in Nigeria. My 
argument on the politicaý role of TV in Nigeria is that, like radio and the 
press, "every power-seeker wants to control" it. 
4 Its political influence 
on participation arfd voting in comparison to radio or newspapers is the 
least strong, particularly in Igboland where there is a strange phenomenon 
of more activities political active in the rural areas during election 
periods than in the cities. Television as an urban-centred medium would not 
be very effective in such an environment. For the nation as a whole, we 
should realise that, though TV has existed in Nigeria for more than two 
decades, it has only once been effectively used for a political campaign and 
that was in 1983. This is not enough to demonstrate its political power. I 
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regard the statement that the 1979 election was a "television election" as 
an unqualifed, exaggeration of facts, because different factors which have 
been outlined above shaped the outcome of that election and reduce the 
characteristically violent nature of Nigerian politics. Television's most 
important function could be no more than that of influencing the audience to 
participate, in terms of surveillance, vote guidance, reinforcement and 
excitement. 
The main reason for this is that the long period of military rule in Nigeria 
has strongly shaped the content and orientation of television in Nigeria 
towards commerical and entertainment uses. Originally most of the TV 
programmes in Nigeria were imported programmes from Britain and the United 
States, and this has been statistically demonstrated. 5 
"The content of the imported programs is of ten alien to the values 
and imagery of the importing country. When programs from Europe 
and the United States are imported by developing countries the gap 
in values and imagery can be unbridgeable. It is this 
consideration that has caused the Nigerian Broadcasting 
Corporation to raise its own production to 70 percent of its own 
output... " (Katz and Wedell, 1977: 156-157). 
Gradually indigenous programmes, which ref lect the interests and cultural 
values of different states and ethnic groups, ' began to replace imported 
programmes. Most of these indigenous programmes are not overtly political. 
Thus Tv, like the film industry in Nigeria, may have more impact on culture 
and social life than on political life. 
In view of these facts, the rapid expansion of expensive colour television 
stations throughout the states for political use in the 1983 general 
election could be irrational and a waste of resources. 
By 1983 there were 34 television stations in Nigeria, possessing more than 
half of the local number of stations in the Black Africa (62 TV stations). 
of these 34 TV stations, 24 were owned by the federal government, under the 
auspices of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA). The remaining ten were 
owned and controlled by the state government. Particularly those states 
that were not controlled by the NPN ruling party during the 1979-1983 
civilian rule. 
"In a multi-party situation under the short-lived presidential 
system (1979-83), the TV stations were used for Oropaganda 
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purposes, which tended to undermine national unity in a federal 
set-up . Allocation of frequencies had generated acrimony and 
bitter rivalry among various political groups, authorities or 
interest camps. --6 
The argument for the development of radio and press in Nigeria after 
independence and their relationship to political parties is much the same as 
TV. But the 'bitter rivalry' in the establishment of TV is made more 
complex by the structure of state creation in Nigeria. The way TV may now 
run counter to national unity is so much generated by the states ownership 
of TV and the way in which a particular party, which is dominated by one 
ethnic group, dominated the use of federal TV stations. 
When Gowon created the 12 states, each was distrustful of the other and bent 
on establishing its own TV station. Edoga noted that this was a way to get 
out of the larger ethnic groups' domination. 
7 We noted earlier that states 
were created out of ethnic groups. Owning and operating TV at state level 
is the basis of bitter rivalry. Through TV, Nigeria's fragmented political, 
cultural and social life becomes more fragemented and fractured. In 1976, 
seven more states were created and the TV expanded along this line. Also in 
1976, the military governemnt became more seriously concerned 'with the 
handing over of government to civilian rule. Decree 24 in prpLctice only 
permits federal and state governments to establish TV stationst but under 
the military, all NTA stations were under the control of federal government. 
1he military regime maintained that it has to control TV networks in order T 
to -fulfill national needs rather than partisan or sectional interest, to 
foster unity and assist general education. "8 
When the NPN government took over power in 1979 under Shehu Shagari I the 
fulfilment of 'national needs' through NTA became fulfilment of interests 
and needs of the NPN party. They controlled NTA stations in Lagos as well 
as those in the states. To the other four political parties that registered 
in 1979, they were convinced that federal mass media controlled by the NPN 
had become effective propaganda machines for the ruling party at the expense 
of the others. 
Before the general elections of 1983, those states which were not controlled 
by the NPN ruling party had established their own TV broadcasting stations. 
Anambra state was the first to establish state TV broadcasting stations in 
1981, then others such as Lagos, Bendei, Bornol Kanoq Ondo, Ogun, Plateau$ 
Imo, Kaduna and Oyo states followed. 
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The period between 1981-83 was a time of television explosion in preparation 
for the 1983 general elections. In the process of the development each 
state had two TV stations: one federal and another one state owned, a 
situation which in the 'allocation of frequencies generated acrimony and 
bitter rivalry'. Since section 36 (2) of the Nigerian Constitution states 
that only federal and state governments could establish and operate radio/TV 
stations, ' their political content during the election period is bound to be 
full of biased ethnic political content. Individual or privately owned 
newspapers may report objectively on political issues without bias. The 
competition between state-owned broadcasting stations and federal 
government's merely generates tensions, conflicts and political disunity. 
Because of local ýroadcasting, as shown with radio, the communities' ability 
through their network of connectedness to validate broadcasting messages 
could rate TV as a politically important medium. 
In reference to the 1983 general elections, it is therefore important to 
discover empirically the extent in which TV intensified political conflicts, 
how reliable TV was in political information and that enabled voters to 
participate in the election. Length of exposure to TV during election 
periods. may not be directly related to ownership of sets nor'With. the amount 
of influence it would have on viewers because of the phenomenon of communal 
viewing, and the entertainment orientation of TV in Nigeria. Other factors 
of political influence, such as parentss schoolmates, clubs unions, friends, 
relatives, financial needs will be compared with the political influence of 
TV. 
It is from these findings that the explosion of TV networks and their costs 
to federal and state governments during the 1983 general elections can be 
evaluated. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE FIRST 14EDIA ELECTION IN NIGERIA, 1979 
". ** Judging from subsequent events, 
it would appear Anuforo was 
merely trying to put the Brigadier where he could be easily held. 
His decision to stay in undisclosed private lodging, on 12th of 
Jauary, 1966, may have contributed to the postponement of the date 
of the coup. "l 
Three days later, on 15th January, 1966, a group of young majors struck and 
the under six-year old First Republic of Nigeria was overthrown. Political 
corruption, tribalism, etc., were stated as the underlying factors which led 
to the coup. 
"Our enemies are the political profiteers, swindlers, the men in 
high and low places, those that seek to keep the country 
permanently divided so that they can remain in office as ministers 
and VIPs of waste, the tribalists, the nepotists. -2 
This does 'not imply that within the military organisaton, there were no 
discontents among the rank and file. As much as the young army of f icers 
99wanted to get rid of rotten and corrupt ministers, political parties, trade 
unions and the whole clumsy apparatus of federal system-3, they hated their 
top ranking army officers. What were seen as ills of Nigerian society were 
all embracing from the civilian political systems to her military 
organisation. 
The discontent, and tribalism within the army was voiced by Major Okafor, 
who was buried alive during the 'counter-coup. He, once, feared that he 
would be dismissed from the army by Brigadier Zadkari Maimalari because he 
punished "a Northern Nigerian solider who went absent without leave". Also 
Major Anuforo condemned Colonel Yabubu Pam, the Adjutant General and a 
Northern from Jos for being brutal to TIV rioters of Northern Nigeria while 
he was in charge of operations there, as commander of the Third Batallion 
an of f icer who had caused the death of so many people should be 
punished. 4 
The important point so far is that tribalism and nepotism, etc. are not the 
characteristics of the civilian circles in Nigeria only. The army bears the 
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same 'symbols'. Both civilian and military rules in Nigeria, since 
independence, face the same problems, but the ways in which they solve them 
are def ined by the structure of the two different organisations. This does 
not imply that the masses, who are highly connected through the cultural and 
social systems of Nigeria, are not aware of their common relationship and 
practices. 
The junior officers' coup of 1966 was regarded as a success. The exclusion 
of senior army officers from the coup planning committee and elimination of 
some of them along with top ministers was a clear indication that there were 
strong links between the two army ranks and ministers in the way the country 
was run. The 'alliance' between the two would imply that corruption could 
remain unchecked without a revolution. Unfortunately, the 1966 revolution 
was a 'representative revolution' by a handful of junior army officers and 
not by the masses. It could not be the masses as we have seen in Chapter 
Three that the nation (Nigeria) is historically divided by social, cultural, 
geographical and economic differences. The-handful of young officers were 
easily rounded-up and power fell into the hands of the old enemies of unity 
and integration. The Nigerian crisis intensified and the nation was torn 
further apart by bitter civil war in which civilians played 'important roles. 
As in the case of Indonesia, observed by Karl Jackson and Lucian Pye: 
" the chief power-holders under Guided Democracy were the 
president, top minister and the army ... power resides with the 
president or minister who modulates the competion for power in 
both civilian and military bureaucracies. "5 
In such a political and bureaucratic network, ties between top military and 
civilian authorities to the exclusion of junior army officers, excessive 
abuse of power and office can prevail to create permanent political 
instability. The junior army officers who form the majority in the 
organisation, like the masses, would always view either the military or 
civilian rule with discontent. 
When Buhari came to power in Nigeria in 1983, he Pointed out that he took 
over power to avert a bloody coup from junior officers. The second point 
was that the civilian regime from 1979-83 was corrupt and inefficient. 
Then,, why were those regarded as most corrupt in the civilian regime allowed 
to escape from the country before the 1983 coup? The undemocratic and 
unconstitutional relationship between top military and civilian ministers 
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cripple the principles of democracy in Nigeria. The situation is reinforced 
by personal networks of communication between kin, friends and tribesmen in 
power. Those outside these circles, not so much colleagues in terms of 
profession, rank and status, are excluded from the network. Apparently, 
networks of kin and tribesmen in power make it difficult for journalists to 
penetrate the network and expose corruption. This is one of the reasons 
for the lack of investigative journalism in the country. * The failure of 
most Western writers on Nigerian and African political and communication 
systems has led to the unfavourable comments that African media reporters 
lack investigative journalism. Some think the over generality of issues is 
a result of lack of professional training while others conclude that it is 
very expensive for African journalists to embark on investigative reporting. 
Attempts to represent investigated and factual reports can lead to loss of 
job, imprisonment or even death, e. g. Delewa. 
However, what was popularly believed in the 1966 coup and its popularity as 
'The Morning Post' argued, was that the common man was completely 
disregarded in Nigeria by those in powet. The nonchalant attitude of the 
federal government over the political crisis in Western Nigeria was another 
reason for the junior. officers' intervention. 
The new Head of State and Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces I General 
Ironsi, in his speech of 24th May 1966, introduced a unitary system of 
government. He divided the regions into provinces and announed that a 
unified national civil service had been introduced. Most important of all, 
political parties and tribal organisations were banned. These measures 
were not taken kindly by the leaders of Northern Nigeria. The nation was 
thrown into confusoin by street demonstrations in the North, Shortly 
afterwards a counter-coup was staged, the Head of State killed. Also 
thousands of his tribesmen living and working in the Northern part of the 
country were killed, large numbers were wounded and others returned safely 
to their regions in the Eastern part of the country. They returned with 
little which they had acquired in property after long years of service to 
the nation in the North; in some cases this amounted to nothing. In 1967, a 
civil war erupted and ended in 1970. The military remained in. power for 13 
years and in 1978, the ban on political parties was lifted followed soon'in 
1979 by a general election in which Nigerians went to the polls to elect a 
new president. 
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This thesis does not intend and has no space to discuss the civil or other 
military governments' activities besides those connected with the handover 
of the government to civilians in 1979. 
Af ter the civil war, General Gowon promised to hand over power to those he 
described as "duly elected representatives of the people", once it had 
attended to the unsolved problems "which during his regime had assumed a 
different domestic and international magnitude". D. Graf remarked that 
"like civilian government before it, the military regime of Gowon was 
founded in a morass of inaction, corruption and inefficiency. "6 
However,, in the October 1st 1974 independence celebration nationwide 
broadcast,, Gowon disclosed to the nation that the date of military handover 
to civilians had bcome indefinite. Both the civilian population and some 
sections of the army were disappointed by his speech and responded coldly to 
the indefinite postponement of civilian rule. 
On July 29th 1975., Gowon was overthrown and Muratela Mohammed took over 
power in a bloodless coup. Brigadier Olusegun Obsanjo was appointed Chief 
of Staff Supremp Headquartersq Brigadier Theophilus Dunjuma, the Army Chief 
of Staff. 
I 
The short-lived regime of Muratela Mohammed was regarded by most Nigerian as 
the most' radical and rapidly decisive regime in Nigerian military history. 
It aimed to seriously control corruption and abuses of power. Such ills 
have been closely associated with top military and civil servants in Nigeria 
an with them Mohammed began the 'purging' exercise as Austrian radio put it 
in 1975. He dismissed all former state military governors and appointed new 
ones who were directly accountable to Lagos Supreme - Headquarters. All 
military officers above the rank of Brigadier were retired and about 10,000 
civil servants and a number of university profesors, police, state 
administrators and judges were forced to retire or were dismissed. Almost 
every sector of government appartus was affected by the forced retirement or 
dismissal exercise. 
Before Mohammed came to power, the strength of the Nigerian armed forces was 
about 250,000 and by 1979 it dropped to 180,000. Under Obassanjo, who 
virtually continued every policy adopted by Mohammed, a tribunal was set up 
which discovered corruption in high places and for the first time comitteeS, 
or what were called Public Complaints Commiss. ions (PCC) were set up at state 
7.4 
and national levels for the common man to hear his grievances, opinions on 
government policies and actions. 
All these measures were taken not only to eliminate corruption but also to 
enable citizens to participate in nation building through exchange of 
information and views. 
The implication of the massive retirement and dismissal of top military and 
civil servants was very ironic. This irony lay in the economic condition of 
Nigeria in the 1970s. In 1976, when oil exports, which constituted 95% of 
Nigerian export revenue, stood at 6,322.7 million Naira, rising to 7,969.2 
million in 1977, and oil production rose from 758.1 in 1976 to 
765.5 million 
barrels a day in 1977-. 
7 With the promulgation of "Indigenization Decree". 
the conversion of foreign owned companies to domestic control where, at 
least, the managing directors should be Nigerian, meant that experienced 
Nigerian citizens would be needed. 
These civil and military officials who were dismissed or forced to retire 
did not only find themselves holding more finacially rewarding posts in the 
private sectors, but also were able to take advantage of the oil boom 
economy to set up their own businesses, a situation which enriched those 
regarded. as 'corrupt and power drunk'. Most of these people belonged to or 
organised 'social clubs' and soon after the ban on political parties was 
lifted, they emerged as active party leaders, agents or organisers. 
As former top military and civil servants, they had built up a network of 
friends, colleagues, tribesmen within and between the various administrative 
units which they headed or controlled before they were dismissed or forced 
to retire. Alsog they had built up international connections during their 
periods of service, a situation which helped them to organise various 
financial 'arrangements' and to run local elections. They were particularly 
able to organise and win national, state and international business 
contracts through colleagues or those they employed in various state 
organisations before they retired. They acted. as trusted colleagues who 
agreed behind the scenes on various terms for awarding government contracts. 
The basis of corruption and 'kick-back' was thus broadened. 
Although it is believed that the 'clean up exercise' in the civil service, 
the judiciary, the army and the universities was apparently laudablet the 
process of dismissal or forced retirement by the military goVernment has 
been deemed to be: 
unable to devise a just mechanism for implementation. Too 
often dismissals were made soley on the advice given to the 
military by heads of institutions. Where the head of the 
institution was himself corrupt, insecure or inefficient, the 
system failed, merely elminating rivals or potential rivals. 
There was a resultant loss of morale in the various civilian 
institutions in the country. Government work, hitherto seen as a 
secure and safe career, was now seen as a high risk occupation. 
With its relatively low salaries (compared to those in the private 
sector), government service began to lose people to the private 
sector and was failing to attract high-quality young recruits. "8 
This situation had a drastic effect on the entire urban village population. 
The fundamental and historical role of formal education beyond primary 
school level began to be seriously questioned and its value in the 1970s and 
early 1980s began to be questioned by the younger generation who wanted to 
get rich quick. The quality of secondary education began to drop because 
young people depended on what they called lexpol to pass their First School 
Certificate, i. e. they were able to buy question papers before exams. 
Private business sectors were expanding rapidly; young school leavers and 
graduates began to set up their own businesses, and unfortunately, most of 
these businesses were import oriented, which greatly drained the nation's 
foreign reserves. This is because the educated group in the society clearly 
understood that the Nigerian populatibn had been -prone to* consumption of 
Western made goods. Besides, they also clearly understood how inefficient 
Nigerian bureaucracies function; they manipulýted the system so well to 
further their selfish interest that, within a very short period of time, 
untold pressure was put on Nigerian foreign exchange reserves to pay for 
huge imports, coupled with the drop in the price of oil. Graf commented 
that within this short period, most of these top well known upper echelon 
figures became millionaires with both huge foreign bank savings and local 
bank accounts. 9 
In Britain, the idea of encouraging talented men and women into government 
employment has been historical, for instanceg the civil service and 
government policies. The 'Brain Drain' from Britain, particularly in the 
1960s, was somehow checked. More recently Margaret Thatcher made a 
controversial move when she increased the salaries of top civil servants 
considerably to match those of their counterparts in the private sector. 
She argued that it was a preventive measure to stop talented civil servants 
leaving for more financially rewarding private sectors of the economy. 
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In Nigeria, the drift of the administrative and bureaucratic elite to the 
business and trading sector, which was previously occupied by illiterates 
and semi-educated groups, implies that Nigerian politicalt bureaucratic and 
private sectors are now occupied by corporate groups of elites. 
Consequently, corruption in high and low places became difficult to check, 
and pressure was put on semi-educated businessmen, traders who could no 
longer compete with the elites in the 'free enterprises' of Nigeria. Some 
of the semi-educated businessmen and traders who acquired wealth, before the 
elites were attracted into the sectors, still remain strong in business but, 
having been in the profession for a long time they employed more crude, 
complicated illegimate practices in order to stay in business. The weaker 
groups were completely muzzled out of business and they either became 
exploited employees of the elite businessmen, or they remained as the army 
of unemployables in the city; some of them joined armed robbers, others 
drifted back to the villages. Before the general election of 1979, there 
was already a high proportion of displaced traders, unemployed young school 
leavers, large numbers of the so-called illegal immigrants who constituted a 
great danger to political campaign in a nation which, as we shall see, was 
charcterised by political election violence. 
However, the overthrow of Gowon continued to generate tension, within the 
army. Some soldiers, claimed to be his tribesmen, eg General Bisalla and 
Lt. Col. B. S. Dimka, etc. on 13th February, 1976, attempted a coup dletat in 
which the Head of State, Murtala Mohammed, was assasinated. The New African 
Year Book reported that the officers "from Benue and Plateau States .... felt 
they. had lost power to an audience of Hausa-Fulani and Yorubas". 10 Note 
here that the Igbos as a major tribe are not mentioned as power holders. As 
usual, the plotters of that coup were executed and 37 of them were involved* 
However before the Head of State was assassinated, he had announced that a 
military hand-over of power to the civilians would not exceed "a date later 
than October 1st, 1979". He was succeeded by his second -a Yoruba - Ltd. 
General Obasanjo, and Brigadier Shehu Yar-Adua became second in command. 
They carried out all the policies laid down by Mohammed. Under them, the 49 
Constitution Drafting Committee, who were appointed in September 1975, 
produced the first ever Nigerian Constution after 15 years of independence - 
an indication of the long and lasting impact of colonialism and military 
intervention in Nigeria soon after independence. The Constitution was 
heavily criticised, by a large group of the elite in Nigeria. Graf noted 
that by September 1976 the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) had 
produced a two volume report this stimulated intellectual discussion, which 
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he stressed: 
"o*o immediately formed the basis for lengthy newspaper articles, 
television debates, expensive analysis in learned journals and 
heated discussions among citizen groups,, "12 
In December of the same year, local government elections were conducted as a 
prelude to constitutional democracy in Nigeria af ter 13 years of military 
rule. Then the crucial and long awaited moment came on 21st September 1978, 
when the military governemnt lif ted its ban on political activities. Now 
the ban on political activities should not be taken to imply that political 
groups and activities were not going on behind the scenes. Graf observed 
that soon after the ban was lifted, political life in Nigeria again resumed 
with a vengence; within days several political parties had been formed and 
by December 18th no less than 53 parties were dying for lack of support. 
The facts behind the rapid formation of political parties soon after the ban 
was lifted have been clearly explained by Amadu Kurfi (1983: 91). He 
believed that the formation of actual political parties began in 1970 at the 
end of the civil war, when Gowon promised civilian rule by 1976. He even 
considered that party political activities were going on during the civil 
war and that 'political groupings' were 'clandestinely' organised "under 
various guises such as leaders of thought, conferences, religious charity 
maetings, development associations, etc. "14 Outstanding among these 
disguised political parties, under names of various voluntary associations, 
was 'Club 191 which was believed to have been made up by tycoon businessmen 
and women. It was believed that the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) announced 
its party and leadership a few hours after the ban was lifted. Although 
many parties were announced and registered, only five were recognised and 
allowed by the Federal Electoral Committee (FEDECO) to' participate in the 
1979 political contest. Even leaders of these parties were chosen by the 
Federal Electoral Committee, a decision which aims to make political parties 
in Nigeria more national than tribal. 
One of the important implications in our study of political communication in 
Nigeria is its approach; this is able to reveal the structure and 
functioning of ethnic voluntary associations, clubs and unions as disguised 
or dichomatic organisatons that are both political and social as different 
needs and situations demand in Nigeria. The empirical relationship between 
clubs such as the Old Igbo State Union and the NCNC before the civil war was 
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strong. The rural and urban networks of political communicatin in Igboland 
converge under the auspices of ethnic organisations and unions. The 
formation 'of political parties, within hours and days after the ban on 
political activities was lifted, emphasises the strength of the networks of 
communication and tribal ties in Nigerian political and social life. What 
is important, shown empirically in this study, is the criteria for 
membership of these voluntary organisations and the extent to which they 
form the bases for political participation and voting in a particular tribal 
or geographical part of Nigeria. 
It is true that the army was aware of the political activities of the above 
mentioned voluntary organisations. We should not doubt that some . top and 
low ranking army o1ficers belonged to them. Most leaders of these clubs 
were prominent figures in the 1960-66 civilian government. The decision of 
the Federa Electoral Committee that "the first President of the 'new' 
Nigeria will be chosen from among five leading politicians of the First 
Republic"15, explains the influence of the older leaders in Nigerian 
communities under the military regimes. Such influences were maintained 
through ethnic social clubs. Their reinstatement as leaders of the new 
Nigeria effectively eliminated more radical grops of young men who wold like 
meaningful changes in Nigerian political systems. As I shall argue later, 
it was tribal leadership' rather than political manifestoes aýd party 
policies which formed the basis of political participation and voting in the 
1979 general elections. If this was the case, and under the military 
government, national leadership still came from among the leaders overthrown 
in 1966 as 'corrupt', Inepotic', 'swindlers', 'political profiteers', etc., 
it means that the cost of the military intervention, particularly the civil 
war, taught Nigerians few lessons. Besides the leaders of the First 
Republic were accused of being tribalistic, a fact which has kept Nigeria 
divided in many respects. This was particularly manifested by these leaders 
during the First Republic. There are two important levels of debate here. 
Either that the army, during the 13 years rule, had become as corrupt as the 
leaders they overthrew in 1966 and shared the same political thought and 
concepts, or the army had realised that 'there was no basis for unity' as 
Gowon disclosed, because of sharp ethnic differences, then continued to pay 
lip service to the notion of political unity and integration in Nigeria. 
if any of these arguments hold true, it means that in the 1979 general 
elections the army knew to whom they were handing over power and the 
pluralistic ignorance of the public (masses) led them to believe that a 
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democratic process was taking place in Nigeria. The army handover of power 
from the restrictive policies of FEDECO was perhaps an experimental exercise 
in whcih they wanted either the f ormer political leaders to have a second 
chance, or they knew that the names Zik, Awolowo, Amino Kanu and the Shehu 
Sharagri, for Saduna of Sokoto, were ethnic political symbols that could 
only command political response along ethnic rather than national lines. 
Once these leaders were reintroduced as new political leaders in the 'new' 
Nigeria, the pattern of participation and voting in 1959 reoccurred in the 
1979 elections. The army knew this well in advance. Kurfi (undated) on 
empirical comparison of the 1959 and 1979 general elections concluded that: 
"There was a strong ethnic bias or block voting during both 1959 
and 1979 elections, though inboth years some political parties 
manged to achieve a breakthrough by securing an appreciable numbdr 
of votes and parliamentary seats outside their traditional 
strongholds; " 
He further discovered in that study 
"that there was a close association between the political parties 
that contested the 1959 elections and those that emerged to 
contest the 1979 poll, such 'nexus' being provided by certain 
individuals that were prominent in the 'af fairs 'of the 1959 
political aprties and their alleged off-shoots in 1979; " 
In conclusion, Kurfi stated: 
"that despite the national integrative provisions of the 1977 
Electoral Decree, or any other legal or administrative 
stipulations, ethnic voting persisted in the country. " 
Similarly, NJM Mackensie and Kenneth Robinson's "Five Elections in Africa", 
1960 showed statistically that elections in Nigeria are influenced by ethnic 
support and sentiments. 
Although the above statements reveal a pattern of political participation in 
Nigeria - ethnic politics - it fails to tell us what political changes occur 
or are likely to take place with a unique ethnic group in Nigeria. Of ten, 
the study of ethnic politics in Nigeria does not exceed the level of 
confrontation between major tribes and the roles of minority ethnic groups 
within them. Earlier, I have argued that changes in the socio-economic 
system have a direct effect on the political system, e. g. education, 
vertical and horizontal labour mobilitys modern social organisations, etc* 
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Both the major and minor tribes contain elements of these socio-economic 
changes which affect the new political system. Until we understand 
how 
different groups, in any given tribe or community, utilise these elements to 
shape the contemporary political system in Nigeria, our understanding of 
political participation and voting patterns and of political analysis will 
remain static and engulfed with ethnic. *enerality. In looking at 
comunication system, we transcend ethnic analysis to groups political 
participation so that when two powerful political leaders emerge from one 
ethnic group, such as Ojukwu vs Zik in Igboland, we begin to understand 
political changes in terms of different groups' support. 
For instanceg the argument that FEDECO guided the parties' activities and 
the election of 1979 was based on the Committee's s trict rules which 
stipulated the new constitution regarding general elections. Yet in this 
basic frameworkj it only reflected the political$ social and economic 
interest of one section in the community - the elite group. Ofonagoro et al 
citing Oni write: 
"0. Oni aruges that the report of the Constitution Drafting 
committee is elitest oriented. Also ... Dr. Adele Jinadu argues 
that 'the CDC's espousal of a mixed economy is nothing. more than 
to say that it is incumbent on the state to provide a socio- 
economic and political environment favourable to the propertied 
and entreprenurial class. Like Hobbe's Leviathan, the state then 
becomes art agent of this class whose business interest it must 
promote and protect. All talk (politics). social objectives and 
fundamental rights is embellishment, mystification., "16 
Two important political forces in Nigeria have emerged beyond the 
transitional conception of tribal politics: % 
a) the new economic social systems 9 particularly the role of education 
has produced a new elite class with a new orientation to politics; 
b) a national constitution has been established which legimates both the 
military and civil elite classes. Particularly, with the civil elite, 
the constitution protects their interest. 
These new forms, nevertheless, do not remove ethnic political forces in 
Nigeria. But all of them influence politics, participation and voting. 
As we have seen in chapter 4, the mass media developed along ethnic poitical 
party lines which, in turn, havd been dominated by the political elites. 
7.11 
Because of the combined impact of ethnic association, elite interest, social 
relationships on political participation and voting, it is difficult to 
discuss the impact of a general election such as the first TV election 
(1979) in terms of the role of media only. Other factors should be 
considered as well. 
In the 1979 general elections we do not have enough data to compare the 
relationship between communication networks and the identified network 
groups. We should only therfore, in this chapter, study the tendencies of 
the 1979 general elections and consider briefly what were the factors that 
influenced and shaped *them, in relation to communication networks or 
channels. From the theoretical discussion so far presented in this thesis, 
it appears that mass media and communication are an essential part of 
Nigerian politics. In particular, the 1976/77 Nigerian constitution 
virtually guaranteed the independent roles of the media, particularly the 
press, Freedom of movement, of social, economic and political 
relationships, freedom of speech were fully guaranteed - important aspects 
of human political communication. Richard Adeniyi noted that: 
"One of the good things that the 1979 constitution did was the 
separation of powers betwi! en the executive, the legislature and 
judiciary. It detailed the functions and roles of public 
departments, the bureaucracy, the police, the military etc. it 
defined the obligations, duties and limitatins of individuals and 
institutions - the press, the political parties, religion, etc. 
But the conduct of persons who made up these bodeis is another 
matter. --17 
Adeniyi has made some crucial points here. The constitution, law and order, 
bills, etc. may set out some sound principles 9 but the ways in which they 
are practically applied in the society are different as determined by the 
actors (a process which in the Nigerian context demands that clear 
relationship between individuals or groups and the institutions be defined). 
It is their definitions and separation that help us to understand the 
structure of communication and relationships between them. Adeniyi's view 
also implies that, though the constitution separates theseý power structures 
so as to allow free political information, participation and decision making 
processes, the Nigerian presidential system was more of an experimental 
exercise. Its meaning and function as a political system stops at certain 
individual or group political needs. Corruption, in other wordso is the 
central weakness of the Nigerian political system and its practices. He, 
then, laments that: 
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"The first major scandal against the paresidential system was the 
alleged disappearance of 2.8 billion oil revenue. This allegation 
generated a lot of controversies but at the end was squashed by 
the authorites themselves. -18 
Hence, the weakenss of the nation consequently undermines the effectiveness 
of its institutions, particularly the mass media and. communcation in 
politics. The role of the media in the 1979 general elections has been 
exaggerated by many Nigierian and foreign writers. It is possible that some 
of the inaccuracy could have originated from problems of access to data. 
My own attempts to collect data in 19783 from the 1979 elections were met 
with difficulties. 
a) I was told that there was no space to store past broadcasts material. 
b) Because of shortage of funds, video and radio cassettes, tapes etc, 
were wiped and used again. 
C) 1 had to obtain special permission from the Minister of Information 
before I could obtain what was available - although he could not be 
reachedq however. Different broadcasting houses/ institutions gave 
different reasons for not providing these items, 
However, the 1979 election, depsite the important roles of radio and press, 
was generally named the TV election. As we have discussed the development 
of TV in Nigerian in earlier chapters, we shall now evaluate its role in 
that-election. 
A special studio was set up at Tafawa Belawa Square, Lagosp 'code named' 
"Verdict 179" at a cost of about N50,000 (about E45,000). According to one 
commentator, the actual cost of the election coverage by the media during 
that election was never made known to the publicl All the same, the main 
objective of "Verdict 179" was to ensure impartial election coverage to all 
the five parties involved. 
"The committee charged with the arrangement resolved to ensure 
objective coverage, enhanced television credibility by balanced 
and impartial treatment of issues. "19 
'The Nigerian Times' noted that while the political parties were 
extraordinarily busy organising themselves, the mass media and television, 
in particular, were preparing the public to participate in elections quite 
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different from the ones that took palce before the 1966 coup, In my 
preliminary study of that election, I observed that television loee 
IV 991, employed a variety of programmes to keep the public abrest 
with all the political changes and development. "20 
I noted that what was most impressive about TV coverage of the 1979 general 
election was that most of the political programmes were created in cheap 
news and current affairs format. Experts in different walks of life were 
invited to speak on special programmes, such as 'Toward Civil Rule', 'Hot 
Seat', etc. These were forms of political education and socialisation by a 
viable medium. Media professionals and politicians assumed that after 13 
years of military ruleg the public had lost its sense of political 
democracy. We recall from chapter one that one of the main factors of 
change in Nigeria since 1966 is increased urbanisation and huge population 
growth. Thus, for the first time, the highest percentage of the population 
were expected to go to the polls. Both those who had participated in the 
pre-199 coup election and the new participants in elections had to learn 
about the new system from the audio/visual medium. Counting on these 
factors, media professionals and politicians assumed the all importance of 
TV for the 1979 general elections, 
However, whether these views could justify the huge amount spent on TV for 
these general elections remains a critical question to investigate, Ikwan 
U. Erotu has argued that: 
"The political culture of Nigerians generally cannot be said to be 
impressive. The apathy which every average Nigerian has f or 
politics has its off-shoot from the manner the game of politicis 
is played by its practitioners in Nigeria oes politicial 
education and enlightenment was more positive and successful- 
during colonial days. Political emancipation and independence, 
being the one and only goal, has been attributed to be the 
underlying factor for the general political awareness in Nigeria 
especialy in the South in those days, "21 
Erotuls 'average Nigerian' refers to urban and rural elites in our 
categorical network group, the elite I have previously argued are mainly 
city dwellers. It is this group who also can afford to own television sets. 
If the group 
I 
who own TV sets are apathetic to politics in Nigeria, it is 
difficult to support the view that TV has a strong political impact on 
Nigerians. Another important remark by Erotu is on the relationship between 
politicis in Nigeria in the colonial days and today, By implication, what 
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Erotu is pointing out is that, since indepedendence , Nigerians have been 
misled by the ruling political elites on what should be understood by 
politics and political participation. He states clearly then that the 
educated class - he called 'campus politicians' - did not register for 
voting because they knew what was happening. In his words: 
"Our privileged social class cannot be exonerated from poitical 
lethargy and indifference whcih has entrenched itself in the 
entire populace. " 
on the basis of political indifference by the Nigerian articulate elites, 
because of the way the game is played, greedy and selfish political elites 
have taken an upper hand in the game. This group relatively exploits both 
the urban and rural politically ignorant, Erotu went on to explain that the 
politicially ignorant cannot see the "difference between the capitalist - 
NPN and the self styled socialist - UPN, the Welfarist - NPP"22 andbelieves 
that PRP has no revolutionary politics. If this is true of Nigerian 
politicians and the electorate, what is the latter's incentive for political 
participation and voting? Erotu provides some of the answers. He argues 
that the political elites and the information directorates in Nigeria prefer 
public ignorance in politics so that the masses would not understand and 
question party manifestos and policies. He maintains that politicians have 
been quite contemptible in their ignoble role of selling to the public the 
most unpopular governemnt policies and vindictive actions against poolitical 
opponents. The ordinary man in the street is never told how a particular 
governemnt policy will affect him. 
24 He correctly aruges that it is the 
role of the media to educate the public but he unfortuantley forgets that 
the media, particularly radio and TV, are controlled by the same greedy 
political elite as much as he fails to note that the poor or the masses 
cannot organise themselves without the leadership of those 'campus 
politicans' who are apathetic to Nigerian politics. Some of the educated 
class do not want to take risks in their own country in order to make it a 
better place. They may be as discredited as the greedy and corrupt 
political elites. 
Erotu notes that the 1979 general elections brought in a new dimension to 
Nigerian political communication and advocated that young graduates and 
school leavers, who are unemployed and frequently move from village to city 
or between cities, should help to educate the masses on political i. ssues. 
This, indeed, is a clear insight into relation and interaction in Nigera 
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where interpesonal communication is a crucial element in the dissemination 
of political information. The Nigerian Youth Corps Service should plan a 
long term programme of rural and urban political education by graduates -a 
process that would eliminate corrupt political campaigns and ethnic based 
politics. 
The suggestion by Erotu is that thd media coverage of the 1979 general 
elections relatively separated rural from urban political participation in 
its election coverage. This is because the programmes, such as 'Towards 
Civil Rulelp 'Hot Seat' and other debates exclusively covered by 'Verdict 
1791 in Lagos could not reach all parts of the country. Radio could 
broadcast such programmes to remote villagesq but the effectiveness of the 
campaign by the media could be covered by interpersonal communication if 
similar radio and TV broadcasts could be directed to the rural population 
through organised youth and school leavers. This stops certain politicians 
using relatives and kinship networks of relationship to exploit the masses 
by misrepresenting the issues of the general elections. 
It was noted in the 1979 general elections that broadcasters were neutral to 
. 
TV political debates, and the politicians obeyed the rules 'laid down by TV 
men'. This is more indicative of the domination of the army in that 
election than. anything else. The political sphere that granted the media 
effective neutrality was, therefore, the military government which was 
operating relatively differently from the media and the political party 
system. Edoga-Ugwuoju strongly stated this point that: 
"The 1979 electoral campaigns and the elections were relatively 
fairly covered ... because the army was still in control and ... because of the uncertainty about which party would win control, 
equal time was given to all registered political parties by. the 
Nigerian Television Authority. This even-handed coverage obtained 
in the state radio corporations. "25 
This is a situation similar to S. Hall et al's observation -with British 
politics that in media coverage of political issues, their role "... is 
determined in the long run or last instance by the political appartus, 
operating through another level of the st'ate. "26 
As we shall see with the 1983 general elections, as soon as the level of 
political party and media control for political broadcast were submergedt 
partisan and sectional political interest dominated network broadcasts. 
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Edoga noted that, in the first year of Shagari's government, federal- 
controlled media became a propoganda tool for NPN. He went on to say that 
this fact was evident not only in the content of the news but in its slant. 
Adversaries were either blocked out of the news or given the type of 
coverage that did little to enhance their image. In some instances, 
advertising space was even refused to political adversaries by the Nigerian 
Television Authority. 27 
However, my viewpoint about that election is not so much the impartiality of 
the coverage, but the extent to which the general Nigerian public 
participated in it through media broadcasts. The balanced programmes and 
debates only catered for the few urban citizens. What TV did was what 
Anthony Smith observed in the 1974 British general election's coverage that 
the: 
"discussion programme or debate , which is presumed to present a 
balanced presentation of argument, 
, 
carried with it an aura of 
having been transported f rom, the real scene of political battle 
into the studio. "28 
Similarly, the Nigerian in the 1979 general elections, the New Times 
commented, did relish watching live the heated and rousing arguments which 
many political party representatives strained their nerves to present. Even 
the occasional cool-headed presentation of party programmes gave the 
audience a feeling of being present at election campaignso especialy when 
pictures of rallies were also shown. 29 
I have observed elsewhere (Mgbemere, 1982) that NTV Lagos particularly 
presented 'actuality' and documentary films that showed slums, housing and 
transport problems in Lagos, which drew the attention of the viewers to 
problem areas that required political actions. I pointed out, therefore, 
that the media role in this sense was to enlighten the public on social, 
economic problems which could only be solved through political decision and 
policies. Further suggestions were made that such issues could be a major 
content of party political manifestos and policies to attract voters. The 
actual programmes made the debate that accompanied them real political drama 
and the audience were captivated. 30 
Nevertheless as a drama, it was only politically entertainingo or for 
watching or self identification among the urban population. The actual 
reports were persistently centred on city matters while the problems of the 
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rural population, which constituted the higher percentage of the Nigerian 
electorate, were not reported by the television. This is a common problem 
of television coverage of political and social issues, where too much 
coverage is given to urban questions and world events, because of their 
appeal to elites who own TV sets and live and work in the city and not in 
the rural areas. 
Even to the city audience, it is argued that time constraints on TV 
structure and broadcasting not only give the audience a generalised view of 
the political system, the politicians themselves and how they govern. The 
constraint on TV imposes a high degree of impartiality which in turn cold be 
a constraint upon the ability of the viewer or the electorate to understand 
'clearly the political events that were for the first time going on through 
television. I have argued that this constraint is also reflected in the 
neglect of coverage of rural problems, which kept the urban, as well as 
rural populations, unaware of existing socio-political problems in other 
parts of the nation. In this sense, television helped to create 
pluaralistic political and social ignorance because of time constraints. 
More coverage of world events in news and current affairs divert citizens 
away from more domestic pressing needs. 
In particular with the 1979 general election, I observed that some of the 
political debates and 'actuality' programmes were slotted together. The 
verbal and visual images at various interpretative levels were anchored 
togther. This could have been immensely confusing and politically 
incomprehensible to large numbers of the Nigerian audience who were not 
familar with political television. In such a situation, Anthony Smith 
explains that: 
-The expectation of impartiality as a pressurised constraint 
within broadcast content might itself affect the audience's 
willingness to vote or not to participate in the electoral 
process. An audience cannot be influenced by a medium which is 
visibly constrained; it can be entertained and informed, but it is 
less likely to be persuaded if. it is constantly reminded that the 
forms in which communcations occur are somehow pre-arranged 
precisely to prevent the audience feeling the full impact. "31 
In Nigeria, quite unlike the observation made by Anthony Smith in the 
British political audience, the latter would not refrain from participation 
"in the electoral process" because alternative means of political 
relationship and information flow exist based on tribal or kinship systems* 
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The audience would, in TV political broadcasts, fail to grasp the apparent 
aim of the political programmet political speeches, policies, manifestos, 
etc., which could be evaluated to form the 
basis of demand on the 
politicians by the electorate. Amidst the confused visual and verbal 
TV 
presentations, the political programmes become a mere medium of 
entertainment. The Nigerian city audience would then resort to pre-1966 
motives for political participation, tribal sentiments, characterised 
by 
personality identification rather than on political issues. In this case, 
the political effect of TV broadcasts on the urbanites would be no different 
from the effect on the rural population who neither owned TV sets, nor 
watched it for political information. Their tribal political leaders 
represented to them the same type of identification as to the urbanites. 
Consequently, the voting patterns of the urban dwellers and villages follow 
the ethnic line. In other words, the network groups, in terms of their 
differences and the way the media covered the election issues, could not 
vote differently. Political issues were badly presented so that they could 
not appeal to different network groups to influence their voting behaviour. 
Roger and Kincaid (1981: 312) have argued that, in network studiest attempts 
are made to discqver communication network stability, i. e. the degree to 
which a network link occurs at two or more points in time. In the TV 
network of political broadcastq the content should link different groups in 
different political environments, rural and urban, so that participation 
would be based on the content of the broadcast, either as direct effect, or 
mediated effect via opinion leaders, bridges or 'liaisons'. It is in this 
process that different responses and reactions to issues are presented by 
the political leaders to influence groups. In so doing, the influence of 
the leader and his suport base solely on the ethnic understanding of 
political issues would be minimised. What would stand out to be crucial was 
the leaaer's convincing presentation of his manifestos and policies which 
could sound sufficiently meaningful and convincing enough to solve certain 
socio-economic and political problems if elected to power. 
I concluded in reference to the 1979 so-called 'first television election' 
that it was the failure of politicians to present their package, as argued 
above, and the inability of the media profession to create such formats that 
would compel politicians to present their election package that partly 
contributed to ettinic voting. I asserted that television was used only for 
information which, politically in terms of votingo was ineffective. Its 
main function was for entertainment and identification restrictively in the 
c_ities. . 
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The cost of temporary studio for 'Verdict 1791, was about E45,000; the other 
19 stations throughout the federation also cost state and federal 
governments dear; the politicians themselves knew that their impact on the 
population would be much less. They had to exploit the traditional voting 
based on ethnicity. 
"In the campaign preceding the 1979 general elections, the 
Nigerian's Peoples Party was portrayed as representing the 
interest of the Igbo-speaking peoples of Nigeria within the 
Nigerian body politic. The winning argument then was that if the 
Igbos, of the country's three major ethnic groups, were to be 
freed from the political, economic and bureaucracy emasculation 
which had resulted from the civil war, then it was of overriding 
importance for all the people to join together and present a 
powerful pressure group who could negotiate successfully on their 
behalf at the federal level. " 
The argument further states that: 
"The propaganda was that the Unity Party of Nigeria was a Yoruba 
party, while hte Great Nigerian Peoples Party, the ... National 
Party of Nigeria and the Peoples Redemption Party were all Hausa/ 
Fulani parties.,, 
32 
The appendix below shows how different states voted for the 1979 general 
elections. The figures show that the relationships between political 
parties, ethnic groups and actual voting in the presidential elections were 
very strong. In this situation, therefore, we should agree with Harrison, 
particularly in the network of political communication where alternative 
networks, outside the media, are operative, that: 
Television may inform or reinforce attitudes, but it rarely 
converts. --33 
However,, this table does not show us, as I have argued abovel whether there 
were differences or not in the way the urban media audience and the rural 
audience voted as a result of media Political content. The similarity 
between the urban and rural voting, despite differences in the amount of 
exposure to media, particularly TV in the cities, is shown below. I have 
chosen four states from three different regional and tribal groups. In 
each, a major city and a rural population is chosen. Similarly, the pattern 
of voting in cities an villages tend strongly towards ethnic lines. 
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If this was the case with the 1979 general elections, as statistics have 
supporteds what were the merits of mass media and, in particulars 
televisions's claim to be the medium that governed these elections? 
In my opinion (Mgbemere, E., 1982: 9), the format and regulations imposed on 
TV by the military government contributed to the apparent merit of TV i 
these elections. I reported that in these elections all TV stations were 
required by the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) to stay open on the days 
of any of the five elections until the final results were broadcast. There 
were immediate 'on the spot' reports in the form of news about elections, 
events, 'facts and figures' and names of candidates who won or lost. Brief 
comments were made, the results Iwere 
given. Still photographs of the 
candidates in question were displayed'and some 
'of the candidates who lived 
near Lagos and who could reach there on time by air or road were invited to 
make some guided comments about their victory. Care was taken not to 
provoke the losers. 
Another TV broadcasting f ormat, again cheaply produced, in these elections 
was the current af f airs progamme in which the election panorama, with the 
seemingly familiar news characteristics of impartiality, balance and 
objectivity prevailed. In news and current affairs, the majoriiy of 
Nigerians could not distinguish the differences. In the election period, 
the audience was more interested in the results of the election. In these 
elections tool, it was observed that TV programmes on news and current 
affairs were concerned with probation and the exploration of the basic aims 
of the military government's attitude to the hand-over of power to civilian 
rule. In all mass media networks, this basic idea of the military remained 
the central concern. As we shall see from the summaries of some news talks 
from Imo State Broadcast (ISB) now IBC - the Imo Broadcasting Corporation - 
in 19791, there were only warnings and recapping of the 1966 events. 
The 'aims' of the military were imposed on the media professionals; time 
constraint was another limiting factor. The pressure for impartiality on 
media professionals, who were already biased with their semi-skilled and 
unskilled professionalism to cover presidential elections for the first time 
via TV in a system different from what has ever been obtained in an African 
state was an 'immensely painful task'. 
In a highly advanced political system, the process of impartiality in a 
general election has never been achieved. In the British general election 
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of 1974, Anthony Smith observed that: 
"Of course, great pains are taken to separate news bulletins from 
the strict application of the rubric of impartiality; comment is a 
deliberately balanced set of 'values', but the total machinery of 
broadcasting has now become so important to electoral activity 
that distinction tends to be obliterated under the sheer weight of 
the overall necessity to balance. -'34 
In the 1979 general election, impartialitys balance and objectivity by the 
media were psychologically out of party political and physiological system 
and the media profession and institution, but with the army. 
Such control and constraint extended to radio and some of the broadcasts of 
the 1979 elections, obtained during the fieldwork in Imo State, are 
presented to support the argument (see Appendix 5). 
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PART TWO 
THE 1983 GENERAL ELECTIONS: 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO IMO STATE: 
CEAPTER EIGHT 
HETHODS OF STUDY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
My method in this study is innovative in comparison with other recent 
political communication studies in Nigeria. Foremost in all the methods I 
used was active participant observation before, during, and after the 1983 
General Election in both rural and urban environments. This is a process I 
regarded as essential in the analysis of political communication in a 
transition society where traditional and modern systems are seemingly 
converging. 
2. THE CHOICE OF METHOD 
The aim of the re! ýearch is to -discover the strudture of political 
communicaion in contemporary politics in Nigeria with particular reference 
to the 1983 general elections. But in examining contemporary political 
communication, there is often a tendency to concentrate heavily on mass 
media. Consequently, the'role of rural political communication systems with 
inherent traditional features is often treated partially or totally ignored. 
In my view, such an approach would leave a lacuna in Nigerian political 
communication studies. 
Thus my investigation, in order to fill the gap, took cognisance of the two 
different environments acting upon the national general elections. The 
method therefore investigates the total-systems in both urban anti rimal 
areas. Though it presents peculiar problems, the appraoch offers an immense 
and rare chance to gain insight into the actual Political communicaton 
structure in Nigeria. Its uniqueness lies in the opportunity it offers to 
assess the importance, strength, weakness and validity of formal, informal, 
modern and traditional institutions, organisations and communication 
channels in Nigerian politics at the election period. 
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GENERAL PREPARATION FOR THE FIRMWORK 
Before my first trip to Nigeria in the early part of 1983, for preliminary 
investigations, I decided to renew contacts by correspondence with several 
institutions, individuals, organisations, friends and relatives who helped 
me during my survey of the 1979 general elections in Nigeria. I informed 
them about my current research orientation and also requested their advice. 
My previous experience in fieldwork in Nigeria and many discussions with Dr. 
J. B. Ford and Dr. R. A. White helped me to decide in which part of Nigeria to 
carry out the investigation. 
THE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHICAL LOCALITIES FOR THE FIELDWORK 
During my M. A. fieldwork studies, most of the institutions and individuals I 
contacted for the information I needed came from Imo Statet particularly at 
Aba and Owerri. Very little investigation was carried out in the villages - 
a serious gap between that work and this study. In*other words, some one- 
sided urban centred information and materials on political communications in 
Nigeria had already been accumulated prior to the-1983-fieldwork. 
Owerri (the capital of Imo State) and Eziama (a. town with a rural population 
from eight villages) seemed the most suitable sites for the study: 
a) Owerri is a typical urban centre with a population of about 409,464 
(population of Imo State by Localities 1976-1984). It fulfills all 
the major criteria of a heterogenous urban population in Nigeria and 
with all the necessary formal and informal organisations and 
institutions. All the major ethnic groups, though in widely different 
proportions, are represented. State and Federal controlled media 
institutions are established in- Owerri, and the seven political 
parties had their offices in the city. 
b) on the other hand, Eziama, with a population of just over 5,000 
people, is a typical hinterland Igbo rural town. Several of its 
traditional institutions still exist. However, modern institutions 
and organisations have gradually gained entrance into the community 
since the colonial period and their impacts have left unmistakable 
marks. Some of these establishments are schools, colleges - dif f erent 
Christian denominations, clinics, police station, Federal Government 
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post office. Modern transport systems connect the town with other 
towns in Ikeduru and with Owerri township - which is only twelve miles 
west of the town. From the town, TV broadcasts from Owerri ITV and 
NTA are also clearly received. 
Perhaps the most important advantage of the choice of Eziama and Owerri for 
this study is my 'natural' or natal membership of the communities, 
particularly the former. It was there that I grew up and received my 
primary educaiton and all the generations of my family have always lived in 
one of the villages in this town (Umuopara). At Owerri I received part of 
my secondary education and many of my relativesq friends and school-mates 
live and work there. Thus my environments for the research in all respects 
are familiar grounds. 
In political communication research the fieldworker could encounter untold 
difficulties if he chose an unfamiliar ground to study in Nigeria. it is 
necessary for him to belong to the linguistic and cultural communities he 
wishes to investigate. Where otherwise, the researcher in Nigeria tends to 
avoid rural populations and concentrate on urban systems. I did not intend 
to fall into this trap. 
ENTERING THE FIELDWORK WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH 
With my past experience and 'natural' membership of the research locality, 
Dr. White and Dr. J. B. Ford suggested that I should do more background 
reading, attend seminars and lectures on political philosophy, 
communications and research methods. I also spent several hours a week at 
the BBC External Audience Resarch Unit in London where I obtained current 
information on the preparation for the general elections in Nigeria. Dr. G. 
mytton allowed me access to the Summary of World Broadcasts Part 4: The 
Middle East, Africa and Latin America which contained major summaries of 
daily radio broadcasts from Nigeria. Also other information arrived 
regularly from friends, relatives, etc. in Nigeria. 
I also opened contacts with The Nigeria Daily Times The National Concord, 
The Punch) etc. offices in London where I collected various Nigerian 
dailies. Other sources of information about the election preparation and 
the mood of the Nigerian public were exploited, so that before I left for 
Nigeria I was well informed about the elections. 
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While I was there I was constantly in touch with Dr. J. B. Ford through 
letters (and a few telephone calls) to seek her advice on various issues 
arising on fieldwork. She was kept aware of the problems on a regular 
basis. Most of the problems were precipitated by the division between Igbo 
leaders, which affected various institutions in the urban and rural areas. 
Even personal relationships were equally affected. The conflicts created 
widespread suspidisons which I found most embarrassing, even among old 
friends and close relatives. Under these circumstances, formal institutions 
such as Radio, TV and daily newspapers made it very difficult for me to 
collect data from the establishments. I offered several explanations, 
authenticated my words with "To Whom It May Concern" letters from J. B. Ford, 
International Student's Identity Card, and yet not all the authorities in 
these institutions were willing to co-operate, 
I resisted the temptation to identify myself with any political party or 
groups actively involved in politics, despite pressures from relatives and 
friends to do so. If I had done so, people's suspicisions as to the aim of 
my research would have been justified, and I would have fouhd it impossible 
to obtain information from individuals, organisations or institutions who 
belong to, or are identified with, the opposite political camp. I was in a 
very -difficult position in this respect. My f amily in the village, and 
relatives and friends who live in the city, were divided between NPP and 
NPN. Thus I could afford to remain. a political party neutralist yet 
obtained the necessary information about political activities freely from 
friends and relatives. 
THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF THE FIELDWORK 
Most of the early part of the days were spent in the city and I returned to 
the villages later in the day. This was because people in the city and the 
villages are involved in different activities. The best time to capture 
political campaign activities in the villages in Igboland is in the evening 
when most people return from the farm. Within this period, I noted that 
many villagers have become very . sensitive to Political matters and even 
tended to resent their close kinfolk who had sympathy for another party. I 
had now found myself investigating the most sensitive, emotional and 
conflict-ridden election campaign ever in Igbo politics. Consequently I 
minimized overt political identification with any person, group or 
organisation in the village. I visited many people in their homes, spending 
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the evening together in their I compound I. Our conversations began with 
social and economic- issues which I deliberately raised, but gradually 
shifted entirely to politics. I knew that this would be the case and often 
I allowed them to lead the conversation towards this direction, but I made 
sure that I shaped the content of the conversation so as to obtain the 
crucial aspect I wanted - the pattern of political information flow. 
Most people in the village were interested to hear stories about Britain and 
I was rather glad to tell them, at the same time concentrating on politics 
and communication in Britain during elections and how people are influenced 
to vote. In the light of this conversation, people revealed abundant and 
vital information on how they participated and also how others did in 
various villages during the 1983 elections. The information helped me 
considerably to design my questionnaire. In order to minimise suspicion, I 
visited the families with a group of young people and while we moved from 
one village to another, our number moderately increased. I made sure that 
those who had very strong political party affiliation did not join us. 
Their presence might create tension within the group and at the same time 
upset those we visited. Also I contained the size of the group to a number 
that would not be an embarrassment to our hosts - always between four and 
six. The majority came from the host village. 
We were offered Ikolal and drinks and allowed to stay with each famiy for as 
long as we wanted, but bearing in mind the purpose of the visit, I made sure 
we did not overstay our welcome. Often we were invited to come again. A 
few villages were invited in turn to my 'compound'. Before we dispersed, I 
instructed the group to explain to the men, women and young people in their 
village the purpose of my research, emphasising that I had no particular 
political party interest. I was simply trying to write a book about 
Nigerian politics which our future generations would read. Within a short 
period of time the news about my project spread throughout the villages and 
many people invited me to their 'compound' to tell me stories about Nigerian 
politics. The response was amazing. Some of the villagers, particularly 
the moderately-educated, were very shrewd and wished to know with which 
political party I shared my sympathy. But I simply explained to them that a 
political communication writer should not identify with any party, otherwise 
he would not produce an objective report which could help solve some of the 
community or national problems. They agreed. In'addition my motherý as a 
leader of a moderately large number of village women, helped to inform her 
group that among her children and other close relatives, I was the only one 
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who had not shown interest for any particular party. She pointed out that 
she had failed to persuade me to join her party, and indeed it was so. Soon 
-Ical party neutrality was no more in doubt in the the news of my polit. & 
villages and I became an arbitor between friends, relatives, etc. from my 
village and the other villages whose relationships have been badly affected 
by the election. This was another important position I Just acquired during 
the fieldwork which not only offered me a wealth of deep knowledge into the 
heart of the matter, but enriched my understanding of Igbo politics. 
Furthermore, the close-knit structure of relationships in the villages which 
I clearly understand made it very easy for me to verify information. Every,, 
or rather most, of the people approached were by now confident that any 
information about the political activities of the people would not be used 
by me to the detriment of anyone. My leadership as the President of Eziama 
Students Union before I left for Britain for further education also began to 
yield some positive results. People understood that I have always 
identified myself with the course of the twon and therefore felt confident 
and free to speak to me about the elections and gave vital information which 
otherwise would have been difficult to guess. 
SOME MARGINAL COSTS FOR THE INFORMATION OBTAINED 
There were four main levels of direct information gathering in the villages: 
a) From those -I visited in their homes 
b) From those who specially invited me into their homes 
C) From those who visited me at my home 
d) From those I came across on a daily basis. 
The major cost in obtaining political information from a community so 
homogenous and firmly established on close-knit relationships is time. 
There was a very strong tendency to move from political disucssion to 
details about the social, cultural and economic situation of the individual 
and the whole community. Some even, particularly the older people, went on 
and on to tell me stories about my great grandparents, whom I never saw. 
With some people it was nearly impossible to eliminate all traces of 
suspicion about the motive of my research. Some would not understand why I 
had come from London to do fieldwork in the villages. They thought it was 
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unimportant and too expensive an exercise. Others wondered why I could not 
do it in Lagos or other big cities where these 'big' men and politicians 
should tell me what they were doing. I had to work through secondary and 
university students to do more explanations to the villagers about my 
research. Fortunately, these students were on 'short break' at this time. 
In return I paid them money, some requested that I should pay for their 
correspondence courses in the UK because of foreign exchange problems, 
others requested some text books which were not available in Nigeria, while 
the majority asked for nothing at all but were all too happy to help. 
A different approach was used to obtain information in the city (Owerri) 
mainly because of the nature of human socio-political activiti6s akin to 
city life. Meetings were formal and mainly within organised institutions. 
SOME MAJOR RESEARCH PARADIGMS - DATA COLLECTION 
The prevailing political situation in Nigeria required some specific 
approaches to data collection. Though I had varieties of options as a 
member of the community I was investigating, nothing had to be taken for 
granted. Rigorous investigation was called for at every stage of the 
fieldwork. 
Major tools of data collection ranged from the socio-anthropological method 
to the development of phases for the collection, which were conceptualised 
in terms of the changing attitude and situation in Nigeria during the 
election. Also I left open alterantive sources of data collection should 
any 'unusual', e. g. army take-over, or other lunexpecteds' occur during and 
immediately after the elections, so that the research which had cost so much 
at this stage would not be drastically altered or abandoned altogether. 
A socio-anthropological approach was central to my participant observation. 
This was not strictly the same as those used by anthropologists and 
enthnographers such as Malinowski, Mead, Bott, Mitchell-, etc., through 
continuous residence with the comunities under study for a resonable length 
of time. Mine', however, was in line with theirs in terms of recording 
events as they occurred and some active participation in the communities' 
involvements. Bearing in mind that my research is network orientated and 
that the basic frame is that modern and traditional systems are converging, 
active partipant observation in order to understand the structure of 
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interactions remained crucial at all stages of the fieldwork. In 
particular, the underlying factors of influence for participation and voting 
by the electorate would only be understood by the f ieldworker through 
participant observation. 
The dramatic and unexpected changes in people's attitudes,, intergroup and 
intragroup alliances, tension and conflicts, formed the core of the 
political communication. Thus it was dif f icult to design af ixed or 
prearranged mode of observation. My membership of the community gave me 
unlimited opportunity to establish different territories of participant 
observation on a daily basis. In dif f erent situations I was able to 
discover different facts about how Nigerians particularly communicate at 
election time. Indeed, it was during this fieldwork that I realised that 
networks of kinship, friendship and group or club allliances are paramount 
in the understanding of political communication in Nigeria - an approach 
strongly recommened by Dr. White before I departed for the fieldwork. 
While I took particular interest in how families, relatives etc. interact 
during an election period, I also renewed my membership of different clubs 
and voluntary organisations in my village and in the town. The Tdo Nnal of 
Eziama club which was founded on Jan 1st 1982 had disintegrated amidst the 
prevailing political conflicts. Within its short life it was the most 
elegant, most powerful, most attractive and foremost, the most elitist union 
in the above town. I was one of the founders and I had every opportunity to 
discover why it had disintegrated. By interviewing its members, I 
discovered that the unity of the club was in serious jeopardy as a result of 
different political party identification by its members. I extended my 
investigation to other clubs, unions and voluntary organisations in the 
villages and Owerri, and discovered that they were equally affected by the 
political conflicts. Hence organisations such as these became an important 
dimension in this network of political communication research. 
ADH M STERING THE FIRST QUESTIONNAIRE 
From experience gained so far in the f ield, the new pattern of political 
communication in Igboland became abundantly clear. 
The first questionnaire was divided into five sections: 
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1) Demographic 
2) Social 
3) Political 
4) Communication and mass media 
5) Isues of concern and major influence 
The trial questionnaire encountered major problems. Large numbers of the 
respondents avoided the open-ended and overtly political questions. Also 
there were a considerable number of missing observations in the demographic 
section, presumably because the respondents did not want to report about 
themselves, their families and other personal background because of wide- 
spread suspicions surrounding the election campaign. Also because many 
villagers are not educated, they were prepared to say much about the 
election, as long as I did not write down wliat they said about politics. 
However, when they saw the questionnaire papers, there were rumours that I 
was employed by one political party or the other, or the British government, 
to investigate the election. Some concluded that I was paid a lot of money 
to do the job and therefore I must pay them something if they answered any 
question. If I had done so their rumour would have been justified. At this 
time I withdrew the questionnaires and began to concentrate on scheduled 
interviews with government officials, top businessmen, club leaders, media 
professionals, recording radio and TV political broadcats, and collecting 
newspapers and other journals about the election. 
Scheduled interviews encountered even more problems than the questionnaire 
administration in village and city. Those I approached for interview 
refused to make comments that could be substantiated with political 
communication realities as I observed them. With some, appointments were 
confirmed for interviews but when I went to see them, they were either out 
and others simply told, me that they had thought about my request and had 
changed their mind. At this time fieldwork had become a most frustrating 
and an agonizing venture. 
Under this situation I organised a large number of students from different 
villages to carry out another phase of propaganda on my behalf. While I was 
concentrating more in the city, they were busy convincing their relatives 
that my intention was a genuine one. This was essential for the second 
administration of the questionnaire which would be the most important data 
for the research. In the city some institutions, however, responded well 
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after Dr. J. B. Ford sent official and personal letters to them. By the 
middle of June,, I returned to London for personal consultation Fith my 
supervisors. Details of the problems encountered in the field were 
discussed and special attention was paid to the prevailing conflicts, 
suspicions, corruptions, and absolute media bias in the election campaign. 
Under these circumstances, I was instructed not to stay away from Nigeria 
but to return and take up more active participant observation on the whole 
process. As people were unwilling to be interviewed,, and unsatisfactorily 
filled in the sample questionnaire, institutional and organisationa 
authorities became less co-operative in allowing me access to official 
documents, I embarked on informal political discussions which at this time 
had been explored in detail but authenticating materials were badly needed. 
After the two major elections - Presidential and State Governorship 
(Gubernatorial) - were over, the nature of the vote results clearly 
indicated a major disturbance or return to military rule. I decided to 
return to the UK in August 1983, after seven months and I was confident that 
my past experiences and participant observation were enough to analyse 
political communication in Nigeria. 
As I correctly suspected, the military came back soon af ter the election. 
As usual, the public rejoiced and voiced their condemnation of Shageri's 
government as the most corrupt civilian rule. Now another opport unity had 
come, more conducive to questionnaire administration. But on the other 
hand, many institutions were probed by the military and in the early part of 
the probation and military take over, these establishments destroyed some 
essential broadcasting documents and particularly tapes. In general, the 
probing exercise by the army made data even more difficult to collect in 
formal institutions but relatively easy among individual respondents because 
everyone was particularly critical of the civilian government. 
10. ADM M STERIMC THE SECOND AND POST ELECTIONS QUESTIONMAIRE 
Shortly after the 1983 military take-over I returned to Nigeria. The second 
questionnaire was designed from th 
,e 
wealth of experience gained during the 
election campaign. There were 153 cases which were distributed in the city 
and villages. Among the eight villages in Eziamas at least 8-10 people were 
interviewed from each. They were selected in order to give'a good spread on 
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age,, education and occupation. In the city a smiliar method was adopted but 
care was taken not to concentrate on one area of the city. Federal and 
State Ministeries were chosen to represent the ethnic composition of the 
city. 'Quarters' in the city where minority ethnic groups live were 
investigated. 
In order to avoid elitist data collection in the city, -I also interviewed 
market women, men and street hawkers. Self-employed men and women outside 
the marketing occupation were also interviewed. By this method I was able 
to obtain representative data of the five network groups theoretically 
described in chapter two. 
"When the research design moves from pictures of -mass 
communication to inquiry into the relationship between people and 
mass communication ... the researcher is obliged not only to 
describe the survey results, but also to describe the survey 
sample and its relationship to the population from which it was 
drawn. "l 
Indeed, it was during my fieldwork that I fully realised that pools of mass 
media theories developed over the years in industrialised societies to 
explain the political communication are 'too vague to explain African 
political processes. Unfortunately most African scholars have wrongly 
adapted these theories in the African situation. 
Some factors may be responsible for this theoretical misconcpetion in the 
study of African political communication. This is closely associated with 
the training of media professionals in the Third World which according to 
Peter Golding (1977) has taken three forms: 
"The attachment of experts from the industrialised countries to 
media in the Third World, courses and -attachments in 
industrialised countries, and courses and training centres in the 
Third World". He showed that "nearly 60 BBC staff were seconded 
to the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation alone between 1950 and 
1960. Naturally their work was more than advisory, it was 
executive, exemplary and authoritative. "2 
We have earlier noted that the training of media Professionals and other 
students in the other disciplines have had great impact in them. "Those 
that return take with them not only skills, but values and attitudes and not 
least a receptivity to the men and machines they have learned to work 
with. --3 
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The above observations have also been recognised by authors such as Katz and 
Wedell (1977); Gibbons (1974); Seymour (1974); Quarmyne and Bebey (1967); 
etc. In terms of political communication research, I believe that one of 
the answers to the problems is for most Third World students training in 
industrialised countries to spend at least a year or more in their own 
country for their fieldwork. They should be encouraged to, select carefully 
from media theories developed in the advanced nations to analyse their data. 
Most important of all, they should develop their own theories -which they 
think could best explain communication processes in their country. Often 
African research students in Europe and America depend on materials sent to 
them by relatives and friends from home. Af ter many years in Europe or 
America they lack adequate perspectives to appreciate changes in their own 
countries, thus they tend to theorize and analyse issues in terms of Western 
ideology and conceptions. It is also important for African students to rely 
on the experience of Europeans who have carried out some research studies in 
that continent. They tend to see African social problems from 
anthropological points of view which could be very usef ul and valid f or 
theory and data analysis in African communication research. 
When If inally returned to the UK in April 1984 1 began to redevelop my 
early theories in order to create a new model which could explain the data 
in the context of Nigerian political communication realities. A convergence 
model within the premises of network analysis became my best theoretical 
model to address and explain Nigerian political communication processes. A 
conference held at the London School of Economics on 'Network' in the early 
part of 1984 further reinforced my orientation toward network approach to 
the study of political communication. It was there that I met for the first 
time Clyde Mitchel, whose ideas further attracted my interest. I phoned him 
a few times, we discussed and he recommended a few books. In contrast to 
the International Association for Mass Communication. Research held in Prague 
a year earlier, most of the papers and seminars concentrated heavily on 
Western mass media research theories. Even a few African scholars who 
attended the conference presented papers which I feel -did not speak 
eloquently on the actual communication problems in Africa. However, I 
clearly understand the problem African scholars face in writing about 
African problems in an international gathering such as the Prague 
Conference. I benefited immensely from speaking to a few eminent scholars 
in the field of communication, especially Elihu Katz (who was particularly 
helpýul in suggesting new theoretical approches in the study of political 
communication in Africa: Jersey Pormoski, Brenda Dervin, Jorg Becker, Paul 
$ i-i, 
Ausah, France Oguajah, Cecs Hanclink, Johane Saltung, Karl Nordentreng etc. ) 
11. CODING THE DATA FOR COMPUTER ANALYSIS 
Learning the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) computer 
programming and the redevelopment of theory were done concurrently. It is 
unimportant to explain the system here. But the basic format was fixed and 
the general output was a series of crosstabulation tables which produced 
relational data. There were different stages in which recording and editing 
operations were carried out. 
12. GROUPING RESPONDENTS BY COMPUTER INTO NETwoRK CATEGORIES - THE 
FORMATION OF THE FIVE NETWORK GROUPS AS UNITS OF ANALYSIS 
The most important format created from the computer was the. -logical 
statements by which all' the respondents in the survey were grouped into 
distinct categories called 'network groups' or systems. The logical 
statements were entirely based on the five muiually exclusive groups 
outlined in Chapter Two. 
The basis of classification of the groups' distinctiveness or exclusiveness 
involved the utilisation of the respondents attributes and characteristics 
to preform the logical statements. At the same timej critical importance 
was attached to the observational relationship between the respondent and 
the entire social structure that must be incorporated, because as David 
Knoke et al have pointed out: 
By ignoring the social structural context within which actors are 
located, ' a purely attribute-based analysis loses much of the 
explanatory potential that relational analysis can offer. The 
ultimate advance of the social scientific knowledge requires 
combinations of both types of data and the creation of measurement 
and analysis methods capable of incorporating them.,, 4 
13. RESPONDENTSt 'INTRINSIC' QUALITIES 
In this study, attributes and characteristics are 'intrinsic' qualities that 
inherently belong to each respondent in the survey. They are varieties and 
8.13 
aspects of such qualities, but for analytic reasons specific ones were 
chosen for the logical statement (statements which help to group respondents 
into categorical groups). These include occupations, last education, 
mobility and age. These are attributes common to all the respondents but in 
differing degrees, hence they form important bases for classification. I 
deliberately omitted ethnic origin because the network groups were drawn 
from one geo-ethnic region - Imo state. 
The survey was carried out within two separate boundaries which were 
specified as urban and rural, and I have argued in chapter two that the two 
environments are inter-related. Thus a factor which best accounts for such 
inter-relationship in terms of network connectedness must be incorporated. 
In Nigeria, the relationship characteristic between the urban and rural 
population is the geographical mobility factor. The intensity of such 
mobility is highest among the unemployed. 
Justification for aggregating the individuals into categorically$ mutually 
exclusive, groups 
have stated that this research* attempts to combine modern and traditional 
political communication processes to discover how Nigerians, particularly, 
communicate in a general election. Different people in the communities - 
urban and rural - use different communication channels to do so and this is 
entirely dependent on the abilities and resources of the individuals to use 
different channels effectively for political information. 
The use of respondents' occupation, last education, geographical mobility 
and age are important grouping criteria in IChe Nigerian context because: 
a) Occupation often relects the level of education, social, economic and 
community leadership status of Nigerians. But this may not in every 
case be true because (as already discussed) in certain stages in the 
lives of Nigerians, education is independent of jobs - or. occupations. 
Large numbers of former urban elites who held prestigious occupations 
often retire to the village at old age, where most of them continue 
farming for the rest of their lives. Thus the educated and the 
illiterate share a common occupational criterion. In the same 
environment, they use both mass media and traditional channels for 
political information and participation. 
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b) Last education This specifically attempts to correct, with 
statistical evidence drawn from the elite group, the misconception 
that the African educated 'class' are highly urbanised, culturally 
alienated, and have cut off links with their natal-rural homeland. It 
has also been suggested that in their political participation, they 
depend entirely on the mass media information. I maintained that in 
the Nigerian political situation, the elites use both traditional and 
modern mass media systems for political purposes. - Also because of 
strong kinship ties between Nigerian elites and village communities, 
most elites may even have a greater tendency and attachment to 
traditional channels of political communication than to the mass 
media. 
Last education of respondents also helps us to associate mutually 
exclusive groups with particular media: that is the characteristic of 
the media - radio, televison or newspapers - shall enable the 
respondents to expose themselves to them according to their 
educational standard. 
C) Geographical Mobility We' saw earlier that Africans spend part of 
their lives partly in the village and partly in the city (Pearce, 
1977: 32; Lloyd, 1974: 122; Meillassoux, 1968: 74-79). The mobility 
pattern helps us to know which group in the communities are most 
mobile horizontally, at what age and why (Lloyd, 1984: 74,76). most 
importantly, the essential kinship networks of communication, linkages 
or ties between urban and rural areas are accomplished by the mobility 
structure of the respondents - frequency of visits between relatives 
in the village and the city. 
d) Age This is important in relation to the time the respondents leave 
the village for the city and also the age they finally return to the 
village to settle for the rest of -their 
lives. Also age can be 
associated with the level of last education, occupation, horizontal 
mobility and most important, it helps to aggregate those respondents 
who are most dependent on others in the community for accommodation 
and job finding -a situation in which the youths can be used by the 
older kinsmen to enhance their social and political image both in the 
urban and village areas after rendering such help to young migrants to 
the city. We have also seen that most of those mobilised by political 
candidates as action-sets or communication-sets were mainly young 
8.15 
people. Generally,, the age of the respondents helps us to assess 
different political participants in Nigeria and to associate them with 
different political activities, behaviour and communication patterns. 
Indeed, grouping respondents under these criteria limits generalisation not 
only within the theoretical framework but also in the data analysis and 
research conclusion. By this approach we are able to know exactly who is 
who in the survey and how they communicate in the community. Peter Lloyd 
in his study of traditional Yoruba communities states that the: 
"individual's personal network is largely confined within his town 
or village... " Thus "the individuals in the network can be 
classified almost entirely in terms of kinship, age and 
occupation. The dominant social groups are defined by descent and 
age, the latter being composed of symmetrical relationships, the 
former of asymmetrical relationships expressed in age ranking. -6 
Using age, occupation and kinship criteria among the traditional Yoruba 
population, Lloyd was able to identify different groups of the communities 
as the poor and the rich in order to establish the network of relationship 
between them. Basic differences between them were de-emphasised because of 
obligaiory kinship network among his respondents. Kinship almost entirely 
formed the basis of interpersonal network ties among his respondents. 
In Chapter Two I show theoretically that different Political participants 
exist within and between urban and rural areas. Major characteristics and 
attributes (demographics) of the respondents are statistically illustrated 
in chapter nine. I proposed in Chapter Two that it would be possible to 
correlate the respondents' demographic factors with available communication 
networks. I argued in Chapter One that the "introduction of a mass 
communication system has not destroyed the traditinal communication network 
based upon personal relations. It simply means that a new network has been 
introduced which greatly expands the physical area of communication. What 
cannot now be communicated by face-to-face contact can be communicated 
through the mass media. " Unfortunately, because of differences in income, 
residence, literacy etc. not all in a transitional society like Nigeria can 
afford access to the modern mass media for political information and 
participation. In Nigeria, therefore, there are different political 
participants based on certain attributes and characteristics as well as 
different communication systems. The communication systems are the linkage 
systems between participants and the political system. On the basis of 
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this, I argued that it would be "a serious limitation in the tudy of 
political communication networks if the characteristics of the linkages are 
emphasised at the expense of the characteristics of those in the network 
linkage". Both should be taken into consideration. 
There are two ways in which I can consider the relationships between them. 
The egocentric or individual approach, in which we can correlate the 
individual's association with the political system through different 
communication networks. With sociometric questions a direct communication 
link between the individual and the political system can be operationalised, 
With a computer3, different variables can be cross-tabulated to show the 
degree of intercommunication. In Chapter Two I rejected the egocentric 
approach in 'this study because of the complex structure of the political 
communication processes involved. In the first instance, the study deals 
with urban and village political communication processes. Different groups 
in the communities are involved. All existing media channels - radio, TV, 
and the press - are incorporated in the study. Face-to-face communication, 
in which the interaction between, participants is not limited to 
interpersonal communication but also the use of different social 
organisati. ons as channels of -political communication are also introduced 
into the study. Collecting and analysing data in a situation such as this 
is not so straight -forward. Even where collection of data and analysis is 
based on one person's network linkage, it has prompted criticisms. Roger 
Sanjck (1974) criticised the work of Epstein (1954) in Zambia based on an 
individual's (Canda) social network over five days as only a 'presentation' 
of an-operational (and rapid) way for collecting network data. 
The quantitative data obtained for this study in terms of social, political 
and communication patterns 'of the respondents have very broad I context 
width' in which case many respondents are given the chance to provide data 
about their socio-political and communication links, which deals with 
concrete rat her than abstract questions in Nigerian politics. This was an 
attempt to make the questions yield more meaningful sociometric data (Moreno 
1934). But one consequence of this approach is that with large numbers of 
respondents,, exceeding a hundred individual cases, questions with broad 
'context width' will not only yield expensive variables but numerous 
variable labels (Appendix 3 shows the number of variables and variable 
labels in this study). 
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Once large numbers of variables and variable labels are produced, some of 
the traditional problems associated with egocentric or sociometric network 
analysis begin to emerge. Where, as in this study, different communication 
channels are involved, the actual structure of communication began to vanish 
because as the number of cells is increased the number of cases in each 
diminishes, sometimes to zero. Particularly in Nigeria, where the last 
general elections in Imo State created abundant intra-group conflicts,, 
hatred, tension etc. and after the election when it was more conducive for 
me to collect the second data "every Igbo turned informer against his 
brother ... " (Nwabueze 1985: 47-48) many respondents could not respond to 
overtly open-ended political questions. On the basis of this, egocentric 
data will certainly produce a large number of empty cells. This problem was 
encountered by Bruan (1975,1976) in his sociometric survey in Colombian 
villages and also by Morett-Lopez' (1979) 'Mexican slums and Korean 
villages'. 
Another problem is that egocentric analysis and crosstabulation of large 
variables with numerous variable labels are not easy to organise in order to 
achieve systematic data analysis, that is using a variable(s) to determine 
demographic, social, economicp political and communication patterns. There 
seem to be endless cross tabulations of one variable against others in order 
to achieve a clear structure of political communicatin processes and 
participations in Nigerian politics which are influenced by so many factors. 
In order to overcome some of the problems of data anlaysis, the 
questionnaire was designed to reflect the general, down to the specific or 
particular practical communication behaviours, of the respondents. The 
most general was the respondent's demographic charcteristics and social 
organisational activities. The data then begins to focus more specifically 
on the political and communication activities of the respondents, which is 
dealt with in chapters 11,12,13 and 14. In these chapters, particular 
political parties, mass media networks and interpersonal communication were 
associated with the respondents. Other factors of political influence were 
specifically mentioned and analysed in relation to the respondents' and 
Nigerian political communication system. 
Most important of all, in order to overcome the problem of very many 'holes' 
or non-data in the data-mat . rix or cells, I decided to aggregate the 
respondents into groups according to their selected major attributes and 
characteristics. The second justification for doing this is also to tie 
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theory in with analysis. In Chapter Two I argued that the five categorical 
groups have a basis in sociological reality. This group analysis approach 
has been used by many resarchers: Nosanchuk (1963); Berlo et al (1972); 
Kadushin (1976); Guimaraes (1972); Betty (1974); Zaltman et al (1973); 
Rachim (1976); Davis (1961); Park et al (1976); etc. In particular 
Sheingold (1973: 714-715) maintains that once distinctions between 
participants and categories of communication system are made,, individuals 
can be aggregated and then we can discover "under what circumstances and by 
what process can new social and political movements (or parties) reach 
potential supporters who are socially isolated and poorly exposed to the 
media. " 
In this study, categorical groups will be held constant and other variabels 
cross-tabulated against them to discover how each group differently or 
similarly participates in Nigerian political elections through social 
organisations, kinship ties, radio, TV, the press, and oral communication. 
We must not deny the potential power of individuals' approach to network 
analysis particularly when "network variables (like opinon leadership) are 
measured at the individual level", in individual voting and media 
consumption etc. Pool (1973); Migram (1967); Roistach (1974); Moreno 
(1934): Lavine (1972); and more recently the work of William D. Richards, Jr 
(1976) applying NEGOPY network analysis procedures have shown how effective 
individual network analysis can be. Besides individual and/or group/system/ 
network analysiso other levels of analysis include: 
1) dyads, in which the structure of communication between two individuals 
in a system can be examined in relation to the two who are linked, 
2) personal network such as that carried out by Epstein on the individual 
in Zambia 
3) cliques. 
It is perhaps desirable to maintain one level of analysis in any given study 
in order to achieve consistency in theory and analytic conclusions. 
However, I shall now show some examples of the individual approach and then 
carry out the rest of the data analysis on the group level. To select a few 
examples, individual respondents' places of residence - urban or rural - can 
be cross-tabulated with the political parties for which the respondents cast 
their votes. 
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Table 1: 8 
Individual Respondents and Political Parties For Which They Voted 
Respondents NPN UPN PRP 
Residence 
(27) (3) - 
Village 
36.0' 4.0 
(13) (10) (1) 
City 
28.3 8.3 2.2 
Column (40) (13) (1) 
Total 33.1 10.7 0.8 
NAP NPP Total 
(1) 44 (72) 
1.3 58.7 100 
(1) (21) 46 
2.2 45.7 100 
(2) (65) (121) 
1.7 53.7 100 
(62%) 
(38% 
This presents a general picture of the voting pattern between village and 
urban respondents in the survey. Votes were nearly almost split between two 
political parties: the NPN 36% (27) and 58.7% (44) for NPP in the village. 
Only 4% voted for the UNP and 1.3% for NAP. In the city a similar voting 
pattern was maintained: NPN 28.3%, down by 7.7%; the UPN more'than slightly 
doubled their gain 8.3% - up by 4.3%, NAP just doubled their score, NPP was 
down by 13%. 
The religion of the respondents can be associated with their voting pattern 
by a cross -tabulation of religion by party for which the respondents cast 
their votes. 
More Catholics and Protestants voted for the NPN and NPP - Catholics 29.6% 
for the NPN and 58.6% for the NPP, similarly 22.2% of the Protestants voted 
for the NPN and 66.7% for the NPP. But in the survey as a whole$ there are 
more Catholici than Protestants - 87 (73.7%) and 18 (15.3%) respectively. 
77.8% of the Muslims voted for the NPN and only 11.1% voted for either the 
UPN and the PRP. None at all voted for the NPP and NAP. 
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Table 2: 8 
Individual Respondents' Reli gion and Parties For Which They Voted 
Religion ION UPN PRP 14AP NPP Total 
(26) (10) 51 87 (73.7%) 
Roman Catholic 
29.6 11.5 58.6 100 
(4) (2) (12) (18) (15.3%) 
Protestant 
22.2 11.1 66.7 100 
Non- 1 (2) (1) (4) (3.4%) 
Denominatiýnal 
25.0 50.0 25.0 100 
(7) (1) (1) (97) (7.6%) 
Muslim 
77.8 11.1 11.1 100 
column (38) (13) (1) (2) (64) (118) 
Total 32.2 11.0 0.8 1.7 54.2 100 
I have argued that in political communication between urban and rural areas, 
the geographical mobility of the participant is an important linkage between 
the two environments. With indilvidual analysis, we can show the pattern of 
such mobility. When people are seeking job employment, movement from 
village to city is more obvious 
(Lloyd, 1974; Peace, 1979; Meillassoux, 
1968; Mitchel et al, 1969). Using the respondents' labour, unemployment 
frequencies and geographical mobility we can show the pattern of migration 
from city to village, village to city, city to city or the respondent's 
decision to stay at the same place as the individual's labour needs and 
circumstances compel him. 
Generally people who are never unemployed visit their relatives in the city 
frequently. The highest number 53 (39.3%) do so once a month. Only a 
small number, 5 (3.7%) and 7 (5.2%) respectively, never or only visit their 
relatives once a year in the city. From this table (3.8), the majority of 
the respondents whether very often unemployed, rarely or never unemployed, 
visit their relatives at least once a year; 22 (16.3%) once a month; once a 
week 24 (17.8%) and more than once a week 24 (17.8%). Thus the linkage 
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between individuals in the networks and their relatives in town is strong 
with the greatest intensity at once a mouth frequency. 
Table 3: 8 
Individual Respondents' Frequency of Visit to Relatives in the City 
Respondents Very Rarely 
Frequency of Often 
Visits 
(2) 
Never 
40.0 20.0 
Less than (1) (1) 
once a year 
14.3 14.3 
(3) (6) 
Once a year 
13.6 27.3 
(8) (14) 
Once a month 
15.1 26.4 
(12) 
once a week 
50.0 
More than (3) (8) 
once a week 
12.5 33.3 
Column (17) (42) 
Total 12.6 31.1 
Never 
(2) 
40.0 
(5) 
71.4 
(13) 
59.1 
(31) 
58.5 
(12) 
50.0 
(13) 
54.2 
(76) 
57.3 
Total 
(5) 
lop 
(7) 
100 
(22) 
100 
(53) 
100 
(24) 
100 
(24) 
100 
(135) 
100 
(3.7%) 
(5.2%) 
(16.3%) 
(39.3%) 
(17.8%) 
(17.8%) 
But when these respondents are not employed 34 (25%) stay in the same city, 
37 (27.2%) go back to the village, 10 (7.4%) go to another city, while 55 
(40.4%) stay in the same place whether city or village. Therefore, while 
people in 
' 
Africa migrate from the village to the city, they equally return 
to the village at the time of unemployment (Peace 19689 LLoyd 1974). 
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Respondents were asked to indicate whether their employment was permanent or 
temporary and their answer was cross-tabulated against their frequency of 
visits to their relatives in the village. 
Table 4: 8 
Individual Respondents Visits to Their Relatives in the Village 
. 
Whether Their Jobs are Permanent or Temporary 
Permanent Temporary Total 
(19) 
Never 
100 100 
Less than (2) - (2) 
once a year 
100 100 
(11) (10) (21) 
Once a year 
54.4 47.6 100 
(31) (8) (27) 
Once a month 
79.5 20.5 100 
(32) (3) (35) 
once a week 
91.4 8.6 100 
More than (35) (11) (46) 
once a week 
78.1 24.0 100 
Column (12) (32) (144) 
Total 77.8 22.2 100 
(0.7%) 
(1.4%) 
(4.6%) 
(27.1%) 
(24.3%) 
(32.0%) 
As in the respondents' visits to their relatives in the city, a large number 
of the respondents visit their relatives in the village very often, 
irrespective of whether they are permanently or temporarily employed or not. 
There is a balance in the mobility pattern between respondents in the 
village/urban and urban/village movementse 
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The respondents were asked to state whether in their interpersonal network 
of political interaction they thought radio political broadcasts had an 
important or unimportant effect on the people in the comwunity in the way 
they voted for different parties. The table below shows their response. 
Table 5: 8 
Voting Behaviour As Influenced by Radio Broadcasts 
Political Important Unimportant Total 
Parties 
NPN (23) (13) (36) (33.3,10 
63.9 36.1 100 
UPN (13) (13) (12.0%) 
100 100 
PRP (1) - (1) (0.9%) 
100 - lbo 
NAP (2) - (2) (1.9%) 
100 100 
Column (54) (54) (108) 
Total 50 50 100 
The respondents were equally divided in their opinion as to the ef f ect of 
radio political broadcasts on the voting behaviour of the people in the 
community. But among NPN voters, radio had more effects than not. 
According to the respondents, radio did not have any effect on those who 
voted for the UPN. NPP voters were equally divided. 
()n the other hand, the ef f ect of newspapers on the voting behaviour of the 
community was more unimportant than important. There were 104 responses to 
that question, only 31.7% (33) said that newspaper political messages had an 
important effect on the voting behaviour of the people. Two-thirds of the 
respondents said that it had no important effect. This pattern was 
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consistent with the NPN and NPP voters. The respondents'_ views on the 
effects of newspapers on the voter was almost the same as the effect of 
television on them. 
On the contrary, the most important factor which the respondents thought 
affected the voting behaviour of the electorate was money. 
Table 6: 8 
The Effect of Money on the Voting Behaviour of the Electorate 
Political 
Parties 
NPN 
UPN 
PRP 
NAP 
NPP 
Column 
Total 
(11.5%) 
(0.9%) 
(1.8%) 
(52.2%) 
In comparison with the media, particularly newspapers and television, money 
had a far greater effect on the voting behaviour of the electorate. The 
effect of television and newspapers combined are less than the effect of 
money alone. Buying voters cards was an open secret during the 1983 general 
elections. On 23rd May, 1983, reading a news talk from Imo, State 
broadcasting station in Owerri, entitled "The need for free and fair 
elections in the 1983 polls", Dr. A. C. Ogunna asked whether "it is possible 
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Important 
(29) 
76.4 
(11) 
84.6 
(1) 
100 
(2) 
100 
(50) 
84.8 
(93) 
82.3 
Unimportant 
(9) 
23.7 
(2) 
15.4 
(9) 
15.2 
(20) 
17.7 
Total 
(38) 
100 
(33.6%) 
(13) 
100 
(1) 
100 
(2) 
100 
(59) 
100 
(113) 
100 
for Nigeria to be a democracy when a lot of the electorates are politically 
ignorant and are easily bought by money? " He pojLnts out that a Nigerian 
newspaper had published an article that in "(Rivers State] 1983 general 
election voters registration cards" were "allegedly bought by the NPN 
supporters for N150-N200". Before Nigeria introduced the two-tier monetary 
system this amount was nearly E180. 
In a country, says Ozidi (1/7/83) where "the people are hungry ... most of 
them have no shelter, their businesses are virtually ruined, - there is a 
scandalous mass unemployment rate ... " N200 would be an attractive sum which 
could make the electorate not think about anything else about the election, 
but to sell their cards and get the money. 
Furthermore, the respondents were asked to indicate which of the channels of 
political communication were most reliable in their political information. 
Respondents' places of residence were cross-tabulated against media 
reliability. 
Table 7: 8 
Which Media Are Most Reliable In Their-Political Broadcasts? 
Respondents Radio TV News- Word of Total 
Residence paper Mouth. 
Village (51) (6) (17) (12) (86) (58.1%) 
59.3 7.0 19.8 14.0 100 
City (18) (11) (21) (12) (62) (41.9%) 
29.0 17.7 33.9 19.4 100 
Column (69) (17) (38) (24) (148) 
Total 46.0 11.5 25.7 16.2 100 
Slightly more than half of the people in the village reported that radio was 
politically more reliable than either television (7%), newspapers (19.8%) or 
word of mouth (14%). On the contrary, far less people in the city believed 
that radio (29%) was more reliable than newspapers (33.9%) in comparison 
with the opinion of those in the village. Similarly, more people in the 
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city (17.7%) than in, the village (7%) reported that TV was more reliable. 
Opinion about the reliability of word of mouth between village and urban 
residents was equally divided. Perhaps this is a reflection on 'reception 
facilities' more than anything else. 
Finally, respondents were asked to indicate the number of hours they spent 
per week on radio, TV or press - 1-10 hours, 11-12 hours, or 21-30/ hours. 
Table 8: 8 
Respondents Hours of_Expsoure to Radio For Political Information 
Respondents 1-10 hrs 
Residence 
Village (42) 
50.6 
City (32) 
53.3 
Column (74) 
Total 51.7 
11-12 hrs 21-30 hrs Total 
(11) (30) (83) (58.0%) 
13.3 36.1 100 
(17) (11) (60) (42.0%) 
28.3 18.3 100 
(28) (41) (143) 
19.6 28.7 100 
Half of the respondents in both village and city listened to the radio 
between 1- 10 hours a week for political information. But on long hours 
(between 21-30 hours a week) radio attracted more people in the village than 
in the city. This is because people in the vilalge are less active than 
those in the city and also the former are more restricted in the alternative 
reception facilities available to them than those in the city. In general, 
radio attracts a large number of listeners. 
Exposure to television has a similar pattern to radio but more people (68.6% 
- 70) watched television for political information between 1- 10 hours a 
week from the village and the city. The number of people from both areas 
are equally divided - 35 each. Seven people (14.6%) in the village watch TW 
between 11-20 hours a week and more people - 20.4% (11) did the same in 
the city - 13.7% (14) spent 21-30 hours a week watching TV for political 
information from the city or the village. 
8.27 
The number of people who spent 11 - 30 hours a week reading newspapers in 
the village is greater than in the city. But those who spent between 1- 10 
hours on newspapers in the city- (84.9% - 45) are greater than those in the 
village. Long hours spent by those in the village also indicate that 
respondents in the village have more idle time to spend and some of them use 
it reading newspapers, particularly the- former city elites who have retired 
from active urban life to the village. 
14. TWO DIFFERENT BUT COWERING SOCIAL STRUCTURES AS BASES FOR THE 
EMPIRICAL BOUNDARY SETTING 
As I am considering two interacting -geographical entities their attributes 
should be incorporated with relational data, that is, analysis should focus 
on the relations between groups in the two environments. Here a 'relation' 
is not an intrinsic characteristic of either environment "taken in 
isolation, but is an emergent property of the connection or linkage between 
units of observation. " (Knoke & Kuklinki 1982) - 
Having specified boundaries of investigation, the levels of observation and 
data colle6tion become more obvious and clear. Within the boundaries . the 
five groups - Traditional, Young School Leavers, Urban Poor, Urban Elites 
and 'Rural Elites, are drawn. But it is also important to note that the two 
enviroT=ents from which our network groups have emerged represent the basic 
socio-economic structures in Nigeria which in many respects define the 
structure of political associations in the country. They are inter-related 
as much as the different individual and groups in them. Structures include 
kinship system, voluntary organisations, political parties, religions and 
mass media systems. These are important channels of linkages between urban 
and rural environments. 
Thus, using these targets, Owerri (city) and Eziama (village town), the 
, small world' of the 'large world' of Nigeria is captured in its seeming 
major structural charcteristics and attributes where the political 
communication behaviour of the categorical network groups constitute the 
core of the analysis. It should be emphasised that the need to set a 
representative boundary is to overcome the problem of endless ramifications 
of linkages in the network which can prevent substantive conclusions. 
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15. 
, 
MUL OF EMPIRICAL DATA ANALYSIS 
In Chapter Two I rejected egocentric network analysis as used by Mitchel et 
al (1969) in their network studies in Africa because it was too micro in 
dimension to explain the rural/urban political communcation in Nigeria - but 
I accepted their general model. I have not either advocated the dyadic 
level of network analysis because it deals with relation, as a function of 
the joint characteristics of the pair, for example the degree of similarity 
of the attribute profile (Laumann, Verbrugge and Pappi 1976: 145-161, Knoke & 
Kuklmski 1982: 17). Neither have I chosen the triad mode of analysis, which 
only examines the relationship between siblings who interact on the basis of 
shared sentiments and obligation. Those who do not fulf il the basic 
membership criteria of the group are Imutally' excluded. Nigerian political 
communication is far beyond this level of network association. However, 
triad analysis comes very close to 'complete network' analysis. In relation 
to the theoretical framework developed in chapter one, complete or total- 
networks provide a more adequate and powerful analysis of structures of 
network of communicain in a system because: 
"complete network uses the complete inf ormatino about patterning 
of ties among, all actors to ascertain the existence of distinct 
positions of roles within'the system and to describe the nature of 
relations among these positions. Although the sample may consist 
of N modes and (N2-N) possible dyadic ties of given type, these 
elements ... add up to only a single system. -5 
Thus egocentric data analysis could become a tool in network analysis if 
individuals so sampled could be aggregated into groups according to their 
attributes, characteristics and relationships to target geoegraphical 
boundaries. 
16. LOGICAL STATEICNTS, AGGREGATION AND THE FORMATION OF FIVE EMPIRICAL 
NETWORK SYSTEHS BY SPSS 
General SPSS Input Format Used: 
Fixed (F3.0,1X, 25(lX, F2.0)/4X, 25(lX, F2.0)/ 
4X, 25(lX, F2.0)/4X, 25(lX9F2.0)/ 
4X, 25(lX, F2.0)/4X, 25(lX, F2.0)i 
4X, 25(lX, F2.0)/4X, 12(IX, F2.0) 
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By using 'if I statements, the computer can aggregate the respondents into 
specific network groups according to their attributes, characteristics and 
relationships to the two target geographical boundaries. For example, 
a) 'if' variable 2 (respondents place of residence) equals 1 (staying in 
the village) and variable 46 (respondents' place of residence when 
unemployed) equals 1 or 3 (goes from village to city) V200 
(geographical mobility of the respondents when unemployed) is equal to 
2, ie the respondent moves from village to city. 
b) 'if V2 equals 9 (staying in the city) and V46 equals 2 (moves from 
village to city) V200 is equal to 3 (goes from city to village) (See 
Appendix 3 for chain of logical-statements based on the 'if' command). 
Similarly, I if I command statements were continued until five distinct 
mobility patterns for group analysis were obtained. The respondents' 
mobility between and within villages and cities which constitute important 
linkages between'the target boundaries were achieved by this operation. I 
assumed that the unemployed period is the most important time which 
charactAises' this movement. Thus the following movements are specified for 
analysis: 
1) Stays in the village 
2) Moves from village to city 
3) moves from city to village 
4) Stays in the same city 
5) Moves from city to city. 
Note here that there is no statement for movement from village to village. 
This is on the understanding of the socio-economic and cultural behaviour of 
the Igbos conditioned by patriarchal norms, that is, male lineage system 
dominates the rural system and males only inherent from their ancestoral 
village. They cannot move. to another village to live, even on a temporary 
basis. 
Thus, geographical mobility which only helps us to establish network of 
communication linkages between villages and cities is restricted to 
environmental relations. It has very serious analytic limitations if the 
mobility structure is not incorporated within the attributes of the five 
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network groups identified in the study. This problem brings us to a second 
level of 'if' statement. 
Hence, with the aid of SPSS 'if I logical command statements, respondents' 
attributes and relational data obtained from the target boundaries are 
uniquely combined for the analysis of political communication in Nigeria 
with particular reference to the 1983 general elections. Here we come to 
grasp the meaning of Mitchell's (1969) concept of network as a specific type 
of relation linking a defined set of persons, objects, organisations, 
varieties of variables relevant to the understanding of particular ways 
Nigerians communicate in the election period which is evaluated and 
explained in terms of political col=unication (see Appendix 3). 
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8.33. 
CHARMERISTICS AM ATTRIBUTES OF THE NETWORK GROUPS 
The aim of this chapter is to establish empirically that the categorical 
network groups do actually exist and that they have different background 
characteristics. The extent to which these backgrounds differentiate them 
in their social relationships and the different ways in which these 
characteristics intervene in determining their political communication 
behaviour wil be assessed. The network groups and their characteristics 
will form an important point of reference in subsequent chapters. 
One of the critical characteristics differentiating Nigerian voters is their 
socio-political and economic environment. As we have noted earlier, the two 
main environments are the village and the urban areas. 
Groups 
Traditional 
School leavers 
Urban poor 
Urban elite 
Rural elite 
Column 
Total 
Table 1: 9 
Res pondents. Places of Residence 
Village City Total 
(49) (0) (0) 
100 0.0 100 
(4) (9) (13) 
30.8 69.2 100 
(4) (7) (11) 
36.4 63.6 100 
(8) (34) (42) 
19.0 81.0 100 
(18) (0) (18) 
100 0.0 100 
(83) (50) (133) 
62.4 37.6 100 
(36.8%) 
(9.8%) 
(8.3%) 
(31.6%) 
(13.5%) 
1 
The data show a significant number of respondents from both rural and urban 
communities. All (49) of the respondents who, belong to the traditional 
group come from the village. Similarly, 100% (18) of the respondents of the 
rural elite live in the village. Focusing on the rural elites, It was 
stated earlier that during the colonial period the missionaries penetrated 
the hinterlands, particularly in the south of Nigeria, to set up schools and 
colleges. After independence, these institutions continued to exist and 
expanded andp- as we shall see later, most of these rural elites are teachers 
by occupation. 
The urban elites constitute the highest number of educated people in the 
city. A small number of them live in the rural areas, but 81% (34) are 
based permanently in the city. Some of the urban poor live in the village, 
but 63.6% (7) live in the city. Among the young school leavers, 30.8% (4) 
live in the village, and 69.2% (9) have already migrated to the city or went 
to school, there. 
There are few explanations of the residential distribution of different 
groups in Nigeria. Those who live in the city visit the village regularly, 
particularly during the weekends. This is increasingly so if the village 
of origin and -city where one works are within easy travelling distance. 
Some workers commute from the village to the city on a daily basis, while 
others spend half of the week in the village and half in the city, depending 
on their various circumstances. The development of roads, rural pipe-borne 
water supplies, electricity and good housing have encouraged village/urban 
commuting on a daily or weekly basis. 
In certain difficult circumstances, the urban migrant might go back to the 
village temporarily before returning to the city once. again. 
"He returns, eee, to his family and will spend several months, 
sometimes several years in the village. Af ter a while, the 
original problem of finding a rewarding job comes up again, and 
again the same expedients are used to find one's way to the 
capital. In a few instances,, a'migrant may return to his village 
three times or more before settling ooe in the city. " (Meillasoux, C., 1968: 767) 
The figures pres ented above for the groups are based on gross percentages 
and do not indicate the actual relationship between village and , urban 
residence. A comparison of row and column percentages between different 
groups illustrates more clearly their degrees of relationship. 
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Table 2: 9 
Relationship Between Village and Urban Residence of the Respondents 
Expressed in Row and Column Percentages 
Groups Village City Village City 
Row Column 
Traditional 100 0 59 0 
School leavers 31 69 5 18 
Urban poor 36 64 5 14 
Urban elite 19 81 10 68 
Rural elite 100 0 22 0 
This table, demonstrates that all of the traditional and rural elite network 
groups live in the rural areas in Nigeria. While some proportions of young 
school leavers, urban poor and urban elites live in the village for socio- 
economic reasons, nevetheless, higher proportions of them live in the city. 
Residence in the city or village does not strictly indicate the place of 
birth. The period of time spent in the city or village has a direct 
relationship with socio-political and economic behaviour. The emphasis on 
primary or. secondary political socialisation is indirectly an attempt to 
ascertain the extent to which environment has influenced political attitudes 
and communication patterns after moving from one political and social 
enviroment to another. It will be hypothesised that primary political 
socialisation and communication behaviour involving networks of kins and 
relatives are some of the characteristics of rural political communication 
network systems while secondary political communication networks involving 
friends, workmates and the mass media are the major characteristics of the 
urban environment. 
It is worth examining statistically the period of years each of the f ive 
groups have lived in the two political environments. Using total cell 
percentages, the breakdown in the survey is as follows: 27.8% (37) of the 
traditional network respondents have never lived in the city while only 4.5% 
(6) and 2.3% (3) have lived in the city between 10-15 years and 16-20 years 
respectively. Only 2.3% (3) lived in the city for more than 30 years. 
Young school leavers are equally likely to have spent their life in the city 
or in the village, a factor that tends to broaden their network of 
connectedness which in turn enhances their political information 
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capacilities. Only 2.3% (3) have not lived in the city at all, while 3.8% 
(5) and 3.0% (4) lived in the city between 16-20 years and 21-30 years. 
Table 3: 9 
Years in the City/Years in the Village 
No. of Traditional School Urban Urban Rural 
Years Leaver Poor Elite Elite 
1-10 3 5 2 20 5 35 
6.1 38.5 18.2 47.6 27.8 26.3 
10-15 7 4 2 12 3 28 
14.3 30.8 18.2 28.6 16.7 21.1 
16-20 10 4 2 6 0 22 
20.4 30.8 18.2 14.3 0.0 16.5 
21-30 4 0 1 4 4 13 
8.2 0.0 9.1 9.5 22.2 9.8 
31-40 10 0 0 0 5 15 
20.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.8 11.3 
41-50 5 0 4 0 1 10 
10.2 0.0 36.4 0.0 5.6 7.5 
51-60 5 0 0 0 0 5 
10.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 
61-70 2 0 0 0 0 2 
4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 
70+ 3 0 0 0 0 3 
6.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 
49 13 11 42 18 133 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
When the young migrants arrive in the city, they come in contact with others 
in two ways: 
"Either they are friends from pre-migratory days, particularly ex- 
school friends who have preceded or followed him to Agege, or they 
are fellow , 
townsmen encountered at Agege since two men f rom the 
same place of origin but with dif f erent circles of f riends, will 
make a point of filling the gaps in each other's spheres of 
acquaintence. " (Peace,, A., 1979: 28) 
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Of the 8.3% (11) urban poor group, 2.3% (3), 3.0% (4) and 1.5% (2) have 
lived in the city between 10-30 years. As Mitchell et al (1969) have 
reported - in Zambia, Africans after a certain age, particularly the 
uneducated ones who fail to get reasonably well paid jobs, return to the 
village. At this time, between the ages of 30-40, they go back to farming 
as a source of living for themselves and their families. Only 1.5% (2) live 
in the village but work in the city. 
on the contrary, urban elites have spent a number of years in the city. Of 
these, 6% (8) have lived in the city under 10 years, and 17.3% between 11-40 
years, none have spent all their lives in the city. They are a well 
urbanised group in sharp contrast to the traditional network group. 
Among the -rural elites, 
75% (10) have spent most of their lives in the 
villages. From the colonial period until the present time schools have been 
controlled by local government education authorities or church parishes. 
This implies that teachers under any local authority or parish are 
transferred from one village to the other. This is where village to village 
occupational mobility on a narrow but. regular basis occurs in Nigeria. Only 
6.1% (8) have spent some time in the city. 
Most traditional network groups have spent their lives in the village, but 
the highest percentage of the respondents in this group have spent between 
10-40 years - 5.3% (7) 10-15 years and 15% (20) 16-40 years. There are two 
other important implications of these figures both in the urban and rural 
populations. The majority of the traditional and urban elite networks have 
lived in the two environments for between 10-40 years, this is supported by 
the observation of Ojetunji Aboyade that in Nigeria children below 15 years 
of age comprise more than 40% of the population and persons over 50 years of 
age form about 8%, so the dependency ratio is very high. 1 This also shows 
that the lif e span in Nigeria bothý in the villages and the cities is 
relatively short, with averages ranging from 45-55 years. The high 
dependency ratio has important political implications in the networks in 
terms of personal influence as well as corruption and nepotism in various 
institutions. In a network of interpersonal relations, a high level of 
dependency reinforces the obligation to members of a group and connected 
members are "less able to withdraw from one another, and so the potential 
degree 
'of 
influence or control of each individual over the other is 
greater. --2 Rogers and Kincaid further remarked that "in India, where the 
advantages of nepotism are widely understood, the president usually appoints 
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his closest relative (such as a son or younger brother) to be his treasurer; 
the possibility of financial misbehaviour is thus minimised. -3 On the 
other handq where the company or ministry is state owned, nepotism can pave 
the way for embezzlement of government funds and aggravate tribal tension, 
as in Nigeria. 
These young people who depend on their parents and relatives often spend the 
first part of their lives in the village, where some of them receive their 
primary and secondary education before migrating to the city. It is in the 
city that they start their secondary socio-political, economic and 
communication readjustment which in many respects are different from the 
village pattern. Even when young people migrate to the urban centre, they 
are still indirectly under the influence of their parents through close 
relatives or friends who live in the city. 
a migrant's parents are of course especially concerned about 
their son's welfare in Lagos: to most of them it seems an 
extremely hazardous place. Accordingly they do not grant their 
sons permissin to move southwards until an older host has been 
arranged. This role is filled either by a kinsman already 
resident at Agege or by a personal friend of a migrant's father or 
older relative. It is the availability of such a host which in 
part influences why a migrant arrives at Agege (Peace, 
1979: 26.: --32). 
A similar observation was made by Lloyd (1984: 75) as shown in chapter two 
above. The survey shows that more than half the number of the young school 
leavers, 6.8% (9), lived in the village between 1-15 years, while 3% (4) 
lived in the village between 16-20 years. Thus no school leaver spent his 
whole life in the city. 
A total of 13.5% (18) of rural elites were identified. The number of years 
they have spent in the village were evenly spread between 1-40 years - 3.8% 
(5) 1-9 years,, 2.3% (3) 10-15 years, 3.0% (4) and 3.8% (5) beween 21-30 
years and 31-40 years respectively. Some of the rural elites who have 
lived in the village for about 40 years or more were the third generation of 
teachers trained by the missionaries in town and posted to teach in the 
village or their local parishes. 
It is striking from the above figures to note that among all the groups only 
the traditional group has respondents who have lived in the village more 
than 50 years. In the village there were 7.4% (10) between 51-70+ years of 
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age and only 0.8% in the city between the age of 51-60 years. This 
statistic supports the view expressed earlier that most Nigerians (Igbos) at 
old age retire to the village and everyone who lives in the city has his own 
traditional homeland, the village. This life-time link between individuals 
who live in- the city and their rural homeland forms the basis of my 
arguement that Nigerians are not completely urbanised and that they do not 
completely abandon village norms, values and socio-political order while 
they are in the city. We saw earlier that through- networks of 
interpersonal relationships, ethnic voluntary associations, the migrants 
have made the city an "expression of rural life" (Mellassoux 1968: 76; Lloyd, 
1966: 32-33; 1974: 130-132). 
I have shown that most urban migrants are young (Peace, 1979: 10-13; 
Mellassoux, 1968: 81) and still maintain ties with the parents in the village 
(Lloyd, 1984: 74,76). Besides, parents make arrangements for the stay in the 
city at the early stage of migration (Peace, 1979: 26-27). In Nigeria, 
educated sons are a great investment to parents and the former take care of 
the latter at old age (Lloyd, 1967: 135,143). This relationship is important 
in the political relationship between the two. 
Later in this study, 
*I 
will propose, that in networks of political 
communication in Nigera, parents have a very important influence on the 
voting behaviour of their children abov. e the age of 18. Meanwhile we should 
examine statistically the relationship between respondents and their parents 
before we can consider how this relationship influences political 
participation during election periods in Nigeria. 
Early anthropoligists have argued that marriage is a form of communication 
and economic exchange which can unify opposing groups. Tribal societies 
such as Nigeria, and other African states, have been the main focus of such 
studies. In my view it is the social characteristics of the groups that are 
more important in influencing the breakdown in ethnicity in Nigeria than 
marriage as a form of interchange and communication between different ethnic 
groups. The more traditional a section of Nigerians are in terms of culture 
and religion, the more exclusive and homogenous they are in their kinship 
network of relations. Such societies Rogers and Kincaid (1981) described as 
ones where a homophilous flow of new information is restricted. Within the 
family, parents therefore tend to control the flow of information which they 
use to influence their children. Through a kinship network, one individual 
can therefore influence the political opinion of others. 
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In the survey, 85.0% of the respondents indicated that their fathers are 
Igbos but all the respondents in the traditional network groups have Igbo 
fathers. 6.8% are Yoruba and 5.3% of them belong to urban elites, 3.8% 
Hausa/Fulani and 4.5% other tribes. Statistics for mothers follow a 
similar pattern. 
This trend is very important in the understanding of political participation 
in Imo state and in particular it indicates that parentage and f amily 
structure in Nigeria have historically remained ethnic and kinship networks 
can be an important political influence. This basic social structure 
propagates and regenerates social political relations that in many ways 
characterise political communicaiton networks in Nigeria. This will be 
demonstrated later. 
Nigeria, as a patriarchal society, maintains a fairly rigid ethnic marriage 
pattern for several cultural and traditional reasons. The most important of 
these is the fact that everyone belongs to a tribal homeland, especially the 
Igbos. In practice, the son inherits his father's land, which is usually 
located in the village. The persistence of this structure and its 
unchanging political influence is a channel through which members of a 
family can be influenced politically* The influence of pqrents on their 
children d uring an election will be compared with that of othei political 
communication networi influences in the last general election in Nigeria. 
The level of education among respondents is an important f act in political 
communication in Nigeria. Table 4.9shows the different levels of 
respondents' education in the different groups, 
A high proportion, 42.9%, of the traditional network group have no formal 
education at all while a further 30.6% have none above primary level, thus 
nearly three-quarters of the group (73.5%) have no post-primary education. 
However, in many of the urban poor, the level of formal education is much 
lower as 100% of the group have no education above primary level and 72.7% 
have none at all. In contrast, neither the urban nor rural elite groups 
contain any respondents with no formal education, 69% of the former and a 
striking 88.9% of the latter being educated beyond primary school and among 
the rural elite over half (55.6%) have secondary education. 
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Table 4: 9. 
Respondents' Educational Background 
Groups None at Elementary Secondary Post or Total 
All or School Univer- 
Primary sity 
School 
Traditional 21 15 11 2 49 36.8 
42.9 30.6 22.4 4.1 100 
School Leavers 0 0 7 6 13 9.8 
0.0 0.0 53.8 46.2 100 
Urban Poor 8 3 0 0 11 8.3 
72.7 27.3 0.0 0.0 100 
Urban Elite 0 13 14 15 42 31.6 
0.0 31.0 33.3 35.7 100 
Rural Elite 0 2 6 10 18 13.5 
0.0 11.1 33.3 55.6 100 
Column 29 33 38 33 133 100 
Total 21.8 24.8 28.6 24.8 100 
it is imporiant to notd that 31% of urban 
Aites 
reported that their highest 
level of education was primary school. This can be explained in terms of 
the period they received their formal education. In the colonial period, 
primary education was high enough to offer job opportunities as colonial 
clerks, etc. The condition which attributes them the status of urban elite 
is often based on long service in ministries, large companies and private 
sectors from the late colonial period when primary education well completed 
was regarded as more important educationally than secondary school education 
is in Nigeria today. 
The small proportion among the rural elite (11.1%) who had no schooling 
above primary level is- a reflection on the nature of the educational 
mobility structure at the time they received. Many'people were employed as 
primary school teachers in the late 50s and 60s after they had successfully 
completed their primary education. We have also seen earlier that a 
shortage of teachers in Nigeria compelled institutions and government to 
award scholarships to students who were then bonded by the institution to 
teach in the same institute that awarded the scholarship (Lloyd, 1974: 98). 
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obligatory relationship and education have important political relationships 
in Nigeria. In general there are a number of individuals or bodies that are 
responsible for an individual's education, including parents and relatives, 
local communities, the church, the government or the self. In particular, 
the responsibility of parents to educate their children and the consequent 
political meaning of this obligation can not be over-emphasised in the 
Nigerian setting. 
Table 5: 9 
Respondents' Parents Education and Sponsorship 
Parents Relatives Village Church Self Total 
Comm- 
unity 
Traditional 8 4 0 0 0 12 
66.7 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
School leavers 7 1 1 1 0 10 
70.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 100 
Urban poor 3 0 0 0 0 3 
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Urban elite 20 5 0 1 1 27. 
74.1 18.5 0.0 3.7 . 3.7 100 
Rural elite 5 1 0 0 1 7 
71.4 14.3 0.0 0.0 14.3 100 
Column 43 11 1 2 2 59 
Total 72.9 18.6 1.7 3.4 3.4 100 
20.3 
16.9 
5.1 
45.8 
11.9 
Of the respondents in all the groups 72.9% reported that their fathers were 
educated by their grandparents, 74.4% of the mothers by their grandparents, 
while 85.4% of the respondents themselves were educated by their parents. 
About half of the respondents received their education in the village 
(48.2%) and half in town (51.8%). 
But it is among the urban elites that parents received the highest formal 
education, . 
45.8%. This is generally the background of many elite families 
in Nigeria since the colonial period. In the early period of colonisations 
most educated Nigerians had illiterate parents who were either poor traders 
or farmers. Even as late as 1967: 
9.10 
"Very many- of the elite in Nigeria have come from humble homes. " 
Lloyd et al (1967) in their survey of Ibadan reported that "Two 
fifths of those men with post-secondary education have fathers who 
never attended school and who were, in consequence, farmers or 
poor craftsmen; only one quarter have fathers who received post- 
secondary education. These latter fathers were, of course, the 
elite of their own generation - the chief clerks, the primary 
school headmasters, the clergy, etc. Between two thirds and three 
quarters of the mothers of these present-day elite men are 
illiterate; only five per cent received post primary education. 
Very few parents have given their sons less education than they 
themselves received; thus the number of the old elite tended to 
give all their sons a good education. " (Lloyd, 1967: 135). 
According to my own data above, it is evident that there is a sharp increase 
in the number of educated parents who have in turn given their children 
similar or better education. A number of factors account for this increase: 
rapid expansion in schools and colleges and economic, political and social 
growth demanding semi and highly educated manpower, increasing government 
expenditure on education. Many parents, relatives etc* can now better 
afford to educate their children than two decades ago. 
Table 6: 9 
Respondents' Fathers' Religion 
Traditional School Urban Urban Rural Total 
Leaver Poor Elite Elite 
Roman 26 9 4 4 15 81 
Catholic 57.1 75.0 36.4 64.1 88.2 63.3 
Protestant 8 2 1 6 2 14 
16.3 16.7 9.1 15.4 11.8 14.8 
Non- 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Denomina- 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.8 
tional 
Muslim 2 1 2 3 0 8 
4.1 8.3 18.2 7.7 0.0 6.3 
Pagan 9 0 4 3 0 16 
18.4 0.0 36.4 7.7 0.0 12.5 
Do not 2 0 0 1 0 3 
Believe 4.1 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 2.3 
Total 49 12 11 39 17 128 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
38.3 9.4 8.6 30.5 13.3 100 
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Religion and politics are closely associated, particulary in the Muslim 
communities of the north. There is a thin line separating them even today, 
despite the introduction of modern political democracy and education. In 
the survey, 75.2% of the respondents in all the groups are Catholics, 63.3% 
and 67.7% of their fathers and mothers respectively are also Catholics. 
Some percentage of the respondents (15.51%) belong to the Protestant church, 
and 14.8% of their fathers and 15.5% of their mothers belong to the same 
Christian religion. There is a sharp drop in the number of pagans in both 
the urban and rural areas of Imo State and the drop increases from one 
generation to the next. Of the respondents' fathers 12.5% were pagans, 8.7% 
of their mothers were also pagans, but only 0.8% of the respondents were 
pagans, 
Table 6: 9 
Respondents' Religion 
Traditional School Urban Urban Rural Total 
Leaver Poor Elite Elite 
Roman 41 9 6 26 is 97 
Catholic 85.4 75.0 54.5 63.4 88.2 75.2 
Protestant 7 1 2 9 1 20 
14.6 8.3 18.2 22.0 5.9 15.5 
Non- 0 0 1 3 1 5 
Denomina- 0.0 0.0 9.1 7.3 5.9 3.9 
tional 
Muslim 0 1 2 3 0 6 
0.0 8.3 18.2 7.3 0.0 4.7 
Pagan 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0.04 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 
Total 48 12 11 41 17 129 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
37.2 9.3 8.5 31.8 13.2 100 
Similarly, 2.3% of the respondents' fathers did not believe in any form of 
religion and the same with 1.6% of their mothers, but most of the 
respondents believe in one religion or another. The number of Muslims in 
Imo State is comparatively low, 4.79%, but 6.3% of their parents are 
Muslims. The number of non-denominational church members is low but since 
the end of the Civil War in Nigeria their number is on the increase. The 
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percentage of the- respondents' parents who belonged to non-denominational 
congregations was 0.8%, while respondents themselves in this congregation 
were 3.9%. Before the Civil War most schools and colleges were run by 
Protestant and Catholic Churches and they were reluctant to admit non- 
members of their denominations into these institutions. With the state 
take-over of the schools and colleges at the end of the Civil War,, young 
people were free to join any religious body and still receive education. 
The above pattern of religion is not true of other parts of Nigerias but it 
does point out clearly that the Imo State is predominantly Catholic. A 
similar survey in Northern Nigeria would show that the region is 
predominantly Muslim. Later we shall associate religion with political 
participation in order to determine how religion as an individual or group 
characteristic influetices political behaviour, particularly voting. 
Religion, it might be suggested, has an important influence on Nigerian 
politics and that this influence tends to pass from one generation to the 
next, the tendency being more consistent with the father's religion. These 
hypotheses will be quantified later, but meanwhile we should state in more 
detail the importance of religion in Nigerian political systems. 
As explained on the theory of missionary education, in Eastern Nigeria the 
early influence of Catholic missionaries in the region established 
ý 
solid 
ground for Catholics, both in -the rural and urban areas. The missiorfaries 
did not only embark on the conversion of pagans to Christianity but also 
offered effective education to the convert which (in my opinion) had more 
effect on the western-orientation of Igbos than the doctrine of religion 
itself. Most of the Catholic educational institutions were exclusively for 
Catholics. Despite current changes in the educational system in Imo State 
the data indicates a consistent relationship between respondents' education 
and religion and that of their parents. 
The expansion of missionary activities in the rural areas, as explained 
earlier, meant that the misionaries, unlike the colonial commercialists, did 
not limit their activities to the urban coast, but penetrated inland. The 
data reflects this trend - 57.1% of traditional and 88.2% of the rural elite 
respondents' fathers were Catholics, while 62.5% and 94.1% of their mothers 
in the same group categories were also Catholics. 
But the importance of the, Catholic religion in Imo, State cannot be over- 
emphasised, nor can the Muslim religion in the North. The Catholic religion 
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seems to be comparatively exclusive in Imo, State . as the data reveals when 
figures are compared with the next most important Christian religion in the 
state, Protestantý 
Table 8: 9 
A Comparison of Catholics and Protestants in the Survey 
Dichotomic Total/Column 
Catholic Protestant 
Respondents' fathers (81) (19) 
63.3% 14.8% 
Respondents' mothers (86) (19) 
67.7% 15.0% 
Respondents (selves) (97) (20) 
75.2% 15.5% 
The impact of these sharp differences on politics in Nigeria will be related 
to the media broadcasts during the last general election in relation to 
religion and education. The, concessions promised to Catholics by a 
Protestant state governor who, took consideratign of 
& 
numbe'r of Catholics. 
in the state will further be analysed in terms of these differences. Also 
why a Protestant rather than a Catholic came to a leadership position in the 
state dominated by Catholics, if religion does play such a cru6ial role in 
Nigerian politics, shows the importance of Zik -a Protestant - in Igbo 
politics. 
In general, however, religion and the kinship or tribal system are closely 
associated in Nigerian politics. As demonstrated, the influence of parents 
and relatives is considerable in kinship structures within different groups 
and regions in , 
Nigeria. If ethnicity is the' basis of political 
participation, kinship and associated networks of social relationship and 
structure reinforce it. I should therefore propose that the basis of 
political interaction or communication should be throughly examined 
, 
within 
these structures rather than exclusively on external structures, but 
relatively functional, such as the imported electronic mass media election 
campaign format. My'central argument is in favour of the convergence model 
within which various network systems are constructed, so that the new 
structure of communication in a rapidly changing, society can be clearly 
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revealed. This argument applies elements of Rogers and Kincaid's concept of 
communication network analysis, in which individuals or groups in the 
communication structure are identified while the communication structure 
itself in a political system is the arrangement of the differentiated 
elements that can be recognised in the patterned communication flows- One 
objective of communication research using network analysis is to identify 
this communication structure and thus to understand the "big picture" of 
human interaction in a system. This research objective is holistic, in 
marked contrast to the study of communication effects on individuals. 4 The 
"big picture" of human interaction in a system is linked by a patterned 
information exchange, which is frequently determined by the structure of 
individual or group relations. The shape of this association as defined by 
kinship and religon is vital in Nigeria's various communities. 
The more similar people in Nigeria are in their kinship and religious 
beliefs, the more likely it is that they are actually related together in a 
pattern of political communication. The extent to which these 
relationships are effectively utilised in place of other alternative 
influences should be examined in depth. Consequentlys it is necessary to 
examine other demographic features of the network groups - the determinants 
of the respondents that will broaden our perceptions of how various groups 
participate in politics in Nigeria. 
In Nigeria and elsewhere, the direct effect of education is that the higher 
the educational attainment of an individual the higher *his/her chance of 
obtaining a high status job. We have noted earlier that educated Nigerians 
are the decision-, making elite. But the desire to become a political 
decision-making elite is not the main motive for seeking education in 
Nigeria. Also, we have seen. above that parents and relatives bear the 
f inancial burden. The political importance of this cost of education in 
Nigeria is that strong ties are maintained between the elite and their 
parents and relatives who may live in the village or city. The financial 
support of the elite for their relatives is a crucial political influence. 
In the survey, the following occupational groups were distinguished: 
unemployed, traders /businessmen, artisans, teachers and professionals. For 
our purposes, professionals will include civil servants, doctors$ engineers, 
bankers and others with a special training. Teachers are considered 
separately because of the political dimension which their profession has 
taken in Nigeria, particularly in tý; -- last general elections. The terms 
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'traders' and 'businessmen' are used interchangeably in Nigeria. Most 
traders call themselves businessmen and in their response to the 
questionnaire they represent themselves as such. What is important here is 
to state statistically which of the five groups are dominant in the various 
occupations. 
Table 9: 9 
Respondents' Occupations 
Traditional 
-School 
Urban Urban Rural Total 
Leaver Poor Elite Elite 
Unemployed 8 9 0 0 0 17 
16.3 69.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.8 
Traders or 2 0 4 13 0 19 
Businessmen 4.1 0.0 36.4 31.0 0.0 14.3 
Artisan 8 2 4 0 0 14 
16.3 15.4 36.4 0.0 0.0 10.5 
Farmer 31 2 3 0 0 36 
63.3 15.4 27.3 0.0 0.0 27.1 
Teacher 0 0 0 10 14 24 
0.0 0.0 0.0 23.8 77.8 '18.0 
Professional 0 0 0 19 4 23 
0.0 0.0 0.0 45.2 22.2 17.3 
Total 49 13 11 42 18 133 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
36.8 9.8 8.3 31.6 - 13.5 100 
In all the five groups 27.1% (36) are farmers but 86.1% (31) ar'e from the 
traditional group, only 5.6% (2) and 27.3% (3) of young school leavers and 
urban poor are farmers. This is the dual residence and occupation which has 
become evident in Nigeria during the rapid economic development when roads 
and cheap transport made it easy foi the inadequately paid, either in the 
public or private sector,, urban poor or young school leavers to go to the 
village to farm or rent land to grow food crops. It is important to note 
that the urban elite and rural elite are completely disassociated from 
farming. There is no association between traditional, young school leavers 
and urban poor groups with teaching and professional occupations in the 
survey. Those occupations are exclusively for the urban and rural elites 
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teaching 18.0% (24) and professional 17.3% (23). 77.8% of the rural leites 
are teachers, while 22.2% are professionals. Professionals other than 
teachers in rural areas are all doctors who work in the rural area 
hospitals. It is , also important to note that 3% of the urban elites and 
36.4% of the urban poor are traders or businessmen. Here we begin to see a 
development of common occupation between the highly educated and the poorly 
or completely uneducated in Nigeria (this development is both political and 
economic). 
The bloodless coup of July 29th 1975 brought Brigadier Murtala Mohammed to 
power, who embarked on the elimination of corruption. As we noted earlier, 
"Some 10,000 civil servants, including not a few well known upper echelon 
figures in the universities, police, statutory corporationst judiciary and 
state administration, were thus retired or dismissed ... Even in the army, 
all officers above the rank of brigadier were retired ... By early 1979 the 
army's strength had ... dropped to some 180,000"05 The strength of the 
army at the end of the Civil War stood at 250,000. 
We observed in earlier chapters that in the pre-Nigerian Civil War period, 
political power rested in the hands of politicians at regional levels. The 
military take-over of power in 1966 drastically altered the power base in 
Nigeria and in the words of William D. Graft: 
the war ... fundamentally altered the balance of power among 
the regions, and between the regions and the central government 
*00 political power was pre-empted from regions to the centre. 
The regional blocs had already been broken up into twelve states, 
and the individual states, now administered by military governors 
and civil servants responsible to the federal government, were 
deprived. Civil servants, rather than politicians, moved into the 
areas of policy-making, resources allocation and administration. 
Central powers were further enhanced after 1969 by a massive 
increase in oil revenues, which by 1972 constituted half of all 
government revenue by 1976 a full 93% of export earnings., -6 
From the above quotation and in relation to our data,, *under the military 
system of government the traditional, ' young school Jeaverso urban poor and 
teachers are excluded from decision-making bodies in Nigeria. This is 
essentially because of their low level of education and subsequently, their 
occupation. Also not all the professionals were engaged in political 
decision-making, 10,000 civil servants'were dismissed and all soldiers above 
the rank of brigadier wereforced to retire. The military demobilisation 
ushered into the Nigerian labour market some 70,000 ex-servicemen. At the 
same time the Nigerian economy was booming as a result of oil revenues. 
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The retired elites went into business or trade, and the Nigerian urban poor 
were further displaced f rom this sector of the economy. During the elite 
terms in office they built strong links with the civil servants who awarded 
governemnt contracts on the "kick-back" basis -a process that intensified 
corruption in Nigeria. The ef f ect of having large numbers of ex-soliders 
released into the economy was a rise in unemployment, increased pressure on 
public welfare services and an increase in crime, especially armed robbery. 7 
Certainly the Mohammed/ Obasanj o policy of civil servants' decision-making 
and accountability to the Federal Government could not be very different 
from the military system of government introduced by Ironsi (which was 
bitterly opposed by the North and then a counter coup was staged in which 
Ironsi was killed and his administration changed). 
This new arrangement had important implications among various groups. Under 
Mohammed and Obasajols rule the number of states increased from 12 to 19; 
reforms were effected in the sphere of local government, a committee on the 
establishment of a federal capital also reported back to the military 
government, and a binding decision was made in favour of the more centrally 
located Abaja. 8 Having realised the decision-making power endowed on civil 
servants, the network of political communication was centred exclusively orý 
the military and the civil servants. Research . which aims at understanding 
this relationship should therefore study politics as a specific decision- 
making network. Since bureaucratic institutions of decision-making are 
formal organisations, their structural network of relationship is strongly 
status-based and characteristically hierarchical in order. Communication is 
therefore more stratified and secrecy prevails. In most cases, the lower 
ranks are excluded, so that not only the urban poor, rural elites, 
traditional and young school leavers are excluded in the network but also 
low rank civil servants as well. Hence autocratic leadership was the 
practice of the system. In this process, enormous power was given to the 
highest bureaucratic decision-making bodies, particularly permanent 
secretaries. It was generally believed that during the above-mentioned 
administration's rule, six to eight permanent secretaries ruled Nigeria. 
Another level of looking at this relationship between civil servants and the 
government in Nigeria is the level of power sharing between the three major 
tribes. Before the Civil War many civil servants, or what I call in this 
study professionals, were the Igbos and the Yorubas. The block of non- 
commissioned army officers were Hausa/Fulani, but the Igbos constituted the 
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majority of the commissioned and commanding officers. The competition 
between the Igbos and the Yorubas., because of their comparable Western 
education, for civil service jobs was freqently intense. With the 
incidences of 1966, the Igbos were forced to create their own government, 
Biafra. This led to a rapid rise in the ranks in the army among Hausa/ 
Fulani and in the civil sector various posts left by the Igbos were occupied 
by the Yorubas. This arrangment seemed to have created mutual power-sharing 
between the Hausa/Fulani, who controlled the political system, and the 
Yoruba, who made bureaucratic decisions that were related to the central 
policy. Yet again easy oil money made the relation more rewarding for both. 
However, the return of the Igbo to politics in Nigeria began to reshape this 
relationship in various ways. 
Going back to our original concept of convergence and network analysis, we 
have noted that 100% of the rural elite respondents live in the village, 
while 81.0% of urban elite respondents live in the city. All the 
traditional group live in the rural areas, so do 63.6% of the urban poor. 
There is therefore close *proximity in terms of residence between urban 
elites, urban poor and traditional network groups. 
The rQle of teachers (rural elites) in particular is an important f actor 
which links the rural population to urban communication networks, eg mass 
media. I have drawn attention to network linkage to show how links based 
on common rural origin, kinship and proximity are used to establish the 
"grassroots organisation of a political party"9 in Nigeria. The obligatory 
relationship and friendship impact on individuals who are linked in the 
political system will be statistically stated, statistics which will show 
whether the concept, that elite Africans are disassociated from the masses, 
is accurate or not: (a) because the obligatory relationship in Africa; and 
(b) several military interventions in Nigerian politics have discouraged 
well-meaning elites from political participation - they are more concerned 
with social relationships with their kinsmen and friends in the cities and 
villages. What generally obtains in Igboland as well as in other 
communities is a generic type of network, in which bonds indicate role 
relationship among family and kinship members irrespective of differences in 
education and occupation. 10 Several forces exact themselves on the elites 
to maintain strong links with the poor in their communities. We have 
already seen that many Nigerian elites come from humble backgrounds. ftoyd 
(1974) in his study of Yoruba communities teased out the main reasons why 
the elite associate themselves with their communities. 
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For an elite to be respected by his social equals, he: 
"see ought to be active in promoting the interest of one's 
community for the man who envisages a political career, mass 
support in his home area is a prerequisite of success, for it is 
only in this area, effectively that he can stand for election. 
Others recognise that local popularity will enable them to get the 
desired plot of building land at a reasonable price, to hear of 
commerical opportunities ... Thus there are strong pressures on 
the city dweller to identify with his home town or village. " 
Sociallyt the network linkage or connections between the poor and rich f rom 
the same tribal origin in the city are enhanced by special occasions and 
celebrations in which: 
the participants at these celebrations 'are to a large extent 
ethnically defined, and ethnic cohesion is thus enhanced. Againg 
weddingsq funerals and the like bring men and women into renewed 
contact with their more distant kin, their erstwhile school and 
age mates, who have remained in the community. By a simple 
greeting the successful emigrant recognises his origins whilst the 
home dweller affirms his relationship with the emigrant. Those 
migrants who have built houses in their home town may furthermore 
spend the whole -weekend there, returning to the city early on 
Monday morning; their interaction with their home community is 
thus increased. " (Lloyd, 1977: 122-123) 
The fact that rural elites (teachers) and traditional network groups 
interact freely, - because the social structure in the village and the 
extended kinship network transcends village level to encompass urban 'areas 
is fully illustrated by Epstein in his African research (1961). He uses 
Elizabeth Bott's concept of 'closed' and 'open' networks in which 'local 
elites' interactions with 'non-elites'. Rogers and Kincaid (1981) discuss 
similar concepts in terms of proximity, strong and weak ties in network 
communication. They argue that: 
The degree of proximity in communication dyads is negatively 
related to their information-exchange potential. 
2) The degree of heterophily in communication dyads is 
positively related to their information-exchange potential. " 
As we have seen statistically, our two political environments, rural and 
urban, are well served by elites who can read. newspapers, listen to the news 
in English by radio broadcasts and own and watch TV with relatives. The 
social structure permits a high degree of interpersonal communication 
between all network groups. Also as Mitchell et al (1969) have noted, most 
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African elites, 'despite distances separating them from their rural folk, 
support them financially, a process which reduces physical distance and 
reinforces social and political influences on each other. It is therefore 
difficult to apply Rogers and Kincaid's model in Africa. There is no 
homophileous community in Imo State; education, teaching, and other 
professionst transport facilities, press, radio and TV have created 
communities of immense interchange of political information. The role of 
teachers (rural elites) as well as urban elites who were concerned with 
their local communities in political mobilisation during the last general 
election will be analysed later. 
One of the main problems in assessing the social and geographical mobility 
of. Nigerians is that nobody has tried to state the frequency of unemployment 
and the permanency of jobs in relation to the different categories of the 
working population. 
Labour mobility is an important aspect of political communication processess 
particulary in a society where extended kinship systems do not stop at the 
village boundaries but extend and are reinforced by new socio-political and 
economic needs in the cities. Nigeria, like other African societies, is 'a 
kin-bound'12 society, and in the cities and in the villages tribal unions, 
clubs etc. are formed to perform similar roles for members of the same 
village in the cities. Earlier, I have speculated on how these social 
clubs are utilised by group leaders, politicians and general members of the 
organisations for politicial mobilisation. People who are not engaged in 
permanent jobs often take active parts in the running of these village/ 
ethnic clubs. Before we examine these clubs statistically as collective 
political communication channels, we should illustrate qualitatively which 
groups in our five categories are less permanently employed, and how 
frequently they are unemployed and how frequently they visit their relatives 
in the villages and the cities. This will help us to determine the degree 
of connectedness between villages and towns through respondents network of 
interpersonal relationships, a factor which is very important in 
understanding political information exchange, both within and between 
villages and cities. 
In all the groups, 80% of the respondents are in permanent employment and 
only 20% are not. Using row percentage the relation between permanently 
employed and temporarily employed persons in each cell can be clearly 
identified. 
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Table 10: 9 
Row % (Of Whether Permanently Employed 
Groups Permanent Temporary Total 
Traditional 88.6 11.4 35.2 
(39) (5) (44) 
School Leavers 27.3 72.7 8.8 
(3) (8) (11) 
Urban Poor 81.8 18.2 8.8 
(9) (2) (11) 
Urban Elite 83.3 16.7 33.6 
(35) (7) (42) 
Rural Elite 82.4 17.6 13.6 
(14) (3) (17) 
Total 80.0 20.0 10.0 
(100) (25) (125) 
It seems an over-simplistic approach to understand only the extent to which 
various network groups are permanently or temporarily employed. To pin down 
oiir arguments 0 and analayse subsequent data with the view of understanding 
clearly how demographic tactors intluence the way particular groups 
communicate, we should know the frequency of unemployment in different 
groups. This has a direct effect on how often unemployment forces Nigerians 
to move geographically from village to city, city to village, village to 
village (a rare labour movement in Imo State because of the exclusive role 
of kinship ties within any village in Igboland), or in the case of teachers 
(rural elites) who are transferred from one village to another. City to 
city mobility is common and some stay in the same place to look for a new 
job. 
The- degree of difference in the frequency of unemployment can be expressed 
as of ten unemployed, rarely and never unemployed. This will enable us to 
determine statistically the differences in permanent unemployment in a 
format which can later be related to the degree of geographic mobility 
between different groups and the- frequency of their visits to their 
relatives who live in the towns and villages. When these visits become more 
frequent, such as during election campaigns, they can be associated with 
different groups and the data will be explained politically in terms of the 
relationship. 
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Table 11: 9 
Respondents'Frequency of Unemploy ment 
Groups Very often Rarely Never Row 
Unemployed Unemployed Unemployed Total 
Traditional (8) (13) (24) (45) 
17.8% 28.9% 53.3% 36.6% 
School Leavers (3) (2) (5) (10) 
30.0% 20.0% 50.0% 8.1% 
Urban Poor (1) (2) (8) (11) 
9.1% 18.2% 72.7% 8.9% 
Urban Elite (1) (16) (23) (40) 
2.5% 40.0% 57.5% 32.3% 
Rural Elite (3) (8) (6) (17) 
17.6% 47.1% 35.3% 13.8% 
Column (16) (41) (66) (123) 
Total 13.0% 33.3% 53.7% 100% 
Number of missing observations - 30 
From these figures it. is clear that those who are frequently out of work are 
young school leavers or those who are yet trying various jobs to make ends 
meet. As we noted in chapter two, jobs for school leavers are not readily 
available in the rural areas where large numbers of them received their 
formal education. The problem is historical, the missionaries advanced the 
growth of education in the interior of Nigeria south of the Benue and Niger 
rivers, the government of the time could not match or make any attempt to 
establish industries in these ares to asborb these young people. The 
tendency has been village/urban migration. Their geographica 11 mobility 
through and from the village is an important mechanism of information 
exchange. 
It may be striking to note that 88.6% of traditional network groups are 
permanently employed, but we should remember that their occupation is 
subsistence agriculture. Most early writers, particularly anthropologists, 
believed that African small-scale farmers are seasonally employed. This is 
an over-generalisation of the farming activities in Africa. In Igboland 
farmers are almost continuously engaged in farming and its related 
industries such as continuous fencing of barns (often destroyed by termite 
ants), domestic animals, etc., clearing and burning of bush for planting, 
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marketing some harvests in order to buy new ones to plant, food and clothes, 
then the actual planting season are all part of farming activities. After 
planting the farmer is not just merely waiting to harvest his crops which 
takes about four to five months to mature. He is constantly engaged in 
weeding the grass which grows with amazing rapidity in the tropical 
equatorial heavy rain belt of south eastern Nigeria. In view of these 
facts, any Igbo farmer would correctly regard himself as a full-time farmer. 
The rural elites, urban elites and urban poor are more constrained and 
institutionally regulated once they are employed either in the public or 
private sectors. The only group who are characteristically mobile are the 
young school leavers. I shall show statistically that the idea that these 
young people only migrate from village to cities is wrong. There is also 
homeward (city to village) migration when hopes of jobs fade away in the 
cities. They are a reserve labour force who are readily available to be 
used in different ways by politicians for a short time during the election 
campaign both in the villages- and in the cities. Their characteristic 
network of political communication during elections as party agents in both 
political environments will also be explained in terms of the available 
figures. 
Generally, 13.0% of the respondents are very often unemployed. In all 33.3% 
are rarely unemployed, and 53.7% are never unemployed. In Imo, State many 
people are self-employed. A high proportion, 72.7%, of the urban poor 
respondents reported that they were never unemployed. This is because most 
of them are traders and artisans, occupations in Nigeria which are usually 
self-employed occupations. They do not therefore consider unemployment as 
an important political question. Since the media reinforce social beliefs 
and are owned and controlled by the state, they systematically avoid 
unemployment and other political issues. How much some pressing social 
issues are ranked in degree of importance by the respondents will be related 
to, and compared with, what the media and the press in particular carried as 
'headlines' during the period of the 1983 election. Interpretation of what 
emerged shall be given in terms of these relationships. 
Those who are self-employed during political campaigns have more opportunity 
to be more mobile between the village and city. The data indicate that the 
number of respondents who are self-employed is nearly equal to those who are 
employed by the government or other agencies. A high proportion of 
traditional and urban poor are self-employed, 78.3% and 81.8% respectively. 
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On the contrary, the highest state employed group is the rural elite, 94.8%, 
and secondly, urban elites, 67.5%. This clearly supports, in quantitative 
terms, the argument that education is the basis on which the state recruits 
its work force, and also that bureaucracy is dominated by the elites in 
Nigeria. 
Table 12: 9 
Row % 
Respondents Self-Employment Pattern 
Yes No Total 
Traditional (36) (10) (46) 36.5% 
78.3 21.7 100 
School Leavers (2) (11. ) (13) 10.3% 
15.4 84.6 100 
Urban Poor (9) (2) (11) 8.7% 
81.8 18.2 100 
Urban Elite (13) (27) (40) 31.7% 
32.5 67.5 100 
Rural Elite (1) (15) (16) 12.8% 
5.2 94.8 100 
Column (61) (65) (126) 
Total 48.4 51.6 100 
Number of missing observations - 27 
We have seen that there is a high correlation between education and gainful 
employment in government establishments, eg educational institutions, etc. 
on the other hand, there is a high correlation between low standards of 
education and/or none at all educational attainment with self-employment. 
Governemnt employment with its associated high level of educational 
prerequisites carries a. high social and economic status, 
In terms of political communication, what is important in occupational 
status is the way individuals who possess such status utilise it to 
influence others and seek political support and leadership in their 
communities. The elites and government employees, in their personal 
networks, help their kinsmen to obtain jobs in the city. We have seen the 
case of the Igbo office clerk who wrote to his relative in the village about 
a vacant post in the North where he worked. In Western Nigeria Lloyd 
states that "the educated man or woman who comes to Ibadan to assume a new 
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post finds himself surrounded by countless friends and aquaintances - near 
and distant kin, school and college friends... " Some of these he would 
accomodate and help to find jobs. The poorly educated save their initial 
earnings and with additional financial support from parents, friends and 
relatives, start on their own as a trader or craftsman - occupations 
regarded as more secure in life than working for the governemnt or others. 
With increasing numbers of more educated people from colleges and 
university3, the poorly educated stand little chance of staying in office 
jobs to retirement age. We must recall our argument earlier that the 
emerging new political elites in African societies were the products of the 
colonial situation. The importance of elite status has a direct 
relationship with the colonial situation. Goldthorpe has noted that in the 
colonial period: 
"With the first establishment of administration and business there 
comes a demand for the services of clerks and other junior 
officals and managerial staff which it is uneconomic to meet by 
bringing in expatriates ... the activities of Christian missions 
have come to include the establishment of schools and the 
provision of education ... a pattern in which mission schools are 
seen as the avenue to the white-collar jobs of Ifunctionnaires' 
and professional men. " 
Hence the term "'the magic of literacy'. Paper qualif ications 
became an end in themselves. Mission-edticated clerks, officerss 
functionnaires, et al. 0 embrace a Western way of life. " 'Western 
way of life' here is not only cultural but also political 
systems. 13 
While education created this elite status classs another important group 
emerged as a result of the new economic system introduced by the colonialist 
money economy. Indigenous businessmen, traders, artisans, cash crop 
farmers, shopkeepers etc. began to employ labour. 
From the above explanations . it is clear that the illiterates and poorly 
educated are self-employed and thus employ other people and the eudcated are 
employees of government, and do not employ others. However, while the self- 
employed may employ a high number of labourers, the educated elites, though 
employed by the state, also employ labour in their private farms, shops or 
others as chauffeurs etc. Goldthorpe agrees that in Africa: 
"members of the elite become farmers and businessmen part-time and 
in retirement. --14 
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It is reasonable to hypothesize that employers both in state (public) and 
private sectors interact with their employees while employees interact among 
themselves and may be influencing each other politically. Bef ore we can 
consider qualitatively the political influence of workmates on various 
network groups, it is important to establish the statistical relationship 
between employees and different network systems. 
Groups 
Traditional 
School Leaver 
Urban Poor 
Urban Elite 
Rural Elite 
Column Total 
Table 13: 9 
Respondents' Numberof Employees 
1-10 21-30 51-60 Total 
23 3 
85.2 11.1 
20 
100.0 0.0 
1 
3.7 
0 
0.0 
27 52.9 
100 
2 3.9 
100 
10 0 
100 0.0 
10 0 
100 0.0 
1 1 
50.0 50.0 
'46 4 
90.2 7.8 
Number of missing observations: 102 
0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
1 
2.0 
10 19.6 
100 
10 19.6 
100 
2 3.9 
100 
51 fo o 
100 
In the survey, 90.2% (46) of the respondents reported that they employed a 
labour force of between one to ten people. Of these, half are f rom the 
traditional network group. -only 4.3% (2) are schoo 1 leavers, while the 
remainder are from the urban poor and urban elites (21.7%) each and. rural 
elites 2.2% only. Beyond this number 1-10, only 3 in the traditional group 
employed 21-30 people and one employed 51-60 workers. One rural elite also 
employed 21-30 workers. At this stage and with 
' 
-these data we cannot 
determine the political relationship between workers themselves and their 
employers. To do so would be sheer speculation. The political influence 
that exists between them will be examined, later. But, statistically, it is 
evident that in Nigeria the traditional group, though the least educated, 
are the higest employers of labour besides the government and large private 
enterprises. Also rural elites and urban elites, though employed by the 
state, employ a few people. It is important to point out that the 
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traditional employer depends f or ' his employees on members of his f amily and 
kin who are made up of wives, children and other relatives. Some distant 
village labourers are employed during planting and harvesting periods and 
are paid on a daily basis. Relatives may or may not be paid, but of ten 
children and wives are not paid. The strong African kinship system 
prevalent in the countryside transcends economic relationships and is also 
expected to create strong political ties where the influence of parents and 
relatives predominates. 
Another important demographic characteristic of the groups is the relative 
differences in geographical mobility during times of unemployment. 
The differences in the mobility of different groups during periods of 
unemployment is important in the general geographical mobility of unemployed 
Nigerians. 'When people are unemployed in a society where unemployment 
benefit does not exist, they are compelled by economic needs to move from 
one place to another in the search f or work. The importance of this 
geographical labour movement cannot be over-emphasised in network analysis. 
This movement is not always exclusively economic, it can have social and 
political implications. Earlier I have argued against Rogers and Kincaid's 
notion of network homophily in terms of information circulation with any 
particular community in Nigeria because of 
& 
presence of elites, radio, TV 
and newspapers in the village, which make every community heterophilous in 
political information. But on the basis of individual linkages to 
heterogenous communities, labour migration in Nigeria can accommodate the 
concept of heterophily or homophily. In the village, because of the 
homogenous character of the population, most people are closely tied to 
members of their kin. The basic pattern of political communication 
influence would be expected to be based on kinship where elders and parents 
have the greatest impact. In the urban areas, an individual is now linked 
to new patterns of social relationship based on a heterogeno7us population. 
The influence of friends, workmates, and' the mass media may become more 
important in political participation and voting. Here also Epstein's (1961) 
study of "the network and urban social organisation" in a small 
administrative African rail post - Ndola - applied the concept of 'closed' 
and open' social networks used by Bott in 1957 to explain interaction 
between local elites and non-elites in urban situations. Here we may 
equally argue that people who are occupationally tied to their village 
communities are governed by norms of kinship in a communication relationship 
which is 'closeil while those who migrate to the cities are governed by' 
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extended or 'open' networks in order to obtain new information for jobs etc. 
In order to relate labour mobility to homophily or heterophily networks of 
connectedness, it is important to identify the particular pattern of 
mobility within each of the identified network systems. 
In most literature on African migration, the concept of, village to urban 
migration has been over-generalised. This thesis so far has increasingly 
tended toward this direction. At this stage the concept should be 
statistically represented and geographical mobility will be pinned down to 
the particular identifiable network groups most involved in the process. As 
people move from village to city they also move back to the village, or to 
another city, or from one part of the same city to the other (Mitchell, ed, 
1969; Southall, ed, 1959; Peace, 1979; Meillassoux, 1968; Lloyd, 1967,1974, 
1984; Peil, 1972). There are various reasons for this movement which have 
been explained earlier; meanwhile we are concerned with such mobility during 
periods of unemployment. 
A. 11 of the traditional network group stay in the village when they are 
unemployed. My earlier arguement is that most of the farmers who are 
occupationally' associated with traditional- network gropus regard themselves 
as fully employed because all year round they have to attend their farms, 
with varied intensity of labour. As a result of this total labour 
confinement to the traditional kinship network characteristic of the 
village, we should assume that the network of connectedness is homophileous. 
But how this demographic characteristic affects political participation and 
voting behaviour differently from other network groups in our study has yet 
to be determined. 15 
The urban poor are more evenly spread out during periods of unemployment. 
36.4% move from village to city. Only 9.1% go back to the village, while 
another 45.5% stay in the same city. 9.1% go to another city. As we have 
noted earlier, most people in this network are self-employed, therefore they 
f ind it dif f icult to move to another city becuse of the cost of starting 
anew* Secondly, unlike the young school leavers, they have young families 
and the accommodation problems in a new city would further discourage city 
to city movement. Peace (1979) and Lloyd (1984) showed that migrants' 
kinsmen such as elders and the educated 'class' prefer to accommodate 
unmarried or single kinsmen migrants because of the cost involved by 'their 
elders' who "frequently provide invaluable mentors in helping them to manage 
9.29 
0 
difficult situations which emerge in the setting of the Town". In terms of 
the extended network of connectedness, they are heterophileous as they are 
no longer tied to their village kin exclusively. 
Table 14: 9 
Respondents'Geographical Mobility When Unemployed 
Stay in Village City to Same City to Total 
Groups Village to City Village City City 
Traditional 49 0 0 0 0 49 
100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
School Leaver 0 4 3 6 0 13 
0.0 30.8 23.1 46.2 0.0 100 
Urban Poor 0 4 1 5 1 11 
0.0 36.4 9.1 45.5 9.1 100 
Urban Elite 0 8 7 23 4 42 
0.0 19.0 16.7 54.8 9.5 100 
Rural Elite 18 0 0 0 0 18 
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Column 67 16 11 34 5 133 
50.4 12.0 8.3 25.6 3.8 100 
Number of missing obersvations - 20 
36.8 
9.8 
8.3 
31.6 
13.5 
of the urban elites 19.0% leave the village for the city during 
unemployment, while 16.7% return to the village. One of the countributory 
factors in city to village migration of this gorup is old age, voluntary 
retirement or forced retirement as we have noted during the Murtala 
Mohammed/Obsenijo regime, and recently by the deposed Buhari regime. A 
higher percentage of this network group stay in the city, 54%, during an 
unemployment period, 
ýhile 9.5% go 
' 
to other cities in search of new jobs. 
Unlike the urban poor or young school leavers, urban elites are better 
qualified and have gained a greater number of years work experience and 
perhaps have saved enough money to sustain them independently of friends and 
relatives if they move to other cities seeking jobs. Statistically, 
therefore, it is the urban elites who are both geographically and socially 
most mobile within the urban environments. By implication, they have the 
most extensive network of linkages and connectedness in the horizontal and 
vertical communication processes within and between cities. 
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All the rural elites stay in the village during a time of unemployment. 
Their unemployment is not like other network groups. ý We have noted that the 
majority of them are teachers by occupation. After the completion of their 
teacher's training, they stay in their village of origin to wait for 
deployment to other villages of their own. During the vacation period, some 
of them still report to their stations for light duties and they do not go 
to the cities to look for jobs unless they have formally resigned from 
teaching. There are twenty missing observations, which are those who 
refused to indicate where they go and what they do during periods of 
unemployment. Those engaged in dubious activities are more likely to avoid 
the question. 
In Chapter One I disputed the idea that educated Af ricans are cut of ff rom 
kin and tribesmen. Coldthorpe (1959) argues that tlie relation between class 
(elite) and kinship makes it dif f icult f or the Western concept of social 
class separatedness to apply in Africa, where he noted that one of the chief 
personal problems of educated Africans is the avalanche of poor relations 
who descend 'on them as soon as they get their first salaried job. 
16 Leith 
Ross (1955); Peace (1979); Peil (1972); Meillassoux (1968); Lloyd (1967, 
1984) have made similar observations on the relationship between educated 
and non-educated Africans. Early in this chapter it ýa. s been statistically 
demonstrated that Nigerian children are educated by the efforts of their 
parents and relatives rather than by the government. It is this obligatory 
kinship responsibility that cements networks of relationships in Nigeria. 
Not all in the family are educated, those who receive it do so through 
unified family contributions and they are obliged to assist those who do not 
have it. 
Leith-Ross comments on the elite in Nigeria from a family point of view 
that: 
"the f amily is not the unit of parents and children but the 
extended family which looks for financial help or moral support to 
whatever member has made good. The minister has a 'sister' 
selling cassava in the market; the successful doctor has a 
'brother' working as a Public Works Department labourer. The 
family bond linking rich and poor, literate, Influential and 
insignificant, militates against any idea of a strictly isolated' 
'class'. It also prevents the group, though increasingly 
Westernised, from being cut off from its origins. --17 
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Table 14: 9 
Frenuenev of Respondents' Visits to Relatives in the City/Townshi 
Groups Never Less than Once Once Once More Total 
once a a a a than 
year year month week once a 
week 
Traditional 4 5 11 23 1 3 47 35.9 
3.1 3.8 8.4 17.6 0.8 2.3 100 
School Leaver 0 0 2 5 3 3 13 9.9 
0.0 0.0 1.5 3.6 2.3 2.3 100 
Urban Poor 1 0 0 3 2 5 11 8.4 
0.8 0.0 0.0 2.3 1.5 3.8 100 
Urban Elite 0 1 6 12 15 8 42 32.1 
0.0 0.8 4.6 9.2 11.5 6.1 100 
Rural Elite 0 0 2 10 3 3 18 13.7 
0.0 0.0 1.5 7.6 2.3 2.3 100 
Column 5 6 21 53 24 22 131 
Total 3.8 4.6 16.0 40.5 18.3 16.8 100 
Number of missiong obser vations 22 
The most direct ways of statistically representing the maintenance of 
relationship between rural and urban networks through human interactions irý 
Nigeria is by evaluating frequency of visits between them. Indeed, this is 
fundamental to my method of analysis. Only 3.8% in all the five groups had 
never visited their relatives in the city, 3.1% (4) of these come from the 
traditional network group and only 0.8% (1) from the urban poor. There are 
two possible interpretations of this: (a) some respondents in the 
traditional network are very old and cannot travel to the city to visit 
relativess, but their relatives in the cities visit them - when they were 
young there were bad roads, many cities were located near the coast and too 
far from home; (b) slave raids limited horizontal movement and when slavery 
was stopped, the modern transport that was introduced perhaps proved too 
expensive for them to afford. For the urban poor (one person) who never 
visited relatives in the city, he could be a trader who finishes his buying 
and selling in the city on a daily basis and returns to the village. 
In the traditional network the rest of the respondents visit their relatives 
in the city fairly frequently, 80.8% do so at least once a year, 48.9% once 
a month and 8.5% weekly or even more frequently. The most modal period of 
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visits according to this table among traditional network groups is once a 
month. In Chapter One we argued that village/urban migration was a quest 
for jobs and better wages to support relatives - mainly the young, women and 
old in the village. We have also seen that parents educate their children 
so that they may support them later in lif e financially. It was in view of 
this that Goldthorpe made his remark about "the avalanche of poor 
relations". But this demand is a continuous demand. In Af rica, and in 
Nigeria in particular, most workers are paid at the end of each month. This 
may throw some light on the monthly visits to wage earners I Most Nigerians 
respond to this family obligation with pride. Similar visits of urban 
dwellers to their relatives in the villages, the urban elites, who 
constitute the highest waged or salaried groupAn the cities, also scored 
the highest of their visiting peiod once a month: 45.2% if relatives in the 
village could not visit them, returning home briefly with goods and money. 
The strength of links between relatives in the city and village in terms of 
monthly visits should become clearer if we compare the column percentage of 
the two polar network groups in our survey, the traditional network and the 
urban elite. 
There are strong ties between urban elites and their rural relatives 
illustrating that the concept that African elites are cut off or 'isolate' 
themselves from their rural poor relatives is misleading. The political 
importance of this network link between the predominantly urban group and 
the predominantly traditional rural networks group during an election period 
will be examined in terms of political communcation influences and voting 
behaviour in the last general election. 
Since this network of connectedness between relatives both in the cities and 
villages is important in deepening understanding of political communication 
in Nigeriag other intermediary network grops in this study should be 
rigourously examined in relation to the two political environments - 
village/urban systems. 
Visits to relatives in the city among the young school leavers group is 
evenly spread from once a year to more than once a week. The highest cell 
total percentage is 38... 5% and this yet again takes place at once a month 
periods. There is nobody in this group who visits his relatives less than 
once a year. The urban poor regularly visit their relatives in the city 
once a month, 27.3%, once a week, 18.2%, and more than' once a week, 45.5%. 
of the urban elites, 35.7% visit relatives in town once a week, 28,6% once a 
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month, 19% more than once a week and only 16.7% once a year. 
The visits could be individual or collective, and the visit here is both 
within and between relatives living in the town and in the village. 
"Educated brothers and sisters are in many cases living in Ibadan. 
All have cars and they can visit one another frequently. It is 
much more difficult to measure the social distance between the 
elite and their non-educated siblings working in their home towns 
as farmers and craf tsmen. All the elite visit their homes at 
least once a year; many go monthly if parents still live there and 
if the distances are short - not exceeding a hundred miles each, 
way. News from home is also carried by other kinsmen. Thus one 
may have a considerable knowledge of the affairs of one's close 
kin at home, whatever one's affective relationship with them. " 
(Lloyd et al 1967: 144) 
When relatives visit each other once a months in Igboland, important 
collective action is taking place. As we shall see later, every Igbo adult 
- male or female - belongs to a social organisation, club or union. They 
hold what is popularly known as 'monthly' meetings once every month in the 
village or in the city. Criteria for membership of these organisations vary 
from members of ethnic, village, religious, age groups etc* to any Nigerian 
citizen. Other reasons could be behind the visit at this once a month 
period. 
I have argued in chapter one that social clubs in the village are extended 
to cities where members of the same kins continue their traditional 
relationship in various ways such as economic assistance to each member, 
helping to find jobs for relatives who arrive from the vilalge, etc. We 
also noted in chpater two that Smoch, A. C. (1977), argued with illustrative 
case studies from Mbaise and Abiriba in Imo State, that these unions existed 
both in villages and in the city (eg Port Harcourt) as the political and 
economic base of the group. How much these organisations are used by any of 
the five identified network groups in the towns or villages for political' 
participation during the 1983 general election in Nigeria will be considered 
in detail in the next chapter. 
Meanwhile, having examined quantitatively the frequency of visits among all 
the network systems to their relatives' in the town, a similar analysis 
should be applied to network groups visiting relatives in the village. This 
is a necessary approach since we have maintained that in studies of 
convergence and networks of political communication attention should be paid 
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to the understanding of communication as the interchangeable, two-way f low 
of information at every level between participants in the system. The flow 
of information between the rural population and urban dwellers, to a certain 
extent, is consistent with the principle of a convergence modil. 
In all the groupss most people visit their relatives in the village, and in 
the traditional network group the frequency -of visits rises from 14.3% once 
a month to 32.7% once a week and cumulates at 51.0% of more than once a 
week. The regularity of interpersonal communication in the traditional 
kinship group may be significantly more important in influencing members 
politically either in a negative or positive way than high intensity of 
interpersonal interaction in the modern city. This is because, in rural 
areas, kinship network carries a high rate of obligatory values while in the 
city friendship has less obligations. Meanwhile, our data cannot tell us 
how politicall y important are the regularity of the visits in both 
environments. 
The young school leavers in their visits to relatives in the town also make 
regular Visits to their relatives in the village. This clearly indicates 
that the young school leavers, previously believed to have abandoned the 
yillage for the city, maintain -regular visits to the village in such a 
manner that it would be possible to reconsider them as both city and village 
dwellers. 
Table 15: 9 
Frequency of Res pondents' Visits to Relatives in the Villages 
Groups Never Once Once Once More Total 
a a a than 
year month week once a 
week 
Traditional 4 11 23 1 3 47 35.9 
8.5 23.4 48.9 2.1 6.4 100 
School Leaver 0 2 5 3 3 13 9.9 
0.0 15.4 38.5 23.1 23.1 100 
Urban Poor 1 0 3 2 5 11 8.4 
9.1 0.0 27.3 18.2 45.5 100 
Urban Elite 0 6 12 15 8 42 32.1 
0.0 14.3 28.6 35.7 19.0 100 
Rural Elite 0 2 10 3 3 18 13.7 
0.0 11.1 55.6 16.7 16.7 100 
Column 5 21 53 24 22 131 
Total 3.8 16.0 40.5 18.3 16.8 100 
Number of missiong observations - 22 
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The urban poor also maintain the same pattern of visiting relatives in the 
village as the young school leavers'. Like their urban elite counterparts, 
in terms of residence only, their highest visiting time of 45.5% is once a 
month, when they fulfil similar obligations to kin as the urban elites do in 
the village. We have already considered above the urban elites' visits to 
relatives in the village. However, because of the nature of their duties, 
19% (8) of them visit their relatives in the village more than once a week. 
This does not mean, as Mitchell (1969: 2,29), and Reader (1964: 22), both 
noted that close kinsmen whom one does not meet frequently are less 
important in one's social and political networks than workmates and friends 
from the town. Political influence among kin and friends, despite 
differences in their geographic proximity, may have a direct bearing on 
this. Half of the rural elites visit their relatives in the village once a 
week to once a year, while the other half visit their relatives more than 
once a week. Table 16.9 indicates clearly the balance of flow of 
interpersonal network of relationship between residence of the two different 
but interrelated political communication environments which form the 
structural basis of our convergence model. 
Table 16: 9 
Total Column Percentages of Both Village and City Visits by Respondents 
Total Column % 
Never Less than Once Once Once More Total 
once a a a a than 
year year month week once a 
week 
Town (5) (6) (21) (53) (24) (22) (131) 
3.8% 4.6% 
. 
16.0% 40.6% 18.3% 16.8% 100% 
village (1) - (15) (37) (33) (47) (133) 
0.8% 11.3% 27.8% 24.8% 35.3% 100% 
This chapter has established strong empirical evidence of the existence of 
networks of connectedness and linkages between and within rural and urban 
networks in our sample. The bases of these linkages are 'exclusively drawn 
from the demographic characteristics of the respondents in the sample. The 
idea that Africans individuals' different characteristics are set apart by 
social differentials is void, as it is clear that kinship forms the key to 
the network. 
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In both village -and urban areas all the five groups are found, but a high 
proportion of the respondents live in the rural areas. However, as pointed 
out in chapter one, in any given region- in Nigeria one ethnic group forms 
the majority of the population in both village and rural areas. For 
instance, in Agege Lagos, 
".. a large proportion" of the urban emigrants "are from in and 
around Abeokuta, the capital of Igboland, which is less than a 
couple of hours by road from Agege and even more distance places 
of origin such as Oshogbo, Ilesha, Ado Ekit, can be reached within 
three or four hours, so most Agege residents can retain close 
contact with their places of origin, thus in part obviating the 
need for ethnic associations. " (Peace, 1979: 22) 
In this case, the Igbos are the dominant tribe in the two different areas 
studied - rural and urban. Most of the respondents have at one time or 
another spent some part of their-lives in the village or in the city. 
Statistically only some of the traditional and urban poor have not had any 
formal education while the urban elites, rural elites and young school 
leavers had the highest level of formal Western education. 
Sponsorship of formal education in all the groups is almost entirely (85.4%) 
the responsibility oi parents and relatives. The government's role in the 
sponsorship of formal education is very marginal (1.0%). The dedication of 
parents to the education of their children is an important obligatory 
commitment which cements, with an abiding socio-economic force, the 
relationship between elites and non-elites in Igbo society. The obligation 
passes from one generation of parents to another, thus perpetuating the 
kinship obligation from the viewpoint of the modern education system which 
in modern political systems is a major criterion for political leadership. 
of the respondents 72.9% reported that their parents were educated by their 
grandparents. 
Christianityp especially Catholicism (63.3%) and Protestantism (14.5%), is 
the main religion. Paganism is fast dying out from 12.5% among the parents 
of the respondents to only 0.8% among the respondents themselves. Most of 
the respondents take on the religion of their parents, with an increasing 
number of those whose parents are pagans becoming Christians. 
Different occupations other than agriculture are now wide-spread, 
particularly in the cities. The most professional groups are the urban 
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elites and rural elites, while the traditional group are predominantly 
farmers. The majority of the respondents (80%) consider their occupation as 
permanent* A high proportion of young school leavers mainly take up 
temporary employment. 
When some of the respondents are unemployed, they move from vilage to city. 
only traditional and rural elites stay in the village until they become 
occupationally active again. The most mobile groups geographically during 
period of unemployment are the young school leavers, urban poor and urban 
elites. Their directions of mobility are from village to city, city to 
village and city to city. This geographical mobility in the quest for jobs 
constitutes an important linkage between urban and village communities in 
Nigeria. 
Furthermore, when people are settled in their jobs there is a widespread 
tendency for those in the village to visit their relatives in the city and 
vice versa* 
Our next chapter will examine the importance of some of these linkages and 
ties in the formation of social organisations in the cities and villages in 
Imo State. Unions, clubs and organisatons, as J have argued above, are a 
major historical basis for political participation in Ni I geria. 
A 
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CHAPTER TEN 
NETWORK GROUPS AND SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS 
We haved noted in chapter two that Mitchell (ed), 1961, argued that Africans 
move from city to city and village to city, and as they do so they form 
kinship networks which help them to maintain their rural norms, values and 
identity. I also, showed theoretically from the work of Banton (1957) in 
Freetown, Briedl (1959: 31), Eric R. Wolf in Banton (ed, p. 15) that these 
network ties based on kinship, friends etc., have strong socio-political and 
economic implications in urban and rural political communication in Africa. 
In partcular to: "the mode of . the associations in Nigeria" 
Lloyd stressed 
the point that: 
".. the association is concerned with conditions in the home area. 
Urban members, having rather more experience of the world, 
intervene in local politics, perhaps suggesting models of local 
development. Money is collected to finance the building of a new 
road to link the village with the highway, or of a primary 
school. " (Lloyd, 1984: 79) 
Personal network ties remain important in the process of network links 
between urban and village areas: 
... the purchase of cheap consumer goods, 
home-town-visits, and 
running of small clubs are the main ways in which recent migrants 
dispose of their income surplusses. " (Peace, 1979: 43) 
In West -Africa this pattern of village/urban linkage seems to be a common 
practice. When migrants leave the village for the town they form 
associations. In Bamako, Meillassoux (1968: 62) showed that: 
"Four associations were created by foreign migrants: two from 
Senegal, one from the Ivory Coast and one from Upper Volta". 
With a map, Meillassoux made "a comparison oo of the the places 
of origin of Bamako inhabitants" which "shows that most migrants 
were represented in town through one association (except the 
Gunieans, whose associtions apparently were not registered). " 
In Chatper Nine we saw that there is a strong empirical relationship between 
demographic characteristics and the five identified groups. The study of 
Smoch, A. C., (1977) on the specific rural areas Mbaise and Abiriba and the 
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township Port-Harcourt, in former Eastern Nigeria, illustrated the 
importance of ethnic unions for political support and economic and social 
co-operation among members of the same local communities who live and work 
in the city. I then argued that such village/urban ethnic unions and clubs 
which Audrey Smoch observed among Mbaise and Abiriba communities in Port- 
Harcourt were characteristic not only of these communities but most of the 
others in Nigeria, and Igbos in particular. I also stated that the Igbo 
Union, which was formed actually when Zik returned from the USA to support 
other Igbos who were studying abroad, was the largest single ethnic union 
behind the NCNC before the Civil War in Nigeria. In all these studies, 
quantitative statements on the nature of organisations, clubs, unons and 
associations in terms of their membership, age of clubs, etc., criteria for 
membership, systems of leadership election in the clubs, decision-making, 
frequency of meeting, channels of information circulation among memberss 
numbers of such organisations to which one belongs, methods of problem- 
solvings relationship with other organisations, etc. have yet to be 
presented by media political scientists in particular. 
I believe that an empirical study of the nature of social organiations in 
terms of these structures will help us to grasp the ethnic integration in 
the city and the entire socio-political relationship between village and 
city as an essentiai prerequisite in understanding the ' validity 
'of 
convergence and network of connectedness in Africa. 
If the network structures of the clubs are represented empirically, it would 
be convenient to utilise them for further qualitative application of the 
theories of ego-political candidates, eg Zik, Awolowo, Ojukwu, etc. 0 who use 
these community and ethnic unions which exist in both villages and urban 
areas as 'action-sets' or 'communication-sets' (Adrian Mayer, 1966: 108; 
Harris-Jones, 1969: 309; Barnes, 1955; and Bott, 1955). Then we can argue 
that because these unions are based bn friendship, neighbourliness and 
kinship, the basis of Barnes' analysis of effective network, they are 
important political bases in Africa. In this respect, the argument of 
Mitchell (1969: 20) of anchorage, density, reachability, range of 
directedness, durability, intensity and frequency of interaction becomes 
valid in understanding political communication behaviour in Nigeria. A 
split in leadership3, i. e. when two competing political candidates emerge 
from one single large ethnic group whose backgroup rural/urban political 
mobilisation is based on these clubs, can alter national body politics. 
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Meanwhile, we must statistically determine the nature and characteristics of 
these unions in the survey. The majority of Nigerians, particularly the 
Igbos, belong to one social club or more. Membership provides possibilities 
of "economic assistance, kinship obligation, religious co-operation or ... 
simply friends"I. In brief, Caplow (1955) referred to these as 
fambience, 2. In a society with intense ethnic competition for jobs etc., no 
member of the society, particularly in the city, would like to be isolated 
from his group. Lloyd has emphasised the importance of group ties in the 
urban areas from the very time the migrant arrives in the city: 
With or without prior warning, and in most casest makes 
immediately for the house of his closest relatives ... the host 
acknowledges an obligation to provide board and lodging and to 
help the newcomer to find employment and a permanent place in 
which to live. Not unnaturally, he is anxious to see his lodger 
independently established as soon as possible and, to this end, he 
exploits his own network to the full. " Lloyd also showed that 
"the migrant is thus quickly drawn into an established network 
consisting most immediately of his close kin in the city and then 
other members of the same home area. His reliance upon them in 
his first weeks in the city creates a reciprocal obligation, so 
that he in turn must both help those who have helped him and also 
aid later immigrants. " But this new pattern of urban network of 
association does not in the least terminate relationship with 
those in the village, rather Lloyd points out "his relationships 
with those in the rural areas" are not ruptured "his affective 
ties with his parents. and siblings still living there are 
maintained; they may be sending him presents of foodstuffs$ while 
he sends home cash or gifts from the city markets". (Lloyd 
1984: 75-76) 
In the city, members of such network ties who help each other to 'survive' 
have been described by Peace (1979: 35) as turban brothers' network. 
In general, 88.5% (115) of the respondents belonged to one form of social 
organisation or another. Only 11.5% reported that they did not belong to 
any social clubs. 23 respondents did not give any answer. Those who 
understood the political importance of social clubs in Nigeria and who also 
did not want to disclose their political identity could either report that 
they did not belong to any social organisation or avoid the question 
altogether. The differences between positive and negative responses to 
social organisation membership can best be shown in each group by row 
percentages. 
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Table 1: 10 
Res pondents' Membership of Social Organisations 
Groups Yes No Total 
Traditional (42) (5) (47) 
89.4 10.6 100 
School Leavers (11) (2) (13) 
84.6 15.4 100 
Urban Poor (10) (1) (11) 
90.9 9.1 100 
Urban Elite (35) (6) -(41) 
85.9 14.6 100 
Rural Elite (17) (1) (18) 
94.4 5.6 100 
Column (115) (15) (130) 
Total 88.5 11.5 100 
Ilumber of missing observations 23 
Table 2: 10. 
Respondents' Membership Of Social Organisations In Towns and Villages 
Groups Yes No Total 
Traditional (34) (13) (97) 
72.3 27.7 100 
School Leavers (11) (2) (13) 
84.6 15.4 100 
Urban Poor (8) (2) (10) 
80.0 20.0 100 
Urban Elite (27) (13) (40) 
67.5 32.5 100 
Rural Elite (15) (2) (17) 
88.2 11.8 100 
6lumn (95) 32 (127) 
Total 74.8 25.2 100 
Number of-missing observations 26 
Though the majority of the respondents belong to social organisations, we 
are uncertain of the percentage that belongs t clubs or organisations having 
branches in the city as well as the village. In order to supportt he 
argument raised earlier, that they exist in both places, the data must 
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therefore show that social clubs, whether modern or traditional, are strong 
group linkages between rural and urban areas through which effective 
political network of mobilisation can be assumed to take place. 
From all the groups, 74.8% of the respondents stated that their social 
organisations either exist in the city or the village. It is now evident 
that the majority of social clubs in Imo State have branches both in the 
villages and in the city, which supports our theoretical arguments in 
Chapter Two that the ethnic union forms the basis of extension of extended 
family, tribal and kinship network from the rural to modern urban areas. 
Among the Igbos, Margaret Peil (1972: 175) has even noted that outside 
Nigeria, they have a great tendency to form unions, for instance in Ghana. 
We should assume that the content of the village/urban network through 
social organisations is political, Social, economic and cultural, but we 
shall later determine the content statistically. 
An important characteristic of these social organisations is their age. The 
older the clubs, the more they are predominantly oriented towards 
traditional values and thus their mode of in-group communication and 
political behaviour are confined to traditional village ways of life. Also 
the age of the clubs-is clearly indicative of social change in Nigeria. 
Tableý 3: 10 
The Age of ReSDondents' Of Social Organisations 
GrouPs 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60+ Total 
Traditional (16) (4) (11) (0) (3) (9) (43) 38.1 
37.2 9.3 25.6 0.0 7.0 20.9 100 
School Leaver (6) (3) (0) (0) (0) (2) (11) 9.7 
54.5 27.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.2 100 
Urban Poor (4) (1) (0) (0) (0) (5) (10) 8.8 
40.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.5 100 
Urban Elite (18) (7) (5) (1) (0) (2) (33) 29.2 
54.5 21.2 15.2 3.0 0.0 6.1 100 
Rural Elite (9) (2) (0) (0) (2) (3) (16) 14.2 
56.3 12.5 0.0 0.0 12.5 18.8 100 
column (53) (17) (16) (1) (5). (21) (113) 100 
46.9 15.0 . 14.2 0.9 4.4 18.6 100 
Number of missing observations - 40 
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If modern political systems should use the social clubs f or political 
support and mobilisation, it is imperative that the majority of the clubs 
should be modern in terms of their network content and linkage, leadership 
and orientation. 
Generally, 49.9% of the clubs are only 1-10 years old, 15% and 14.2% are 11- 
20 and 21-30 years old respectively. An interesting comparison here is 
between the traditional group and the urban elite group. These two groups 
are the polar opposites in the system, and the two extremes of years of the 
clubs' existences can be associated with these groups to show different 
group orientations. 
From this table, too, it is both the tradtional and urban elite groups who 
belong to the same type of youngest or newly formed clubs and indeed the 
urban elites are increasingly dominating new social organisations. This 
supports the hypothesis that modern clubs are founded oriented towards the 
needs of modern socio-political and economic needs, both in the. city and the 
village. The conflict between modernism and traditonalism in these 
processes, in which the modernising elites dominate in the city and in the 
rural areas, has -its basic- foundation in social organisations and changes. 
They are now organised in such a way that the roles of the elders, 
traditional chiefs (though the modernising and political elites today take 
the - titles of traditional chiefs, eg Zik (Owolo of Onitish), 0jukwu, now 
Chief 0jukwu, Barrister Mbakwe - former governor of Imo State (now Chief 
Mbakwe), Awolowo (Chief Awolowo). Thousands of Nigerian political leiders 
today have taken the title. of traditional chiefs as well as traditional 
religious leaders of the North, where there is no clear demarcation between 
political leadership and religious (Islamic) leadership. 
Earlier, I have argued that this processs in which African, particularly in 
Nigeria, elites are taking up 'the titles, roles and duties of traditional 
chiefs, elders and emirs is rapidly eroding the traditional values in 
Nigeria. It also makes them dominate in the rural as well as in the city 
political and economic activities. 
The close association between modern social organisations and the 
traditional group and urban elite group is crucial in understanding 
political communication network based on kinship and tribal connectedness 
and linkages in Nigeria. We have seen in this study that the majority of 
Nigerians live in the rural areas. Table 1: 9 supports this statement, 
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particularly when Eziama is compared with Owerri which is predominantly 
Igbo, where the study was conducted. 
There are two main implications of this association. Most political leaders 
in Nigeria seek and mobilise the. greater number of their political 
supporters from their ethnic origins. Since by democratic rule the number 
of votes decides who gains political power, a campaign outside one's own 
ethnic, even local government area, is deemed a waste of time and money by 
politicians, no matter how much media coverage they obtain. In order to 
secure firm local support, they displace traditional chiefs and make 
themselves one. They often reside in the cities but appoint some henchmen 
to run everyday undefined 'traditional chiefs' roles for them. They 
occasionally come to the village to distribute food, drink and money to some 
poor local people to enhance their prestige. In the cities, because of the 
close link between local rural communities and the communities through 
social clusb, the- 'elite-traditional chiefs' also exercise enormous 
influence in the urban and rural areas. The relationship between them and 
their communities is economic obligatory such as finding jobs, providing 
housing and car allowances, contracts awards, scholarships for tribesmen. 
They do so only when they have control over government resources. I argued 
earlier that the obligatory help which the -elders and elites in the city 
offer their young ethnic migrants enhance their 'popularity in the town ýnd 
in the city among their tribesmen. This popularity in turn is exploited for 
economic and political power by the 'benefactors'. 
The second implication as illustrated by the survey is that the old 
organisations between 51-60+ are dominated by the traditional network group 
(42.9%) and only 9.5% of the urban elites belong to such organisations. 
These old organisations are heavily traditional and their contents do not 
reflect the modern political and social systems but uphold those values such 
as yam festival3, age group ceremony, etc. Their foundations 
' 
are becoming 
strongly shaken by Europeanisation in some respects. - They -are greatly 
pressured to become economically conscious, particularly by the way money is 
now used on an individual basis to influence voting. 
However 9 we must note that in Nigeria social clubs are all-embracing 
socially. They have different purposes, intents and needs by those who 
belong to them. To some extent their names implicitly 'designate their 
roles. If a club is identified as 'social' it could have constantly 
shifting values (core and peripheral) in termb of social or political. For 
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Club 19, for instance, in a time of military rule it was implicitly 
political (peripheral value) but in a time of civil rule social (explicit or 
core value); this depends on the characteristics of those who form the 
majority of the social club. 
The stronger the ethnic network ties through clubs and social organisations, 
the more likely it is that a political candidate in the organisation would 
use it as a unique organisation to mobilise political support within the 
whole ethnic group, extending from village to city and between cities and 
villages. A quasi-political group could emerge from it for effective 
political communication network. The role of quasi-political groups can 
become so pressurising that tension builds up between ethnic groups, in the 
city and to a certain extent between villages as was the case in the last 
general elections in Nigeria. One noticeable role of the action-set and its 
emergent quasi-political group is the general political participation it 
generates within the community. Its role makes it impossible for anyone to 
be classified as an 'isolate'. Characteristically, the action-set and 
quasi-political groups, eg the Ikemba Front, disappear as overt political 
groups after elections. 
We should now identify different organisations and also consider how they 
are politicised. 
Social organisations in Nigeria, as I pointed out earlier, may involve 
specifically social relationships between members but in general they are 
traditional, religious, political and economic in character* It is their 
character, therefore, that determines their content, Content here is 
important in interpersonal communication within the group. Indeed , it is 
communication that is the main purpose of the link between participants in 
the social network. 
In the survey, respondents were asked to name their social club, union, etc. 
In Nigeria, names of social organisations can to some extent indicate the 
character of the association. But it requires participant observation to 
know exactly the content of the member's relationships. 
Generally, 60.2% in all the groups reported that their group organisations 
were 'social', 23.9% religious, 9.7% economic, 5.3% traditonal and only 0.9% 
political. The total number of respondents was 113 and 40 refused to 
indicate the names of their clubs* But it is important to understand the 
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relationship between these unions and the different network groups so that 
we can evaluate them in terms of political association or whether they are 
used as such during an election period. The data below shows that the 
majority of the clubs are social. 
Table 4: 10 
Respondents' Different Types of Social Organisations 
ExDressed in Row Percentage 
Traditional School Urban Urban Rural Total 
Leaver Poor Elite E lite 
Social (23) (10) (6) (21) (8) (68) 
53.5 90.9 66.7 63.6 47.1 60.2 
Traditional (4) (0) (0) (2) (0) (6) 
9.5 0.0 0.0 6.1 0.0 5.3 
Religious (14) (1) (3) (6) (3) (27) 
32.6 9.1 33.3 18.2 17.6 23.9 
Political (0) (0) (0) (1) (0) (1) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.9 
Economic (2) (0) (0) (3) (6) (11) 
4.4 0.0 0.0 9.0 35.3 9.7 
Total (43) (11) (9) (33) (17) (113) 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
There are various interpretations of this. Since political parties exist in 
Nigeria, it is unusual to find an organisation outside the existing parties 
that is overtly political. If this happens, there will be conflicting views 
and opinions between ethnic unions and parties which draw their memberships 
from both social and political party organisations., For instance, the Igbo 
Union before the Civil War was the strongest national Igbo ethnic union from 
which NCNC mobilised a network of ethnic political support. Similarly, at a 
more local level, the Mbaise and Abiriba unions studied by Audrey Smotch, 
also supported NCNC. We can now see why there is near zero associaton 
between groups and social organisations that are overtly political. 
It was the politics of Nigeria during the colonial period and between 1960 
and 1966 that encouraged the development of a pan-Igbo organisation - the 
Igbo State Union. Other ethnic groups had similar ethnic organisations for 
political and cultural reasons - Egbe Omo, Odudwa, Igbirra Trade Union, Ijaw 
Progression Union, ý Idoma Tribal Union, Bornu State Union (Nwabueze 1985). 
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But the Public , Order Decree by the Federal Military Governemnt (FMG) 
dissolved and proscribed these ethnic unions. The ban on political parties 
as well as ethnic unions by the military indicates that both political and 
social organisations carrry out in some respects similar functions in 
Nigerian politics. 
In the last civilian government, the Igbo were still desperate to organise 
themselves not through political parties but through an ethnic Union similar 
to, the pre-1966 Igbo State Union. Thus 'a new pan-Igbo organisation' by the 
name Ohaneze formed after the 1979 restoration, was highjacked by the 
politicians of the Second Republic and thereby prevented from growing as a 
pan-Igbo platf orm. It too is now also proscribed by a 1984 Decree of The 
Federal Military , Government which, without specifically mentioning 
particular tribal or cultural associations by name, as did the 1966 Decree, 
dissolves "all movements and organisations (howsoever known or designated) 
established for the creation of more States or local governments in Nigeria 
or for boundary adjustment or otherwise meet to promote ethnic difference or 
likely to destroy or disrupt the Unity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria" 
(Nwabueze, 1985: 4; Political Parties (Dissolution) Decree 1984). 
Practically,, each time the military dissolves political parties, they also 
do the same to major ethnic organisations. 
Therefore it would be a gross misinterpretation to draw a sharp line between 
the political and social roles of organisation in Nigeria. For most of 
them, they are the only body in which a local community can reach a decison 
on how to embark on community projects, support other communities in similar 
ventures, settle disputes between individuals and villages in the community. 
Though traditional town councils exist, they are more or less part of the 
social organisations in the village. This is because local government 
authorities have no control over how these town councils are run in, the 
village. 
The value of several social organisations transcend political activities, 
particularly during national election periods. Though they could be used by 
political candidates, unlike 'action-sets' which disappear after national 
elections, social clubs continue their general function. The most active 
modern participants in social clubs are the young school leavers, 90.9% 
belonging to social clubs. This again supports the view that quasi- 
political groups can emerge during an election period from the social clubs 
but soon after the election the emergent group disappears, and becomes 
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reabsorbed into the mainstream of their social clubs. 
Another important revelation in the data is the sharp difference between 
social and traditional unions. Except in the traditional and urban elite 
networks, there is no correlation between groups and traditonal social 
organisations. But there is a danger in interpreting the relationship as a 
complete breakdown in traditional values in Eastern Nigeria. The word 
social club in Nigeria generally has a very ambiguous meaning. We should 
not be led to conclude that modern social clubs have displaced traditional 
ones. Conversely, what the data is really indicating is that there is a 
shift in emphasis of cultural values which are influenced by Christian 
values and modern education as the elite groups are actively involved in 
them. Yet, traditional values remain important in the interaction between 
members of a club. 
As we shall see shortly, the traditional importance of these social clubs 
will be revealed when we examine membership criteria of these different 
'social' - organisations. We have noted that the most important 
characteristic of ethnic or tribal group systems is the kinship network 
system. The more that kinship constitutes the principal criterion for 
-membership, the more 
likely that- traditional vilues are embedded in he 
content of network of the relationship. 
In the survey, religion is the second most important association. We also 
found that the majority in the state are Catholics (75.5%). Their 'clubs' 
have not been very actively involved in the past in politics, but during the 
last civil government they were actively involved, particularly because of 
the state take-over of Catholic schools and colleges. 
Economic association is not an insignificant issue in Nigeria. Though it 
scores a lower percentage than religion and 'social' associations, it may be 
the most important underlying factor in political participation, either at 
individual or group level. In this data, the stronger relationship between 
rural elite network and economic association is historical. Teachers who 
make up the majority of the rural elite network were very poorly paid before 
the Ude-Ochi Award. 3 But to maintain their prestige as an educated group, 
they formed 'organisations exclusively of teachers, who make monthly 
'contributions' to its members to supplement low wages. The non-payment of 
teachers salaries for several months during the last civil government 
reactivated such organisations. At this stage, we cannot state 
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qualitatively the roles of these social organisations during the last 
general elections in Nigeria until later. Meanwhile, we should determine 
statistically the relationship between different groups and criteria for 
membership of social organisations. 
In Nigeria there are a few criteria which qualify a person or group of 
persons to be'accepted into a social organisation. These include members of 
the same kin or village community, ethnic group, or state, men and women of 
the same professiont members of the same religion, interested Nigerians, 
Nigerians and foreigners. 
on the basis of the strong relationship so f ar observed between dif f erent 
groups and demographic variables akin to kinship, my hypothesis is that 
kinship is the most important criterion for social organisations' membership 
in Imo state. 
In the survey the respondents were asked to state from a list of criteria 
which ones are the basis for membership of their unions or clubs. The table 
below shows the absolute number and percentage score for each criterion. 
Table 5: 10 
Frequency of Respondents' Visits to Relatives in the City/Township 
_ 
Groups 1 -2 3 4 5 6 7 
Traditional (19) (4) (4) (1) 0 (16) (3) 
14.3 3.0 3.0 0.89 0.0 12.0 2.3 
School Leavers (5) (2) (1) (0) (2) (0) (2) 
3.8 1.5 0.8 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.5 
Urban Poor (5) (0) (0) (0) (4) (1) (0) 
3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.8 0.0 
Urban Elite (13) (2) (3) (0) (5) (9) (4) 
9.8 1.5 2.3 0.0 3.8 6.8 3.0 
Rural Elite (3) (4) (6) (0) (3) (3) (1) 
2.3 3.0 4.5 0.0 2.3 2.3 0.8 
Total (45) (12) (14) (1) (14) (30) (16) 
33.8 9.0 10.5 0.8 22.6 12.0 7.5 
1- members, of the same kin 
2- members of the same state 
3- members of the same professio n 
4 members of the same street 
5 members of the same religion 
6 interested Nigerians 
7 Nigerians and foreigners 
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Statistically the two most important unions in the survey are kinship 
(33.8%) and religion (22.6%). These two social elements have been dominant 
social factors to date. Indeed, their persistent dominance should reveal 
something about the structure of political communication networks in 
Nigeria. 
in Chapter Two I argued that, within the three major tribes in Nigeria, 
numerous minor ethnic groups exist, and in the cities they are united by 
their tribal social organisations. 4 In the light of the elite and elite 
formation debate, I pointed out that leadership struggles among them have 
taken both local and national dimension. Politically, this development led 
to the breakdown of ethnic unions as supporters of one single ethnic leader. 
Ethnic support may not be weakened but a split occurs as a result of 
competing elites within a community. Individuals could still, participate in 
politics without seriously involving ethnic unions. But I stressed that, in 
regions where religion and politics cannot be separated, individuals and 
groups could find it difficult to participate in politics without belonging 
to and using religion as the basis of politicial support and mobilisation. 
In various ways, the above table supports this argument but this will become 
more explicit in later sections, where I shall show the relationship between 
'social' organisatons and the network groups' Political participation. 
Since idnship and religion are the two most important factors that separate 
Nigerians and also form the most important criteria for group integration, 
politicial integration which draws its strength from ethnicity and religion 
is still very weak in Nigeria. The state creation in Nigeria was a 
political attempt to give the minority ethnic groups a say in Nigerian 
decision-making. It was also designed as an effective means of weakening 
the strength of the Igbo during the Biafran struggle. In many respects, the 
state structure reflects ethnic/kinship structures in. Nigeria. The data 
indicates that 10.5% of the respondents' criteria for social club membership 
is based on state origin. This state criterion for membership was 
deliberately separated from kin membership so that we shall be able to 
pinpoint the groups who are most involved in such organisations. In Nigeria 
today the term-statism is rapidly replacing tribalism. The highest (4.5%) 
membership of such an organisation is the rural elite group. The statels, 
particularly Imo Statels, non-payment of teachers' salaries and severity 
with which the teachers' strike in 1982/3 was handled bv the state 
government pushed teachers to unite through unions against the government. 
These unions had important political effects during the 1983 general 
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elections in Imo-state, 
Besides this point, therefore the 10.5% for state should be added to kins 
membership making the total score 44.3%; other criteria put together scored 
20.75%, besides religion which in Nigeria has strong correlation with ethnic 
groups. 
Membership of 'social' organisations based on the state of origin becomes 
important when Nigerians live in states outside their own, particulary among 
the urban poor who depend on such. organisations for economic support 
information, and socialisation. In the survey, 3.8% of the urban poor 
maintain that kinship is the principal conditon for club membership, but 
none showed state membership was important. The explanation is that the 
sample was -taken in Owerri - Imo State - where the majority of the urban 
poor come from nearly rural areas which are not ethnically different from 
Owerri itself. Owerri, in terms of Igbo population, is ethnically 
homogeneous so that the poor would often tend towards village associations, 
primarily kins. 
Similarly we saw from Peace's study of Agege Lagos that the closeness of 
most Yoruba Agege residents to their home town helped them to "retain close 
contact with their places of origin, thus in part obviating the need f or 
ethnic associations. " (Peace, 1979: 22). 
Members of the same street do not any longer count as important criteria for 
group association. From personal experience, such association was very 
important during the early part of the civil disturbance, particularly in 
the major cities in Eastern Nigeria - Biafra. The aim was to check enemy 
'infiltrations' by those who lived in the same street. Individuals who were 
suspected of harbouring unfamiliar faces were quickly spotted and the civil 
guards inf ormed. From the data, such street association f or community 
protection and information to authorities has died out. None of the groups 
(except by'chance one traditional group) reported that street membership was 
a criterion for associational membership. The slogan 'Biafra Be Vigilant' 
created such associations at all geographical 'and social quarters in the 
region. It was indeed a very ef f ective inf ormation network and group 
identity during the crisis. 
The importance ý of religion in group formation and association can be over- 
exaggerated if we do not interpret its importance in terms of dif f erent 
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groups - which -indeed is one of the primary aims of the use of network 
systems as units of analysis. If we consider the total number of 
respondents from each groups the urban elites are the least concerned with 
religion as the b asis for membership of the group association. Only in 
general terms as indicated by this data does religion seem to reinforce 
ethnic identity in Nigeria, specifically Imo State. The elite are gradually 
breaking away from religion more than from kinship as an influence in their 
'social' association. As already made clear above, social life and 
relationships in Nigeria have strong implicit economic rewards in all levels 
of society. Even when economic needs are unnecessary, members in the 
network reshape circumstances to their advantage. 
The elite in Nigeria have the best access to wealth and power at national 
level. Since Muslims dominate political power and its distribution from the 
centre, the elite in the south who aspire to power tend to be associated 
with organisations that are open to all Nigerians. In the survey, elites 
scored 3.0%, the highest in all the groups. From this club, information 
about jobs, government contracts (Federal and State), promotion schemes, the 
sale of government propertys eg used cars, import and export licences, etc. 
are exchanged. The needs for economic information do not presently take 
precedence over religion because, as I argued in chapter three, they were 
disoriented from the Nigerian context' and realities by the colonial 
administration. This point was very strongly stressed by Okwudiba Nnoli 
(Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, 1978, pp. 124-127). 
If the colonial policies had allowed for the integrative development of 
economics, religion and ethnicity, most Nigerians could have had close 
business associations, a phenomenon the Nationalist movement could have in 
time modified and incorporated into the body politic oi the nation during 
colonial and pre-colonial times. This development could have encouraged 
leadership co-operation to minimise ethnic conflict which is orchestrated ýy 
pockets of networks of ethnically exclusive social organisations. 
'- 
The 
problem of political integration which has acutely confronted Nigerian 
politicl stability is the problem of kinship associations$, which are a 
strong basis for political mobilisation and support. 
The Civil War and the oil boom, have resulted in the domination by two of 
the three major ethnic groups. Political, bureaucratic and economic systems 
in Nigeria since the counter-coup of 1966 have compelled those excluded form 
the decision-making and power-sharing of the system to enter into economic 
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rather than real political relationships with those in power. This 
interpretation may upset those involved in the game in Nigeriat but it is a 
hard political fact. Nigeria cannot expect political stability by excluding 
a major group or even minority groups in its politics. Nor can stability. be 
achieved by the excessive urge for personal economic, gain from the game. 
Nigeria has failed to address its policies to her real problems and that is 
why there is persistent eco-political instability. 
The influence of economic and kinship/ ethnicity association in influencing 
political participation and voting in Nigeria will be weighed against other 
influences, e. g. friends, the mass media etc. It is clear from an earlier 
statistical table that kinship/ethnic associations are very strong network 
criteria and the extent to which they are channels for political 
mobilisation, support and voting in an election will be assessed; 
If these strongly ethnic and religious organisations are to be used as 
effective networks of political mobilisation, members of them must be 
politically aware of the potentials of their organisation. Political 
awareness is a function of political socialisation. 'Social' organisations 
are secondary sources of political formation after primary political 
socialisation in the family and at school. Within the group, 1ýprizontal 
socio-political communication is functionally effective. Members are aware 
of how decisions are made and executed, leaders elected or appointed; other 
processes similar to, in miniature form, the national political system, 
takes place within these organisations. 
Respondents were asked, as a test of their knowledge of mini-group political 
or social leadership selecton, to indicate how their leaders were selected. 
Two choices were given: (a) by election; (b) by appointment. 76.3% (87) 
said by election and 23.7% (27) said by appointment. There were 39 missing 
observations. Even in the traditional system, where it might be expected 
that ascribed values might influence leadership selection, 73.8% of 
leadership is by election. This particularly supports the hypothesis 
established in Chapter Three that Igbo society, where most of the data was 
collected, is at all levels an egalitarian, relatively individualistic 
meritocractic society. 
This table also indicates that through poitical socialisation - strictly in 
the sense of understanding basic Political processes through membership of 
clubs, unionst etc. -a micro-political environment has been created. What 
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is crucial is to understand how the micro-political social network systems 
can be tapped either by individual members of the group, or the group as a 
whole, to participate in a broader macro national political leadership 
election. The utility of the group for political communication and linkages 
involves internal networks of connectedness and linkages and similar 
processes externally. 
Table 6: 10 
Respondents' Methods of Leadership Selection 
Groups By election By Appointment Total 
Traditional (31) (11) (42) 
73.8 26.2 100 
School Leavers (8) (3) (11) 
72.7 27.3 100 
Urban Poor (7) (3) (10) 
70.0 30.0 100 
Urban Elite (26) (8) (34) 
76.5 23.5 100 
Rural Elite (15) (2) (17) 
88.2 11.8 100 
Column (87) -(27) (114) 
Total 76.3 23.7 100 
Number of missing observatons - 39 
As we have seen in Chapter Two, frequency of contact among people in a 
personal network5 has been important in the interpretation of social 
behaviour. And when a social organisation has the potentiality for 
political utility, such frquency becomes more crucial as the political 
action of the urban and rural branches of the same organisations must be co- 
ordinated. 
A clear understanding of the potential of ethnic unions in Igboland as 
political communication networks that connect village and. cities led Audrey 
Smoch to stress the point thus: 
"The effectiveness of government depends to some extent on the 
amount and quality of information available to the governors. The 
structure of the ethnic unions provided a communication link 
between the community at home and the emigrants residing in other 
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areas of Nigeria. Branches submitted certain kinds of information 
at the request of the central union s in Abiriba and Mbaise and 
usually forwarded proposals from their members. Annual 
conferences to which each branch sent delegates allowed for direct 
communcation among members. -6 
Table 7: 10 
Respondents' Fre quencies of Meeting s in Their Clubs, Unions 
Groups None Once Once Less Once Total 
a a than a 
week month three year 
times 
a year 
Traditional (0) (19) (21) (1) (3) (44) 37.6 
0.0 43.2 47.7 2.3 6.8 100 
School Leaver (1) (3) (6) (2) (0) (12) 10.3 
8.3 25.0 50.0 16.7 0.0 100 
Urban Poor (0) (5) (4) (0) (1) (10) 8.5 
0.0 50.0 40.0 0.0 10.1 100 
Urban Elite (0) (10) (17) (5) (2) (34) 29. f 
0.0 29.4 50.0 14.7 5.9 100 
Rural Elite (0) (2) (13) (2) (0) (17) 14.5 
0.0 11.8 76.5 11.8 0.0 100 
Column (1) (39) (61) (10) (6) (117) 
Total 0.9 33.3 52.1 8.5 5.1 100 
Number of missing observations - 36 
Respondents were asked to state how of ten their unions met. A list of 
frequencies was given: none; once a week; once a month; less than three 
times a year; and then once a year. The table above shows that in all the 
networks, 33.3% met once a weeko 52.1% once a month, 8.5% less than three 
times a year, and 5.1% once a year. There were 117 observations and 36 
missing ones. 
But this generality does not allow an analytic interpretation of the 
differneces in the frequencies of union meetings amongst different network 
groups. of the 36.6% in the trad. itional group, meetings for the union 
members are nearly equally distributed between once a week (43.2%( and once 
a month (47.7%). Rural and urban elites meet less often for union occasions 
with a mode at once a month. 
As pointed out earlier, monthly meetings of unions and clubs, particularly 
for important discussions, decisions, etc., are more popular among monthly 
salaried elite groups in Nigeria. It is at this time that most of them can 
afford to pay their monthly levy or contributions, both in the towns and 
villages. Amongst the traditional group who are predominantly villagers and 
by occupation farmers, such financial needs associated with elite group 
clubs are less emphasised. Members of traditional group meet more regularly 
to discuss not so much how to finance high-cost local projects, but how to 
run the local communityp clean the market-square and village roads and 
squares, resolve conflicts between kin and villages, e. g. land disputes etc. 
Meetings can be called at any time by sounding the talking drums and gongom, 
to repair a widow's house damaged by heavy rain, to bury the deceased in the 
villageg visit a newly-born baby and mother in the clinic, arrange 
marriages. Religious organisations such as the Legion of Mary League, 
St. jude, Boys' Brigades, meet once a week, either on Saturdays or Sundays to 
clean the church premises and to pray. 
This frequency of meeting among villagers irrespective of which organisation 
they belong to. can become an important communication asset for political 
candidates. From our basic theoretical conceptions in Chapter Two, the 
political importance of such social group networks can be enormous: 
a) Most members are of the same kin. Harries-Jones (1969) noted that 
social organisations which form the basis of political associations 
originating from the lowest level of the community can be utilised to 
build up action-sets from a common kinship tie. 
b) Mitchell (1969: 18) therefore stated that the implication of such dense 
networks makes the 'whole network' relatively compact and relatively 
few links between them need to be used to reach the majority, 
C) Such a network intensifies face-to-face communication between members 
of the unions and party representatives in the community. 
d) The cost of travelling, distribution of political leaf lets, and the 
heavy cost of media political broadcasts are reduced. 
But the dangers can also render these advantages meaningless. Personality 
rather than issues and policies are more important for the electorate, 
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tribal politics become intensified, corruption can rock the fabric of the 
society,, the traditional rural population can become antagonistic to each 
other. If two candidates emerge from the same community, at the same time 
contesting an election through different political parties, different 
action-sets can penetrate and divide these ethnic unions strongly built on 
kinship criteria. Political conflict can embrace both national politics as 
well as the family, as was the case during the 1983 general elections, a 
situation which resembled what happened in Britian during the miners, strike 
in 1984, particularly in Yorkshire, with cases of bitter hatred between 
father and son, even a wedding ceremony postponed as a result of the strike. 
We must note that the data have shown that these unions - have leaders and 
they elect or appoint them; therefore leadership within the group as noted 
in Chapter Two provides an intermediary network. Through the leaders 
dangers of splits are minimised, two-way flow or exchange of political 
communication between national authorities, who control violence during 
elections, are maintained so that troublesome action-sets are controlled. 
In this light, therefore,, decision-making becomes important so that group 
social organisation can transcend political election campaigns, which most 
Nigerians treat as very rapid passing events. In the communities, because 
class differences are a recent phenomena and are obscured by kinship 
patterns, social leadership helps us to understand within these unions who 
are leaders and who are followers. In most Nigerian communities, decision- 
making processes involve three categories of people: (a) the leaders; (b) 
selected committee members; and (c) the rank and file. 
In the survey sample 29.9% (35) reported that decisions are made by their 
leaders, 17.9% (21) said that selcted Committees make important decisions, 
while 50.4% (59) stated that , decisions in the social organisations are 
democratically made by all the members. 
However, leadership prevails over democratic decision-making processes in 
the traditional group, 51.1% and 37.8% respectively. The popularity of 
leadership and democratic decision-making in the traditional group reflects 
the nature of the social organisations there. We have noted that kinship 
organisations and religious unions are predominant, particularly in the 
villages. In Chapter Three I pointed out that the egalitarian Igbo 
communities made their decisions in the village squares and market-places 
democratically. This data supports the hypothesis. Equally, religious 
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organisations are more concerned with prayer and the welfare of their 
members and therefore can easily delegate their leaders to make crucial 
decisions. This also reflects the hierarchical order of authority of most 
Christian churches and in particular Catholicisms which is the main religion 
in the region of the survey. 
Among the young school leavers, leadership decision-making is relatively 
lacking (only 9.1%), This is because the group is the most socially and 
geographically mobile group in the society. Steady leadership in the group 
to make decisions for the members whose characteristics allow for rapid 
occupational, residential and status changes is not easy. They are very 
contemporary and dynamic in their activities and therefore delegate members 
to make decisions or take on-the-spot decisions to solve their immediate 
problems. 
The urban poor seem to be settled in their occupations and, residence. They 
are comparatively less mobile geographically and socially than the young 
school leavers. We noted earlier that more of the members of this group 
belonged to older social organisations than the young school leavers. The 
older the social organisation in Nigeria, the more they tend to establish a 
leadership structure in their decision-making processes. For instance 
leadership decision-making in the urban poor is 11.8%, with young school 
leavers only 9.6%. 
One important point to be noted here is that the relative lack of leadership 
decision-making among the younger school leavers makes their organisation 
vulnerable to political uses, either at group level or at individual level. 
Their lack of strong leadership, rapid geographical mobility, lack of 
permanent job and residence make them a favourable group for the political 
candidates communication-set to be used during an election campaign to 
mobilise support during an election period and be discarded soon after 
elections. I argued in Chapter Two that lack of employment among young 
school leavers increased highway robbery in Nigeria and during the elections 
the number dropped sharly. This is because the members of this group, in 
contrast to other groups in this study, lack the formal organisations to 
make effective political demands. They are collectively or individually 
used. The young West African immigrants into Nigeria also constitute a high 
proportion in this group. Thus they lack leaders, form organisations to 
make political demands and are used as thugs by politicians in Nigeria. One 
of the main arguments for the expulsion of illegal immigrants just before 
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the 1983 general election was based on the fear of the extent of 
disturbances and political unrest these young and floating groups could 
cause. This concern was the preoccupation of the politicians, and how this 
issue was regarded as important to the public will be considered later. 
7 
For the same reasons attributed to leadership decision-making among the 
urban poor, the urban elite and rural elite groups depend to a certain 
extent on their leaders. But there is a striking difference here. As I 
argued earlier, 'social' organisations in Nigeria have several but 
ambivalent functions. Thus the urban elite and rural elite have higher 
concentrations of group decision-making based on selected committee and all- 
members democratic decision-making processes. The latter for the urban 
elite, 70.6% and 64.7% for the rural elite. 
one interpretation of the high concentration of democratic decision-making 
among these two networks is that each member has behind him some urge for 
economic and political interest in matters affecting his organisation. In 
such matters, representative decision-making could deny some members their 
eco-political needs, i. e. decisions made in a way that would not be 
conducive to his private desires. The more decisions that are 
democratically madep the more each member somehow gets what he wants, and 
members can proceed to other 'needs'.. It has been generally known that, in 
Nigerian socio-political representation at all levels, when leaders or 
committee groups are delegated to represent their members, the 
representatives put their personal interest first. This statistical 
representation is very important in understanding the content of political 
communication networks of connectedness in Nigeria. It reveals some aspect 
of network content (economic rewards) which can be concealed in sheer 
allegations and superficial confrontations among- leaders when they only 
disagree on how to share the national cake. At club level, those who are 
denied certain needs through representative decision-making often break away 
from the existing clubs, not so much on the basis of different political 
ideological reasons but on the economic benefit of the association or 
'social' relationship, 
Beyond the social club's network of association, the elites who constitute 
the bulk of political representation in Nigeria have expressed, and on 
several occasions shown, their political and economic greed. Lai Joseph has 
made close observations of this argument and it is worth quoting him in 
full: 
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"By their 'own acts , the politicians are ef f ectively teaching the 
Nigerian electorate that the politicians, regardles of their party 
alliance, are not worth dying for because invariably they think of 
their interest first and foremost ... without any debate, the 
House of Representatives on Thurday, march 26th, 1981, approved a 
sum of 24 million for the maintenance of their housing units. -8 
Quoting newspaper coverage on this issue, Lai Joseph goes on: 
-HOUSE OF REPS APPROVES 24 MILLION WITHOUT DEBATE". House of 
Representatives yesterday approved some items for the 1,004 
housing units at the legislators quarters on Victoria Islands, 
Lagos. The amount was approved by the House without debate during 
its consideration of the 1981 appropriation Bill. "9 
Theoretically, I have argued in Chapters One and Two, that the more complex 
a society becomes the more various advanced means of communication channels 
are devised or introduced into the society to reach its members. The use of 
tom-tom, gong-gom or the talking drum etc. in the villages as channels Of 
communication has proved inadequate to serve the information needs in the 
urban areas. I This appropriate mixture of modern and traditional 
communication systems became inevitable in the communities. 
We have empirically established in this study that in Nigeria, ýt least in 
an Igbo-dominated rural and urban population, there is a very strong social 
tie based on kinship between rural and urban networks. This inevitably has 
imposed a new demand on the socio-political communities for modern 
communication systems. This is apparently another level of looking at the 
appropriateness of the convergence model of socio-political relationships. 
As in modern politics, communication and information flow are vital to 
inform members on dates of meetings, where and when it takes place, the 
agenda or agendum for the meeting, implementation of decisions reached in 
previous meetings etc. To circulate information to members who live in the 
cities and in the villages requires at least the following means of 
communcation: 
1) Letters 
2) Oral information 
3) Broadcasts via the radio, TV and the press 
4) Telephone. 
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My hypothesis is' that the more a group is educated, the more it uses modern 
means of mass information systems. A high percentage of rural and less 
educated groups are associated with traditional means of communication and 
in-flow exchange between their members. The table below illustrates this 
relationship. 
Table 8: 10 
Channels of Information From Between 'Social' Club Members 
(Calculated from Row Total) 
Groups Letters Oral Radio TV Press Telephone 
and 
Symbolic 
means 
Traditional (2) (37) (4) 0 (1) 0 
26.0% 54.4% 18.2% 0.0 20% 0.0 
School Leavers (10) (7) (4) 0 (2) 0 
13.0 10.3 18.2 0.0 40.0 0.0 
Urban Poor (6) (7) (2) 0 0 0 
7.6 10.3 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Urban Elite (26) (13) (8) (1) (1) (1) 
33.8 19.1 36.8 50.0 20.0 100 
Rural Elite (17) (3) (4) (1) (1) 0 
18.2 5.9 18.2 50.0 20.0 0.0 
Column (76) (68) (22) (2) (5) (1) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Letters are important means of information exchange between distant members 
of organisations in Nigeria. Members do not need to be all educated in 
order to use letters as a means of communication. Often the organisation's 
secretary reads the letter and translates it into the local ethnic language. 
Letters are either posted or sent by hand to members in the city or in the 
village. Usually a single letter is sent to the branch chairman or 
secretary, who calls a formal or emergency meeting to discuss the content. 
In the survey, 26% of the traditional group communication with their members 
through letters. This is a significant percentage when we consider that a 
high percentage of this group cannot read or write, a point which supports 
the view that the few educated members in the organisation translate the 
letters to others. 
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A small number of the urban poor depend on letters for information exchange 
between its members, another important reflection on the level of 
educational attainment among this group. 
There is a strong relation between the traditional group and the use of 
face-to-face communication and symbolic means for information circulation 
among its members - 54.4%. This implies that slightly more than half of the 
respondents in the survey at social organisational level within a specific 
group use traditional means of communication for information circulation 
among its members. This is a more important reason why the study of 
political communication in Nigeria should not ignore the face-to-face and 
symbolic communication processes. Virtually every group in the survey makes 
substantial use of this medium in its 'social' interaction among its 
members. The use of face-to-face communication for information circulation 
within an organisation is a structurally horizontal pattern of 
communication. 
On the contrary, information via radio, TV and the press are verticaL, 
Accessibilty reflects the pattern of'power relationship in the society.. The 
use of radio for information circulation among members is dominated by the 
urban elite. - Urban environments no longer permit the use of gong-gom, tom- 
tom, talk drum or the circulation of information by word of mouth. Hence 
the group makes extensive use of radio, which is an instant circulation 
medium capable of reaching members in the cities and villages at very short 
notice. But the cost of air timeý is of ten too high for the poor groups to 
afford. 
A small number of people use radio for information in the rural or 
traditional group. This is not mainly because of cost but as a result of 
the structure of socio-political relationships in the village,. which in 
itself facilitates information as efficiently or more so than radio. 
Despite the use of local language for radio broadcastings Nigeria's use of 
the medium for information among groups is not as popular as the use of 
face-to-face communication. 
TV is a new medium of information in Nigeriat and most stations, as we have 
seen, are owned by the state. Access to it is exclusively to the political 
decision-maker. - The sets are expensive. To buy air-time can prove too 
expensive even for the urban elite group of organisation. But we also saw 
that the majority of these social organisations are kinship-based, and the 
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second largest is the religious organisation. These are not rich enough to 
afford the cost, consequently only one each in the urban and rural elites 
reported that they used TV for information circulation among members. 
The press has not,, as the data show, been an important medium for 
information exchange among all the social groups. The use of the telephone 
seems to be out of the question among all the network groups. 
In general the data supported our hypothesis that traditional media are more 
predominant among the less educated group. The only medium which has a 
relatively strong relationship among all the groups, including the urban 
elite, is radio. Other electronic media networks, TV, telephone and the 
press, indicate an insignificant statistical relationship with all the 
groups as media for information circulation among social club members. 
This reflects accurately the conclusion of Golding and Eliot (1979: 186) that 
in Nigeria, as in most developing countries, "radio is the major medium in 
terms of audience size, and probably influence. Television is a minority 
medium, however elite and influential its small'audience. Newspapers, less 
closely controlled by the government, are seen by many journalists to offer 
greater licence for the exercise of professional skill and discretion. " 
The issue here is that in the history of mass media development in Nigeria 
the structure and functional developments have not allowed for the mass, 
cultural, social, economic and political participation through the media. 
State control of the media has led to mass alienation from the media and 
lack of knowledge of how they could use them for social participation in 
groups. 
This alienation of the masses from the use of the iiedia for their 'social' 
activities can also af f ect their understanding of the use of the media f or 
political participation. The relationship between social participation and 
information flow through the media among club members can be relevant to the 
masses' use of the media for political participation. To use the media to 
inform clubs union, etc. members about club activities is not so much 
different from using them to inform them on political issues, e. g. voting. 
The main difference is in content rather than direction of flow of 
information. At times the formats used can be exactly the same. Later we 
shall eýamine in the network relationship context the association between 
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various groups and their degrees of participation in the last general 
election through traditional media and electronic media. 
The need to use the media for social or group information exchange is very 
important in Nigeria because most Nigerians belong to 'social' organisations 
in the villages and towns. In the survey 83 respondents belonged to 
different clubs. Some belong to between 1-5 clubs that are set up in the 
town, while 95 respondents belonged to similar clubs social organistions 
that exist both in the villages and in the cities. This is a clear 
indication that through 'social' organisations villages and towns are 
strongly linked. 
The relevance of this village/urban linkage through 'social' organisations 
in political communication is that 'unions' constitute an important level 
with which we can apply convergence models in Nigeria. Secondly, it helps 
us to reveal the structure of political communication which is the basis of 
network analysis, particularly if these clubs, unions, etc. were to be used 
politically by the political candidates to mobilise political support in'the 
villages and in the cities. Thirdly, the pattern of horizontal, i. e. group 
interpersonal communication and the way group leaders link individual 
organisations in order to mobilise nation-wide political support for the 
candidate. Fourthly, in attempting to reach wider national audiences and 
group support, the group leaders invariably use the mass media -a process 
in which formal organisations use formal communication institutions for 
political purposes. 
However, before we can statistically establish whether these unions were 
effectively used as a medium for political support, participation and voting 
in the last general election in Nigeria, it is important to assess further 
how members of the group interact. Group interaction is more overt when 
members wish to solve their common problems. ' The levels of interaction 
between members indicates who are the leaders and who are followers. Those 
in the 
, 
group who are relied upon more than others tend to be closely 
associated with leadership roles. Are problems solved by members' general 
participation, or left in the hands of a selected committee or the 
President? Whichever method is used, the process is similar to election of 
leadership for a small community, a big city or a nation. In different 
political systems, leaderships are chosen either by general political 
participation (democracy), or by hereditary (feudal system), or by select 
committee (communism); military dictatorship is self-imposed. Members' 
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participation in: problem-solving within their small group organisation is a 
prerequisite to a general understanding of how national political systems 
function. 
Considering the structure of Igbo society as described in Chatper Three, and 
more importantly the strong relationship between different groups and their 
kins which form the basis of group formation in cities and villages, my 
hypothesis is that most unions solve their problems democratically or by 
select committee* 
The strength of relationship between systems of organisational problem- 
solving and different network groups can best be seen in the table below: 
Table 9: 10 
Club/Unions Problem-Sovling Methods Expressed In Column Percentaze 
Groups Members Discuss Selected The President Total 
Problems Committee decides how to 
solves the solve them 
problems 
Traditional (36) (9) (0) (45) 
80.0 20.0 100 
School Leavers (6) (4) (1) (11) 
54.5 36.4 9.1 100 
Urban Poor (8) (2) (0) (10) 
80.0 20.0 0.0 100 
Urban Elite (22) (10) (1) (33) 
66.7 30.3 3. o 100 
Rural Elite (15) (2) (0) (17) 
88.2 11.8 0.0 100 
Column (87) (27) (2) (116) 
Total 75.0 23.3 1.7 100 
Though we have seen that traditional channels Of communication and the radio 
are the most important media of information flow between members of a union, 
this could be only one aspect Of political communication participation 
through 
, 
social processes. But it is through actual participation of members 
of the group in solving unions' problems that the individual becomes 
politically socialised. 
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In the survey, 87 people reported that in their unions problems are solved 
by all the members' participating, while only 27 reported that a 
representative committee attends to a union's problem. The number who 
reported that their chairman or presidents solved their problems were only 
two. 
In all the groups members overwhelmingly use decision-making as a democratic 
process: social systems in Igboland are participatory activities. Thus, if 
these patterns of decision-making, problem-solving and network of 
connectedness in social groups formation should bear any practical 
relationship to the political systems and practices, we could anticipate 
that Nigerians within the Nigerian political context are very articulate. 
If also this remains consistent with other socio-political relationships, 
the role of media as a major political instrument of influence should be 
questioned. 
So far we have demonstrated that kinship is linked with membership of social 
organisations. Religion is the second most important relationship. The 
processes of communication in groups are related to the kinship system and 
radio, owing to its characteristics, is an important medium of information 
circulation among members of the club. We have found out that these clubs 
exist in the cities and villages. This is a rather over-generalised 
statement which would render analysis of political communication vague if at 
any stage in this study social clubs constitute an important analytic base 
in national political participation. The geographical level, i. e. village, 
city, divisional, state, national and international levels, in which these 
clubs, unions etc. exist constitute, an important level in which political 
candidates and their communication-sets can mobilise political support 
through unions etc. This will help us to test some of the theories of 
networks established in Chapter Two, such as proximity, obligatory 
relationshipt density, kinship, friendship and acquaintance in political 
mobilisation processes. 
we shall now associate these political activities, with different groups in 
order to examine the level of political participation through the clubs. 
From the table, it is evident that social clubs in all the groups exist at 
the levels in Nigeria where one would expect national political activites to 
operate during national elections for leadership 'selection. In the past, 
general elections in Nigera were influenced by tribal organisations so that 
wherever Nigerians lived within the countrys they voted according to their 
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'homeland' in support of a particular ethnic leader. 
There As an important -relationship in the groups revealed by the data. 
The 
number. of respondents who reported that their clubs have international 
links 
are higher in the traditional group and young school leavers group than 
in 
the urban and rural elite group. 
Table 10: 10 
Respondents' Levels of Social Organisations 
GrouPs 
Traditional 
School Leavers 
Urban Poor 
Urban Elites 
Rural Elites 
Column 
Total 
Village City Divisional State National International 
(39) (25) (14) (12) (12) (4) 
50.0 42.4 41.2 36.4 30.8 33.3 
(8) (8) (2) (1) (6) (3) 
10.3 13.6 5.9 3.0 15.4 25.0 
(7) (7) (2) (1) (1) (2) 
9.0 11.9 5.9 3.0 2.6 16.7 
(18) (15) (11) (13) (11) (2) 
23.1 25.4 32.4 39.4 28.2 16.7 
(6) (4) (5) (6) (9) (1) 
7.7 6.8 14.0 18.2 23.1 8.3 
(78) (59) (34) (33) (39) (12) 
100 100 100 100 100 -100 
We have noted already that religion was an important group association in 
all the groups, particularly among the traditonal network group. The 
universality of -modern religions was reflected in this data. In the 
Catholic Church, religious unions such as Legion of Mary,, Sacred Heart, 
Knights of St. John, etc. have as much international association as the 
Catholic Church itself. Also non-denominational churches have strong links 
with several Evangelical European and American church movements. 
Historically, Islam has strong ties with the Arab world in their ever- 
increasing tendency towards Islamic brotherhood. The political importance 
of organisational relationship at international level is relevant in the 
study of international political communication networks, which is not our 
concern in this thesis. 
Another important relationship in the data is the difference between the two 
elite groups to national clubs and international clubs. The urban elites 
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scored 28.2% (11) for national level and only 16.7% at international level. 
This shows that elites are not interested in religious organisations but on 
national organisationsq for which the criterion for membership is 
professionalism, that excludes the most vulnerable group, the urban poor. 
The table shows that at both state and national levels the urban poor scored 
only 3% and 2.6% respectively. The numbers of the rural elites were evenly 
spread at all levels, rising sharply at national level but dropping very 
sharply to'8.3% at international level, which is associated with religion. 
However, the highest level of association is the village level, once again 
emphasising the strong relationships between all the network groups and the 
rural environment. 
The political imporýance of this national link with villages is reflected in 
the high percentage of traditional groups, 30.8%, who reported that their 
clubs operate at national level. This is because village leaders, for 
political mobilisation reasons, are accepted into national clubs, e. g. Club 
1191 which is a club of implicit socio-political movement at national level. 
As I argued in Chapters One and Two, the elites who worked in the cities 
belong to these clubs and when they retire to the villages also continue to 
be members. We have yet to see how these associations were used as a basis 
for polit. ýcal participation in the last general election in terms of network 
of connectedness. 
If these clubs etc. were to be efficiently used to mobilise political 
support for local, state and national politics, leaders of different groups 
or committees or all the members must be linked. Group alliance for social 
economic, political or cultural activities are the functions of this linkage 
process. In Chapter One I argued in terms of Clyde Mitchell's view that 
social network is a specific set of linkages among-a defined set of persons 
(or group). Their linkages, he argues, have certain characteristics as a 
whole which could be used to interpret the socio- or political behaviour of 
persons or groups involved. This concept implies that, in networks of 
communicaton, linkages are crucial.. The importance of linkage in network 
has been emphatically stressed by Rogers and Kincaid, thus: 
"link is. a communication relationship between two units (usually 
individuals, although the nodes may be groups, or organisations, 
nations, etc. ) in a system. The link is the basic datum in any 
type of network analysis. Without knowing the existing links 
among the units/members in a system, no- type of network analysis 
is possible. "10 
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As our unit of analysis is on group or system networks with similar basic 
characteristics, the characteristics of their linkage are: individuals 
(nodes, leaders), groups (selected committee members); organisational (all 
the members of the club). The table below shows the characteristics of the 
links in relation to different network systems in the survey: 
Table 11: 10 
Structure of Linkage Between Social Organisations 
Groups 123 Row Total 
Traditional (23) (12) (8) (43) 
53.5 27.9 18.6 100 
School Leavers (6) (3) (2) (11) 
54.5 27.3 18.2 100 
Urban Poor (5) (2) (2) (9) 
55.6 22.9 22.9 100 
Urban Elite (14) (10) (9) (33) 
42.4 30.3 8.0 100 
Rural Elite (12) (3) (2) (17) 
70.6 17.6 11.8 100 
Total number (60) (30) (23) (113) 
Total column 53.1 26.5 19.8 100 
1- the leaders 2- selected members 3- all the members 
We have seen earlier that most of the clubs etc. were spread throughout the 
villages and cities in Nigeria. As organisations most of them stated the 
presence of leaders within them. In general, one of the principal functions 
of leadership in social clubs in Nigeria is to link one organisation with 
others for such activites as cultural dances, celebrations etc. Social, 
economic and political activities are important in 'inter- and intra-group 
relationships. If the leaders do not initiate such relationships, delegated 
members of all the members do so. Some of the links, as pointed out in 
Chapter Two, are direct or indirect links through intermediariest eg 
leaders. 
In the survey, 53.1% (60) of the respondents reported that their leaders 
determine external relationships with other organisations. In all groups, 
except the urban elite, over half of the respondents reported that-relations 
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with external organisations are determined by the leaders, this rising to 
70.6% for the rural elite: This implies that leaders act as intermediaries 
between clubs in Nigeria. This indirect linkage between leaders is very 
important in political influence and alliances in Nigeria. The implication 
here is that the majority of the illiterates, who make up a large proportion 
of the network group, can be exploited by their leaders during an election 
period. The members are always given second-hand information concerning 
other unions, particulary those outside the villages. In the process of 
socio-economic changes, the majority of these clubs in the villages have 
changed from the traditional type to modern or a combination of both. This 
high proportion of leadership linkage in the village reinforces the 
theoretical argument in Chapter Two that status in Nigeria are positions in 
traditional terms, but not all positions are status, chiefs, Obias, emires 
and elders. All status are important positions of linkages in the 
traditional, modern or contemporary village/urban political and social 
communication networks. In particular, the elites in the cities occupy 
important positions in the network structures. As 'important' politicians, 
they connect others directly or through their action-set etc. I have argued 
-earlier that in recent years the majority fo these political elites have 
assumed the roles of traditional chiefs, emirs, Alhajis, Obias, elders etc. 
Thus the strong network ties between the urban elite grop and the kinship- 
based organisation in the cities and villages have dual positions in the 
society's traditional and modern political activities. David Knock and 
James Kuklinkski (Network Analysis, 1962, pp. 18-19) have argued that in 
network analysis a position or socio-political role within a subgroup is an 
identifiable linkage point between one group or another. 
These leaders who link their social groups form cliques. Between them there 
are 'strong ties' and between their followers in separate groups there are 
'weak ties' (the concept of direct and indirect ties in network analysis in 
the Nigerian context). This process of clique formation in social 
organsiations represents a particular way Nigerians communica'te during an 
election period. To understand the way cliques communicate with political 
leaders, and the way both cliques and 'politicians manipulate the masses 
through kinship and religious organisations, is to understand the 
complexities of Nigerian political conflicts. The analysis of Nigerian 
politics on an ethnic basis has involved the realities of the structure of 
political behaviour and relationships there. Leaders and their cliques 
exaggerate ethnicity so as to exploit the masses. I have shown earlier how 
leaders agree quickly on how to increase their wages and allowance without 
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debates. It is the cliques, the elites, all those with status and position, 
who collaborate at all levels to include the use of the media to manipulate 
the masses for their own political ends. 
The high percentage of linkages to external groups etc. by leaders tend to 
emphasise that linkages take place through structural equivalent positions 
of group leadership. But because of the strong relationship between all the 
groups through kinship and religion, equivalent positions should not stress 
the importance of class or highly stratified equivalent positions such as 
emirs-to-emirs, Obias to Obias, elders to elders, elites to elites. The 
dual position which political elites assume in Nigeria today makes such 
relationships difficult. 
In contrast to decision-making and problem-solving within the organisation, 
where all members and selected committees score higher than leadership, 
direct communication between social groups in Nigeria favours the leaders. 
only 26.5% and 19.8% in all the groups reported that they were linked 
externally by a selected member or by all the members respectively. If 
therefore most Nigerian leaders either in social or political roles are 
recognised or accepted by their own tribes, and upon this their status - 
positions fo r* further powerful positions - are built, it means that most 
clique formation via group leadership would be ethnic in character and their 
mobilisation of socio-political support will be characteristically ethnic. 
What network analysis does is to help us identify in the society those who 
are specifically in this pattern of socio-political network of connectedness 
and why. 
This analysis reduces theoretical generalisation so that particular 
political communication problems can be focused on a particular group in the 
society to solve the problem of ethnicity, political integration etc* On 
the basis of this revelation, it must be argued that thos political leaders 
who have taken the title of traditional chiefs should not take part in 
elective and rational or state representative government, so that new forms 
of network linkages are built away from ethnic and religious-based criteria. 
This is a process in which national political leaders can link with their 
colleagues, irrespective of tribes, on the basis of policy, ideology and 
national political consensus. The major problem of Nigerian political 
instability and corruption is this network of ties based on religion and 
kinship, in which leaders form cliques whose socio-political interests are 
self centred. 
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I shall now statistically examine the statement that modern political 
leaders have increasingly taken dual leadership titles in' Nigeria and by so 
doing displaced the power of traditional chiefs in the rural areas. This is 
a process which gives them position and status in the towns as well as in 
the villages, with larger populations in order to win general -support. The 
questionnaire asked whether the respondents felt that their 'clubs' or 
tsociall organisations are traditional, modern or a combination of both. A 
total of 11.6% (13) reported that their clubs are traditional, 6.3% (7) and 
4.5% (5) from the traditional and urban poor respectively constitute part of 
the 11.6% total. 
Table 12: 10 
The Nature of Social Organisations in the Survey 
Groups 1 2 3 Total 
Traditional (7) (16) (18) (41) 
17.1 39.0 43.9 100 
School Leaver (0) (4) (7) (11) 
0.0 36.4 63.6 100 
Urban Poor (5) (3) (2) (10) 
50.0 30.0 20.0 100 
Urban Elite (1) (16) (16) (33) 
3.0 48.5 48.5 100 
Rural Elite (0) (8) (9) (17) 
0.0 47.1 52.9 100 
Column (13) (47) (52) (112) 
Total 11.6 42.0 46.4 100 
1- traditional 2- modern 3 combination of both 
There is a total of 42% (47) in all the groups who reported that their 
organisations are modern while yet more, 46.3% (52), said that their social 
organisations are both modern and traditional in nature. 
Two cells are very important in this table, 'traditional and urban elite 
groups. Also the relationship between column 2 (modern) and column 3 
(combination of both) are important. 
Only 17.1% of the respondents from the traditional grop reported that their 
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clubs were purely traditional, and among the rural elite none do So. In 
both these groups more'or less half the respondents characterise their clubs 
as both traditional and modern (43.9% and 52.9% respectively). But a 
considerable proportion, 39% and 47.1% respectively, actually reported their 
clubs to be purely modern. Among the urban elite only 3% report that theirs 
are purely traditional clubs, while the remainder are equally divided 
between a purely modern and a modern and traditional interpretation. This 
finding does not only support the idea of dual roles of ruling political and 
bureaucratic elites in Nigeria, but also has several social, economic and 
political implications. 
In all the network groups 9 except in the urban poor group with its nearly 
uniform spread of membership of different clubs, there was a strong tendency 
towards organisations which embody traditional and modern functions and 
roles. Since the elites with strong economics social and political powers 
share membership with the poor, less educated and less well-off, leadership 
positions will certainly fall on the former's shoulders. 
Another important feature of social organisations in Nigeria is the way they 
are financed. Elites tend to demonstrate publicly their economic power over 
the old traditional chiefs by'huge donatiorts and levies on their members. 
The economic strength of the elites has in many respects rendered the worth 
,, of traditional rulers less attractive to the masses of Nigerians, who have 
in recent years become disoriented. Those possessing wealth count, no 
matter how they achieve itl Consequently, those who are poor are excluded 
from the club because they cannot afford the cost of membership. Secondly, 
though they are 'clubs', they are sources from which political leaders are 
recruited and financed. The club members 'lobby' together to obtain federal 
and state contracts in which costs are over-estimated. Donations and the 
resultant 'kick-backs' are made available to political parties. In the last 
two general elections, it was stated that each party should not spend more 
than 1-10 Kobo per vote, but the cost of the elections could not be 
calculated. 
The table below shows the financing of clubs by voluntary donation, general 
levy, village collection, state government subsidy, federal,. government 
subsidy and all of those. 
The bases under which the elites tend to dominate socio-economic and 
political organsiations in Nigeria cannot be disassociated from the colonial 
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influence and introduction of education -missionaries in particular - the 
money economy and new political and ideological relationships. 
Table 13: 10 
The Finances of Social Organisations 
Groups 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Traditional (17) (34) (6) (0) (0) (3) 
School Leavers (7) (8) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Urban Poor (4) (7) (2) (0) (0) (0) 
8.9 7.3 22.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Urban Elites (14) (30) (1) (0) (0) (0) 
31.1 31.3 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Rural Elites (3) (17) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
6.7 17.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total number (45) (96) (9) (0) (0) (3) 
Column 'Iwo 100 100 100 100 
1= voluntary donation 
2- general levy 
3- village gener4l collections 
4- state'government subsidy 
5- federal governm * ent subsidy 6= all of these 
Consequently, African social institutions that were formally sustained by 
shared norms, values and consensus began to depend increasingly on money for 
their existence. Besides these financial needs, ideological pressures were 
put on the traditional leaders and the entire communities by emerging new 
elite groups. The old social organisations were not eroded by radical 
shifts or changes but by gradual absorption and assimilation of new ideas 
from the elites. 
The - data shows that 45 respondents reported that their organsiations are 
supported financialy by voluntary donation, 96 by general levy, and only 9 
by village general collections. There is no government - federal or state - 
support to clubs. Thus the strength of the clubs rests on the financial 
ability Of their members. Those clubs- where members are poor will tend to 
be less important in social, political and economic deýisions in the 
communities. Leaders of more financially powerful clubs will tend to 
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influence leaders of the poorer clubs and their followers. 
The old tradition of village general collection is rapidly dying out and 
only 6 reported that their unions are supported by such collection. There 
is strong relationship between the traditional network group and sources of 
supporting their clubs by voluntary donation, 37.8%, and general levy, 
35.4%. Urban elites showed a similar association on these sources, 31.1% 
and 31.3% respectively. This relationship shows that the urban elites form 
the core of the traditional network unions and clubs. The political 
implication of this data will be shown later on, how money influences 
political participation as a result of network of association between the 
rich and the poor through kinship-based voluntary organisations. 
In conclusion, it was easy for members to assume that their unions were non- 
political but leaders through linkage exploited the association for their 
political ambition. The political climate in Nigeria since independence 
does not permit overt expression of clubs as politicly, but by implicit 
intent they are political. 
Social organisations (unions and clubs) are an important level of political 
communicat. ion linkage between the rural al; d urban population in Nigeria. In 
the survey,, 85.5% of the respondents belong to such organisations. Large 
numbers of. these organisations (74.8%) exist both in the village and in the 
city communities. These organisations are either social (62.2%), religious 
(23.9%), ecoýomic (9.7%) or traditional/cultural (5.3%). Only 0.9% are said 
to be political. 
The high proportion of social organisations which exist in both villages and 
cities supports the point made earlier that social organisations in Nigeria 
can be highly politicised because they form the largest channel for the 
mobilisation of various communities in general election campaigns. 
The democratic process 'of leadership, particularly in Igbo communities, is 
demonstrated by the pattern of leadership in these organisations. For 
instance, 76.3% of the respondents reported that their leaders are chosen by 
electionp while 3.7% stated that their leaders are chosen by appointment. 
When the organisations are faced with problems, members generally discuss 
them to provide solutions, and problems are not left'in the hands of leaders 
or small groups of members to solve. 
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Dif f erent network groups use dif f ernet means to communicate with their 
members in urban and rural areas. Oral communication is the basic form of 
information flow between traditional network group members. Urban elites 
circulate information to their members through letters. In general, 148 
respondents used face-to-face interaction to circulate information, 76 of 
the respondents do so by letters, while 22 use radio and only 5 newspapers$ 
2 television. None at all use the telephone to communicate with their 
members. 
These organisations spread from village to cities and some of them emcompass 
members who live in different parts of the country, and outside it- 
Naturally, when those voluntary organisations are politicised their members 
who live in different parts of the country tend to vote for one particular 
leader or party. 
The organisations are traditional/ cultural (11.6%), modern (42%) or both 
(46.4%). A large number of them (96) are maintained through general 
financial levy on the members, while 45 of the social clubs are supported by 
members' voluntary donations. Some of the clubs in the village (9) are 
supported through village 'money collection' a process which involves male 
and female adults only. Three of the clubs are financed by the combination 
of all the above means. 
In the next chapter we shall analyse the relationship between different 
network groups and their political behaviour and participation during the 
last general elections in Nigeria, taking into consideration the demographic 
characteristics and structure of social relationship of the clubs, unions 
etc. discussed in this and the previous chapter. 
I 
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NMORK GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Chapter Ten saw statistically that formal voluntary associations are wide 
spread in Nigeria. They are not formal political associations but could 
provide important areas in the society in which political participation and 
relationships could be established. In the pre-1966 period, ethnic unions 
particularly in Igboland constituted very important organs of political 
parties. Audrey Smoch in her study of Igbo politics writes: 
"Channels of communication between political representatives and 
the community ran through the ACIU (Abiriba Communal Improvement 
Union) rather than through the NCNC. Emole (the Abiriba 
representative in the Eastern House of Assembly) reported through 
ACIU general conferences and at meetings with branches in urban 
centres, as did the Federal Representatives. The Abiriban 
commýjnity gained another line of' communciation with the House of 
Assembly whený after an Abiriban was elected in 1961, to represent 
an urban area near Port-Harcourt, the Union members made him their 
president in order to benefit from his prestige and possible 
political influence. "l , 
In Chapter One I argued that when an ethnically-based voluntary association 
acts as an intermediary between a community,. such as Abiriba, and a 
political organisation, eg the NCNC, it functions as a node as much as an 
individual who links a community and a political organisation. The 
importance of ethnic unions in a political communication network lies in its 
ability to be conveniently used by a single political leader to mobiliSe an 
entire community for political support. In the national election, the 
linkage of several communities through multi-ethnic unions or a single 
ethnic union becomes very crucial in the understanding of political 
communication networks in Igboland. 
Bef ore the Civil War, the Igbo State Union was an outstanding ethnic union 
through which a single ethnic leader (Zik) dominated (without regional 
opposition) the politics of Eastern Nigeria. Smoch noted that "the Igbo 
State Union claimed to be the representative of fall the Igbos' at the 
regional and federal levels". The political importance of the Igbo State 
Union was so crucial to local communities that "theoretically ... every 
branch of all Igbo ethnic unions" was included in the Igbo State Union but a 
considerable number of them never paid the annual dues and registration fee. 
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Throughout Eastern Nigeria one man dominated the politics through a party. 
The NCNC Party drew its strength from a tribal union, but, if the pattern of 
leadership altered, the ethnic unions which supported a single party and its 
leadership will also be altered. 
In Chapter One I pointed out the danger that in the use of a single large, 
ethnic union as a means of linkage and of political mobilisation at local, 
regional and national levels, any initiative taken by another leader for 
changes both in le'adership and political ideology and philosophy would be 
quickly suppressed. Besides,, oppositon is met with dismissal either from 
the ethnic union or from the political party* Harries-Jones (196: 309) also 
supported this viewo stressing that in the network of politics in Mikomfwa- 
Zambia political activists who formed a new action-set (here action-set is 
equivalent to ethnic *union as a linkage in the socio-political systems in 
the community) were dismissed from the UNIP Party. 
This situation resembles the struggle of leadership between Azikiwe and 
Ojukwu in Igboland during the last general election. The split between 
these leaders and their consequent local and individual identification 
sharply altered the pattern of Igbo politics in Nigeria. The situation was 
not so much the formatign of a new party in Igboland but the identification 
of different popular leaders with different existing parties in the country. 
- 
my hypothesis is that when two strong competing egos-(Political candidates) 
emerge from one ethnic community in the struggle for local or national 
political leadership, the action-sets, or communication sets, will also 
splitq and the community in which the action-set mobilises for political 
support to the ego will also split its roles between the two leaders. 
Ilowever, where the communication-set or union has more historical and social 
relevance than a temporary political or a rapidly passing event such as 
leadership elections, the union may cease altogether to function as a 
political mobilising centre for any of the leaders, particularly during the 
election period. Tensiori between members who identify with different 
leaders can be reduced by temporarily closing down the club or union during 
the election. Individuals who identify with different ethnic leaders and 
parties but one from the same locality will shift from using the formal 
ethnic unions for political mobilisation networks to using friends, 
relatives and families. In these processes, political communication 
networks will seriously affect relationships at all levels of the human 
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institutions, particularly the family. The effectiveness of interpersonal 
political communication network linkages and the influence of the distant 
mass media can then be compared according to the respondent's own view of 
, what influenced him to participate and to vote. Tension rocked the fabric 
of Igbo society so much that people who actually participated in politics, 
under the pressure of friends and relatives, refused to acknowledge in 
public that they were at all interested in politics or that they identified 
with any party. 
In the survey, respondents were asked whether in the last civil government 
they identified or belonged to any political party. A list of the seven 
political parties was given to them and they were asked to tick one only. 
It is assumed that the party a respondent ticked was the party she/he voted 
for. It was impossible to ask direct questions such as "Which party did.. you 
vote for? " Many Igbos, as a result of tension and family conflicts during 
the election, would not give any answers, particularly local teachers who 
were more-or-less political scapegoats because of their political 
identification during the last general elections. The table below shows 
such'identification and voting during the elections. 
TABLE 1: 1-1 
Respondents and Parties For Which They Voted 
Groups NPN UNP NAP NPP Total 
Traditional (12) (0) (0) (28) (40) -36.7 
30.0 0.0 0.0 70.0 100 
School Leaver (6) (1) (0) (4) (11) 10.1 
54.5 9.1 0.0 36.4 100 
Urban Poor (2) (0) (0) (6) (8) , 
7.3 
25.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 100 
Urban Elite (9) (9) (1) (15) (34) 31.2 
26.5 26.5 2.9 44.1 100 
Rural Elite (7) (2) (1) (6) (16) 14.7 
43.8 12.5 6.3 37.5 '100 
Column (36) (12) (2) (59) (109) 100 
33.0 11.0 1.8 54.1 100 
Number of missing observations - 44 
Though there were seven registered political parties, only three, according 
to this table were significant in attracting votes from the respondents. 
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They were NPN, UPN and NPP. They were the 'three parties seen above which 
represent the three major tribes in Nigeria - Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and 
Igbos. 
Generally, in all the groups 33.6% voted for NPN,, 11% voted for UPN and 
54.1% voted NPP. In the traditional network group, votes were split only 
between the two parties, namely the NPN 30% and the NPP 70%. Most members 
in this network group, therefore, did not vote for any other party in 
Nigeria. In the young school leavers, 34.5% voted NPN and 36.4% NPP. In 
this group there is a greater tendency towards identification with NPN than 
NPP. In the urban poor network group 25% vote NPN and 75% NPP. Several 
commentators and writers have described the NPN as the party of the rich and 
without looking at the elites' network groupq particularly the urban elites 
characteristically associated with economic, social and political power in 
Nigeria, one could jump to such a conclusion. None in the urban poor group 
voted for UPN or NAP. 
In the elite group votes were equally split between UPN and NPN (26.5% 
each) . But a higher percentage of 44.1% voted NPP. There are several 
interpretations to this pattern of voting among the urban elites. If the 
rich and the powerful exclusively identified with NPN a considerable number 
of the urban elites in this network group could have cast their votes for 
NPN rather than NPP. What tended to prevail in the NPN party was that the 
majority of its 1dadership was associated with wealth in the most corrupt 
manner. They were men, in fact, who had no concern for political change, 
stabilty and the general welfare of the public. In general, this stability 
is characteristic of Nigerian politics. The majority of the elites who see 
Nigerian politics as a risk-taking venture try as much as possible to stay 
clear of it, and stay even further from the government in power. Some of 
them seriously criticise the system, but do not take against to correct it. 
It has been noted that many elites in Nigeria do not even vote in Nigerian 
elections. Another important interpretation of the data on the urban elite 
is that the majority of the elite were state-employed and the NPP was an 
opposition party to the ruling party, NPN. Thus urban elites would 
naturally vote for the state ruling party. 
The rural elites cast slightly more votes to NPN, 43.8%. than to NPP, 37.5%'* 
The most effective propaganda carried by NPN against NPP'during the election 
concerned non-payment of teachers' salaries by the NPP state government of 
Imo State. The hopes of most teachers were raised by the NPN by the promise 
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of rapid changes -that would take place in their pay conditions if they voted 
NPN. Such propaganda, through the media and through informal networks of 
friends and relatives, worked efficiently among rural elites. Af ter the 
election in which the NPP remained in power in Imo State, thousands of 
teachers were transferred away from their own villages to the remotest 
villages in the state. This made lif e dif f icult f or af ew weeks since most 
teachers disliked moving their families to stations where they had to teach 
in fear of armed robbery. We noted also in Chapter Nine that most teachers 
engage'in dual occupations: teaching, but also. farming on their ancestral 
lands to eke out their living when salaries are not forthcoming. When they 
are transferred away from home, securing a piece of land for agriculture 
becomes difficult. As soon as the army took over the government again in 
December 1983 those affected by this massive transfer rejoiced. This is one 
of the main reasons for the army's popularity at the beginning of the Buhari 
regime. Other factors which contributed to such popularity were the 
elimination of corruption and the detention of politicians. 
One of the serious limitations of the network system analysis based on group 
characteristics such as occupation, educaiton, mobilityq residence, etc. is 
that it tends to conceal the effect of ethnic politics which dominate 
Nigerian politics. If individual characteristics and attributes are the 
maj or clasificatory criteria we cannot illustrate statistically the shift 
and changes in ethnic politics without temporarily resolving our level of 
analysis from network group to ethnic groupings. 
Consequently we should examine the relationship between respondents I ethnic 
origin and the parties for which they cast their votes. We have seen in 
Chapter Four that the political party development in Nigeria was shaped by 
ethnic groupings and even by the creation of states after the Civil War. 
This pattern of political development has remained the same. The table 
shows the relationship between respondents' ethnic origin and the parties 
for which they voted. 
There are two important cells in the table - the NPN and the NPP under the 
Igbo column. There were 122 respondents who actually voted. 102 were Igbos 
and this shows that the urban and rural areas where the data was collected 
were predominantly Igbo communities. 33 (27%) of Igbo respondents in the 
survey voted for NPN while 66 (54.1%) voted for the NPP. If these figures 
are compared with the 1979 general elections as shown in Chapter Seven, and 
other previous general elections in Nigeria, for the first time in the 
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history of Nigerian politics a quarter of Igbos voted for a party other than 
an Igbo dominated party. 
Table 2: 11 
Respondents' Ethnic Origins and the Parties For Which They Voted 
Expressed in Row Numbers 
Political Igbo Yoruba Hausa/ Other Row Row 
Parties Fulani Tribes Total Total 
Number Percent 
HPN 33 1 5 1 40 32.8 
UPN 1 8 1 3 13 10.7 
PRP 0 0 1 0 1 0.8 
NAP 2 0 0 0 2 1.6 
NPN 66 0 0 0 66 54.1 
Total 
Column' 102 9 7 4 122 100 
I argued earlier that once there is a split in leadership within an ethnic 
group the ethnic communities are bound to split along the same line. It was 
the confict between Zik who was the leader of the NPP and Ojukwu who 
identified with Hausa/Fulani NPN that divided the Igbo communities in their 
party identification. The pardon and return of Ujukwu from exile after the 
fall of Biafra altered the pattern of politics in Nigeria, especially among 
the Igbos. 
Another important relationship between ethnically homogeneous villages and 
the cities in Imo, -State is that the majority of communities are Catholic. 
In addition, most of their social institutions or clubs are kinship-based 
(in Chapter Nine we' saw that 75.2% of the respondents are Roman Catholics, 
and in Chapter Ten 33.8% of the membership of 'social' clubs is based on 
kinship 'and 22.6% on religious criteria). Another important factor is that 
decision-making within most social organisations in Igbo communities is 
democratic. These are all conditions which facilitate a rapid network of 
political communication. 
In the first instance, sub-groups in the communities are based on socio- 
cultural and religious cohesion. As shown earlier, broader sub-groups, both 
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in Igbo villages'and other cities in Nigeria are strongly linked by branches 
of kinship unions. Therefore , in many respects, we should expect a 
homogeneity of attitude and behaviour in political participation and voting. 
Through to our analysis on linkages between different 'social' organisations 
and ethnic unions, we discovered that 55.1% of all external linkages in all 
the network groups are carried out by leaders. This is relevant to the 
earlier debate about clique formation and political mobilisation. 
In network analysis, the crucial point made by Barnes, as noted in Chapter 
Two, should be examined. He maintained that groups are linked by lines and 
on the line are actual people who initiate linkages. The linkages or nodes 
are important, in network analysis. My criticism of this point was that he 
failed to identify these individuals on the linkage lines in terms of their 
distinguishing characteristics and attributes, taking for granted the* why 
and when of most frequent group linkages. 
In developing the social network concept of analytic and operational 
networks of political communication, I call the linkages group leaders. 
These leaders are not essentially political leaders but, as Audrey Smoch 
noted in her study of Igbo politics, they are professional politicians, such 
as Emole in the Abiriba local community study, who became a 'social' club or 
ethnic union chairman so that his political position and influence -would 
render benefits to the group. Emole, in turn, linked the union to his 
political party so that through the ethnic union the entire ethnic group, 
rather than the political party, would vote for Emole and his party. This 
two-way flow of political communication can be relevantly applied to the 
theory established in Chapter Two, that in network groups communication and 
linkages are complex and horizontal, and that. there is a general involvement 
in which'everyone is directly linked to others in the group, while linkages 
between groups tend to be vertical and 'single stranded' (structural 
equivalents relationship and clique formation). 
The principal political actors during the 1983 general elections in Igboland 
were Zik and OJukwu. Under Zik's influence Jim Nwaobodo and Sam Mbakwe won 
the governorship of Anambra and Imo States respectively. The NPN performed 
poorly in these states. The new constitution states that for any political 
cnaidate to become a President of the Federal Government in Nigeria he must 
win 25% of the votes in each of, the states. This is an attempt by Nigeria 
to establish a symbolic political leadership with which all Nigerians -will 
emotionally identify, irrespective of tribes and religion. To achieve this, 
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the leader must in turn satisfy the needs and expectations of 25% of all the 
different ethnic groups in Nigeria, This is another point which indicates 
that Nigerian states are established on the basis of ethnicity. With this 
new demand, ex-President Shagari pardoned and recalled Ojukwu from the Ivory 
Coast. The disagreements between Zik and Ojukwu and the defection of the 
former to Nigeria during the Civil War left Ojukwu very bitter. During the 
Civil War, Ojukwu was as much a popular leader among the Igbos as was Zik 
before the Civil War. Hence, unlike other sections of Nigeria, the Igbos 
could identify with two important leaderships. 
In network analysis therefore, the two egos (political candidates), Zik and 
Ojukwu, in their political leadership struggle, began to put pressure on the 
political 'action-set' and the ethnic unions which characterise urban and 
village communities in Nigeria. 
The leaders of these ethnic groups sharply identified with the two leaders. 
The Ikemba militant group (action-set) was effectively mobilsed to oppose 
NPP sub-groups and leaders within Amanbra State. In Imo Stateg the 
influence of Dr. Michael Okpala, who was fighting for the creation of Ibiam 
State under NPN, durther divided the Igbos between the NPN and NPP. Since 
the ýgbo communities in their social, cultural and religious organisations 
are relatively homogeneous, divison among cliques, structural equivalents or 
the liaisons would gradually divide the voting patterns of the co=unities. 
According to my data, one of the major explanations of the 33% votes gained 
by NPN in Imo State, is that the 33% is primarily a result of emergent ego 
(Ojukwu) in the political leadership in Igboland.. In addition, the 
popularity of Zik as Igbo leader is eroding with the emergence of many 
powerful leaders who tend increasingly to identify with the Northern 
dominated ruling party (NPN). Various reasons are given for the alliance, 
such-as offering the Igbos another chance after the Civil War, to enter into 
the national main stream of decision-making in politics and the economy. 
A total of 11% voted for- the UPN, of whom none were from the traditional 
network. Three quarters of all who voted for the UPN came f rom the urban 
elite. A cross-tablulation of ethnic origin and respondents party 
identification earlier revealed the ethnic origin of those who voted for the 
party. (We saw that of the thirteen (10.7%) who voted for UPN, eight (6.6%) 
were Yorubas, three were from other tribes, and only one Igbo man voted UPN. 
This party gained only one vote from the Hausa/Fulani tribe. Similarly, no 
other tribe voted NPP except the Igbos). 
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The table shows ýthat in the survey there were 8 Yoruba respondents and all 
of them voted f or the UPN. All the eight, also belong to the urban elite 
group. Only one Igbo voted for the UNP. This shows that the Igbos and the 
the Yorubas are more politically disintegrated than the Igbos and 
Hausa/Fulani, both in terms of leadership assocation and of the masses of 
the two ethnic groups. The Igbos bitterly resent what the Yoruba leadership 
- Awo - did to the Igbos during and after the Civil War. Ojukwu capitalised 
on this resentment during the 1983 general election and in his speech 
published by New Nigeria Tuesday, 7th June 1983, he told the Igbos at 
Enugu: 
"In a sudden change of tone which held the crowd spellbound, Chief 
Ojukwu told them to reject the UPN leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, 
because he was responsible for their problem. This is the man 
that goaded us into war and then abandoned us. lest we forget, 
this is the man that boasted that starvation was a legitimate 
weapon of war. Lest we forget, this the man that gave us twenty 
pounds for every fortune that we had acquired... This is the man 
that brought indigenisation when we were destitutes and could not 
benef it thereof . Lest we forget, this is the man for whom we 
founded and maintained the UPGA and who repaid us with bullets in 
war. This is the father of tribalism in Nigeria, lest we forget 
this is the man that prevented us from a single legislative seat 
in Lagos State. -2 
At this time t under 
& 
auspices of NPP and UPN, led' by Zik and Awo aný 
other mnority ethnic partiest the leaders decided to form PPA. - Ojukwu 
described the move as a political alliance which "brought two strange bed- 
fellows together". His attack on Awolowo effei: tively reminded the Igbos of 
the past, and they turned down any form of 'good' gesture during the 
election campaign by Awolowo. 
Though the number of Hausa/Fulani and other non-Igbo ethnic groups living in 
Owerri were small, none of them voted for the Igbo-dominated NPP party. Most 
of them voted for UPN or NPN. Despite their close proximity with the Igbos 
in terms of housing, working and social relations, the non-Igbos in the 
community voted for their own ethnic party. Here the argument raised by 
Harries-Jones in the study of the copperbelt town, that links based on 
common rural origin, kinship and proximity are used to establish the 'grass 
roots' organisation of a political party in the copperbelt town, is 
relevant. 3 Though this may be a general characteristic of most multi- 
ethnic cities in Africa, the most important factor is that the rural origins 
of the ethnic groups in the city are strongly linked through unions and 
cliques with the rural social institutions, so that the impact of friends, 
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workmates, and 'neighbours is minimised (Peace 1979). Thus Mitchell 
concludes as we have seen in Chapter Two that: 
"Face-to-face interaction is not a necessary condition for the 
obligations entailed in a relationship to be honoured. There are 
many circumstances where an intense link [in terms of geographical 
proximityp eg housing, work and neighbourhood] with a person 
living some distance away may be an important factor in the 
behaviour of an individual. "4 
There are also other , 
factors besides ethnicity which influence Nigerians to 
vote, It is the interpretation of these other factors which will enable us 
to assess actual changes in political relationships in Nigeria. 
Concentration on ethnicity has over-shadowed various major political changes 
such as the division of Igbo communities between the NPN and the NPP during 
the last general elections. These other factors include party leader/ 
chairman's popularity, party policy/manifesto, party's national achievement, 
ethnic origin, parents' influencel friends' influence, club membership, or 
other reasons. Respondents were asked whihc of these factors had mad the 
respondent join the party. The table below illustrates the scores of each 
network group: 
Table 3: 11 
Reasons Why Respondents' Voted For a Particular Party 
Based on Total Row Percent 
2 
.3 
4 5 6 7 
Traditional (10) (15) (15) (3) (1) (0) (8) 
55.6 25.4 50.0 27.3 50.0 0.0 80.0 
School Leavers (1) (6) (1) (2) (1) (1) (0) 
5.6 10.2 3.3 18.2 50.0 100 0.0 
Urban Poor (3) (2) (1) (2) (0) (0) (0) 
16.7 3.4 3.3 18.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Urban Elites (3) (24) (9) (4) (0) (0) (2) 
16.7 40.7 30.0 36.4 0.0 0.0 20.0 
Rural Elites (1) (12) (4) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
5.6 20.3 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total number (18) (59) (30) (11) (2) (1) (10) 
Total percentage 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1- - voted because of leadership; 2- voted because of policy; 3 voted 
because of party achievements; 4- voted because of ethnicity; 5 voted 
because of friends; 6- voted because of clubs; 7- none of these 
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Leadership 
In terms of sample sizes in all the network groups, the traditional and 
urban elite groups are significantly important. Leadership is an, important 
influence in deciding party membership and voting among the traditional 
network group. It was generally believed that Mbakwe and Jim Nwaobodo won 
the governorships in Imo and Anambra States because they came under the 
umbrella and political shelter of Zik, who was an almost legendary political 
figure of the Igbo, particularly the conservative rural population. In my 
study of the 1979 general election (1982), 1 statistically illustrated that: 
"Chief Charles Abangwuo, an Igbo, but UPN candidate 'polled 6,960 
votes (1%) against Mr. Jim Nwobodo, also an Igboman, an NPP 
candidate who polled 772,061 votes (76%) ... Chief Awolowo himself 
had 7,063 (0.76%) in Anambra State and 7,335 (0.65%) in Imo 
State.,, 5 
I also noted that in the Western State, Yoruba candidates who stood for the 
NPP registered as many low votes as the Igbo UPN candidates in the Eastern 
states of Igboland. 
Though I have aruged that division among leaders could lead to divison by a 
community voting for different leaders,, this is also true if the sub-group 
poitical candidate identifies with a leader who is relatively popular in the 
communities. It is somehow problematic to generalise on this point until we 
are able to show statistically which combination of party alliances could 
lead to political stability in Nigerian politics (according to the view of 
the survey respondents). 
Only 7.5% of the elites (3) and 5.9% of the rural elites reported that 
leadership was a contributory factor in their voting and political 
participation. These low figures in these groups support the notion earlier 
established that Nigerian elites, particularly bureaucratic elites, are not 
much impressed by political leadership in Nigeria. Urban elites (teachers), 
in particular, felt' that political leaders use them during the election 
period for campaign purposes3, particularly when it comes to long-standing 
arrears of their salaries. Most of them were convinced that their salaries 
were used to finance businessmen who openly supported political parties, and 
for election campaigns. Because of the constitutional law, civil servants 
could not take part in politics as openly as businessmen. 
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Party Policy 
Considerable numbers of all the groups voted because of party policies. The 
most important group in this respect are urban elites, 40.7% (24), rural 
elites, 20.3% (12), and young school leavers, 10.6% (6). Only 3.4% (2) of 
the urban poor were influenced by party policies in casting their vo. tes. 
25% (15) of the traditional group were influenced by policy and should be 
regarded comparatively as a low score because of the size of this 
traditional group in the survey. 
The implication of these scores in relation to different networks lies int 
he way party policies are communicated to electorates in Nigeria, Most 
party policies and manifestos are broadcast in formal and highly 
standardised English on the radio and television. Of ten when they are 
distributed in leaflets and published in newspapers they become more 
exclusive to the literate group networks. Those least able to understand 
the contents - the traditional and urban poor - are not influenced by party 
manifestos and policies. When these policies are broadcast in local 
languages, they are presented, as I argued in Chapter Two, as a*summary of 
the English language broadcast. When political leaders are invited to make 
political speeches, or. be interviewed on their policies, they completely 
embark on the use of formal English. This means that party policies on 
various media channels are always addressed to the elite 'class' who can 
meaningfully decode the message and decide how relevant these policies are 
in the context of Nigerian socio-political problems. 
Party Achievements 
The achievements of. parties did not command much influence on the voting 
behaviour among all the groups. The traditional group recorded a comparably 
higher figure, 25.4% (15j. This is because the electrification of rural 
areasp pipe-borne water supply, road and bridge constructions in the rural 
areas were deceitfully speeded tfp by the state governments during the 
election campaign - the ruling government making direct gestures to the 
rural areas. Both governments made more empty promises of what they would 
do if elected to power. The elites were aware how empty the promises were 
and were less influenced by them. They also knew that politicians used 
corrupt means to enrich their pockets and made very little improvement in 
the political and economic development of the nation. 
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The impact of ethnicity, friends and clubs were statistically insignificant, 
large numbers of voters not being influenced by them in their voting 
beahviour. 
Table 4: 11 
Whether Respondentst Social Organisations Were Active During The Elections 
Yes No Row Total 
Traditional (13) (29) (42) 36.8 
31.0 69.0 100 
School Leaver (5) (6) (11) 9.6 
45.5 54.5 100 
Urban Poor (3) (6) (9) 7.9 
33.3 66.7 100 
Urban Elite (10) (26) (36) 31.6 
27.8 72.2 100 
Rural Elite (5) (11) (16) 14.1 
31.2 68.8 100 
Column (36) (78) (114) 100 
Total 31.6 68.4 100 
Various studies in Nigerian politics and other West Af rican, studies , A. 
Lewis (1965), J. Coleman, (1965), Jan J. Milewski (1975), 0. Nnoli, (1978). 
Audrey Smoch (1971), have shown in different ways that groups within major 
ethnic groups constitute important political party supporters. Audrey Smoch 
in particular demonstrated with examples from Mbaise, Abiriba and Port- 
Harcourt in what was formerly Eastern Nigeria that the ethnic union of what 
I term clubs were the backbone of ethnic politics. Even beyond the Nigerian 
experience, Michael Parenti 
("Ethnic politics and the persistance of ethnic 
identification", American Political Science Review, LXI [Sept 1967], p. 724, 
Wolfinger, 1964), speaking of "the development and persistence of ethnic 
vot ing" strongly stressed the importance of ethnic organisations in the 
voting behaviour of Americans. The underlying factor in their studies of a 
network of connectedness in political participation via ethnic unions is 
that, at both local and national politics, where the composition is of 
different ethnic groups, unions constitute important channels through which 
groups participate in politics. 
What most Of them ignored in the study of ethnic unions as channels of 
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political participation was the structure of leadership, both within the 
ethnic unions and political parties in the nation. The study of A. L. 
Epstein in Zambia in Luanshya copperbelt revealed the importance of 
leadership among Malawi, Bozi and Benba where splits in leadership amongst 
ethnic immigrants also caused splits in the group. 
Whea Zik was the most important and absolutely dominant political 
personality in the Igbo-dominated former Eastern Nigeria,, the strength of 
ethnic union as a powerful organisation was expressed thus by Smoch: 
"Divisions of ethnic unions operated as political sub-groups 
within the NCNC to maximise positions and nomination f or their 
members. The intensity of the political conflict was mitigated by 
the common - NCNC allegiance and by the need even for divisional 
groups to co-operate with similar units to gain their political 
objectives. If ethnic unions prompted ethnic competition and 
confrontationg they also induced political compromise and 
accommodation. Ethnic unions commonly traded support f rom one 
another for a specific political goal ... participation in 
politics through the more inclusive divisonal union, rather than 
through the primary village or clan unions actually increased the 
ability of groups to compromise and accommodate. " 
This is a view in which ethnic unions is seen as more instutitionalised than 
a political party. 
In this study, I propose that when leadership splits in terms of party 
identificationt the role of ethnic unions as an ordering force for political 
identities also shifts accordingly. Often the ethnic unions may become 
politically passive channels or remain paralysed during election campaigns. 
Individuals participate in politics without going through their unions. 
In the survey, 31.6% (36) said that their unions during the general election 
of 1983 were active in politics. On the other hand, '68.4% (78) reported 
that their clubs were not involved actively in politics. There were 114 
respondents and 39 did not give any answer when asked whether their clubs 
were active or not in politics. This shows that ethnic unions in Nigeria, 
particularly in Imo State, are no longer powerful channels through which 
entire ethnic groups "compromise" their political beliefs and 
identification. This is an important development in Nigerian politics which 
can no longer be ignored. Ethnic politics is changing direction, not as a 
result Of the influence of the mass media which seems currently over- 
exaggerated, but by the pattern and influence of shift in ethnic leadership$ 
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particularly in Imo State. Such leadership began to emerge in Igboland in 
the 1960s when the Independent Party led by Chiko Obi, an Igbo, slowly began 
to weaken the strength of the Igbo State Union. The influence of Zik, the 
NCNC leader, far exceeded that of Chiko Obi who was regarded as a good 
mathematician and could best serve as a university lecturer, not an Igbo 
political leader. It was popularly known that he jumped into a conference 
hall through the window and when ordered out he explained that the window 
was the shortest point *to his seat in the conference and since he was late 
he could not take the door entrancel 
Ojukwu, who reshaped Igbo politics, was a popular'leader of the Igbos during 
the Nigerian crisis and his popularity was equivalent to Zik's during the 
pre-Civil War period. Earlier I have argued that for two action-sets to 
have effective impacts on a political community the egos (political 
candidates) on whose behalf action-sets, unions,, clubs, etc. mobilise the 
masses for political support, must have equivalent political status. Zik and 
Ojukwu are political equivalents and equally exerted strong influence on the 
entire Igbo communities. In the North the influence of Amenio Kanu, leader 
of the People Redemption Party (PRP), and Alhaja Ibrahim Waziri, leader of 
the Greater Nigeria People's Party (GNPP), were particularly important in 
reshaping Hausa/Fulant politics. The political leadership in the North is 
slightly different from that experienced in the East between Zik and Ojukwu. 
-The last two have different political philosophies, but are historically 
Igbos by origin. Their differences during the Civil War culminated in a 
long standing political bitterness, only to be exploited by non-Igbo 
political leaders so as to create more division and bitterness btween them, 
a situation which rationally affected the entire Igbo communities. 
The Northern leadership divison was an aspect of historical division between 
the original Hausas and the Bornu races who were conquered militarily and 
ideologically by the migrant Fulani during the Rhad. Amino Kanu stood for 
radical change, though his followers Alhaji Abba Musa Emi (Kaduna) and 
Alhaji Mohammed Abubaker Remi (Kano) maintained different' approaches to 
Hausa politics. In principal, the NPN, strongly rooted in Sokoto-dominated 
Northern politics was in many respects a continuation of the NPC Party whose 
powerful leader, the late S4duna of Sokoto, gave the North what they wanted 
in Nigeria and firmly united them as a Muslim political group. Sadunals 
death weakened one man regional political control and brought about the 
emergence of new political leaders. In the 1983 general election five out 
of seven registered parties came from the Hausa/Fulani north. 
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The most dominant and most powerful tribal political leader in Nigeria to 
remain unchallenged by his own people is chief Awolowo. Though the Yorubas 
have produced eminent personalities in different walks of life, none has 
been powerful enough to challenge Awolowo politically as much as Ojukwu has 
challenged Zik to reshape tribal politics in Western Nigeria. It is this 
weakness of the indigenous Yoruba to produce a political equivalent to 
Obafomi Awolowo which makes Yoruba politics most tribalistic. The effort 
made by Chief Abola (as noted in chapter four) to use his popular newspaper, 
The National Concord to demystify the power of Awo, failed because he was 
not nominated the NPN Presidential candidate according to the zoning 
arrangement of the party. As no one from Yorubaland, through a different 
party other than the UPN, confronted the influence of Chief Awolowo, the 
network of political communicatin remains unique along one line, structured 
by one leader, one party, one ego, and one action-set all of whom 
sequentially influence an entire tribal or ethnic community, the Yoruba. 
The notion of party discipline in the UPN is the function of this one 
leadership dominance. The voting behaviour of the tribe is also a 
reflection of this structure of leadership. The withdrawal of Awo f rom 
politics during the last few years of military government that handed over 
to civilian in 1979 was a cover-up to run the new party, UPN, formerly AG 
(Action Group) in týe name of the social club exclusively made up of 
Yorubas. When in September 1979 the' ban on political parties and the 
National State of Emergency were lifted, Awolowo within a few hours 
announced the formation of the UPN Party. By 18th December 1979 about 53 
parties had forwarded appiications to the Federal Electoral Committee, but 
only five were approved, of which three were a continuation of the pre-1966 
political parties. A large number of these parties continued to exist under 
the military regime as social clubs, without changing their criteria for 
membership. 
The political activities of these clubs varied widely. Their interests 
range from local infrastructural development to national semi-political 
activities. Some of them are active during election periods, some all the 
time irrespective of elections, but the majority of them tend not to be 
politically active at any time. This does not mean that those non-active 
political clubs are not used by their leaders as political mobilisation 
channels. 
In the survey, the table below shows that only 21.9% of respondents reported 
that their social clubs are most active during an election period. More 
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than half of these come form the traditional group. Only 8.7% f rom the 
young school leavers, 4.3% from the urban poor, 26.1% from the urban elite 
and 8.7% of rural elites stated that their social clubs were active during 
an election period. 
Table 5: 11 
Resp ondents' Social Or ganisations and Their Activities 
Or Otherwise During Election Periods 
Groups Most Active Active all Never active Row 
During the time in politics Total 
Election 
Period 
Traditional (12) (10) (20) (42) (40.0) 
28.6 23.8 47.6 
School Leavers (2) (3) (4) (9) (8.6) 
22.2 33.3 44.4 
Urban Poor (1) (2) (7) (10) (9.5) 
10.0 20.0 70.0 
Urban Elite (6) (6) (18) (30) (28.6) 
20.0 20.0 60.0 
Rural Elite (2) (2) (10) (14) (13.3) 
14.3 14.3 71.4 
Column (23) (23) (59) (105) (100) 
21.9 21.9 56.2 100 
These figures represent important network group relationships to politics 
through social organisations in Nigerian, and in particular Imo, State. 
During the election periods several of the elite clubs in Imo, State were 
sharply divided in their political supports to either NPN or NPP. The 
reasons' are related to points raised above on the concept of splits in 
leadership and subsequent clubs division along different ego (political 
candidate) identification. An illustrative example of an elite club divided 
and lmost paralysed form its noble start in 1982 is the Udo Eziama 
Association, a town made up of eight villages where most of the rural raw 
data for this-thesis was collected. The club is exclusively made up of the 
most educated, the wealthiest and most respected personalities of the town. 
A brief statment from a letter which the secretary of the association, Mr. 
N. A. Iwunwah, Vice-Principal Eziama Commercial Secondary School, circulated 
to members of the assoication after the 1983 general elections is presented 
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below. The intention was to remind the members of the association that 
elections were over and that they should once again come together and act as 
one body, one organisation, to achieve some of their goals. He concluded 
the letter by pleading gently, thus: 
"Let us re-examine ourselves in the light of the present and 
dedicate ourselves anew to Udo Nna before the clouds gather over 
us * We can make it if we will. Eziama is our only indigenous 
town. We have no better place than home. Long live Udo Eziama, 
Association. 
Long live Eziama. 
Long live Nigeria, "7 
This letter reveals the important political communication network in the 
villages during the election. Members of the more elite clubs became 
members of different clubs to collect information which they then used to 
mobilise political support on behalf of different political candidates. 
Most of these elite members could not influence their fellows in the same 
club because they shared different political views and interests. Their own 
clubs, therefore, tended to be relatively indifferent to politics, 
particularly in the rural areas. On the other hand, those associations 
strongly based on village kinship systems and religious organisations became 
more important political targets where different elites concentrated to. 
mobilise political support. The traditional groups constituted the majority 
in the associations exploited by the elites. During the 1983 general 
elections different small village organisations confronted one another 
politically, spearheaded by two or more members from the the non-active 
elite associations such as the Udo Nna Association. The traditional groups 
did not only organise themselves as political wings but also as pork-barrel 
associations to receive the 'essential commodities' - rice, stockfish, sugar 
etc. - artificially made scarce by the ruling party during the elections. 
As Awolowo declared during the Nigerian Civil war that starvation was a 
weapon of war, so did the artificial scarcity of essential commodities 
during the election period become an important means of political 
mobilisation. Essential commodities reached the poor through the elites in 
the villages. Prior to the election, it was widely believed that ýNPN 
businessmen and politicians were granted import licences for these basic 
commoditiesq which they then hoarded. Existing rural associations were 
dissolved and then reconstituted in conflicting groups. Basic commodities 
and money were used to buy votes. 
"In the Bendal State the UPN Government is exploiting this 
difficulty to the hilt and more than one NPN candidate has accused 
the Party of encouraging the hoarding of basic commodities so as 
to be able to accuse the NPN of pushing up prices, "8 
Higher prices indeed meant higher marginal profit for the hoarders who were 
directly or indirectly associated with ruling parties at state or national 
level. Surplus profits earned by those who were granted import licences by 
the ruling parties were ploughed back into the party for the campaigning 
process. The practice was parallel to the aware of contracts to party 
members mentioned earlier. 
The economic pressure put on the traditional network during a political 
campaign compelled the traditional group to actively re-organise themselves 
into groups, in order to benefit from the event. The poor farmers, with the 
widespread drought of 1983, could no longer ask what the political leaders 
and their parties could do for them if they voted for them, but only how 
much money, rice, sugarg stockfish, etc. the farmers could get. Though, 
generally, party manifestos and policies do not reflect Nigerian politics, 
under the prevailing conditions in the 1983 electons, the traditional 
network group would be the least likely to examine party manifestos. To the 
group, party manifestos are irrelev. ant. The close associations and 
interpersonal networks of the traditional rural population made the latter 
clearly aware of the nature of Nigerian politics. There were widespread 
allegations of bribery and corruption as fundamental means of political 
mobilisation and participation in Nigerian politics, The degree of impact 
of corruption in Nigeria as stated by different groups will be quantified 
latere Whether it is corruption or the media that influence voters' 
political behaviour will be empirically assessed. 
However, on the clubs, the data indicate no difference in the political 
activity Of the social organisations between election and non-election 
times. But it is important to note here that the word 'politics' is all- 
embracing in Nigerian daily life. In rural areas associations such as the 
Udo Nna of Eziama are constantly engaged in socio-political and economic 
activities, irrespective of whether or not there is a national election. 
The association stressed that one of its main objectives was "to foster a 
sense of direction and communal development in our country". By implication 
this would involve leadership, decision-making, a rural community 
constitutional approach to problem-solving, and most important of all, 
communication links between members of the association and the entire 
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community, so as to mobilise them to support their various developmental 
projects. 
on the other hand, nearly two thirds of the respondents (65.2%) reported 
that their organisations are never involved in politics. There are two main 
interpretations of this high percentage. First, as we noted in Chapter 
Nine, that religion was the second most important criterion for membership 
of organisations in Imo State. The religious organisations carry on their 
activities in more or less the same way at all times, with very mimimal 
political involvement. This does not mean that individuals in religious 
organisations are not members of other organisations which are politically 
active. Religious organisations such as the Legion of Mary, St. Jude etc. 
are purely apolitical but during election periods members can influence eahc 
other privately outside the organisation to support a political party. More 
so the priest can visit these different church organisations during weekly 
prayer meetings and make indirect suggestions to them as to which way to 
vote. He may avoid a split in his parish by totally keeping politics out of 
his Sunday sermon because a hugh parish Sunday congregation is made up of 
different party supporters. 
Secondly, some non-religious orgaýnisations are too traditional to be 
involved in national politics, for example age group associations, village 
elders, palm wine associations, etc., but they can form groups to mobilise 
support for a political candidate. It is striking to note from the data 
that eighteen out of thirty respondents from the urban elite groups and ten 
out of fourteen from the rural elite groups reported that their 
organisations are never involved in politics. This can be interpreted as 
not being involved in national politics rather than local politics, or that 
the elite did not want to implicate themselves politically. This reflects 
on the structure of community relationships in the communities where kinship 
ties (as we have sen earlier) bind the elite and non-elites together through 
group associations. 
One'of the most important functions of these associations is not to act as 
only a convenient channel through which a leader can link different groups 
to mobilise support for a political candidate(s) but also to develop groups' 
understanding of political organisations through their own involvement in 
it. We noted in the earlier chapters that different political systems have 
operated in Nigeria. The public tend to generalise the systems into two 
main categories: the civil rule and the military. To understand the system 
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helps groups to make demands on the government. 
Table 6: 11 
Respondents' Knowledge of the Political System in Nigeria 
Groups Parlia- Presid- Auto- Combina- Row 
mentary ential cratic tion of Total 
all of 
these 
Traditional (2) (44) (3) (0) (49) 37.4 
4.1 89.8 6.1 0.0 100 
School Leaver (0) (11) (1) (0) (12) 9.2 
0.0 91.7 8.3 0.0 100 
Urban Poor (0) (10) (0) (1) (11) 8.4 
0.0 90.9 0.0 9.1 100 
Urban Elite (2) (32) (3) (4) (41) 31.3 
4.9 78.0 7.3 9.8 100 
Rural Elite (0) (15) (2) (1) (18) 13.7 
0.0 83.3 11.1 5.6 100 
Column (4) (112) (9) (6) (131) 100 
Total 3.0 85.5 6.9 4.6 100 
Number of missing observat ions - 22 
In the survey, respondents were asked to state the type Of Political system 
that operated during the 1979-1983 periods in Nigeria. 3.1% (4) said it was 
parliamentarys 85.5% (112) presidential, 
6.9% (9) autocratic, and 4.6% (6) a 
combination of these systems. 
Strikingly, 31A (4) f rom all the groups 
which said that the last civilian government 
in Nigeria was a parliamentary 
system, were exclusively from traditional and urban elite groups. The 6.9% 
(9) who reported that the system was autocratic came from all groups but 
mainly from traditional and urban elites. 
More ironically, 4.6% (6) who 
stated that the system was the combination of all the systems mentioned 
above came from all groups except 
from the traditional least educated group, 
whose background would make it 
difficult for them. to understand the 
prevailing political system in Nigeria. This reveals that political 
ignorance, contrary to many theoretical arguments concerning rural and urban 
politics in Nigeria, is not restricted to the rural village farmers who make 
up the block of our respondents in the traditional group. 
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The relatively close associatons between the urban population and rural 
population via active social clubs based on kinship and religious criteria 
have brought political awareness and knowledge into the rural population. 
Secondly, the politicisation of small village groups, where a large number 
of the Nigerian electorates live, helps members in the traditional group to 
understand the type of political system at any time. It is very strange to 
note from the data that it is within the urban elite, the, most enlightened 
group, that a higher percentage of political ignorance prevails. There are 
two possible reasons for this: first, the older generations in this group 
who have lived in the city for a long time are aware of detailed changes in 
the political system. Secondly, the few (9.8%) of the urban elite who 
reported that the last civil government in Nigeria was a combination of both 
systems could have said so in the light of what they regarded as the nature 
of Nigerian politics. Many elites 'in Nigeria believe that quasi$ haphazard, 
undefined aspects of various political systems operate in Nigeria. Thus, a 
combination of various weakly applied aspects of these systems operate in 
Nigeria. The systems which have been under the authority of the Muslim 
North, either in the military or civilian governments, can easily be 
described as aspects, of these systems. However, a large proportion of the 
respondents stated precisely that the last civil rule in Nigeria was the 
p-residential system (85.5% or 112 out of 131 respondents). Twenty-two 
respondents, perhaps for personal reasons, avoided giving replies to any 
overtly political questions. 
The most important networ k linkages between the urban political environment 
and the rural network of interpersonal communication are the roles and 
functions of active political- actors, who participate in politics in both 
rural and urban areas at election periods. In chapter two I argued that one 
of the serious limitations of early social network studies in Africa was the 
concentration on individual linkages which restricted 'the study to very 
localised analysis. Though Mitchell et al (1969) have been credited in such 
studies for their ability to shift network analysis from the metaphorical to 
analytical level, they could not transcend the egocentric level. of analysis. 
Crucial to my debate is that individual charz 
the network linkages between them, in this 
relaionship between the village and urban 
network linkages based on clubs, unions, and 
force of the two networks is kinship and 
demonstrated above. We would still remain 
Lcteristics are as dynamic as 
respect the socio-political 
population characterised by 
organisations. The binding 
religion, as statistically 
at the individual level of 
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analysis if individuals , as I have already argued in Chapter Two, are 
logýcally aggregated to form groups or systems based on their identical and 
charcteristic similarities and attributes, so that wider communities could 
be studied involving more complex relationships, beyond kinship, friendship 
and neighbourhood political networks. 
Careful consideration of carefully the political activities of different 
network groups in the villages and towns is a practical attempt to elevate 
egocentric analysis to group analysis. It is worth recalling the statement 
of Mitchell et al (cited in chapter two) that "the relationship of the 
linkages in a network to one another is taken to be a salient f actor in 
interpreting social action is one of the steps whereby the metaphor of a 
social network is expanded into an analogy and made analytically useful". 
My system or group network approach looks at broader political activities in 
a network of leadership election. 
T! 01%1,0 7-II 
Where (Rural or Urban) Were the Respondents Most Politically Active 
During the Election 
Group The City The Village Both Places- Row 
Total 
Traditional (4) (22) (9) (35) 39.8 
11.4 62.9 25.7 100 
School Leaver (2) (4) (3) (9) 10.2 
22.2 44.4 33.3 100 
Urban Poor (2) (0) (4) (6) 6.8 
33.3 0.0 66.7 100 
Urban Elite (4) (10) (10) (24) 27.3 
16.7 41.7 41.7 100 
Rural Elite (0) (10) (4) (14) 15.9 
0.0 71.4 28.6 100 
Column (12) (46) (30) (88) 100 
Total 13.6 52.3 34.1 100 
Number of missing observations - 65 
In the survey,, 13.6% (12) of all the groups reported that they were only 
. politically 
active in the city. Perhaps it is surprising that 11.4% (4) out 
of the traditional group said they were active in the city. It is important 
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to explain this odd phenomenon. Although most people who belong to 
traditional network groups, as we have seen in Chapter Nine, live in 
villages, 11.4% of the respondents during a political campaign are active in 
the city, not in the village. In the Nigerian context, and Igboland in 
particular, we have shown that people who live and work in the city retire 
to the village in old age to spend the rest of their lives there. During 
the last general election some of these people clearly grasped the 
implications of the split between the Igbo leadership and the way it 
affected family relationships in the village. They also understood that the 
'pork-barrel' exercise (benefitting from the political event) was more 
rewarding in the cities than in the villages. Their long years in the city 
offered them the advantage of interacting with old friends in the city to 
obtain political information and share in the distribution of bas. ic 
commodities as a reward for unassessed political campaigning in the village 
for a party or parties. They got what they needed - goods and money - and 
returned to the village as passive participants. 
Similarly, 16.7% (4) of the urban elite group were only active in the 
village, while equal numbers were active both in the village and the city. 
In the traditional group, 62.9% (22) were active in the village, while 25.7% 
(9) were active both in the village and city. A high proportion of young 
school leavers, 44.4% (4), were active in the village only, with 33.3% (3) 
active in both the and village and the city. 
This statistical relationship between different groups and political 
participation in urban and rural politics in Nigeria shows that there are 
strong ties between different social groups in Nigerian politics. One's 
political participation is not restricted by residence and because of 
kinship ties one has more tendency towards native or natal-homelands' active 
participation than in the city where one lives. The urban elite group is a 
clear illustration of this point. Though the majority of its membes live in 
the citYP only 16.7% said they were only politically active in the city, 
compared with 41.7% who said they were active in the village, and 41.7% (10) 
who reported that they were politically active both in the village and in 
the city. 
Rural elites were not involved in active politics in the city at all. A 
high percentage of them, 71.4%, concentrated their political activity in the 
village. In chapters two and four I argued that teachers are the main 
political opinion leaders in the village and are leaders of community 
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associations and therefore constitute important political intermediaries. 
In the last general election the restrictions imposed on the overt active 
political participation of civil servants and teachers limited teachers' 
community political activity to rural areas. From participant observation, 
I noted that most teachers decided to form strong cliques which visited 
various people at night to persuade them to vote for a particular party. 
Party agents sent the names of various teachers to state headquarters and 
when the NPP won, in the state of Imo, most of the teachers who campaigned 
underground for other parties were transferred to the remotest villages, 
especially to where there were no natural streams, or pipe-borne water 
supplies. Also, during the election, school supervisors and headmasters 
were instructed to keep records of teachers' attendance so that none of them 
had time to go to the nearest city for political contact. 
A small number of teachers, 28.6% (4), were politically active both in the 
city and in the village. These were those, according to my own participant 
observation, who visited party leaders or agents in the city in the night or 
immediately after school hours to obtain informationg exchange views and 
make necessary arrangements for the 'basic commodities' to go to for village 
voters. 
However, as I have noted elsewhere (E. Mgbemere, 1982) the role of teachers 
as rural political leaders and opinion leaders is a historic one originating 
in the breakdown of the traditional chief sI and elders I political roles, as 
a consequence of colonialism and emergent nationalism. It was the teachers, 
I noted, who read newspapers and used the information to influence local 
populations to support nationalism. 
In terms of the present study, the above table reveals that in all groups 
more than half of the respondents (52.3%) have strong tendencies towards 
village political participation rather than city politics. This tendency is 
consistent with earlier kinship membership criteria for social and economic 
organisation. It also reflects upon the theoretical framework established 
in Chapter Two, which showed that the political implications of kinship 
ties,, which maintain strong socio-political ties between the urban and rural 
African communities, cannot be over-emphasised. Supporting this view, 
[Friedl, E. (1959: 31); Banton, M. and Eric R. Wolf (1957); Peace (1979); 
Meillassoux (1968); Lloyd (1968,1974,1984); Peil (1972)], Chapter Two 
stressed that the "role of kinship ties as a mechanism for maintaining 
urban/rural connections is extensive and permeating". Similarly, Friedl 
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illustrated with the Greek urban/village socio-political and economic 
situation that changes in social status from poorer to wealthier, result in 
the rupture of kinship ties and obligations. This applies as much to the 
Greek peasant as to his social superiors. 
In Imo State, the political i; portance of kinship network ties is partly 
reflected on-the networks' intensive political participation in the village 
where most relatives live. The data also support Audrey Smoch's view, as 
quoted in chapter two, that the Igbos in the village and in the city 
"learned to co-operate with one another and to communicate on political 
matters when political utility provided the incentive". 
The most important implication of. the political communication network data 
is that the majority of communication constituents are close kin and distant 
kin. Therefore political persuasion and influences predominate in the 
traditional network of face-to-face communication. Through networks of kin 
the political products of the media are mediated. 
Only certain people , particularly local teachers and civil servants banned 
f rom. active political participation, communicated their view to relatives 
whom they trusted would not betray* them. In the city, friends and-co- 
workers or employers are trusted the least, hence the urban elites tendency 
to participate actively in the village as well as in the city. The 
bureaucratic elites could not risk their Job by active politics in the city, 
Politically this fear of retribution by the authorities towards a group in 
society during elections makes elections as a whole unfree and unfair,, 
While the elites bore the constraints of economic retribution, the poor, the 
unemployed, the village farmers were constrained by: 
"bribes ... offered by candidates and those who campaign for them 
and accepted by officials, voters, middlemen of various kins and 
even by some of the candidates themselves. "9 
Furthermore, a small number 13.6% (12) of all the groups' political 
activities in the city reflects the point made in chapter two as stated by 
Gluckman (1962: 8), Barnes (1954: 44), Frankenberg (1966: 275ff), that in large 
urban areas, large numbers of single-stranded relationships exist which make 
it difficult for people to meet. The activities are, therefore, 
comparatively isolated from each other. Applying the concept of 
freachabilitY' by Mitchell and Barnes, 'density' in political communication 
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networks, we can conclude that network groups as political intermediaries 
are characterised by face-to-face communication in their political relations 
between urban and village environments at 13.6% urban only, 52.3% village 
only, and 28.6% city and village. Thus as stated theoretically in. Chapter 
Two, political information circulated very fast among relatives in the 
village. As leadership in the last general election was divided between the 
Igbo political 'heavyweights' at state and national levels, corrupt means of 
political influences were extensively used. According to the theory of 
reachability and density within the communication network, large proportions 
of the rural community were contacted through face-to-face communication. 
The influence of money and relatives constituted the most important factors 
during that election and will be compared with other rcognised influences 
later. 
As a higher percentage of the respondents active Political participation in 
Imo State during the general election took place within the village, it 
appears that political campaigns and traditional interpersonal networks of 
communication are important features in Nigerian politics. The split in. 
Igbo leadership between two different political parties, , NPP and NPN, 
implies that competition for local support was strong among different party 
supporters, 
Table 8: 11 
Assesing Whether Different Parties Competed for Local Political 
Information in the Village 
Groups Yes No Row Total 
Traditional (31) (7) (38) 36.4 
79.5 20.5 100 
School Leaver (11) (1) (12) 11.2 
91.7 8.3 100 
Urban Poor (8) (0) (8) 7.6 
100 0.0 100 
Urban Elite (24) (9) (33) 30.8 
72.7 27.3 100 
Rural Elite (13) (2) (15) 14.0 
86.7 13.3 100 
Column (87) (20) (107) 100 
Total 80.3 19.7 100 
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The extent of the competition between party supporters in the village was 
reported by the respondents who were asked whether their parties competed 
strongly in the village. There were 107 respondents to the question and 46 
missing observations, namely those not interested in answering directly 
related political questions. In all the networks, 81.3% (87) confirmed 
that their parties competed very strongly in the village and only 18.7% (19) 
s#d that their parties did not compete with other parties in the village. 
Each of the groups' members scored between 72.7% and 100% 'yes' to the 
question, while only 0- 27.3% reported that their parties did not compete 
in the village. 
But the question does not tell us the content of the competitions which 
consequentlý would determine the content of the Poitical communicat , 
ion 
networks in the village. In network analysis there is no restricted meaning 
to content. Clyde Mitchell, as we noted in chatper two, defined as the 
"links in a person's network ... where the content ... among other 
possibilities include economic assistance, kinship obligation, religious co- 
operation or ... simply friendship". He stressed that "the actors and the 
observer eee are able to understand the behaviour of those involved becuse 
it is accorded a meaning in terms of the norms, beliefs and values which 
jhey associate with this behaviour". 
I 
At this stage the structure of political communication is kinship-based. 
The resources utilised to win local support include government funds, 
private donations, influential local people, social clubs, traditional 
chiefs, local councillors or all of these as resources of political 
mobilisation. The extent to which these resources constituted important 
political mobilisation factors in the villages are illustrated 
quantitatively in the table 9: 11 below. 
There are a total of 168 scores for the seven resources but each respondent 
was allowed to tick more than one, thus on average the score f or each 
resource is 12.92 (13) namely 168/153 cases or respondents in the survey. 
The three most important resources for which different parties competed in 
the ellection through networks of traditional communication were government 
funds, as reported by 34 respondentss private donations as reported by 42 
and local influences, as reported by 25. 
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Table 9: 11 
Resources Competed For By Network Groups Based on Row % 
Groups 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Traditional (49) (2) (21) 49 41 (3) (6) 
(49) 58.8 50.0 50.0 33.3 66.7 47.1 
School Leavers (3) (2) 13 (3) (2) (2) (3) 
(13) 8.8 4.8 10.7 22.2 22.2 17.6 
Urban Poor (1) (1) (3) 11 (1) (1) (0) 
(11) 2.9 7.1 3.6 11.1 5.9 0.0 
Urban Elite (7) (10) 42 (6) (2) (0) (3) 
(42) 20.6 23.8 21.4 22.2 0.0 17.6 
Rural Elite (3) (3) (6) 18 (4) (1) (1) 
(18) 8.8 14.3 14.3 11.1 11.1 11.8 
Total (34) (42) (28) (9) (9) (17) 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
1- Parties competed for 
so 
government funds 
private donations 
local influentials 
social clubs 
local chiefs 
councillors 
all of these 
7 
(8) 
34.5 
(2) 
6.9 
(1) 
13.8 
(10) 
(34) 
(2) 
10.3 
(29) 168/ 
100 153 
During the Nigerian political campaign government funds covered a variety of 
meanings. It could imply the use of teachers' salaries for election 
campaigns, or the award of huge and very expensive contracts to party 
supporters with half of the money ploughed back into the ruling national or 
state party by the contractors, to be used for campaigning. Election 
campaigns in a huge and complex nation like Nigeria, are so expensive that 
only the ruling party and the main opposition parties can afford to compete. 
Private donations featured as the most important competitive resource for 
all the political parties. If kick-backs from*contracts were to be made, 
these were generally done in the form of private donations by party 
supporters. Again, only the government party could get big donations as it 
was the government which awarded the contracts. Some donations were made in 
the anticipation that if the party won the donors would obtain either 
promotion or more contract awards. 
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Donations and contract awards were strongly linked with influential local 
people who already possessed existing resources with which to influence 
their different communities to support a particular party. Social clubs, 
and local chiefs did not feature as important resources for which parties 
competed in local mobilisation. We noted above that because of the division 
in Igbo leadership social clubs were not conducive to group political 
activity. The emergence of new local elites who, by virtue of their 
education, commanded better salaries and socio-poitical status, displaced 
the importance of the traditional chiefs. Local councils and councillors 
were not used as extensively as social clubs in the pre-Civil War period in 
Nigeria. To a certain extent the split in Igboland made local councils, 
whose functions transcend contemporary leadership elections in national 
politics, an unsafe place to mobilise political support for any one of the 
two different political leaders from the same Igbo ethnic group. 29 
respondents reported that all the above-mentioned resources were competed 
for by different parties. 
The competitive approaches adopted by different party supporters were in 
many respects illegal. Those parties that had no strong local 
representatives were excluded and in practice only the NPP, the ruling state 
government, and the NPN, the ruling national party, were able to compete for 
resources in Imo State. The rootlessness and bitterness with which the 
local agents competed for these resources put unbearable strain and stress 
on the voters to the extent that family relationships began to break down. 
The reality of the leadership electon was overshadowed by bribery and 
corruption and money became the only effective campaign force. No mention, 
regard or attention was paid to the validity of party policies and 
manifestos. As we shall see later, through dense networks of political 
communication between friends, relatives and neighbours, electors understood 
the influence of money in election participation. 
Politically, resources are essential in democratic Political leadership 
election campaigns. But were these resources competed for in ways that 
could yield free and fair elections? The extent to which the last general 
election in Nigeria was free and fair will be statistically answered using 
empirical statements by the respondents. 
Amadu Kurfi (1983: 230) argues that what constitutes a free and democratic 
election has been debated by many Political scientists, and that some of 
them believe: 
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"that elections are inevitably undemocratic -a procedure allowng 
the cleverest and most powerful to make the 'sovereign' people 
yield power to them in an acceptable way ... the distinction 
between classical electons thought of as free and competitive and 
their unfree and non-competitive variants becomes blurred, as both 
are said to rely on manipulaton of the people's will. " 
The extent to which NPN leaders fought hard to win the last general electon 
using all the national resources at the NPN's command led the BBC to comment 
that the Shagari government was heading towards a one-party system in 
Nigeria. The desire of all African leaders to stay in power once voted in 
is typically associated with the illegal ways in which they distribute of 
power and resources so as to force lasting loyalty from the electorates and 
opposition parties. 
In such complicated political activities, the networks of communication were 
dominated by conflicts and compromises between friends, associates. The 
local political intrigue was so convoluted that only careful participant 
observation could reveal the structure of the networks of political 
communication at the interpersonal community level. In the survey, 78 
respondents admitted that their political parties, namely the NPP and the 
NPN, competed for government funds and for private . 
donations from rich 
businessmen etc. An additional 28 noted that the parties tompeted for the 
membership of local influential people. Once Igbo leadership was split 
between two opposing parties, the leaders of the social clubs and other 
organisations were also split, and political candidates and their local 
agents inevitably had to compete for support from different split groups. 
The traditional groups were the main beneficiaries of the parties' funds and 
donations. In return, the groups gave up any interest in party manifestos 
and party policies. They gave up their right to know what policies were 
being offered in exchange for their votes. This is peculiar to the 
historical development of politics in Nigeria and Igbo communities in 
particular. Though the Igbos as an egalitarian society "had a particpant 
orientation towards politics, they perceived this participation more ina 
group context than as an individual activity. "10 During the last general 
election this pattern of group political participation under a leader 
persisted, but in immensely localised and ever-fragmented units. Leaders 
shifted their party identifications erratically and their followers followed 
suit. Once there was discontent with leaders over the amount of money or 
basic commodities which the groups had obtaineds the groups cross-tabulated. 
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Sometime a leader would be unsatisfactory sharing out the rewards by giving 
some members of his association more than others, or by appropriating the 
surplus of it himself. His followers would then abandon him for another 
group or party. This process increased the flow of donations and 
strengthened the influence of local leaders group who could ensure the 
unified voting of each small group. Donations were also used to buy over 
opposing groups, through their leaders. 
Attitudes which had prevailed within regional and national politics bef ore 
1966 were still important in Nigerian attitudes towards the national 
political system. Audrey Smoch noted that: 
"most participants viewed the political system primarily as a 
distributor of political goods rather than as an instrument to 
regulate or change society. " 
Competing parties were no longer judged on their political merits regardless 
of dominant ethnic or tribal groups, but on the basis of what the candidates 
of f ered and what the electorate obtained f rom the parties through local 
leaders. Only those parties which had secured the support of local leaders 
could compete in such local communities. Parties whidh historically or as a 
result of contemporary social or political issues lost the confidence of 
local leaders would not feature in political support and voting in the area. 
The case of UPN, and the role of Awolowo during the Civil War, which was 
emphasised by Ojukwu in his speech at Enugu quoted above, are both clear 
examples. 
The dominance of the NPN and the NPP in Igbos political activity in Imo 
State during the last general election demonstrated how far both national 
and local leadership had ; become politicised. Interpersonal relationships, 
rather than the distribution of money or commodities, became the main means 
whereby political influence was exerted within given rural communities. 
Thus to a considerable degree, as shall be seen later, networks of 
interpersonal political communication replaced the political communication 
role (influence) of the media. It might be postulated that the media under 
the prevailing circumstances would merely reinforce existing opinions by 
emphasising issues unrelated to national political realities, and by 
dwelling heavily on promotion and stereotyping of local and national 
political leaders. Their rural political networks' contacts could be more 
influenced by material goods than by the actual media content of the 
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election campaign. The-media could be extensively used but their influence 
as a politically persuasive mirror to the political world of Nigeria remains 
questionable. 
From the above data, it is clearly evident that during the 1983 general 
elections, the Nigerian political struggle descended from broadly national 
ethnic politics to rural political identification between the two main 
parties, namely the NPP and the NPN. Should we therefore conclude that 
ethnic politics is beginning to decrease in Nigerian political life? I 
should advocate that a reservation be imposed on any answer to this question 
because the election did not address the main issues confronting Nigeria, 
nor did its political contents relfect either the needs for normative 
political values or the political realities of the country. - 
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to answer 'yes' or 'no' as to 
whether or not the last civil administration was strongly ethnically 
oriented. From the five groups 69% (89) of the respondents believed that 
ethnic politics were very strong in the last civilian government, while only 
31.1% (30) reported that the administration was not influenced by ethnic 
considerations. 129 people responded to the question and 24 did not. 47 
out of 49 people who were identified as members -of the traditional group 
responded to the question. 75.5% (35) said the last civil rule was strongly 
ethnic, and 29 (69%) of the elites agreed that the last administration was 
ethnically oriented. 
Statistically, there is a close relationship between the structure of ethnic 
political awareness within the predominantly rural population and that 
within the predominantly urban population. The same pattern of awareness is 
recorded among the rural elites and the urban poor groups. In contrast, all 
13 respondents identified as belonging to the young school leavers network 
replied to the question and nearly half the number decided that the last 
civil administration was strongly ethnic - 42.6% (6) said it was ethnic, 
while 53.6% (7) reported that it was not. 
The similarities in response by the traditional and urban elites indicates 
that political awareness in Nigeria is a relatively horizontal equivalent to 
a certain extent. This is primarily as a result of strong socio-political 
links between elites and non-elites in Igboland, particularly through the 
interpersonal communication network structured by kinship and religious 
criteria association. Secondly, as we have noted statistically, and 
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theoretically stated by Smoch, "In an environment of economic scarcity and 
high demands" particularly during the austerity measures which characterised 
the part of the Shagari administration, "competitive localism has more 
pernicious consequences than in more economically developed political 
systems. --13 
Thirdly, while the more settled network group have the greater tendency to 
see Nigerian politics as the continuation of old regional ethnic politics 
within the structure of interstate political co-operation, and participation 
in it as such, the younger generation have relatively balanced opinions 
about the role of ethnicity in Nigerian politics. Perhaps'this is because 
politics is not widely thought about or taught in secondary schools in 
Nigeria, and this constitutes the highest political experience of this 
group. Secondly, most of them are too young to draw from their personal 
experience in order to distinguish between classical Nigerian ethnic 
politics, state politics and superficial party identification and political 
alliances. For the fact that slightly more than a quarter of Tgbos believe 
that the last civil adminsitration was not strongly ethnic is relatively 
indicative of a slight breakdown in ethnic politics in Nigeria. But this 
breakdown is too apparent to be real, because the political alliance between 
the Igboi and the Hausa through the NPN only involýed political leaders and 
not the masses. 
But the content of the breakdown is what is crucial. Is the breakdown 
between all the ethnic groups or between the Igbos and certain ethnic 
minorities or majority tribes? Ojukuls statement that the Igbos have been 
excluded from Nigerian politics since 1966, which was necessary to get them 
back into the mainstream of Nigerian politics, is an essential factor in the 
content of the seeming breakdown in the ethnic politics in Nigeria. Most 
Igbo leaders and communities are well aware that Nigerian politics and the 
power have been dominated by the Hausa/Fulani North. Their population 
strength has ever guaranteed them this position in Nigerian politics. The 
meritocratic values attached to bureaucratic top and middle positions in the 
civil service, businesses, etc. left the Igbo and Yorubas in severe 
competition. The Biafran question guaranteed the Yorubas absolute control 
of the bureaucracy in Nigeria. They have a fair share in the systeml This 
does not mean that young Yorubas are not keen to see an equitable 
distribution of power and justice for all in Nigeria. 
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Members of the Igbo elites belive that Nigerian politics are primarily 
concerned with the sharing of resources rather than with constructive 
political changes and development. In order to get back into the mainstream 
of politics from which bureaucratic changes can be effected, the Igbo allied 
themselves with permanent political leaders. This was evident in the NPNI 
NPP accord which the Yoruba leadership within the NPN silently disliked and 
worked to destroy. Briefly, the basis of the NPN/NPP accord was the 'unity, 
peace, stability and. progress' of Nigeria. On September 27,1979, President 
Shehu Shagari invited all the political leaders to join him in the new civil 
administration. All other political parties except the NPP turned down the 
offer. If it is true that the NPP was Igbo dominated, then the party's 
readiness to accept joint administration with the NPN, whose victory in the 
1979 general elections was questioned by most opposing parties, implies that 
the Igbo leidership was anxious to get back into mainstream Nigerian 
politics. Indeed the NPN might have won the Presidential election, but 
could not without the alliance with the NPP form an overall majority power 
which could enable the ruling party to effect policies through the National. 
Assembly and the Senate. 
Specifically, the accord on October 1979 spelt out the sharing of crucial 
powers at the National Assembly between the two parties. President of the 
Senate went to (Hon) Dr. Joseph Wayas and the Deputy President went to 
Ibrahim, both members of the NPN. The NPP provided the Deputy President of 
the 
. 
Senate, Mr. John Wash-Pam, and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives. The accord was on an equal footing between the two parties 
at Federal level only. There were no junior and senior partners to the 
accord. ' 
However, soon af ter the accord, in November 1979, disagreemnts began to 
surf ace beteen the NPP Senate leider, Senator Jaja Wachukwu and Chief 
Richard Akinjide, a Yoruba who was nominated Minister of Justice. Jaj a 
Wachukwu opposed the nomination because he regarded Akinijde as a tribalist. 
Gradually other events accumulated which dissatisfied the NPP and often led 
to its members voting for other parties outside the accoid against the 
President's bills. For instance, President Shagarils appointment of 
Presidential Liaison Officers in ever state was opposed by all the parties 
and paved the. way towards - 'progresivel governors' alliances. Tension 
between the two parties reached its climax in 1980 when the NPN Revenue 
Allocation Bill was opposed by the NPP who, along with the other parties, 
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opposed it. The opposition by the NPP was so strong that a NPP governor for 
Anambra State., Jim Nwaoboý, took President Shagari to court. In February 
1981, at a press conference at Enugu the national leader of the NPP, Dr. 
Njamdi Azikiwe, outlined some of the weaknesses of the accord and accused 
the NPN of adopting measures calculated to undermine the success of the 
accord. He emphatically condemned the impeachment of the governor of Kaduna 
State, Alhaji Balarabe Musa, on 7th May 1981 and his eventual removal from 
office on June 24th 1981 "the impeachment of governor Musa is calculated to 
impugn the integrity of our highly respected judiciary and our cherished 
belief in the rule of law was thus debauched. "14 
The removal of Musa f rom. of f ice was regarded as an intrigue which could 
seriously undermine the unity of Nigerian politics, an important aspect of 
the accord. The NPP believe that the decision to impeach Musa was made by 
the NPN without consultation with the NPP. Dr. Obi Wali thought that it 
would be best for the NPP to be dissociated from the NPN, particularly as 
the Kaduna Governor's impeachment ws generally seen by Nigerians as unjust 
and unlawful. 
The accord posed several questions: Why did the NPN enter into a separate 
and secret accord with the PRP-, which was dominated by Muslims from the 
North, when the only party that honoured the NPN invitation for loint 
sharing of power was the NPP? Whyp in particular, should the secret 
alliance between the NPN and the PRP take place only three months after a 
formal accord with the NPP? One possible answer is that Northern parties 
are connected by entrenched Muslim religious doctrine and belief. Alliances 
with the Southern parties are vague and based on contemporary problems, and, 
once the problems are attempted or solved, alliances fall apart. 
It is important to notq that during the alliance period two Yoruba leaders, 
Adeniran Ogunsanya of the NPP and Chief Akinloye of the NPN, showed great 
interest in what wsa happening in the alliance. In terms of parties' 
majority members, the NPN was Hausa/Fulani dominated, while the NPP was 
Igbo-dominated. Politically, if the principles of the accord succeeded, 
they would imply a strong political alliance between the Igbos and the 
Hausa/Fulani to the exclusion of the Yoruba who dominated the UPN party. 
On July 6th, 1981, Chief Ogunsanya in a press conference announced that the 
accord had been placed on conditional trial for six months, and that if 
conditions were not improved the accord might be terminated. To see the 
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party happily ended Chief Akinloye announced three days later that the NPN 
had "no alternative but to accept the termination with immediate effect". A 
large number of NPN members opposed the termination announced by the 
national party's chairman, Chief Akinloye. The relationship was stage- 
managed and Yorubas within the parties played a crucial part in ending the 
accord. There were some parts of the accord which would threaten the 
political security of the Yorubas if the accord succeeded. Why should a 
party (NPP) that did not even come second in the 1979 electon have equal 
power-sharing with the NPN Party which won without a majority? The phrase 
in the accord that "no junior or senior partner existed" was a gross 
understatement of Nigerian political realities, particularly under the 
experimental Presidential system. Also, why should the accord be limited to 
the Federal level of Joint decision-making rather than extending their 
policies to the state level? One thing becomes obvious: the allocation of 
national revenue became centralised during the Civil War to the benefit of 
two main regions, the North and the West, and at the expense of certain 
sections of the East. We noted in earlier chapters that revenue allocation 
was regionalised before the 1970s oil boom. During the depression of the 
1930s, 1950s and the later 1960s, cocoa made the Western region one of the 
richest, and therefore particularly strongest, regions in Nigeria. Awolowo, 
particularly, refused to centralise revenue-allocation. In both historical 
and contemporary politics in Nigeria, revenue allocation has had a very 
conflicting and confusing impact on policies and party alliances, for 
instance: 
"The 1963 census was simply declared invalid and revenue 
allocation, State creation, etc. were instead based on the *so 
somewhat dubious 1963 census. --15 
Most Nigerians clamoured for the return to civil rule, not so much with the 
intention of changing policies and political developments, but because oil 
brought unprecedented wealth to the nation. William D. Graf particularly 
observed that: 
"Gowon ... altered the previous system of revenue allocation, by 
means of channeling oil and other revenues through the Federal 
Government treasury,, so as to distribute the vastly increased 
national income more evenly among the individual states. " 
He continued to stress that: 
11.37 
"the preservation of national unity, the process of national 
reconciliation, the sudden windfall of oil revenues, a popular 
awareness of being part of development and nation building, a 
burgeoning business sector - all of these factors concealed an 
auspicious situation for a rapid return to civilian rule. "16 
How well the distribution of increased national income among the individual 
states, which was ef f ected in Nigerian military or civil rule through the 
policies of revenue allocation, requires extensive investigation. This 
remains a crucial aspect of political alliances. The governor of Imo State, 
Chief Sam Mbakwe, was stereotyped "the crying governor" and such sterotyping 
is closely associated with the pattern of revenue allocaion in Nigeria. 
During the 1983 election campaign the Imo State government was accused of 
borrowing extensively from overseas to service state projects. In this 
respect, the politics of party alliance and revenue allocations in Nigerian 
politics, moves from local or national politics to international politics - 
an important aspect of Nigerian politics which should be research further. 
However, restricting ourselves to local politics, one essential question 
emerges: are Nigerians or certain sectors of the population aware of any 
sort of inter-ethnic political develoment during civil government or the 
election period? 
Table 10: 11 
The Respondents' Opinion About Inter-Ethnic Co-Operation During 
The Last Civil Rule In Nigeria 
Groups Yes No Row Total 
Traditional (41) (7) (48) 37.2 
85.4 14.6 100 
School Leavers (1-1) (2) (13) 10.1 
84.6 15.4 100 
Urban Poor (9) (0) (9) 7.0 
100.0 0.0 100 
Urban Elite (36) (5) (41) 31.8 
87.8 12.2 100 
Rural Elite (16) (2) (18) 14.0 
88.9 11.1 100 
Column (113) (16) (129) 100 
Total 87.6 12.4 100 
In the survey, 87.6% (113) of the respondents from all the five groups 
believed that during the last general elections in Imo state, theria was a 
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greater tendency towards inter-ethnic co-operation. Only 12.4% (16) did not 
believe that there was any tendency towards inter-ethnic co-operation during 
the elections. There were in all 129 respondents to the queston and 24 non- 
respondents. In each of the f ive groups a high number of respondents 
believed that there was a greater tendency towards inter-ethnic co- 
operation, namely: 84.4% of the traditional group, 84.6% of the young school 
leavers, all the urban poor, 87.8% of the urban elites and 88.9% of the 
rural elites. Thus the five group s are all positively aware of new ethnic 
political identification and co-operation in Nigeria. But the extent to 
which the respondent understood the hidden agenda of inter-ethnic co- 
operation in Nigerian politics remains an open question. 
In Chapter Four I laid emphasis on the adverse ef f ect of colonial economic 
poliices on Nigerian 'ethnic politics'. I argued that the orientation of 
individual regions' economics away from each other but towards the 
metropolitian towns of colonial au&rity was a great weakness in Nigerian 
poitical relationships among the tribes. It seriously divided the nation. 
In this study, from the statistical arguement on the NPN/NPP accord and the 
revenue allocations, economic motivation can be seen to erect a political 
basis upon Ohicly different - ethnic groups could maintain mutual 
understanding. Individual political interest and the associated corrupt 
practices could envelope the political reality that is emerging- from the 
economic base in Nigeria. The alliance between parties is not new in 
Nigerian politics but the political identification and alliances of 1979 and 
1983 between the Igbos and the Hausa/Fulani are different. They are 
different in the sense that, unlike the pre-1966 alliance, political parties 
and political leaders were the sole creators of the alliances, which they 
maintained or terminated without the masses' participation. In 1983 the 
identification between parties and the alliances generated by the split 
between two leading Igbo political leaders ushered in this new political 
participation of the rural and urban masses, as shown by the data in the 
survey. It is important to point out here that the split in leadership and 
identification did not only affect political leaders. The peculiar way in 
which business contracts were awarded in Nigeria, particularly during the 
Shagari government, attracted a huge number of Igbo businessmen to identify 
with the NPN national ruling party. on the other hand, the smaller 
businessmen, who could not bargain for such 'deals' at national level, 
descended to state level to identify with the opposition NPP party, which 
further intensified party competition, bitterness and verbal warfare in the 
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East during the elections. 
However, sticking to our best alternative - network analysis - what tends to 
happen in Nigeria is that once political and business leadership linkages 
are established between different ethnic groups, shared economic interest 
sustain the network of relationships. In terms of Mitchell's network 
content, political communication in Nigeria puts greater emphasis on 
economics than on political policies. This is not basically bad in itself 
because, as I argued earlier, it was what exactly was missed out in Nigerian 
political development as a result of colonial administration and economic 
interest. 
Once ethnic leaders establish economic interest through their overt 
political networks, ethnic ties gradually start to give way to inter-ethnic 
eco-political ties within which a certain mutual political culture emerges, 
designated as typical of the way Nigerian political networks operate. 
We have noted statistically that Nigerian political groups are characterised 
by kinship and religion. Also we have empirically established that 
leadership is the major principle in the group linkages between these 
kinship and religious dominated 'network groupings at rural, urban and 
national levels. In terms of communication, leaders can conveniently reach 
the masses through their organisations. As political leaders are closely 
associated with economic power in Nigeria, they would use their economic 
influence to change the political attitudes and behaviour of the masses who 
were already organised in quasi-political groups within in the village and 
urban communities. 
The problem is that Nigerians vaguely interpret the economic relationship 
between leaders as political co-operation, but once they become politically 
involved they begin to grasp the economic implications. Often they abandon 
political issues and recklessly follow their economic interests, which 
generally make more sense than the alien system of government which even the 
leaders themselves do not always understand. Another danger is that if the 
strongest and most meaningful interests were economic no adequate political 
policies would be developed to solve Nigerian economic problems such as 
revenue allocation, urban deprivation, unemployment etc. Again, a ruling 
party which has access to national revenue and resources in the 
interpersonal network might illegally distribute power and resources to 
a mass political support, and then Nigeria would move towards a one-party 
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state. If political order were not developed and constitutional methods of 
mobilising support established, there would be no legal opposition to the 
ruling party. Finally, there is the danger of the emergence of economic 
classes which would also exploit the masses if there were no developed 
political constitution that protects the masses. These tendencies showed 
themselves during the four years of civilian rule when the term 'democracy' 
was regarded - particularly by the non-political elites in Nigeria - as an 
insult to the masses. Fela, in his controversial music, called democracy in 
Nigeria 'Demo-crazy' - madness. 
These are generalisations about the inter-ethnic tendency in the last 
general elections in Imo, State. We need to be more statistically specific 
so as to know the actual direction of the tendency and why. In early 
chapters we identified three major ethnic groupings, the Igbos, Hausa/Fulani 
and the Yorubas. Political stability, unity and integration have all been 
questioned within Nigeria. The inter-ethnic tendency towards or away from 
each of these dominant groups is crucial to the establishment or otherwise 
of such political stability, unity, and integration within Nigeria. 
Generally, we cannot under-estimate the political importance of ethnic 
minorities in re6ent political changes in Nigeria. The creation of states, 
their relative autonomous administrative characteristics, the zoning systms 
introduced by the NPN ruling party, the 2/3% which a President must win to 
become nationally accepted as the President of the Federation have triggered 
off a new form of inter-ethnic political co-operation and alliance. These 
changes not withstanding, the threee big tribes, the Igbos, Hausa/Fulani and 
Yoruba, still dominate Nigerian politics. It is dif f icult to see a 
political stable Nigeria when any one of these three - particularly the 
Hausa/Fulani - does not hold some of the highest posts in Nigerian 
government. The instability of Nigeria as a result of major tribal 
alliances is an open question among all sectors of people in the country. 
In the surveyl respondents were asked to indicate which of these three major 
ethnic or tribal groups they thought could form a more lasting political 
alliance for political stability in * 
Nigeria. A range of tribal groups and 
their possible political -alliances was provided for the respondents to 
choose from. The possible tribal alliances could be Hausa/Fulani and Igbos, 
as in the case of the NPN/NPP accord discussed above, Yoruba-Hausa/Fulani, 
or Igbo and Yoruba, each controlling a separate party with no alliance, or 
all allied in a one party system. 
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Table 11: 11 
Respondents' View on Ethnic Political Alliance and 
N_igerian Political Stability 
Groups Hausa/ Igbo + Each All in Yoruba Total 
Fulani + Yoruba In one + Hausa/ 
Igbo Separate Party Fulani 
Parties 
Traditional (24) (3) (2) (4) (15) (48) 36.9 
50.0 6.3 4.2 8.1 31.3 100 
School Leaver (8) (1) (0) (2) (2) (13) 10.0 
61.5 7.7 0.0 15.4 15.4 100 
Urban Poor (4) (1) (0) (2) (2) (9) 6.9 
44.4 11.1 0.0 22.2 22.2 100 
Urban Elite (16) (4) (5) (7) (10) (42) 32.3 
38.1 9.5 11.9 16.7 23.8 100 
Rural Elite (8) (2) (0) M- (5) (18) 13.8 
44.4 11.1 0.0 16.7 27.8 100 
Column (60) (11) (7) (18) (34) (130) 100 
Total 46.2 8.5 5.4 13.8 26.2 
Number of missing observations = 23 
There were 130 replies to the question, 23 missing observations. 46.2% 
from all five groups reported that political alliance between the Igbos and 
the Hausa/Fulani tribes would ensure some lasting political stability in 
Nigeria. In contrast only 8.5% (11) believe that an Igbo and Yoruba 
political alliance would create any lasting peace in Nigeria. Very few 
(5.4%) believed that politics with any form of alliance between the major 
tribes in Nigeria would result in political stability. One the other hand 
26.2% (34) conceived that Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani alliance w6uld result in 
political stability - this happened during the Civil War and until 1979. 
This table represents an important current political belief among the urban 
and rural population in Igboland which warrants a more detailed 
consideration of the data form group cells. Many respondents answered the 
question, which implies that the question was of interest to them. In the 
traditional group, 50% (24) of the 48 respondents believe that an Igbo and 
Hausa/Fulani alliance would create political stability in Nigeria. A high 
percentage of young school leavers (61.5%) took the same stand. Among the 
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rural elite, this was shared by 44.4% while the number of those in favour of 
such an alliance drops slightly among the urban elites, to 38.1%. The urban 
poor maintain a similar percentage, 44.4% to the rural elite. 
There are two main interpretations of this fairly high score in favour of 
Igbo and Hausa/Fulani political alliance. The current division between Igbo 
leadership and the large number of Igbos in sympathy with the NPN/Hausa/ 
Fulani party gave the masses, in particular the traditional village network 
group, the impression that the Igbo and the Hausa/Fulani alliance would 
improve the life of the rural population. Such improvements might include 
the supply of water-pipes, rural electrification financed by the Federal 
Government (which would come about more quickly than state-financed 
electrification) the building establishment of local roads by the Federal 
Government rather than the poorly constructed, often unfinsihed. ones 
undertaken by the. state government and the establishment of Owerri Airport 
to facilitate trade and transport. All these possibilities were important 
propaganda spread through 
, 
the village by NPN supporters. There was great 
emphasis on teachers' salaries which were not paid by the state government 
under the NPP. Teachers were highly influenced by the NPN propaganda that 
the Federal Government would immediately alleviate their problems by paying 
all their salaries if the party won the Presidential election in the ceniral 
government and the gubernatorial election in the state government, through 
the teachers' votes. The effectiveness of this propaganda compares 
favourably with the earlier statistics on the rural elite network voting 
behaviour, where 43.8% (7) out of the 16 respondents from the network voted 
for the NPN. Here again 44.4% (8) were in f avour of an Igbo and 
Hausa/Fulani political alliance for stability in Nigeria. 
The promises of the NPN candidates in Imo State, such as airport 
construction, rural electrification, etc., meant the 
' 
creation of jobs for 
the unemployed, namely the young school leaverse This group was 
particularly influenced by this propaganda. In the young school leavers 
group we noted that 54.6% (6) out of 11 respondents voted for the NPN, while 
only 36.4% (4) voted for the NPP in the last general election. Asked their 
opinions about tribal alliances for political stability, 61.5% (8) out of 
the 13 respondents favoured an Igbo-Hausa /Fulani alliance and only 7.7% (1) 
and 15.4% (2) thought that an Igbo/Yoruba or Yoru ba-Hausa/Fulani alliance 
would create political stability. 
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In terms of political propaganda, the rural elites and young school leavers 
in Imo State were more inf luenced by the NPN than by the NPP money - could 
have played a role and the NPN had more t -o spend. Their attitude to 
political alliance and voting behaviour is not a true reflection of 
political reality in Nigeria, but of political behaviour and opinion shaped 
by individual economic needs. Though 50% (24) of the traditional group were 
in favour of an Igbo and Fulani/Hausa political alliance, only 30% (12) of 
the respondents voted for the NPN, while 70% (28) voted for the NPP. With 
this network group, political voting and political concepts were different 
from those of rural elites and young school leavers. The underlying factor 
is that their economic needs were different. While their subsistence 
farming economies did not permit them to look beyond local or state 
politics, the floating network group - school leavers and the dispirited 
teachers, disillusioned by the delay or non-payment of salaries - could lock 
beyond the state for help through political identification. Again, among 
the traditional group, the effect of propaganda can be neutralised by 
effective kinship network where pressures are put on individuals to side 
politically with the majority of his kin, for fear of isolation and social 
discrimination. This minimised the interpersonal or group conflicts which 
characterised the elections. The rural elites and young school leavers are 
exposed to various other influences, such - as the mass 'media and 
interpersonal networks other than kinship. 
The urban elites tend to understand the implications of using ethnic 
alliances to exclude one of the major ethnic groups from Nigerian politics. 
of the 42 respondents, 16 (38.1%) reported that a Hausa/Fulani-Igbo alliance 
would make Nigeria politically stable. Proportionately not many of them 
were in favour of the Igbo-Hausa/ Fulani alliance because the breakdown of 
the accord and reasons behind it were known to them. Also, the number that 
supported such an a. 1liance could think about it as the best alternative to 
get the Igbos- back to the 'mainstream of Nigerian politics' and therefore a 
high proportion voted for the NPP. This is because the majority of those 
members of the elites who were interviewed were state employed in regularly 
paid and secure jobs. Unlike the teachers and young school leavers, NPN 
propaganda that the Federal government would intervene to improve their 
working conditions was irrelevant. Many Igbo elites believe in working 
within their own states. The question of abandoned property during the 
civil War, the constant and discriminatory transfers from one state to 
another by the top Federal bureaucracy, controlled by other tribes, hurt 
them. So did the fact that when they are transferred to other states they 
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have to serve under less qualified, more junior persons. Because of this, a 
lot of Igbo members of the urab elites resist Federal government 
appointments. Many of them also believe that the constant tranfers affect 
the education of their children and they therefore prefer to engage in 
private or independent business or serve under their own state government 
with less salary and less good working conditions. The rural elites 
(teachers) are not faced in their profession with similar problems because 
the primary and community secondary schools that employ them are controlled 
by state governments and therefore they cannot be transferred to other 
states, where the wanted experience, effects similar to those of the members 
of the professional urban elites. On the part of the young school leavers, 
if the Federal government injects more money into the state economy, the 
general nepotism practised in employment in Nigeria would enable them to get 
jobs in their own state. Their voting behaviour cannot be similar to urban 
elites until they are in the first instance employed. 
The Igbos, through experience, are less in favour of political alliance with 
the Yorubas and they show this both in their political concepts and voting 
behaviour. Similarly, though the number of Yorubas in the survey was 
comparatively smaller, becuse of the geographical location of the' areas 
surveyed, they have as much a tendency towards identification with the 
Yoruba dominated party as the Igbos have wit. h the Igbo dominated party. In 
the survey 1% of the Igbos voted UPN (Yoruba party) while 64.7% voted for 
the NPP (Igbo party). In addition, 32.4% of the Igbos voted for the NPN, 
only 11.1% of the Yorubas voted for the NPN, and 88.9% of the Yorubas voted 
for the UPN and none voted f or the NPP. In the survey too, 71.4% of Hausas 
and Fulanis voted for the NPN, 14.3% voted for the UPN and another 14.3% 
voted for the PRP, while none at all voted for the NPP. Other tribes 
besides the three main tribes - Igbos, Yorubas, Hausa/Fulani - split their 
votes between the NPN and the UPN: 25% voted for the NPN and 75% voted for 
the UPN. The UPN captured more votes from the minority tribes in the south 
because of the Cross Rivers' presence in Imo State, the mid-west etc., who 
tend to identify with the UPN rather than with either the NPP or NPN. In 
the northern regions, the minority group tend to identify with the NPN 
rather than the UPN. From this survey, the Igbos are comparatively more 
inclined to other parties, specifically to the NPN which is not Igbo 
dominated, than are other tribes in Nigeria. The minority tribes are 
disinclined to join the Igbos. Politically therefore the Igbo are an 
abandoned majority group. This is due to the lost power of the Igbos in 
Nigerian politics as a result of the Civil War. Whether or not they may 
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regain such power as they had before the 1966 coup is a critical question in 
Nigerian politics today. 
Table 12: 11 
Nigerian Political Instability As The Result Of Tribalism 
, 
According To Respondents 
Group Yes No Total 
Traditional (43) (4) (47) 36.7 
91.5 8.5 100 
School Leaver (11) (2) (13) 10.2 
84.6 15.4 100 
Urban Poor (7) (2) . 
(9) 7.0 
77.8 22.2 100 
Urban Elite (39) (2) (41) 32.0 
95.1 4.9 100 
Rural Elite (18) (0) (18) 14.1 
100 0.0 100 
Column (118) (10) (128) 100 
Total 92.2 7.8 100 
Number of misýing obqervations - 25 
In the process of ethnic political Identification, Nigerian politics are 
constantly experiencing a dramatic tendency towards disintegration) 
disunity, and serious if not endemic instability. Whether the nation's 
politics reflect the realities of these problems is another important 
question which should be investigated. %_1 
Respondents were asked whether they thought that tribalism was responsible 
for political instability in Nigeria. 
There were 128 replies to the question, and 25 missing observations. Out of 
these respondents, 92.2% (118) agreed that Nigerian political instability 
was the consequence of ethnic politics. Each of the five identified groups 
scored high percentages in favour of ethnic politics as the main cause of 
political instability. 91.5% (43) of the traditional group reported that 
ethnic politics was responsible for political instability, while 84.5% of 
young school leavers agreed, as did 77.8% of the urban poor and 95.1% of the 
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urban elite. This statistical opinion representation of the causes of 
political instability as reported by various identifiable socio-political 
and economic groups, irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds, indicates 
that ethnicity in Nigeria is still strong and alive. The Igbo political 
tendency towards the Hausa/Fulani dominated NPN Party during the last 
general election should not be interpreted as a serious breakdown in ethnic 
politics in Nigeria. The tendency may lead to it only after a long. but slow 
change in attitudes. The true nature of ethnic politics, with all the 
pseudo-alliances and accord, is understood by the urban and rural elites. 
In this survey 95.1% of the members of urban elites believe that ethnic 
politics remains and causes political instability, and all of the rural 
elites maintain a similar stand. 
one of the * major consequences of ethnic politics is not just the broad 
political instability but the immense social, economic, political and 
cultural conflicts it creates between ethnic groups, different 'classes' and 
interest groups in the country. Indeed, it is under the whims of these 
conflicts that political instabilty becomes apparant or real. In the 
survey, respondents were asked to answer 'yes' or 'no' as to whether they 
thought that ethnic politics create conflicts in Nigeria. 
Table 13: 11 
Respondents' View About Ethnicity and Political Conflict 
Groups Yes No Total 
Traditional (44) (4) (48) 37.2 
91.7 8.3 100 
School Leavers (13) (0) (13) 10.1 
100.0 0.0 100 
Urban Poor (8) (0) (8) 6.2 
100.0 0.0 100 
Urban Elite (37) (5) (42) 32.6 
88.1 11.9 100 
Rural Elite (18) (0) (18) 14.0 
100.0 0.0 100 
Column (120) (9) (129) 100 
Total 93.0 7.0 100 
Number of missing observations - 24 
A nearly equivalent number of respondents who considered that ethnic 
politics create Political instability also maintained that it creates 
various political conflicts between different groups. 93% (12) answered 
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'yes' to the question. The young school leavers, the urban poor and rural 
elite groups all reported unanimously that ethnic politics in Nigeria create 
conflicts. 91.7% (44) of the traditonal group and 88.1% of the members of 
the urban elites agreed. All in the rest of the groups agreed. The 
dissenters are a minority group in Nigeria who think that politics is 
essentially a struggle between individuals over who controls national 
resources and determines their distrbution. Irrespectove of politicians' 
ethnic origin, their primary concern is to enrich themselves out of the 
public money. Of course such an opinion is linked with the idea that the 
basis on which an individual politican legitimates his power to control and 
distribute national resources is ethnic popularity and support, without 
which he gains no power at all. 
I have been arguing that the* context in which political instability, 
conflict, ethnic political participation, network groups' political 
identification and voting in the election campaign take place can be seen as 
a communication network event. In the next chapter, this discussion will be 
empirically related to the role of the mass media and communications in 
Nigeria, and specifically to the 1983 general elections. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
NETWORK GROUPS AND THE MASS 14EDIA 
We have seen that historically, the mass media have been an important part 
of political development in Nigeria, a development marked by varying degrees 
of conflict. In Chapter Six in particular, we saw that under the NPNq Shehu 
Shagari's government monopolised NTA for the interest of his ruling party. 
I noted that before the 1983 general elections, those states not controlled 
by NPN established their own TV broadcasting stations. These added to the 
existing radio stations and newspapers owned by each of the states. The 
implication I stressed was that each state had two TV, radio stations and 
newspaper publishing houses - one owned by the state, the other by the 
Federal government. The situation therefore created acrimony, bitter 
rivalry and conflict. I also argued that the localisation of the media in 
terms of content and locally-born media professionals in both Federal-owned 
and state-owned broadcasting brought home to the electorates the real nature 
of mass media and politics. There was intense competition between the mass 
media owned by the states and those controlled by the Federal Governemnt 
during the 1983 general election. 
In the survey, different network groups perceive the conflicts differently* 
The media intensified and sometimes resolved political conflicts during the 
election campaign. They acted as channels whereby different parties and 
leaders attacked each other. In the election 100% (30) of the traditional 
groups' respondents reported that radio was better in handling and resolving 
political differences. Most of the other groups similarly favoured radio as 
a medium that resolved problems (school leavers 100% (6), urban poor 85.7% 
(6), urban elites 88.2% (15) and rural elites 100% (9)). A remarkable 100% 
of the respondents in other networks believed that televison did not help 
resolve political problems. The table (1: 12) shows that similar reports are 
attributed by the respondents from the different network groups to the press 
and to face-to-face political communication. 
When the respondents were asked to indicate which of the media intensified 
political conflicts during the general election only 37.5% (3) in the 
traditional group believed that radio intensified political conflict. These 
respoondents held a similar opinion about TV and political conflict. The 
rest of the respondents reported that televison did not intensify conflict. 
PAGE 
NUMBERING 
AS ORIGINAL 
Table 1: 12 
ReSDondents' Ovinion About Media and Oral Communications 
Intensify ing And Resolvin g Political Conflicts. 
Media resolves conflicts: 
Radio (V114) TV (V 115) Press (VI16) Oral (V117) 
Groups Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Traditional (30) (0) (3) (8) (1) (8) (3) (6) 
100.0 0.0 27.3 72.7 11.1 88.9 33.3 66.7 
School Leavers (6) (0) (0) (1) (0) (5) (0) (3) 
100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Urban Poor (6) (1) (0) (2) (0) (3) (0) (2) 
85.7 11.8 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 12.5 100.0 
Urban Elite (9) (0) (0) (3) (0) (4) (0) (1) 
100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Missing observations: 84 126 11 8 1 30 
Media intensifies Political conflict 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Traditional (3) (5) (3) (5) (3) (3) (2) (20) 
37.5 62.5 37.5 62.5 50.0 50.0 9.1 90-. 9 
School Leavers (0) (5) (0) (5) (1) (0) (0) (4) 
0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Urban Poor (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) (1) (1) (7) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 12.5 87.5 
Urban Elite (0) (6) (0) (6) (12) (1) (0) (14) 
0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 92.3 7.7 0.0 100.0 
Rural Elite (0) (5) (0) (5) (3) (0) (0) (5) 
0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Missing observations: 129 1 29 128 100 
It is important to note here that apart from the 27.3% of the traditional 
group who reported that television resolved conflicts, the rest of the 
respondents in all the network groups could not say that television resolved 
political conflict. The score for televison reflects the fact that 
television is politically a new medium. Television was first introduced in 
1959 in Western Nigeria and its first political coverage was that of the 
1979 general election until then the army had dominated ý the Nigerian 
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political scene, which means that the mass of the people still f ind it 
difficult to understand how television functions as a political medium. 
most Nigerians understand and are influenced by entertainment and 
advertising programmes. Even members of the urban elite, who are more 
familiar with this medium, stated that television did not resolve political 
conflict. This is a very serious reflection on what is assumed to be the 
role of television in Nigerian politics. These responses indicate that the 
political role of televison is completely uncertain. 
Either this is the case or, as I argued in the discussion of the role of 
television in the 1979 general electionss known as 'the First Television 
Election', viewers were confused by the formats. I emphasised that verbal 
and visual images, wheh used together at various interpretative levels, 
could have an immensely confusing and politically incomprehensible effect on 
a Nigerian audience not familiar with political television. Anthony Smith 
(1978: 85) says that such a medium can entertain or inform but is less likely 
to persuade the audience to vote. The fact that the respondents, 
particularly the elite, were uncertain whether televison intensified or 
resolved political conflicts in Imo State, where the battle between the NPP 
and the NPN was hottest because of the split in 'Igbo leaders, put a big 
question oveý the political role of television. Constraints, as noted 
earlier, could be one limiting factor in the understanding of the political 
role of televison in Nigerian politics. . 
Later we shall evaluate the 
relevance of this data by examining television's influence on different 
groups to participate and actually vote in the 1983 general election. 
The scores by all the groups on whether or not newspapers intensify 
political conflicts show no significant patterns. The. re is one exception, 
the urban elite, of whom 92.3% (72) believed that newspapers intensified 
poitical conflicts in Nigeria during the general elections. When compared 
with television the trend tends to confirm that television as a new 
political medium is not yet seen as having much political importance except 
by the urban elite themselves. The essence of Nigerian poitics is'conflict 
generated by tribal politics. The tribal structure of Nigeria, as we have 
seen, has defined * 
and determined the party politics of the nation. The 
press and the mass* media have all been developed, controlled and owned by 
regional (now state) governments and parties. The press remains a very 
powerful voice for different parties, expressing bitterness, opposition and 
ethnic political conflict. This political role of the press was examined in 
earlier chapters. 
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In addition, the role of face-to-face communication in Nigerian politics is 
defined by the kinship networks, which form the basic structure of tribal 
politics. In the survey 33.3% (3) of the respondents from the traditional 
group reported that political conflict could be resolved by word of mouth, 
but in the other groups it was believed that this neither resolved nor 
intensified political conflict during the election. 
There are two possible interpretations of this data. In Imo State where the 
data was collected, many families were divided in their support of different 
parties, mainly the NPP or the NPN. Most people understood that 
participation was based on how much an individual could get f rom. party 
agents in terms of money or basic goods. Therefore, while conf rontation 
between close friends and relatives was low, it was high in the open village 
squares and market palces. Thus, large numbers of the respondents felt that 
face-to-face political communication between opponents did not resolve 
political conflicts because in rural areas, opposing groups from towns and 
villages engaged in verbal confronýation. On the other level, face-to-face 
political communication did not intensify political conflicts among 
relatives who, though divided in their party political support, knew the 
election was a passing event which must not interfere with their more 
lasting kinsfiip relationships. which, although politicised, transcended 
national politics. Again, face-to-face communication could not intensify 
political conflict between parties at state and national level because 
newspapers, radio and television were used to express national politics. 
Further interpretation of this data, for example that taken from radio, is 
that it is not the contents of the different media that determine the degree 
to which they can be assessed by the audience as resolving or intensifying 
political conflicts, but that such assessment depends on the ability of 
different network groups to decode media political messages. In general, 
radio uses local languages to broadcast political messages - this made radio 
a popular medium for the colonial administration - and has power to reach 
the remotest areas. Thus, as the data shows, both the rural and urban 
network groups have more objective views on the way in which the media 
intensify or resolve political conflict. These views do not show the rural 
and urban network groups to be better politically informed than the rest of 
the population. 
Some of the conflicts, as expressed by the media in Nigeria, are genuinely 
aimed at checking or redressing some of the political evils in society 
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rather than generating more ethnic conf lict , which is the basis of the 
political system. Opinions vary as to which of the channels of political 
communication gave reliable information. The table below demonstrates 
respondents' views as to the reliability of different media and 
communication channels. 
Table 2: 12 
Respondents' Opinion On the Reliability of 
Different Communication Channels 
Groups Radio TV Newspaper Word of Total 
Mouth 
Traditional (31) (4) (5) (7) (47) 
66.0 8.5 10.6 14.9 100 
School Leavers (4) (1) (4) (4) (13) 
30.8 7.7 30.8 30.8 100 
Urban Poor (6) (1) (1) (3) (11) 
'54.5 9.1 9.1 27.3 100 
Urban Elite (11) (8) (16) (7) (42) 
26.2 19.0 38.1 16.7 100 
Rural Elite (6) (1) (8) (1) (16) 
37.5 6'. 3 38.1 6.3 100 
Column (58) (15) (34) (22) (129) 
Total 45.0 11.6 26.4 17.1 100 
Number of missing observations - 24 
A total of 45% (58) of the respondents from all groups reported that radio 
was a reliable medium of political information in the 1983 general 
elections. Newspapers came second as a reliable source of information with 
26.4% (34), while word of mouth ranked third at 17.1% (22), with television 
remaining as the least reliable source of political-Anformation. 
It is striking that among the traditional group radio far exceeded word of - 
mouth (66% (31)) compared with 14.9% (7)) as a reliable channel of political 
information., The reason for this relates to the tension and conflicts that 
built up among Igbo communities during the election. The split in 
leadership, as I have already made clear, resulted in splits between 
communities, villages and families, Locals no longer trusted what others 
did or said about the election. Another important factor which made such 
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word of mouth unreliable was the political corruption of the election 
campaign, with party agents allegedly buying voters' cards with large sums 
of money in the villages. People deliberately refused to talk about why 
they would support NPN or NPP candidates. Often what they said in public 
was different from what they actually did. Radio remained an important and 
reliable medium because it was heavily localised in its political content. 
Locals were able to compare and validate radio information, which was based 
on local political events, in which both the broadcaster and the audience 
had access to sources of information. 
Nearly half of the respondents who thought that the newspaper was a reliable 
source of inf ormation during the election came from the urban elite. This 
again supports the earlier concept that newspaper sources of political 
information were largely restricted to the urban elite. About half of the 
rural elite network group also reckoned that newspapers were a reliable 
source of information. Radio was a less popular source of political 
information among members of the urban elites (26.2% (11) and 38.1% (16)). 
This is because, as I observed during the field work, radio stations 
depended on newspapers for their information. Some of them summarised 
newspaper headlines and editorials for broadcasts of news and current 
affairs. The summaries were comparatively more detailed in Englisfi tha4 in 
any of the major local languages. In addition only a few stations, IBS, 
Radio Nigeria and FM Stereo Rivers State, could be clearly received in Imo 
State. The Federal government of Nigeria has been very reluctant to grant 
to many state governments the right to operate their radio stations on FM 
f frequencies. This has important political implications. Without FM 
frequencies, a state radio station is geographically limited to an area 
which often includes the state's satellite communities. Most states in 
Nigeria are ethnically homogenous. Thus news items f rom, one state do not 
reach other states. In political news -items the broadcast often tends to 
reinforce the political views of the audience, a ref lection which in the 
Nigerian context is no more than ethnic political philosophy centering 
around ethnic leadership. 
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The Federal, Kaduna and Port-Harcourt stations can be received in most parts 
of the nation. Broadcasting items f rom these areas can be used to 
destabilise other communities and bias the minds of their own communities 
against other states. The victimised states cannot retaliate in kind. 
The verbal waref are between Imo State and Rivers State is a good example of 
this. IBS Owerri could only reach periphral communities in River State , 
while FM Stereo Port-Harcourt was able to penetrate all parts of Imo, State. 
The opponents of NPP in Imo State used NPN propaganda from Rivers State to 
intensify the division within the Imo State electorate during the election 
campaign. On the other hand, members of the elite read detailed 
information from a wide range of newspapers with very contrasting views. 
This helped them to validate the accuracy of political information by 
presenting both local and national viewpoints. 
54.5% of the urban poor responded in favour of radio as a reliable source of 
information, while only 9.1% thought the newspaper was reliable. This is a 
point- which shows us the danger of generalisation. s about the influence of 
mass media on the audience. The urban poor, as I have shown, are 
characterised by little or no education and therefore could not read 
newspapers even though newspapers were an urban medium that circulated where 
they lived and worked. In contrast to the urban poor, the rural elite, 
which lived -and worked in the rural areas where newspaper circulation was 
poor, scored highly - 50% said that newspapers were a more reliable 
political communication channel than radio (37.5%). This clearly indicates 
that the characteristics of the media are directly related to the 
characteristics and attributes of the different groups which use the media 
to obtain political and other information. It is clear f rom the above 
table that television is the least popular and reliable medium for political 
information in all the network groups. Several factors contributed to the 
unpopularity of television as a source of political information during the 
election. Party supporters went about providing lorries and offering money 
to voters who attended political rallies, even if they did not support the 
party in question. Where the gathering was very small, phototricks were 
employed, such as the superimpositon of political candidates onto 
photographs of the Pope's crowd during the latter's visit to Nigeria. Most 
Nigerians clearly identified the false pictures. The television 
broadcasters deceived the public in the formats they created for political 
broadcasting. Many people did not believe what they saw on television. 
Also Nigerians are not familiar with television political formats. As 
television 'is now widely available throughout the country, the public 
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consume it for entertainment and for commercial advertising. The political 
situation - militarism - has not allowed it to develop as a powerful 
political medium. 
In contrast with newspaper development in Nigeria, which was inspired by 
nationalism at home and the libertarian theory of the mass media abroad 
(Golding & Elliot 1979: 29), television in Nigeria emerged at a time when the 
social and political view was to accept the media philosophy of presenting a 
balanced and unbiased account of issues. In Nigeria the balanced and 
impartial account of television or radio reflect the thinking of the 
political leaders who own them and control their content. With newspapers, 
the libertarian theory emphasises a political philosophy in which the media 
are also the channels through which truth can be determined. In this case, 
thereforet newspaper journalism has a sound editorial tradition of 
presenting impartial accounts. On the other hand,, ownership and control. 
have rendered the television editorial tradition weak, while constantly 
restraining the professional skills and opinions of the television 
broadcaster. From these differences, it becomes important to discover the 
truth from the media which could influence the political behaviour of 
Nigerian voters. 
As well as this, attempts were made during the survey to find out from the 
respondents which media they considerd 'politically unreliable durng the 
elections. The table below shows the responses, 
Table 3: 12 
Respondents' Opinion On The Unreliability of 
Different Communication Channels 
Groups Radio TV Newspapers Word of Row 
Mouth Total 
Traditional (13) (3) (7) (25) (48) 37.5 
27.1 6.3 14.6 52.1 100 
School Leaver (4) (1) (3) (4) (13) 10.2 
30.8 7.7 23.1 38.5 100 
Urban Poor (4) (2) (0) (3) (9) 7.0 
44.4 22.2 0.0 33.3 100 
Urban Elite (8) (7) (5) (22) (42) 32.8 
19.0 16.7 11.9 54.2 100 
Rural Elite (3) (4) (0) (9) (16) 12.5 
18.8 25.0 0.0 56.3 100 
Column (32) (17) (15) (54) ('128)- 100 
Total (25.0 13.3 11.7 50.0 100 
Number of missing observations - 25 
13, of 
From the five groups, 25% believed that radio was an unreliable medium for 
political information (compared with 45% above, who said it was reliable), 
13.3% said television was unreliable. The same applied to newspapers 
(11.7%), and word of mouth (50%). The scores for the unreliability of each 
medium varied from one group to another. From the traditional network group 
27.1% (13) said that radio was unreliable, in sharp contrast to 66% in the 
same group who believed that radio was reliable. 6.3% said that television 
was unreliable, while 14.6% said that newspapers were. 52.1% said that word 
of mouth was unreliable, in sharp contrast to 14.9% who had previously said 
that face-to-face political communication was reliable. 
For the young school leavers, scores for the unreliability of different 
media in the political coverage of the 1983 general election remained 
comparatively the same as for their reliability. In each case television 
scored the lowest, 0.8%. The urban poor gave a similar response to the 
young school leavers, but note that the urban poor did not mention that 
newspapers were unreliable and only 9.1% had earlier believed that 
newspapers were an unreliable channel of political communication. The low 
score here should be considered in terms of the groups' demographic 
attributes and characteristics, as well as those*of the medium. There is a 
'natural' imposed avoldance. 
From the urban elite and rural elite groups, more important differences 
begin to emerge. Only 19% of the urban elite believed that radio was 
unreliable; 16.7% of them maintained that televison was unreliable. There 
is a noticeable contrast in estimates of the reliability of newspapers in 
this group - 11.9% (5) unreliable and 38.1% (16) reliable. This showed that 
the majority of the elite, who were more or less exclusively associated with 
political press readership, believed that newspapers were a more reliable 
channel of political communication than all other media, even radio, in 
Nigeria. 
The reason for the credibility of newspapers as a reliable source of 
political information in Nigerian politics is understandable. First, we 
have noted that, historically, newspapers developed from private ownership 
by men who believed in telling the truth about their social, political and 
economic environment. Chronicle, 14 July 1909, Lagos Weekly Record 5 May 
1906; Omu (1978: 205) and the principal aims of the development of the press 
were outlined by the short-lived Nigeria Press Association, formed on 17th 
August, 1929 (cf Omu, 1978: 23). It was truth that made the newspaper 
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credible and hence attracted the attention of the most politically 
articulate group in the communities - the elite. Second, The decree/ 
legislation which debarred ownership of radio and television from private 
organisations or individuals, except by permission of the Federal 
government, reduced the credibility of these two media. This is because 
party politics in Nigera are developed and entrenched within tribal politics 
and nationalism. The relationship between the different political parties 
is characterised by blackmail, false accusations, stereotyping, slander, and 
so on. Through the different media, controlled exclusively by the political 
parties, this disinformation is disseminated among the people. 
Among the rural elite 37.5% believed that radio was reliable and 18.8% 
unreliable. But there was 6 
some contrast about television, 25% saying it was 
unreliable and only 6.3% saying it was reliable. Nobody indicated that the 
newspapers were unreliable. This has more to do with the environment than 
with neturality of opinion as expressed by the data. Most of the rural 
elite, as we have seen, live and work in the villages where the distribution 
of newspapers is limited to a few local ones, often owned by the states. In 
terms of exposure to different newspapers owned by individuals, the states 
and the Federal government, the rural elite are restricted in contrast with 
their ýrban counterparts. ' Hence radio, the press and television provide for 
members of the rural -elites the same version of political news and 
information. The most unreliable medium for political messages or, 
information in the last general elections in Nigeria was face-to-face 
communication (word of mouth). The most important figure in this regard is 
56.3% of members of the rural elite although the traditional group has 
52.1%, school leavers 38.5%, urban poor 33.3%, and members of the urban 
elite 52.4%. 
The reasons that more than half of the rural elite's respondents believed 
that word of mouth was an unreliable political communication medium are set 
out below. First, most of them lived in the rural area where face-to-face 
political communication predominated. Second, the respondents acted as the 
nodes and linkages between the rural population and the political leaders. 
Although they were banned from active political leadership during the 
election, and because they felt ill-treated by the state government of Imo, 
they campaigned very hard against it through what they called their 
'underground campaign movement' (most of their campaign exercise took place 
at night, as I pointed out earlier). ' Third, because they carried out this 
type of campaign through the traditional network of relationship in the 
1 
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communities, their activities became known through interpersonal contacts. 
As already stated, the rural communities were, for the first time in 
Igboland, split between NPN and NPP supporters, Therefore, many of the 
politically active teachers were betrayed by others, or tole lies too The 
teachers treated others in much the same wayo As we shall see later, 
everyone was directly or indirectly interested in money, which the corrupt 
political leaders were circulating in the villages: different opinions were 
expressed in public than in private. Similar behaviour was found among 
other groups, but to a lesser extent. 
In general, the fact that 50% of the respondents believed that word of mouth 
was an unreliable medium of political communication firmly supports my 
earlier observation that the split in Igbo leadership in the last general 
election affected the fabric of rural Igbo communities. We have seen that 
the rural and urban communities are linked by social and religious 
organisations. Membership of these organisations, particularly social 
traditional ones, are based on kinship. Within these associatins not only 
the elite and non-elite are linked, but urban and village socio-political, 
economic and cultural life converge. The main communication process is 
horizontal, face-to-face interaction. Once the communities became split in 
their political identification, the information circulated between friends 
and relatives both in the cities and in the villages became infested with 
falsehoods, stereotyping and so on, as the data clearly indicate. The fact 
that 52.4%. of the urban elite believed that face-to-face communication was 
unreliable during the election also supports the argument that the elite, 
through kinship networksq are strongly linked with the rest of their 
communities. 
The high score of unreliability given to face-to-face political 
communication has a direct effect on the credibility of mass media 
information. The basis of all political information is initially word of 
mouth or direct symbolic observation. The radio, newspapers and television 
journalistst who were localised in Imo State, obtained their reports from 
what they saw or heard from people during the election. If the oral 
information was false, the political messages, which had been ideologically 
reconstructed and edited as secondary information by the media, could be 
more unreliable than face-to-face communication. 
In my opinion, because of control and ownership, media messages are a lot 
more constrained than face-to-face political communicaion. Thus the latter 
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becomes less reliable. The majority of media audiences, no matter how 
localised the information, cannot reach the source of the information, and 
is therefore forced to accept it as true. Hence we should-not conclude that 
the respondents' statements about the last election were the absolute truth. 
Another important point is that most relationships in both cities and 
villages in Imo State were strained by different party identifications which 
led many respondents to respond to the question with certain emotions which, 
from my cultural experience of Igbo communites, were due to the 'natural' 
relation rather than to politics. Here opinion, experience and participant 
observation should be used to moderate any extreme views and interpretation 
of data. 
The question is, why do people in semi-industrial and largely rural 
communities vote at all, if they believe that most of what they hear is 
false? One of the concerns of this thesis, therefore, is to find empirical 
evidence which will uncover sources of political influence other than the 
media and face-to-face communcation. 
Table 4: 12 
Respondents' Media Ownership (Reception Facilities) 
Groups Radio TV Tele- Radio 
phone + TV 
Traditional (34) (1) (3) (6) 
77.3 2.3 6.8 13.6 
School Leaver (9) (0) (0) (4) 
69.2 0.0 0.0 30.8 
Urban Poor. (8) (0) (0) (1) 
88.9 0.0 0.0 11.1 
All Row 
Urban Elite (17) (0) (0) 
41.5 0.0 0.0 
Rural Elite (8) (2) (0) 
47.1 11.8 0.0 
Column (76) (3) (3) 
Total 61.3 2.4 2.4 
Number of missing observations = 29 
(22) 
53.7 
(7) 
41.2 
(40) 
32.3 
of Total 
these 
(0) (44) 
0.0 100 
(0) (13) ' 
0.0 100 
(0) (9) 
0.0 100 
(2) (41) 
4.7 100 
(0) (17) 
0.0 100 
(2) (124) 
1.6 100 
35.5 
10.9 
7.3 
33.1 
13.7 
100 
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An individual's exposure to political information depends on his access to a 
particular medium, such as a radio set. This depends on various factors: 
first, the ability to buy it, -and second, the ability to use it effectively 
- that is, the ability to use the political information supplied by the 
medium to reach the decision to vote for a political candidate(s). The 
medium may be used just to reinforce one's own existing opinion or to modify 
it but rarely, as we have seen, will it change it. I have already referred 
it to the summary of 'main' findings of research on the media and election 
campaign-reported by Golding (1974: 79-83). 
In the survey table 4: 12,61.3% in all groups own a radio set, while only 
2.4% own a television, and only 2.4% own a telephone. 32.3% own both. The 
radio owners comprise 77.3% of the traditional group; 69.2% of the school 
leavers; 88.9% of the urban poor; 41.5% of the urban elites; and 47.1% of 
the rural elite. While the two elites scored the lowest in radio ownership, 
the majority of elite members own both radio and television sets: 53.7% (22) 
of the urban elite and 41.2% (7) of the rural elite. Of the 40 who reported 
that they own both radio and television sets, 29 are from the elite group. 
The least likely, in the survey, to own both radio and television sets are 
the urban poor (11.1%); the traditional network (13.6%); and young school 
leavers (30.8%). Only the urban elite (4.9%) owns both radio and television 
sets, as well as a telephone, (see Table 4: 12). 
In general, private ownership of radio and television sets in Imo State is 
widespread, with radio far exceeding the rest. Ownership of both is 
concentrated in the hands of the elite, both in the cities and villages. 
Most people in Nigeria, irrespective of residence, occupation, standard of 
education, and so on, are exposed to radio and therefore to its political 
influence. This exposure may further explain why radio was ranked as an 
important reliable medium for political information. There is a weak 
relationship between ownership and exposure, While f ewer people own a 
medium such as a television, more people watch it -af actor governed by 
social ties. 
Hours of Exposure to Political Media 
The extensive use of the media during the Nigerian election campaign and the 
considerable amount of time people spend listening to political broadcasts 
and also talking politics, is worth examining in detail. Anthony smith 
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(1978: 96) has argued that too much coverage of politics by the media during 
an election campaign leads to 'overkill' which makes the audience 
indifferent to political broadcasts. Others have argued against this point 
by saying that the period of political campaign and voting are so short in 
comparison with other national activities that media coverage of the events 
cannot be described as 'overkill'., Furthermore, an election period is 
regarded as an exciting moment in the history of a nation because it 
determines what goes on thereafter. The problem with Smith's assessment of 
media election campaign 'overkill' in the 1974 British General Election is 
that he concentrated too much on television coverage. 
In Nigeria, the amount of time people spent on television, radio, and 
newspapers, or in talking about politics varied according to the type of 
media, and its availability within particular groups. We cannot talk about 
overkill in Nigerian communication and politics because the network of 
socio-political and economic relations links different groups to different 
media networks. Contact between groups varies widely and participation in 
politics is not absolutely-dependent on the media presentation of political 
information. The nature of an industrial society such as Britain allows for 
such dependency on the media. In turn, media professionals exploit such 
dependency. 
Table 5: 12 
Respondents Hours of Exposure to Radio 
Groups 1-10 11-20 21-30 Row 
Hours Hours Hours Total 
Traditional (23) (5) (15) (43) 34.4 
53.5 11.6 34.9 100 
School Leaver (6) (2) (3) (13) 10.4 
61.5' 15.4 23.1 100 
Urban Poor (5) (4) (2) (11) 3.8 
45.5 36.4 18.2 100 
Urban Elite (22) (10) (9) (41) 32.8 
53.7 24.4 22.4 100 
Rural Elite (9) (4) (4) (17) 13.6 
52.9 23.5 23.5 100 
Column (67) (25) (33) (125) 100 
Total 53.6 20.0 26.4 100 
Number of missing observations -28 
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Table 6: 12 
Respondents' Hours Of Exposure to Television 
Groups 1-10 11-20 21-30 Row 
Hours Hours Hours Total 
Traditional (16) (4) (4) (24) 27.4 
66.7 16.7 16.7 100 
School Leaver (8) (1) (3) (12) 13.8 
66.7 8.3 25.0 100 
Urban Poor (3) (1) (1) (5) 5.7 
60.0 20.0 20.0 100 
Urban Elite (23) (7) (4) (34) 39.1 
67.6 20.6 11.8 100 
Rural Elite (10) (1) (1) (12) 13.8 
83.3 8.3 8.3 100 
Column (66) (14) (13) (87) 100 
Total 69.0 16.1 14.9 100 
Number of missing observations = 66 
6 
Table 7: 12. 
Hours Spent Reading Newspapers For Political Infoi: mation By the Respondents 
Groups 1-10 11-20 21-30 Row 
Hours Hours Hours Total 
Traditional (17) (5) (3) (25) 26.0 
68.0 20.0 12.0 100 1 
School Leaver (10) (2) (1) (13) 13.5 
76.9 15.4 7.7 100 
Urban Poor (4) (0) (1) (5) 5.2 
80.0 0.0 20.0 100 
Urban Elite (32) (5) (0) (37) 38.9 
86.5 13.5 0.0 100 
Rural Elite (12) (2) (2) (16) 14.7 
75.0 12.5 12.5 100 
Column (75) (14) (7) (96) 100 
Total 78.1 14.6 7.3 100 
Number of missing observa tions - 57 
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Table 8: 12 
Respondents' Hours Of Involvement In Face-To-Face Communication 
Groups 
Traditional 
School Leaver 
Urban Poor 
Urban Elite 
Rural Elite 
1-10 
Hours 
(18) 
50.0 
(5) 
41.7 
(1) 
14.3 
(11) 
40.7 
(7) 
53.8 
11-20 
Hours 
(11) 
30.6 
(2) 
16.7 
(4) 
57.1 
(7) 
25.9 
(4) 
30.8 
Column (42) kzks) 
Total 44.2 29.5 
Number of missing observations - 58 
21-30 
Hours 
(7) 
19.4 
(5) 
41.7 
(2) 
28.6 
(9) 
33.3 
(2) 
15.4 
(25) 
26.3 
Row 
Total 
(36) 
100 
(12) 
100 
(7) 
100 
(27) 
100 
(13) 
100 
(95) 
100 
37.9 
12.0 
3.4 
28.4 
13.7 
100 
From all the five groups, '53.6%, (67) spent from one to ten hours. a week 
listening to the radio about politics, 69% (60) spent similar hours watching 
television, and 78.1% (75) spent the hours reading newspapers, Only 44.2% 
(44) had face-to-face political communication for between one and ten hours 
a week. 
Beyond ten-hours-a-week exposure to political information the number of the 
audience dropped sharply. In all the five groups 20% (25) listened to 
political information the radio for between eleven and twenty hours a week, 
while only 16.1% (14) did so for television, and 14.9% (6) for newspapers* 
Face-to-face communication slightly increased to 29.5% (28). The number who 
exposed themselves to these media and communication channels from twenty-one 
to thirty hours a -week remained within the same range as those who spent 
between eleven and twenty hours a week on them: for radio 26.4% (33) spent 
between twenty-one and thirty hours a week listening for political 
information; 14.9% (13) watched television for political information between 
twenty-one to thirty hours a week, while only 7.3% (7) did, so for 
newspapers. 26.3% (25) were. involved in face-to-face communication for the 
same purpose. 
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A close look at the tables above will reveal that majority of the 
respondents spent between one to ten hours a week on different communication 
channels for political information. Although radio was the most popular, 
and sets are owned by the majority of the respondents, most of the 
respondents did not give it more time than other media. But it is important 
to note from the data that 34.9% (15) of the traditional group spent between 
twenty-one to thirty hours a week listening to radio. This is the longest 
period spent by any group on any one of the four means of political 
communication in the survey. In effect this obliterates the lower 53.6% of 
the network groups' exposure to radio for between one and ten hours a week 
(compared with 69% for televison and 75% for newspapers for between one and 
ten hours a week). 
The high percentage for newspapers of between one and ten hours a week is 
largely a result of the urban elite's exposure to them. Of the total of 37 
respondents of the urban elite who read newspapers for between one and 
thirty hours a week, 32 respondents spent only one to ten hours a week, 
while nobody spent between twenty-one and thirty plus hours a week on it. 
Another important relationship in the data is that between the traditional 
group (twenty-one to thirty hours. spent on face-to-face political 
communication per week) and that of the urban elite within the same twenty- 
one to thirty range: strictly, 19.4% (7) of the traditional network group 
spent twenty-one to thirty-one hours a week on face-to-face political 
communication while 33.3% (9) of the urban elite did the same. We noted 
earlier that face-to-face communication is more akin to the traditional 
group in village communities while mass media communication is associated 
with the urban elite. In the political campaigning process, the urban elite 
is more actively engaged in face-to-face communication than the traditional 
group. Even so the urban elite spent less time reading newspapers, 
listening to radio and watching television than talking politics to friends 
and relatives. 
Earlier, we noted statistically that a higher percentage of respondents from 
the urban elite were active in Politics during the election period in the 
villages than in the cities. In Chapter One I pointed out that both the 
urban elite and the rural elite were the opinion leaders, political 
persuaders and active political agents in the villages. They are also the 
leaders in the small ethnic organisations which have branches both in the 
cities and in the villages. Linkages with other similar ethnic 
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organisations are made possible through these leaders or select committee 
members. These leaders also act as points of convergence between urban and 
rural politics. 
The long hours of face-to-face communication among the urban elite and the 
traditional group imply that face-to-face political communication in Nigeria 
is a dynamic process. Political communication between -two groups, for 
example, the elites and the traditional village groups, is not so much a 
process of sharing information among equals but a didactic flow of 
information shared by two groups. The relationship between the rural and 
urban populations during the election period in Igboland was peculiar in an 
African context. In chapter two I stated that the Igboland region was the 
last to be conquered by Ithe 
British because of its scattered village 
structure in the bush. Unlike the northern or the western part of the 
country, in the pre-colonial period city-states did not develop in the east 
(predominantly Igbo), hence everyone belonged to a village. The city was a 
colonial creation. In the election period a large number of the Igbos 
living in the cities returned to their villages to vote. It was during this 
time that members of the elites were involved in constant face-to-face 
political communication with their kin and relatives in the villages. 
Another important relationship between the different network groups and the 
media times of exposure is that between television and the traditional 
group, and television and the urban elite. The data on ownership of sets 
show that a far larger number of members of the elites own television sets 
than do members of the traditional network groups. But the data indicate 
that 66.7% of the traditional network group watch television for political 
information for between one to ten hours a week, and that 66.7% of the urban 
elite do the same. 
The interpretation here is that the majority of the traditional group do not 
own sets, but that because of the structure of kinship relations and network 
association, one television set owned by a relative is watched by a large 
number of kin and relatives. Hence non-owne 
, 
rship of television sets, is 
independent of respondents' exposure to them owing to the structure of 
social relationships in Igboland. 
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TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE 1983 GENERAL MCTIONS: AUDIENCE RESPONSE IN IMO 
STATE 
We have examined the relationship between the states, the Federal 
Government, political parties and media ownership. The states within former 
Eastern Nigeria are: Anambra, Imo, Cross River and Rivers States. Each has 
a NTA station and a state station. In the last civil government Rivers and 
Cross River States were controlled by the NPN, while Anambra and Imo States 
were under the NPP. The NTV Aba/Owerri is at Aba (Imo State), NTV Enugu, 
Anambra State at Enugu, NTV Port-Harcourt, Rivers State at Port-Harcourt. 
During the election, Channel 59 was established at Owerri by NPP to 
counteract the political propaganda put out by NPN through the NTV stations. 
in the region. In the survey, the respondents were asked to rank in order 
the frequency with which they watched different channels. The ranking was 
from 1 to 3. 
Groups 
Traditional 
School Leaver 
Urban Poor 
Urban Elite 
Table 9: 12 
Respondents' Exposure to Different TV Channels 
First Choice 
68 10 11 59 Total 
(5) (1) (0) 
18.5 3.7 0.0 
(5) (0) (1) 
41.7 0.0 8.3 
(1) (0) (0) 
14.3 0.0 0.0 
(21) (2) (1) 
53.8 5.1 2.6 
0.0 
(0) 
0.0 
(1) 
14.3 
0.0 
(0) 
0.0 
(1) 
1.0 
(21) 
77.8 
(6) 
50.0 
(5) 
71.4 
(15) 
38.5 
(9) 
69.2 
Rural Elite (3) (0) (1) 
23.1 0.0 7.7 
Column (35) (3) (3) 
Total 35.7 3.1 3.1 
Number of missing observations - 55 
(56) 
57.1 
(27) 27.6 
100 
(12) 
100 
(7) 
100 
(39) 
100 
(13) 
100 
(98) 
100 
12.2 
7.7 
39.8 
13.3 
100 
35.7% (35) watched Channel 6 TV (NTV Aba); only 3.1%, watched -Channel 8 
(Enugu) and Channel 10 (Port-Harcourt). This was because these stations are 
far from Imo State and pictures from them are often blurred. A higher 
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percentage of the respondents made ITV Owerri (Channel 59) their f irst 
choice - 57.1% (56). Two factors are responsible for this: firsts, the 
station represented the interest of the Igbo in the political campaign of 
the 1983 general elections; sicond, from Owerri, the capital of Imo State, 
ITV pictures can be clearly received by television sets in the urban and 
rural areas. In addition, it was a new station which emerged uring the 1983 
election campaign. Most aspects of its programmes centred heavily on the 
election and were created essentially from the very local environment which 
the NPP campaigned hard to retain. The programme contents were very 
familiar to the audience who watched them. 
Table 10: 12 
Respondents' Exp osure To Different , TV Channels 
Second Choice 
Channels Traditional School Urban Urban Rural 
Leaver Poor Elite Elite 
1 (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) 
3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
2 (1) 1 (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) 
3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
6 (19) (5) (5) (15) (9) (53) 
67.9 45.5 71.4 39.5 75.0 55.2 
7 (0) (0) (0) (1) (0) (1) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 1.0 
8 (2) (0) (4) * (1) (8) 
7.1 0.0 14.3 10.5 8.3 8.3 
9 (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 1.0 
10 (1) (5) (1) (7) (1) (15) 
3.6 45.5 14.3 18.4 8.3 15.6 
12 (1) (0) (0) (0) - (0) (1) 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
59 (3) (1) (0) (10) (1) (15) 
10.7 9.1 0.0 26.3 8.3 15.6 
Total (28) (11) (7) (36) (12) (96) 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
29.2 11.5 7.3 39.6 12.5 100 
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The second most popular channel among Imo, State electorates in the last 
general election was Channel 6- 55.2% (53) of the respondents marked it 
second to ITV. Channel 10 and Channel 59, both 15.6% (15), remained their 
second choice. 
The third important channel was Channel 10, which 61.1% (55) reported as 
their third choice. Channel 8, was the third choice for 12.2% (11), as was 
Channel 59 (also with 12.2% (11)). Two respondents showed that they 
watched other channels for political information. Most of these channels 
cannot be received in Imo State-where the survey was carried out. The 
respondents watching these outside channels were people who moved from one 
part of the country to the other during election time. The respondents 
could -be traders or unemployed school leavers beeking employment in 
different towns. 
Table 11: 12 
Respondents' First Newspaper Choice For Political Information 
Newspaper Traditional School Urban Urban Rural 
P Leaver Poor Elite Elite 
Daily Sketch (0) (0) (0) (2) (0) (2) 
-0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 0.0 2.1 
Daily Times (5) (2) (1) (7) (2) (17) 
20.8 15.4 25.0 17.9 13.3 17.9 
The Guardian (0) (1) (1) (4) (1) (7) 
0.0 7.7 25.0 10.3 6.7 7.4 
National Concord (8) (3) (0) (12) (8) (31) 
33.3 23.1 0.0 30.8 53.3 32.6 
New Nigeria (1) (1) (0) (2) (1) (5) 
4.2 7.7 0.0 5.1 6.7 5.3 
Nigerian (5) (5) (2) (8) (3) (23) 
Statesman 20.8 38.5 50.0 20.5 20.0 24.2 
Nigerian Tide (0) (0) (0) (1) (0) (1) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 0.0 1.1 
Nigerian Tribune (2) (1) (0) (3) (0) (6) 
8.3 7.7 0.0 7.7 0.0 6.3 
The Punch (3) (0) (0) (0) (0) (3) 
12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 
Total (24) (13) (4) (39) (15) (95) 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
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The first choice, National Concord was the most important newspaper read by 
the Imo State electorate 32.6% (31) during the election. The Nigerian 
Statesman, which is Imo State's newspaper, came second with 24.3% (23)9 
while the Daily Times the Federal government's paper, was third choice. 
One of the reasons for the popularity of the National Concord during the 
election was the political stand of Abiola, the owner of the newspaper. 
Before the renomination of Shagari as the flag bearer of the NPN, Abiola 
hoped, on the basis of the zonal system of that party, that he would become 
the next flag bearer of NPN. In other words he believed that Shagari would 
step down for him. While he hoped for such leadership he made a series of 
serious political attacks on Chief Obafemi Awolowo, accusing him of 
corruption and capitalism while deceiving the Yoruba people and the nation 
with his political campaign of pragmatic socialism. Abiola's constant 
disclosure of Awolowo's practices in connection with the Muruko land deal 
attracted the attention of many newspaper readers in Imo State. Abjala used 
the press to attack Awo, the most serious attack on Awo by a fellow Yoruba 
in recent years. The principal aim of Abiola was to demystify the power of 
Awo, whom most Yoruba people believed to be politically faultless in a 
corrupt political system. The press attack on Awo could be equated with 
6jukwu and Zik's conflict in the-East. 
But, unfortunatelys while the quarrel between Zik and Ojukwuls factions 
continued during the elections, the failure of the NPN party to appoint 
Abiola as the party's flag bearer for the Presidency quickly led him to 
change his political attack on Awo, and Abiola turned against the NPN 
leadership and the Hausa/Fulani domination of that party. The many readers 
of the National Concord could see it as a fearless newspaper ready to 
disclose the ills of the society. 
In addition, Abiola, being a millionnaire in Nigeria during the civil rule, 
could do and say anything with his press and get away with it. Any paper 
that disclosed the faults of Awo, particularly if that paper was owned by a 
fellow Yoruba, would find favour with the Igbos. As well as this, the 
bitter political conflicts between the NPN and the NPP in Imo State during 
the electon coincided with the period when Abiola was disappointed by the 
NPN. His criticism of the party and those connected with it also found 
favour with the majority of the Igbos who were opposed to the NPN in Imo 
State. 
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The tables show that the Imo State electorate's second most important 
newspaper was the Daily Times with 33.7% (33), followed by the National 
Concord with 27.6% (27), and the New Statesman with 12.2% (12). The Daily 
Times was popular because it covered political issues beyond the state 
level. It also covered international and world news better than the other 
national dailies did. This was important for the elite whose quest for 
information transcended local issues. 
Table 12: 12 
Respondents Second Newspaper Choice For Poitical Information 
Newspaper Traditional School Urban Urban Rural 
Leaver Poor Elite Elite 
Daily Sketch (0) (0) (0) (1) (0) (1) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 1.0 
Daily Star (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) (1) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 1.0 
Daily Times (10) (2) (2) (11) (8) (33) 
38.5 15.4 50.0 28.2 50.0 33.7 
The Guardian (5) (3) (0) (3) (0) (11) 
19.2 23.1 0.0 7.7 0.0 11.2 
National Concord (7) (4) (1) (12) (3) (27) 
26.9 30.8 25.0 30.8 18.8 27.6 
New Nigeria (0) (0) (1) (1) (0) (2) 
0.0 0.0 2.6 2.6 0.0 2.0 
Nigerian Herald (0) (0) (0) (1) (0) (1) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 1.0 
Nigerian (3) (2) (0) (5) (2) (12) 
Statesman 11.5 15.4 0.0 12.8 12.5 12.2 
Nigerian Tide (0) (1) (0) (0) (0) (1) 
0.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Nigerian Tribune (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) 
3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
The Punch (0) (1) (0) (5) (2) (8) 
0.0 7.7 . 0.0 12.8 12.5 8.2 
Total (26) (13) (41) (39) (16) (98) 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
The third most 'popular newspaper was the Nigerian Statesman 20% (19), 
followed by the National Concord 18.9% (18), followed by the Punch and the 
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Daily Times, each with 16.6% (16). Of the Nigerian Statesman's readers 20% 
(19), were from the urban elite. 
Much of the press coverage of - political events in Imo State was just a 
repetition of what was also broadcast on the radio and television. Members 
of the urban elite were therefore attracted ýo reading newspapers other than 
those of Imo State so as to broaden their political horizons, and follow 
other issues as well. 
THE EFFECT OF THE 1983 GENERAL ELECTION ON PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN, IMO 
STATE 
Many factors, as shown in this study, contributed to political conflicts in 
the 1983 Nigerian general election. One of the basic arguments in favour of 
a network study of political communication is that it reveals the underlying 
structure of interpersonal relationships, and political participation, and 
makes plain the role of communication within the total system. It has beer, 
made clear that kinship networks constitute an important aspect of political 
identification and participation in Igboland, and that the division in Igbo 
political leadership created political conflicts both in the cities and in 
the villages. Also, the localisation of mass media within each of the 
states for the 1983 general election created another dimension of political 
conflict. In my own participant observation, many people decided which 
party to vote for not so much on ethnic grounds, party manifestos and 
politicst nor even according to how much money or 'basic commodities' they 
received from party leaders and agents, but on psychological grounds. A 
small quarrel or misunderstanidng between relatives and friends during the 
election quickly led them to identify with and vote for different parties, 
the NPP or thq NPN. The more hatred intensified, the more they identified 
with different parties. In other words, personal relationships became 
politicised. This became so widespread, particularly in the villages, that 
within certain families people became identified as NPN or NPP members 
rather than as members of a particular kin group. Consequently, I decided 
to use the survey to find out the degree of such unusual political conflict 
in Igbo communities. 
In the survey, responden 
* 
ts were asked to indicate whether they thought that 
the last general affected election their relationship with other people, 
such as parents, relatives, friends, co-workers or other ethnic groups, in 
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good or bad ways. 
The data shows that in all the five groups 88.2% (82) of the respondents 
reported that their relationship with their parents during of the general 
election was good. In the demographic analysis of the kinship network I 
discovered that the majority of the respondents who attained any level of 
education were educated by their parents. I argued that the importance 
attached to education from the colonial period made education such a valued 
thing that most parents made a major sacrifice in order to educate their 
children. Next, using Mitchel et al, (1969), 1 maintAined that 'obligatory 
kinship relationship' forced city dwellers to identify with their village 
kin, particularly parents, during an election period. Kinship ties at 
parental level transcend politics, and it is difficult to alter this. 
Table 14: 12 
The Effects Of The General Election On Personal Relationships 
Of The Respondents With Their Parents 
Groups Good Bad Total 
Traditional (28) (4) (32) 
87.5 12.5 100 
School Leaver (11) (2) (13) 
84.6 15.4 100 
Urban Poor (8) (1) (9) 
88.9 11.1 100 
Urban Elite (25) (4) (29) 
86.2 13.8 100 
Rural Elite (10) (0) (10) 
100.0 0.0 100 
Column (82) (11) (93) 
Total 88.2 11.8 100 
Number of missing observations 60 
34.4 
14.6 
9.7 
31.2 
10.8 
100 
In Igbo communities, siblings are the most important kin, after the parents, 
in the socio-political system. If the relationship with parents were to any 
extent affected by the election , we would expect relationships with 
siblings to be even more adversely affected. 
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In all the groups, quite a high level of respondents had a bad relationship 
with their relatives irrespective of their class, education, occupation and 
residence. In the traditional group 35% (14) of the respondents reported a 
bad relationship. If a third of the respondents from the traditional group 
- whose social structures are completely based on kinship networks - had a 
bad relationship with their kin during an election, the situation was likely 
to be worse with the other groups. 
Table 15: 12 
The Effects Of The General Elections On Personal Relationships 
Of The ResRondents With Their Relatives - Siblings and Primary Kin 
Groups Good Bad Total 
Traditional (26) (14) (40) 
65.0 35.0 100 
School Leaver (8) (5) (13) 
61.5 38.5 100 
Urban Poor (6) (3) (9) 
66.7 33.3 100 
Urban Elite (16) (12) (30) 
60.0 40.0 100 
Rural Elite (7) (5) (12) 
58.3 41.7 100 
Column (65) (34) (104) 
Total 62.5 37.5 100 
Number of missing observations - 49 
38.5 
12.5 
3.7 
28.8 
11.5 
100 
In the young school leavers. group 38.5% (5) of the respondents reported bad 
relations. A third of the urban poor reported bad relations with others. 
In the urban elite the corresponding figure was 40%. The f act that the 
urban elite drifted back to the villages during the election period so as to 
campaign affected their relationships with their relatives even more. The 
ef f ect of the election on personal relationships with relatives among the 
rural elite (teachers) was even more adverse because of the double role 
rsulting from the pressure put on them by government regulations. The 
urban elite could get away with such a regulation - non-active political 
participation - because after work their co-workers do not know what they 
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did with the rest of their time. In the village where teachers live and 
teach, the close network of kin and relatives makes known the activities of 
teachers and makes it easy for others to dictate to them. Some of them were 
reported to the authorities by their relatives -a situation, as pointed out 
earlier, which led to the massive transfer of teachers to remote villages 
where there was shortage of water and rarely any good roads, by the NPP 
government at the end of the election. However, 100% (10) of the rural 
elite respondents maintained a good relationship with their parents. When 
the military took over power soon after the 1983 general election, all the 
teachers were returned to their former stations before the massive 
retirement exercise by that government began to hurt them more than the 
harsh transfers did. 
In the survey, only 49.5% (30) in all the five groups reported that their 
relationship with friends remained good. According to Mitchell et al 
(1969), friendship in Africa does not carry as strong an obligation as 
kinship relationship*. In Agege Lagos relatives in Peace's survey desribed 
themselves as brothers. While kinship is the basis of 'urban brothers' 
ties, the manifest content which enhanced the realtionship in the city is 
the economic relationship between them. "If you treat your brothers like 
other i6wnspeople (in relation to debt)- then yoii will be quickly lost. 
Brothers are the only people you can trust in Agege and if you are not 
generous with them, then you will not survive" (Peace, 1979: 35). Thus, in 
an election period, disagreement with friends can lead to more 
irreconcilable breaches in relationships than would occur with with 
relatives or 'brothers'. Here, bad relationship increased, from relatives, 
37.5%, to 50.1% with friends - an increase of 12.6%. 
In the traditional group 53.8% (21) of the respondents said that 
relationships with f riends were bad. Among young school leavers 53.8% (7) 
also said they were bad. It was among the urban poor that nearly 100% good 
relationships were maintained with friends - 85.7% (6) said these were good 
and only 14.3% (1) of the respondents said these were bad. A possible 
explanation of this is that for the urban poor, in the growing hardship of 
Shagari's austerity measures, life in the city was becoming very difficult. 
They had to work long hours to make ends meet. In the affluent society 
which Nigeria is rapidly becoming, the poor support each other in time of 
difficulties, thus solidfying their friendship. But in Nigeria such urban 
poor solidarity is much stronger among kin than with friends (Peace 1979, 
Lloyd 1974). Most films of the 1930s in America illustrate such support 
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among the poor. Even American wealthy families lost their 'good time' 
friends and depended on black servants for friendship and companionship. 
This situation could trigger off mass revolution if members of the elite 
behaved in the same way. But kinship ties make revolution in Nigeria a mere 
dream because the poor, who should revolt, depend directly or indirectly on 
the rich for financial and other personal supports. 
The elite, in their network, had more linkages in their interpersonal 
relationships because of their horizontal horizontal and vertical mobility, 
They had a very high proportion of bad relationships with their friends. 
only 41.9% (13) reported that relationships with friends were good. This is 
because members of the urban elite were more involved in persuading people 
from the villages and in the cities to vote for either the NPN or the NPP, 
thereby damaging their friendships. They were leaders' of small groups and 
once the groups were divided in their support of either of the two main 
competing parties, the leaders shifted to attack individuals within the 
group who caused the split. This led to bad relationships. Also, in the 
city, relationships are based more on friendship than in the village, and 
the urban elite are more likely to have friendly relations, which carry 
relatively less obligations than kinship relations. These can easily go 
bad. More than half -of the rural elite maintained good relationships with 
their friends (63.6%), while'36.4% had bad relationships with their friends. 
Here the explanation lies within the environment in which they live and 
work. Most teachers faced the same problem during the civilian government. 
For several months they were not paid salaries and they depended on a small 
group's monthly financial contributions to support one another. But some of 
them, for personal reasons, perhaps because their relatives were in top 
government posts, decided to support the NPN to upset fellow teachers. This 
contributed to bad relationships. We have seen earlier that-the majority of 
the rural elite voted NPN in the 1983 elections. The NPN propaganda to 
improve teachers' salaries was effective. 
Another important network of personal relationships which was affected 
during the 1983 general election was between co-workers. In f act, the 
relationship - between friends is not unlike the relationship between co- 
workers. The main difference is that the friendship relation has a broader 
base than that of the co-worker,, which is restricted both environmentally 
and hierarchically, according to the different grades of workers in the 
offiqe, factory or administration. 
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One of the main characteristics, if not the main feature, of urbanisation is 
the formal labour organisation. This does not demand one, particular type of 
labour force, such as relatives engaged in subsistence farming in the 
villages, but a labour force of mixed skills, age and sex. Thus the labour 
force is heterogeneous. Also the ethnic composition of workers is 
heterogeneous: as we have seen from the demographic characteristics of the 
respondents, -the city has a far more heterogeneous population than the 
village. The respondents' statistical evidence supports our theoretical 
view, drawn from Barnes' concept of network, that the 'characteristic of the 
principal formal difference between simple, primitive, rural, or small-scale 
socieities as against modern, civilised, urban or mass societies is that the 
latter is large and complex' (Barnes, 1954: 45; Shrinivas et al 1964: 167; 
Gluck, 1955: 19). 
In Nigeria the nature of ethnic conflict and the size of the society has 
imposed a more cautious and ordered type of relationship at work places in 
the cities. Differences in education have furthermore required a 
hierarchical order of association, which hitherto placed further constraints 
on interpersonal relationships between co-workers. The implication of overt 
political support, particularly among civil servants in the last general 
election, could lead to several problems. Again much depended on whether 
the employers were under the Federal or State concerns. Formality tends to 
pýevail between workers. Political differences are played down and the 
stereotyping of personal relationships protects them from political damage. 
Thus relationships between co-workers suffered less damage than did 
relationships between friends during the 1983 general elections. 
In all the five groups, 60.2% (50) of the respondents said that their 
relationships with co-workers were good. The argument that relationships at 
work are formal, hierarchical, and stereotyped, is supported by. 61.5% (16) 
of the urban elite who reported that their relationships with co-workers 
were good. The latter come from junior workers whose political stand would 
not be as important -as that of the top decision-making group. 50% (4) of 
the urban poor and 64.3% (9) of the rural elite said their relationships 
were good, while 35.7% (5) said they were bad - figures which nearly 
correspond with their friendship relationships and require some explanation. 
Some of the young school leavers who were temporarily employed, 36.4% (4), 
said that the relationship was good; but because they were more actively 
involved in politics as party agents, thugs and party fans, 63.6% of them 
reported that relationships with their co-workers were bad. 
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In the traditional group 70.8% (17) of the respondents said that their 
relationships with co-workers were good. There should be no contradiction 
in the use of the term co-workers. In the rural areas where occupations 
among the traditional group are predominantly agricultural (an important 
reason in the network studies for separating the rural population into 
different groups, such as rural elite so as to allow for theoretical 
development and for sound analytical conclusions) co-workers do not exist in 
the sense that they do in the city. But as much as modern education brought 
about the development of the elite in the rural areas, so did modern 
economic development bring about the use of the term co-workers in the rural 
areas. Another factor of convergence between the two traditions was modern 
economic developments, including water projects, road construction, modern 
building works, rural electrification and so on. All these employed large 
numbers of local as well as other ethnic groups, but the projects were 
highly politicised. Because of such development in the rural area, the 
homogenity of the labour force in the rural areas is breaking down and the 
term 'co-workers' has began to mean the same as in the city. But the formal 
relationship between workers in the city and those in the rural projects is 
not quite the same. The workers in the rural projects are not highly 
differentiated. There may be a few highly skilled workers to direct the 
project but the majority of the workers fall within the same category. Many 
of them come from the same locality and have some blood relationship. They 
may be classified as kin in local government projects. Hence, relationships 
between co-workers in the traditional network group during the election 
campaign were comparatively 'good' rather than 'bad'. 
It is very clear from this chapter that Nigerian politics can no longer be 
discussed and understood in terms of ethnic politics only. This does not 
imply that the disease of ethnic politics has died out. In many respects it 
is still very strong. In times of election the conflicts between the ethnic 
groups frequently lead to disastrous effects at national level. 
In the survey, it was discovered from the network groups that 43.8% (35) of 
the respondents said that relationships with other ethnic groups were good. 
From the individual network groups 46.1% (12) in the traditional group said 
that their relationships with other ethnic groups was good. What we should 
distinguish here is the difference between psychological ethnic differences 
as a result of historically entrenched bias, and politicised and actual bad 
relationships as a result of direct contact with others in the city. The 
urban elite satisfy the second condition, as 46.2% (12) said that their 
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relationships with other ethnic groups were good. In the city we have 
observed that the population is ethnically heterogenous. Here different 
ethnic groups compete for jobs, housing, power, and other opportunities. 
The basis of real hatred is more obvious than in the village, yet the 
traditional group in the village is badly disposed towards other ethnic 
groups which they have not met. Another possible cause of hatred or bad 
relations between the rural traditional group and other ethnic groups could 
be the media, particularly in radio coverage of issues concerning other 
ethnic groups. Media influence can *lead to bad relationships - we shall 
discuss some of the reasons later. 
However, other network groups reported some varying degrees of good and bad 
relationships with other ethnic groups during the election. In the young 
school leaver group only 36.4% (4) reported that relationships with other 
ethnic groups was good. The high percentage of bad relationships between 
the young school leavers and other ethnic groups during the elections can be 
explained in terms of the nature and characteristics of this network group. 
First, most of them were unemployed and it was from them that thugs, and so 
on were hired. Thus, they were bound to clash with youths of other ethnic 
groups during the election campaign. Second, their horizontal and social 
mobility are still flexible and they are often exposed to various groups in 
the nation, some of whom have opposing views that can lead to clashes. 
Third, they are exposed to different media, which bias their minds against 
other ethnic groups during an election period. 44.4% (4) of the rural 
elites reported that their relationships with other ethnic groups were good. 
For the rural elite, mass media and psychological hatred of other ethnic 
groups could be responsible for such bad relationships. 
Though there is no existing data on Nigerian mass media political 
communication with which to compare the extent of good and bad relationships 
between ethnic groups during the election period, it is very encouraging to 
note that across all the groups of the respondents there is a relatively 
good relationship with other ethnic groups during the last general election. 
This As a trend that points out clearly that Nigerian politics are shifting 
from ethnic bias to 'class' struggle, but that the 'class' struggle is 
constrained by the obligatory kinship ties between different groups in the 
comunities. 
In Nigeria, as in other societies, the basic form of political communication 
is the interpersonal relationship with parents, relatives, friends or 
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neighbours, co-workers and/or members of other ethnic groups. These are 
indeed the conditions under which face-to-face communication can take place. 
Communication between these groups is an informal and two-way process of 
sharing and exchanging political information. We have seen that in the last 
general election relationships between groups varied. Because the 
relationships were considerably worsened in face-to-face political 
communication processesq we can see why 50% of all the five network groups 
reported that during the election word of mouth (face-to-face communication) 
was unreliable as against 25% who thought that radio was unreliable, 13.3% 
who thought the same of television, and 11.7% who thought that newspapers 
were. 
I have argued earlier that of ten the mass media in a political environment 
do not change an audience's political opinions and attitudes but merely 
reinforce the existing situation. How much the different communication 
channels contributed to the 'bad' and 'good' relationships that prevailed 
during the 1983 general election has been stated by the respondents 
themselves. 
Table 16: 12 
Respondents' Good Or Bad Relations With Others 
As Influenced By Radio Broadcasts 
Groups Good Bad Total 
Traditional (8) (12) (28) 33.9 
40.0 60.0 100 
School Leaver (3) (2) (5) 8.5 
60.0 40.0 100 
Urban Poor (3) (4) (7) 11.9 
42.7 57.1 100 
Urban Elite (11) (7) (18) 30.5 
61.1 38.9 100 
Rural Elite (8) (1) (9) 15.7 
88.7 11.1 100 
Column (33) (26) (59) 100 
Total 55.9 44.1 100 
Number of missing observations - 94 
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From all the five groups 55.9% (33) said that radio political broadcasts 
helped them to maintain good relationships during the election with other 
people. But the influence of radio on good or bad relationships varied from 
one network group to the other. 40% (8) of the traditional group 
respondents said that radio contributed to a positive relationship with 
others, In other words, 60% of the traditional group felt that radio gave 
them a negative view of their parents, relatives, friends, neighbours, co- 
workers and other ethnic groups. Though radio ranked as the most reliable 
political medium, it tended o be more popular among the traditional group 
who used it considerably to reinforce the existing conflicts which 
characterised the 1983 general elections. Should radio then be held 
responsible for politicising ethnic hatred, which 53.8% of the traditional 
network group reported to be rife during the election period? This may 
depend very much on the station they listened to most. The conf licts 
between IBS of Imo State - under NPP must have contributed to this feeling. 
More traditional villages listened to IBS than Radio Nigeria Owerri, and the 
former was overtly critical of Shagarils government. For the purpose of 
apparent National Unityt Radio Nigeria Owerri was more moderate. The attack 
on Imo State was by the Igbos who belonged to the NPN. This was not seen 
as tribalistic at all. - But a few months before the general election the 
question of Igbo abandoned property in Rivers State in particular brought 
into crisis the ethnic relationship between the Igbos and the Rivers State's 
peoples. IBS and FM Radio Port-Harcourt were the channels that conducted 
the "war of the mouth". This must have affected the views of the villages 
about other tribes in Nigeria. Some of the events recalled villages' bitter 
experiences of the civil war, which injured the feelings of many of the 
rural Igbo populace, particularly those who had lost relatives during the 
war. 
60% of the young school leavers thought that radio broadcasts made 
relationships with others 'good'. 42.9% of the urban poor agreed, as did 
61.1% of the urban elite, who felt that it made a positive contribution. 
Also the contribution of television to the 'bad' and 'good' relationships 
among respndents falls nearly within the same range as radio. 59.5% (22) 
from the five groups reported that television broadcasts had a good effect 
on their relationships with others. 
70.6% (36) of the respondents from the five network groups reported that 
press coverage had a good effect on their relationships with others. The 
largest consumers of newspapers for political information, as seen above, 
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are the urban and rural elites. The report on the ef f ect of newspapers on 
their relationships with others during the campaign is more significant. 
75% (12) of the urban elite said that newspapers' political reporting made 
their relationships with others appear good. 88.9% (8) of the rural elite 
agreýpd. 
The importance of discovering which medium contributed how much toward 
'good' or 'bad' relationships between people during the election is that in 
Nigeria commercial viewing or listening to political broadcasts is very 
common. From participant observation, opposing groups can engage in very 
serious political debate on events of the day for a long time in market 
squares, homes and so on. Often the group will wait for a major newscast to 
resolve the debate. News items often form the basis for political 
arguments. Certain newspapers, radio and television stations are believed 
to be telling lies, and these create more misunderstandings between friends, 
relativest and others who listen to such broadcasts communally. 
Frequently, if no mass media broadcast content can resolve the differences, 
these arguments result in clashes between different party supporterse In 
the survey 73.4% (80) of the respondents from the five network groups said 
that bad relationships between them and others during the election were due 
to face-to-face communication. Such a high percentage of respondents 
stating that face-to-face communication resulted in bad relations indicates 
how much face-to-face communication is involved in political activities in 
Nigeria. Such involvement is not restricted to the rural population, as 
many writers on political communication in Africa think (a thought which led 
to the massive and expensive development of television, in particular, for 
political campaigning). A comparison of the traditional group, which 
represents the village system of political communication, with the urban 
elite, who are associated with mass media political culture, shows that both 
have high involvement in face-to-face political communication. Among the 
traditional group, 73.9% (34) said that bad relationships with other people 
during the campaign were due to f ace-to-f ace - communication. Similarly, 
73.4% (21) of the urban elite agreed that bad relationships with other 
people were due to arguments, Here we see that the two polar-opposite 
network groups in, this study were equally affected in their relationships 
with other people by face-to-face communication. Thus to ignore the impact 
of face-to-face communication in Nigerian politics is to fail to understand 
the nature of political conflict, particularly during an election period in 
the country. Rather, it is evident empirically that the convergence of 
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urban and rural political communication in Nigeria owes more to face-to-face 
communication than to the mass media's homogenising effect. 
1983 GERMAL ELECTION: FREE AND FAIR? 
An election campaign which is characterised by conflict, both at indiviudal 
and group levels, local and national, is difficult to conduct fairly and 
freely. Amadu Kurfi in his study of the 1959 and 1979 elections in Nigeria 
made the following observations: 
"To the Nigerian politicians, and it is believed, to most Third 
World political practitioners, an election is free and fair only 
when one's party or candidate wins it. It is rigged or unfree and 
unfair if the election is lost. This was particularly true of the 
1979 general elections when allegations of 'rigging' or 
manipulating the elections were made by all the political parties. 
Each claimed that the elections were rigged in the areas where it 
failed woefully to win seats. For example, the NPN and NPP were 
unanimous in their allegations that the UPN rigged the election in 
Lagos, Oyo, Ondo and Ogun States where the UPN swept the polls, 
the NPN and UPN accused the NPP of rigging the election in Imo and 
Anambra States, the NPP's strongholds, the UPN, NPP and GNPP 
accused the NPN of rigging the election in Benue, Sokoto, Niger, 
Kwara and other-states where the NPN won, the PRP and GNPP were in 
turn accused of rigging the election in Kano and Borno Sfates 
respectively, 'where these parties scored victory over other 
parties. 
Thus in Nigeria, an election is 'free and fair' or 'massively 
rigged' depending on the fortunes at the election of the candidate 
or party making the allegation. In the best of circumstances it 
is extremely difficult, even for political scientists, to define 
what constitutes a free and fair election. "l 
In Kurfils observation, each of the parties mentioned won in its own state 
or tribal region. . 
In other words, free and fair election is assocated with 
tribal patterns of voting. When other parties fail to vote outside their 
own tribal group, they accuse the winning party of vote . 
'rigging'. The 
point here is that Nigerian politicians do not accuse any ethnic gýoup of 
tribalism in their voting behaviour but the political parties. Nigerian 
politicians have failed constantly to present to the electorate realistic 
manifestos and party policies for solving Nigeria's socio-political and 
economic problems, but have only used the mass media and communicaion 
process to attack each other on issues unrelated to people's problems. 
Hence, each tribe has voted on personality grounds rather than on issues, 
poliices and party manifestos. . 
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Though Kurfils observation is theoretically valid in terms of what seems to 
obtain in Nigeria, his conclusion is drawn f rom the view point of the 
politicians rather than the voters. If the electors, voted on the basis of 
tribal sentiment, as in the case of the 1959 and 1979 general elections, 
accusations of vote 'rigging' are seen as part of those unreliable 
politicial messages which the electorate notices are common in the media 
owned and controlled by the political parties. 
In this study, I am approaching the issue of f ree and f air elections 
regarding the 1983 general election from the point of view of the 
electorate, based on the five categorical network groups. In the survey, 
the respondents were asked to tick 'yes' or 'no' if they thought that the 
1983 general elections were free and fair. A total of 129 responded to the 
question, while 24 gave no answers. Out of these, an overwhelming 85.3% 
(110) reported that it was not free and fair. Thus, Kurfils observation of 
the 1979 general elections was from the point of view of politicians, while 
my data are representations of the 1983 general elections from the point of 
view of the electorates. Both are in agreement, although his was a 
theoretical statement and conclusion while mine is an empirical statement. 
In 'terms of network analysis I shall examine in more detail the relationship 
between fair and free elections as expressed by different network groups, 
In the traditional group 77.1% (37) of the respondents said that the 
elections were not free and fair If we compare this figure with another 
major network group, the urban elite, we find that 90.5% (38) reported that 
it ws not free and fair. Pressures have always been put on rural 
populations to vote along ethnic lines. The name Zik symbolised for an Igbo 
villager a political leader who led the Igbos against the Yorubas under the 
leadership of Awolowo. Most villagers who voted for the leadership of 
Awolowo, also those villages who voted for the NPP, did so because the name 
Zik was associated with the NPP. That the NPP won in Imo State shoed that 
the election was fair and free. However, large numbers of the traditional 
network group, 77.1% (37), believed that the election was not fair and free 
because they understood that a lot of villagers were bribed to vote. 
The opinions of . the other network groups concerning the 1983 general 
elections' are not different from the rest of the network. Of the. young 
school leavers, 96.6% (11) reported that the election was not free and fair. 
90% (10) of the urban poor agreed and 88.2% (15) of the rural elite 
confirmed that it was not fr. ee and fair. 
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It was this general acceptance by the majority of the electors, that the 
1983 general elections were not fair and free, and the resultant tensions 
that were building up, that led to the military take-over of government soon 
after that election in 1983. As we have seen, particularly with reference 
to the Imo State elections campaign, free and fair elections should not be 
thought of in terms of ethnic politics, but in terms of what the electorate 
thought made the election unfair and unfree. 
In the survey, I listed a few elements which were considered to have caused 
the 'ills' of the 1983 general election. These included corruption, 
tribalism, vote rigging, media lies or all of these. 
Table 17: 12 
Respondents' Views On What Caused The 'Ills' Of The 1983 Elections 
Groups Corruption Tribalism Vote- Media All of Total 
Rigging Lies These 
Traditional (9) (2) (3) (0) (31) (49) 
18.4 40.1 14.3 0.0 63.3 100 
School Leavers (1) (2) (2) (0) (8) (13) 
7.7. 15.4 15.4. 0.0 61.5 100 
Urban Poor (0) (0) (5) (1) (4) (10) 
0.0 0.0 50.0 10.0 40.0 100 
Urban Elite (0) (0) (14) (1) (27) (42) 
0.0 0.0 33.3 2.4 64.3 100 
Rural Elite (0) (1) (2) (0) (14) (17) 
0.0 5.9 11.8 0.0 82.4 100 
Column (10) (5) (30) (2) (84) (131) 
Total 7.6 3.8 22.9 1.5 64.1 100 
The data show that in the five groups, 7.6% (10) of the respondents believed 
that corruption was a problem in the 1983 general elections. Nine out of 
these ten respondents came from the traditional group. This is because the 
villages were the areas where the competiton for political support between 
the NPN and the NPP was strongest, and each party employed every corrupt 
means to win local supporters. 3.8% (5) said that tribalism was responsible 
for the 'ills' while 22.9% (30) believed that vote-rigging was responsible. 
Neairly half of the respondents who thought that vote-rigging caused the 
failure of the 1983 general election came from the urban elite, 10.7% (14). 
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In fact, when we consider what happened in Anambra State, vote-rigging by 
the NPN was difficult to check. The activities of the NPN in Oyo State were 
another overt vote-rigging exercise in the 1983 general elections. The high 
percentage of the urban elite who commented on this matter should be taken 
seriously because they are the network group most associated with the modern 
political system, and they understand how vote-rigging is practised in 
Nigerian elections. Only 1.5% (2) from all five groups believed that the 
mass media contributed to the 'ills' of the 1983 general elections. That 
the media scored such a low figure in contributing to Nigerian political 
problems tends to suggest that voters do not pay great attention to 
political media in order to discover how to vote. None of the respondents 
were influenced by the political contents of the media -a point which 
should compel us to discover alternative influences on political 
participation in Nigerian politics. 
However, in the survey as a whole, 64.1% (84) of the network respondents 
stated that corruption, tribalismg vote-rigging, and media lies contributed 
to the failure of the 1983 general election. Hence vote-rigging should not 
be regarded as the major but not the only factor which led to the breakdown 
and failure of the Nigerian general election. 
Another important factor in'establishing the 'ills' 'of the Nigerian general 
election concerns those responsible for allowing these factors to impinge 
upon electoral processes in the country. 
In the survey, respondents were asked to tick only one of the following: 
Politicians; Civil Servants; Students; Christians; Muslims; The Media; 
Farmers; Clubs; Everybody; and Every Organisation. 131 respondents from the 
five network groups responded to the question and 22 observations were 
missing. Out of these, 86.3% (113) reported that Politicians were 
responsible for the breakdown of the 1983 general election. Only 3.8% (4) 
accused civil servants, one said students, two said Christians. 3.1% (4) 
accused the media (2.3% (3) of those who accused the media came from the 
urban elite and one person from the rural elite). Again among those asked 
how mass media contributed to the Political breakdown in Nigeria, only one 
person from the urban poor reported that businessmen contributed to the ills 
of the 1983 general electionso while two people said that everybody was 
responsible for the failure, and another two believed that all organisations 
in Nigeria contributed to the breakdown of the 1983 general elections. 
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Table 18: 12 
Respondents' Views On Those Responsible For 
Political Malpractices In Nigeria 
Traditional School Urban Urban Rural 
Leaver Poor Elite Elite 
politicians (47) (8) (9) (36) (13) 
95.9 61.5 90.0 85.7 76.5 
Civil Servants (1) (0) (0) (2) (2) 
2.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 11.8 
Students (0) (1) (0) (0) (0) 
0.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Christians (1) (1) (0) (0) (0) 
2.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
muslims (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
mass Media (0) (0) (0) (3) (1) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 5.9 
Businessmen (0) (0) (1) (0) (0) 
0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 
Everybody (0) (1) (0) (0) (1) 
0.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 5.9 
Every (0) (2) (0) (1) (0) 
Organisatioa 0.0 15.4 0.0 2.4 0.0 
Total (49) (13) (10) (42) (17) 
100 100 100 100 100 
The striking thing about the f ailure of the 1983 general elections is that 
the politicians accused each other of corruption, vote-rigging and so on, 
but from this study it is clear that 86.3% of the respondents from different 
network groups blamed the politicians irrespective of party affiliation, 
ethnic origin or other factors. In other words the majority of the masses 
approved the army re-take-over of government from civilians soon after the 
1983 general elections. 
Despite the masses I accusation of politicians as corrupt, and responsible 
for the political breakdown, a large number of Nigerians went to the polls 
to vote them to power. A point which clearly confirms that the poor depend 
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on the rich, making revolution a dif f icult achievement in Nigeria. In the 
next chapter we shall discover which people and organisations influenced 
respondents and which ones the respondents themselves influenced to 
participate in the 1983 general election. Here also, the influence of these 
elements on the respondents will be compared with the influence of the mass 
media in the election campaign. 
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CHAPTER THIRTEENA 
CRITICAL FACTORS AND ISSUES IN THE 1983 GENERAL ELECTIONS 
In the above chapters, I hope to have demonstrated that different network 
groups are politically associated with different environments, people, 
organisations and mass media. In this chapter I will examine the relative 
degree of influence which mass media, face-to-face communication and other 
factors had on the respondents in their voting behaviour. First, however, I 
will recap: 
Crucial to the theory of political influence during election periods in 
Nigeria is an understanding of the structure of social relationships in the 
communities. Mitchell carefuly distinguished between 'recognised 
relationships I designed on a temporary basis to achieve certain goals, eg 
political support, and relationships based on Irecognised right and 
obligation'. In Chapter Two I stressed that this is a valid point in the 
understanding of the structure of political communication and influence in 
the network systems where rural and urban politics converge. Based on these 
two types of relationship. stated by Clyde Mitchell, I proposed in Chapter 
Two that the influence of parents and relatives (kin) are more important 
political influences than those of friends, co-workers or the media in 
political participation and voting in Nigeria, particularly in Imo State. I 
explained that this is as a result of strong extended family relations that 
still prevail' in most Nigerian communities, which tend to weaken the 
strength of political party membership and -identity. But since political 
parties in Nigeria are heavily based on ethnic criteria, a situation which 
has matured through the regionalisation of politics in the colonial period, 
the influence of parents and relatives in political participation and voting 
at one level becomes blurred. 
Since the absolute influence of mass media on Nigierian electorates in the 
1979 and 1983 general elections has been taken for granted by Nigerian media 
professionals and writers, but seriously questioned in this study, 
questionnaires were designed to discover the real factors of influence in 
the 1983 elections. 
In particular, the respondents were asked to state in ideal rank of 
importance how the following factors influenced their political views and 
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participation: school/college/university mates, clubs, unions, etc., 
friends, radio, relatives, TV, immediate financial gain and newspapers. 1 
But as I have indicated in chapter two, that linear model and its 
derivatives that emphasise sources, message, channel and audience are unable 
to explain the structure of political communication in a combined rural and 
urban political system. One of the derivatives of the linear model is the 
concept of opinion leaders mediating the influence of the mass media in 
changing beliefs and attitudes of the audience. Stycos' (1952,1963) 
studies of Rural Greek Village, Ruhadkar (1958), Agricultural Innovators in 
India and Harik (1971), Village Leaders in Egyptian Rural Communities, have 
concluded that if the mass media had any 'influence' it was mediated by 
certain individuals who exposed themselves to the mass media. These are 
conclusions drawn from the two-step flow concept propounded by Merton 
(1949); Katz and Lazarsfield (1955). Others such as Lipset, Coleman and 
Trow (1956) supported 'The People's Choice' approach. This concept was 
challenged by Rogers and Shoemaker (1972) who argued that different leaders 
are involved in different social, political and economic situations. 
Politically, as shown in Chapter Two, in Igbo rural communities, no one 
group or individual controls information. Yet Winer (1955), Stinchombe 
(1968), 'Meadow (1980) state that those in power have access to-and control 
of information which increases their power because they use it to influence 
others. This is again similar to the opinion leadership and political 
influence in the two-step flow process. The work of Troldhal (1966) is one 
of the contributions that revised the two-step flow to one-step flow. But 
he could not specify which groups in the society are directly influenced by 
the mass media output, though he noted that there are various sources of 
information in the highly literate community and the direct influence of the 
mass media is limited. This is an important approach to the study of mass 
media and communication in relation to political influence so that other 
'various sources' of influence such as those indicated above can be compared 
with the media influence in relation to different political participants in 
any community. 
From the two-step flow and one-step flow models, the multi-step flow 
approach emerged. In industrial nations' research has concentrated on 
leaders' reception of information from the media, and on how, through 
interactive communication, the leaders and the undecided voters exchange 
information. Within small groups, information flows from leaders to leaders 
and from leaders to followers. This latter model is close to the network 
I 
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approach to political communication. 
In my view it is through networks of interpersonal communication that 
participants in election campaigns and voters know how others were 
influenced to vote, not only by the mass media, but also by other sources of 
political influence in the community. The questionnaire was designed to 
enable us not only to assess how different network groups were influenced in 
their participation and voting behaviour by parents, friends, relatives, 
etc., during the 1983 Nigerian general elections, but also what effects or 
impacts these factors had on others. It was not possible to determine what 
influence the respondents had on the mass media because of the structure of 
ownership and control, so they were asked to state what influence 
politically, and particularly during the election campaign, they themselves 
had on other people. Starting with the influence of the parents on the 
respondents' political behaviour, 46.3% (56) reported that this is an 
important factor. 
But specific to each of the five groups, 31.8% (14) of the traditional group 
reported that parents had an important political influence on them. I have 
aruged earlier that kinship ties are. important political influences in 
Igbolaný and parents constitute the centrality of such ties. Ironically', in 
the traditional group, only 31.8% said that parents' influence was important 
in their voting behaviour. Besides, earlier, it was seen that only 11.8% 
(11) had a bad relationship with their parents during the 1983 general 
electons, yet 68.2% of the respondents were not influenced by their parents. 
There are two interpretations to this response: 
a) The maJority of the traditional group members are older than any other 
group in the survey; it was from this group that 11.4% (15) of the 
respondents were aged 51-70+ years. Thus they could not be influenced 
by the parents, who were dead. 
b) In Igboland, as I pointed out earlier, parents educate their children 
so that at old age they look after them (Lloyd 1967: 143; - Peace 
1979: 43). This relationship may explain why children influence their 
aged parents more than they are influenced by them. Thus in the same 
network group, 75.6% (31) said that they had an important influence on 
their parents during the 1983 general election. 
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Table 1: 13 
Respondents' Influence 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (14) (30) (44) (36.4) 
38.8 68.2 100 
School Leavers (8) (4) (12) (9.9) 
66.7 33.3 100 
Urban Poor (4) (4) (8) (6.6) 
50.0 50.0 100 
Urban Elite (20) (20) (40) (33.1) 
50.0 50.0 100 
Rural Elite (10) (7) (17) -(14.0) 
58.8 41.2 100 
Column (56) (65) (121) (100.0) 
Total 46.3 53.7 100 
This supports the views of Meadow (1980: 90), cited in Chapter One, in his 
community study that an important group of people exists in any community 
who do not have coercive resources, but have substantial influence. The 
family, he stressed, and kinship ties are among the most important factors. 
Within that structure, influence is based on love, affection, devotion, 
roles or duty;, people frequently respond to the wishes (ie preferred 
outcomes) expressed by family members. This is similar to Mitchell, 
Harries-Jones (1969) Obligatory Relationship in African communities. 
Earlier I pointed out that these obligatory kinship ties in Africa transcend 
politics and political identification. 
From table 1: 13 above, it can be seen that 66.7% (8) of the young school 
leavers said that their parents had an important influence on their 
political participation and voting. Indeed the young school leavers are 
those most influenced by parents during the election. We saw that in Agege 
young people who left the village for the city (Peace 1979) did it with 
their parents' permission and the latter also arranged for their 
accommodation and feeding with relatives and friends in. the city. I 
stressed that this was an important aspect of parents' influence on the 
young immigrant to the city. The main reason is that most of this group are 
young, unemployed and often totally dependent on their parents for economic 
support; hence their political influence on them during the election. This 
does not imply that a higher proportion of these young school leavers would 
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not influence the political attitude of their parents. The less educated 
the parents, the more they depend on their children for Political 
information. 
The urban poor and the urban elites are equally split in their opinion on 
the degree of influence their parents had on them during the election. 50% 
of the urban poor respondents said that parents had an important influence 
on them during the election. Similarly 50% (20) of the urban elites said 
that parental influence was important, 58.8% (10) of the rural elites 
equally maintained the same position. In general, therefore, the political 
influence of parents on the participation and voting attitude of the 
electorate in Imo State during the 1983 general elections was strong but 
slighly weaker among the traditional group, as a result of age, but slightly 
stronger among the young school leavers and rural elites because of youth 
and dependency, while in the urban poor and rural elites, about half claimed 
to be influenced by their parents. 
In contrast the influence of school, college and university mates on the 
respondents during elections was not great: only 32.2% (38) saw it as 
important. 
Table 2: 13 
The Extent To Which Respondents Were Influenced By Their Schoolmates 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (11) (34) (45) 
24.4 75.6 100 
School Leavers (5) (8) (13) 
38.5 61.5 100 
Urban Poor (0) (7) (7) 
0.0 100.0 100 
Urban Elite (15) (24) (39) 
38.5 61.5 100 
Rural Elite (8) (9) (17) 
47.1 52.9 100 
Column (39) (82) (121) 
Total 32.2 67.8 100 
--I --* -a- 
The rural elites recorded the highest percentage, 47.1% (8) on important 
influence by school friends, etc. than any other group. The interpretation 
is that most rural elites in Nigeria are teachers. They often attend the 
same training colleges, are employed by their own local government and teach 
in the same local government. Thus, after formal education, they still 
maintain strong ties. More so as their economic plight - non-payment of 
salaries noted above - were the same, they were more linked than other 
groups during the election. In particular, the non-payment of teachers' 
salaries was highly politicised during the election and the pressure and 
consequences were heavy on teachers with . 
large families. Stinchcombe 
(1968), and Meadow (1980: 55) have argued that political information can be 
influential when there is a high probability that messages are acurate and 
are widely disseminat-ed so that all members of the community are aware of 
them. Stinchcombe then emphasised that it is* largely a matter of 
publicizing important messages that enhances 'influence'. Here is another 
important use of the network concept in understanding the way participants 
influence each other on the grounds of their common circumstances. Also the 
environment in which the teachers worked helped them to create conducive 
communication networks to mobilise others to participate in the election to 
cast their vote against the NPP in Imo State. 
All respondents of the urban poor group reported that the influence of 
school, college or university mates was unimportant in their. voting 
behaviour. In the demographic chapter, we noted that only 27.3% (3) of the 
urban poor had primary school education and 72.7% (8) had no education at 
all. Among those who had primary education, two lef t school between 21 to 
40 years ago, thus they could not maintain links (unlike the rural elites), 
to inf luence each other during the 1983 elections .A number of school 
leavers and urban elites are influenced by their school friends because they 
have recently left school, college or university and could still be in 
contact. The 24.4% (11) in the traditional group are young school leavers 
who are educated in the villages and are still there waiting to migrate to 
the city or go onto further education. Their network of connectedness is 
'dense' and they use it to influence each other politically, primarily 
because their school-friends have not yet migrated to various parts of the 
country. 
In general there is a sharp dif f erence between groups in the importance of 
this factor. 
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Another key factor of political influence on participation and voting in 
Igboland is the voluntary associations such as clubs, unions, etc. Earlier 
we have discussed Audrey Smoch's research on the political functions of 
voluntary associations in Igboland. Her main emphasis was on the Mbaise and 
Abiriba ethnic unions. She illustrated vividly how the Igbo State Union 
constituted the core voluntary association that mobilised all Igbo 
communities behind the NCNC. Ethnic voluntary associations can be created 
as a temporary body 'action-set or communication-set' to assist an 
individual to solve his social and economic problems. We saw from the study 
of Lloyd in Ibadan that "in the case of a dismissed Igbo worker two action- 
sets were activated - his workmates and the trade union office in order to 
fight for his reinstatement, and the members of his ethnic group to find him 
alternative employment (Lloyd 1974: 134).. The formation of such quasi-groups 
based on kinship and friendship circles is a common phenomenon in Nigerian 
communities. In election times action-set formation tends to be more 
erratic and wide-spread, particularly when two favoured political candidates 
emerge from the community. I argued that in the 1983 election the 
development of the two political candidates, Zik and Ojukwu, created 
different communication-sets in Igbo communities. The two different 
factions (action-sets/communication-sets) mobilised the electorate for the 
NPN and NiP. The numerous ethnic organisations 'consequentl .y could not act 
together as a unified political force to mobilise the electorate for one 
party. The strength of one single ethnic union such as the Igbo State 
Uýion, as pointed out earlier, was weakened and could not constitute an 
important channel of communication in the 1983 general elections. 
We noted that the two most important criteria for membership of these 
voluntary associations were kinship and religion. We have also seen that 
kinship in particular carries strong obligatory relationships among kin 
which transcends national politics, especially leadership elections. 
Consequently the majority of the people in Igboland did not utiliseltheir 
unions for political campaign and mobilisation. Relatives willingly decided 
to keep their networks of social ties out of contemporary politics. In the 
survey, the respondents were asked to indicate what influence these 
voluntary associations had on their political participation and voting 
during the 1983 general election. 
I 
Over all the groups, only 26.3% considered voluntary associations important. 
Among the traditional group 25.6% (11) felt that their voluntary 
associations were important in influencing their political participation and 
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voting. In this group, small voluntary associations formed important 
political action groups in the villages. The intense competition between 
the NPP and NPN supporters in the last election rendered these unions 
politically ineffective organs for party support. 
Some aspects of the concept of reachability in networks of communication are 
empirically manifested within the young school leavers and rural elite 
network groups as seen in Table 3: 13. These scored highest on the influence 
of voluntary organisations. 41.2% in each of these two groups reported that 
the influence of club members was important in their political 
participation. 
Table 3: 13 
The Influence of Voluntary Organisations 
In The Voting Behaivour Of The Respondents 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (11) (32) (43) 36.4 
25.6 74.4 100 
School Leaver (5) (7) (12) 10.2. 
41.7 58.3 100 
Urban Poor (1) (7) (8) 6.8 
12.5 87.5 100 
Urban Elite (7) (31) (38) 32.2 
18.4 81.6 100 
Rural Elite (7) (10) (17) 14.4 
41.2 58.8 100 
Column (31) (87) (188) 100 
Total 26.3 73.7 -100 
Number of missing observations - 35 
In relation to the concept of reachability discussed in chapter two, and in 
terms of Mitchell and Barnes' postulations, there are two interpretations of 
the scores of young school leavers and rural elites. Barnes used 'density' 
to mean the same thing as Mitchell's' Ireachabilityl. The former 'was 
concerned with communication network between kins and siblings in the rural 
environment while the latter was interested in communication between friends 
at their place of work. In such environments, as I argued in Chapter Two, 
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political communication is characterised by face-to-face interaction which 
friends and siblings can use to influence each other very fast when the need 
arises. 
We have noted earlier that a high proportion of our respondents belonged to 
some form of social club, 88.5% (115); and in particular 94.4% (17) of the 
rural elite belonged to such clubs. Most of the respondents who reported 
that their voluntary associations were formed for the financial support of 
members were the rural elites. This does not only support the 'view put 
forward earlier that the non-payment of teachers' salaries put pressure on 
them to form unions for financial support, but also an association from 
which they shared political information- about the 1983 general election. 
The strict monitoring of their activities by the state government and other 
party agents during the election made them eliminate intermediary political 
information sources and influence. Also I have explained that most teachers 
were trained in the same schools and colleges and employed by local 
government within the same geographical boundary. 
Thus: (a) within their club there'was immediate horizontal interpersonal 
political communication between members who have know each other for a long 
time; (b) the nature of their profession has proved an environment of elites 
who would contact each other directly or through an intermediary source. An 
intermediary was a political candidate, who used a few teachers, eg school 
headmasters to mobilise other teachers' political support for the NPN or NPP 
during the election. (c) Teachers, having been united in their political 
attitude through forces of economic needs, became politicised by the media. 
The media therefore became another important intermediaries between 
different local government teachers in linking wider parts of the state and 
the national political attitude within this group was unique. 
Fhe young school leavers' higher percentage score for club influence can be 
e xplained in terms of their freshness from school where the majority of them 
could still reach each other through voluntary social associations during 
the election. Reachability here reflects Mitchell's concept of the term. 
Secondly, their unemployment condition made them readily available to be 
organised as a temporary political avant-garde. The process I observed 
reflects Jones-Harries' concepts of ego and action-sets in political 
mobilisation during elections. In chapter two I illustrated these concepts 
with the fomation of such action-sets as the 'Ikembal during the election. 
The groups were largely made up of youngs chool leavers who supported the 
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political candidate, Ojukwu of the NPN, against Zik's faction, the NPP. The 
young school leavers, through these factions, influenced each other's 
political participation and voting immensely during the election. 
I 
Other groups strongly f elt that social clubs and unions had a negative 
influence on them - traditional group 74%, urban poor 87.5%, urban elites 
81.6%. 
In Africa, friends are those individuals who came in close contact and 
developed relationships in cities, in public places such as the market, 
church, school., college, recreation clubs and general work-places. Usually 
friendship does not carry such strong obligations as kinship. But as a 
result of the weakness of voluntary unions for political support among 
unified Igbo communitiess the split in the clubs led to some members 
influencing each other politically as close friends. Also the tensions 
between certain families compelled certain individuals to be influenced more 
by their friends. 
PP-11.1 - 
The Political Influence Of Friends On The Respondents 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (26) (19) (45) 37.5 
57.8 42.2 100 
School Leaver (6) (6) (12) 10.0 
50.0 50.0 100 
Urban Poor (5) (3) (8) 6.7 
62.5 37.5 100 
Urban Elite (15) (24) (39) 32.5 
38.5 61.5 100 
Rural Elite (6) (10) (16) 34.3 
37.5 62.5 100 
column (58) (62) (120) 100 
48.3 51.7 100 
From the network groups, 48.3% (58) reported that they were influenced by 
their friends while more of them said that the influence of friends was 
unimportant for their Political participation and voting. In the 
traditional group a slighly higher percentagep 58.8%, said that the 
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influence of their friends was important. This is the group in Igboland 
where political ties and identification are based on kinship; once it was 
disturbed by the political conflicts and tension described earlier, members 
began to expose themselves to friends from other villages and towns for 
political information and influence. 
The political influence of young school leavers on each other is balanced 
between important and unimportant at 50% each. There is a higher influence 
of friends on the urban poor, 62.5%. The urban elites are naturally exposed 
to the urban environment where relationship is more on friendship than 
kinship. It is likely that friends who influence others are more 
sophisticated urban neighbours than their social equals. The urban elites 
tend to influence more people than they are influenced by, thus only. 38.5% 
said that the influence of friends during the election was important. (I am 
not suggesting that the elites in Nigeria influence political attitudes on 
the basis of their politically rich information; rather on the basis of 
their economic and social position and the linkages through which politicans 
'influence' communities by interpersonal communication). 
The second most important obligatory network of relationship in Africa after 
parents are relatives. Relatives range. from brothers and sisters to the 
classificatory extended family of 'brothers' and 'sisters', including 
cousins. All these have important obligatory relationships, as we noted'in 
Chapter Two, and they could be used as important networks of political 
mobilisation. 
Table 5: 13 
The Influence Of Relatives On The Political Behaviour Of The Respondents 
Groups 
Traditional 
School Leaver 
Urban Poor 
Urban Elite 
Rural Elite 
Column 
Important Unimportant Total 
(21) (22) (43) 36.1 
48.8 51.2 100 
(6) (6) (12) 10.1 
50.0 50.0 100 
(4) (4) (8) 6.7 
50.0 50.0 100 
(15) (24) (39) 32.8 
38.5 61.5 100 
(8) (9) (17) 14.3 
47.1 52.9 100 
(54) (65) (119) 100 
45.4 54.6 100 
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The political conflict which affected various levels of kinship- relation 
during the election also affected relatives. In the survey, 45.4% (54) of 
the-respondents in all the five groups said that the influence of relatives 
was important in their political behaviour. In the urban elites only 38.5% 
rated this as important. Other groups were nearly or equally balanced 
between the important and unimportant influence of relatives. * For the young 
school leavers it was 50% for and against; the same applied to the urban 
poor, of whom 47.1% reported kin to be important. The notion that the urban 
elite influence relatives and friends more by socio-economic position than 
in their political behaviour is consistent with this data. Also it was 
among relatives in the villages that the effectiveness of the' campaigning 
battle between the two action-sets of the NPP and NPN was centred. In their 
actual voting behaviour we noted that the Igbo voters were split along the 
line of two opposing parties, so also the influence of relatives in the 
voting behaviour of the respondents in the four most vulnerable groups was 
split. The implication of the data is that relatives influenced each 
other's vote for or against either of the two main parties - NPN or NPP. 
Earlier, I mentioned some psychological aspects of voting behaviour among 
participants during the elections. Some relatives identified with and voted 
for different parties on the basis of previous animositiýs that existed 
between them. Outsiders orchestrated the minor differences between 
relatives in order to buy their votes. The influence of relatives on each 
other in their election behaviour and participation was not so much a matter 
of persuasion but more one of psychological revenge and breakdown in 
interpersonal communication characteristic of relatives and kin in both 
village and urban environments in Nigeria. From participant observations, 
there was little dispute among relatives on party politics, manifestoes, and 
important political issues. The mass media dealt with them vaguely, thus 
electorates were influenced by personalities. 
The fact that people relied more on radio than word of mouth for political 
influence relfects the Political practices in Nigerian election processes. 
In Chapter Two I argued that, where leaders in their personal relationship 
divided the electorate at national and local levels between two parties 
using illegitimate means of political influence to persuade people to vote, 
networks of interpersonal political commu nication would be severed. 
Rationality, therefore, would begin to prevail among the adult electorate 
who consider their life-long. ' relationshp before and after national 
leadership elections as more important. As the election continued, I 
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observed the continuing tension between different electorates. During the 
election a large number of people relied on radio for political information 
rather than face-to-face interaction. This was an important way to avoid 
continued damaging relationships between kin, friends, relatives etc. 
Secondly, illegitimate practices made more people suspicious of each other 
thus radiog which was heavily localised in its political content, became one 
of the important sources of political influence and information among 
various political groups. 
Table 6: 13 
The Influence of Radio On The Political Participation 
And Behaviour Of The Respondents 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (24) (20) (44) 35.1 
54.5 45.5 100 
School Leaver (7) (5) (12) 9.8 
58.3 41.7 100 
Urban Poor (4) (6) (10) 8.2 
40.0 60.0 100 
Urban Elite (21) (18) (39) 32.0 
53.8 46.2 100 
Rural Elite (7) (10) (17) 13.9 
41.2 58.8 100 
Column (63) (59) (122) 100 
Total 51.6 46.4 100 
Number of missing observations - 31 
Indeed the most important illegitimate political practice in Nigeria during 
the 1983 general election as briefly mentioned earlier, was the use of money 
to buy the electorate's votes. I stressed that in the rural areas as well 
as in the city, the general awareness that money was the greatest instrument 
of political influence rather than the use of mass media to influence 
voters, in contrast to media political impact on voters in Western Europe 
and the USA, renders media and political r* esearch in Nigeria problematic. I 
furthermore hypothesised that the political candidates (egos) and their 
action-sets (different party supporters on a temporary basis) emerged for 
the first time in Igbo national politics, leading to diverse network 
linkages. This was in contrast to the pre-1966 election: one large ethnic 
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union which mobilised Igbo communities behind one party, the NCNC, The 
press and radio in particular reflected this political structure in their 
contents. In the 1983 general elections, micro-units of political 
supporters rallied behind different political power seekers from virtually 
every local community in Imo State. I concluded that, as a result, 
everybody became involved in politics not'by the media mobilisation process, 
but because of members of the communities I identification with one party or 
the other as a result of network linkages. The force behind the 
mobilisation and linkage was the content of political commication - 
immediate financial reward -a political situation I described as a 'pork- 
barrel' exercise. 
Table 7: 13 
Influence Of Money On The Participation And Political Behaviour 
Of The Re"ondents 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (10) (28) (38) 33.6 
26.3 73.7 100 
School Leaver (5) (7) (12) 10.6 
41.7 58.3 100 
Urban Poor (1) (7) (8) 7.1 
12.5 87.5 100 
Urban Elite (4) (34) (38) 33.6 
10.5 89.5 100 
Rural Elite (4) (13) (17) 15.0 
23.5 76.5 100 
Column (24) (89) (113) 100 
Total 21.2 78.8 100 
Number of missing observations - 40 
The respondents were asked to indicate hdw much they thought money 
influenced them to participate and vote in the 1983 general elections. Only 
21.2% (24) reported that money was an important influence. Among these 
26.3% (10) came from the traditional group and 41.7% (5) from the young 
school leavers group. The higher percentage in these two groups who openly 
acknowledged the influence of money on them during the election should be 
differently interpreted. For the traditional group, the majority of them, 
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as we have seen in the demographic chapter, are poor illiterate f armers who 
do not understand what modern political practice require except the 
immediate financial reward they can gain from it. They know that 
traditionally, Nigerian elections are characterised by a period of time when 
politicians give out their wealth and they are willing to accept the offers 
and acknowledge it. ' This is particularly so with the old men and women in 
the village who openly asked for such offers. At the same time, lack of 
money as a result of unemployment among young school leavers compelled some 
of them to identify with any political party that offered them enough money. 
Many of them regard it as a temporary employment period to earn some money. 
Also if the party they supported won, it could lead to full-time employment 
in the future. 
While the majority of the respondents denied that money had any important 
influence on them, the respondents were asked to indicate whether they 
thought that money had an influence on others in the community. 
Table 8: 13 
Resp ondents' Opinion To The Degree Of The Effect Of Money 
On The Political Behaviour Of Others In The Community 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (43) (4) (47) 38.5 
91.5 8.5 100 
School Leaver (11) (2) (13) 10.7 
84.6 15.4 100 
Urban Poor (6) (3) (9) 7.4 
66.7 33.3 100 
Urban Elite (31) (5) (36) 29.5 
86.1 13.9 100 
Rural Elite (14) (3) (17) 13.9 
82.4 17.6 100 
Column (105) (17) (122) 100 
Total 86.1 13.9 100 
Number of missing observations - 31 
While, as we have seen, 78.8/*9" of the respondents denied the influence of 
money on them, their view of the influence of money on others was very high. 
In fact, the percentage of each group who reported that money had an 
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important influence on others was higher in all the network groups, from the 
lowest of 66.7% up to 91.5%. 
These two tables illustrate clearly the problem of assessing respondents I 
reporting on political issues in Nigeria without a clear understanding of 
how Nigerians communicate in elections and what essentially influences them. 
We shall come back to the impact of money as a major influence on political 
participation and voting in the 1983 general election. Meanwhile, we should 
look at the influence of TV and newspapers on the respondents themselves so 
that we can compare the different influences of the media and other elements 
of political communication. 
Table 9: 13 
Influence Of TV On The Political Behaviour Of The Respondents 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (7) (25) (32) 32.0 
21.9 78.1 100 
School Leaver (3) (8) (11) 11.0 
27.3 72.7 100 
Urban Poor (0) (7) (7) 7.0 
0.0 100.0 100 
Urban Elite (14) (21) (35) 35.0 
40.0 60.0 100 
Rural Elite (6) (9) (15) 15.0 
40.0 60.0 100 
Column (30) (70) (100) 100 
Total 30.0 70.0 100 
Number of missing observations - 53 
In the earlier chapters, I have argued against emphasis which has been 
placed on media professionals and politicians - particularly in reference to 
the so-called 'First TV elections in Nigeria', the 1979 general election. I 
did not dispute the theoretical claims that socially, culturally, and 
economically TV has had great influence on Nigerians. But with regard to 
its impact on participation and voting during elections a lot of 
misconceptions have been applied. 
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In my survey 70% (70) said that its political impact on them was not 
important. Of the 30% who said it was an important medium of influence, 
more than half are from the elite groups - 40% (14) from the urban elite and 
40% (6) f rom the rural elite. Only 21.9% (9)of the traditional and 27.3% 
(3) of the young school leavers said it was important. None at all from the 
urban poor reported that TV had an important political influence of them, in 
fact 100% of the urban poor respondents said it'was unimportant. 
In chapter seven I disputed the description of the 1979 general election as 
a 'TV election' on the grounds that it was an over-exaggeration of the role 
of TV in Nigerian politics. In the early chapters there is clear 
statistical evidence that TV is an urban medium. It is also important to 
note that the two different network groups who are predominantly associated 
with urban environments are the urban poor and urban elite. To eliminate 
possible over-generalisation of the relationship between TV networks, sets, 
etc. and urban population, our network system helps us to separate the urban 
population and then various aspects o the medium are related to the 
different urban populations. 
Between the two urban populations we noted that 53.7% (22) of the elites in 
the survey owned TV and radio sets, 41.5% (17) owned radio sets only, while 
4.9% (2) owned both radio, TV and telephone. In contrast, within the same 
environment, 88.9% (8) of the urban poor in the survey owned only radio and 
none owned TV only, but 2.5% (1) owned radio and TV. None in this group has 
a telephone in his home. Thus, though it is true that TV is an urban 
medium, in Nigeria about 99% of the ownership of TV is exclusively 
associated with the urban elite. However, ownership of a medium is not 
necessarily a prerequisite for exposure to it. In chapter seven I stated. 
that there is a weak relationship between ownership of a TV set and TV 
watching because of the structure of social relationships in Nigeria that 
guarantees communal viewing. Statistically, this concept was supported by 
only 2.5% (1) in the survey among the urban poor who reported that he owns a 
TV set. At the same time from the same network, 60% reported that they view 
TV from 1-10 hours a week for political information, and another 40% said 
that they did so between 11-30 hours a week. In sum, though only 2.5% (1) 
of the group owns a TV set, 97.5% (5) watch it for political information. 
This is not peculiar to urban environments, but the weaker relationship 
between ownership of TV sets and exposure to them is more akin to the rural 
environment in Nigeria than the urban because of kinship network ties. The 
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polar opposite of the urban elite environment in the survey is the 
trditional group of rural areas. In the latter group, it was seen that only 
15.9% (7) owned a TV set. Independent of this thin ownership of TV sets in 
rural areas, 66.7% (16) in the traditional group reported that in the 1983 
general election they watched TV from 1-10 hours a week for political 
information, 16.7% (4) did so from 11-20 hours, and 84.3% (40) view TV from 
20-30 or more hours a week for the same purpose. In this group there is a 
sharper contrast between the level of ownership and that of exposure to TV 
for political information, not so much as a result of public communal 
viewing, but the network of kin viewing communally at home. But the crucial 
point here is not the importance of TV ownership nor the subsequent exposure 
to it, but how the TV political content influenced the respondents in their 
participation and voting in the 1983 election. In relation to the figures 
on ownership and exposure above, while 2.5% of the urban poor owned TV, 
97.5% of the group were exposed to TV political coverage, but none from the 
same group was influenced by TV political content to participate or vote in 
the elections. Similarly, 15.9% (7) of the traditional group owned TV, 
84.3% were exposed to it for political information but ony 21.9% said that 
they were influenced by TV political broadcasts to participate and cast 
their votes. 
Even among the urban elites, who are characteristically closely associated 
with TV, the relationship between ownership of sets, exposure and important 
political influence of TV is weak. 63.7% (22) of them owned TV sets, 67.6% 
(23) exposed themselves to it for political information between 1-10 hours a 
week, 20.6% (7) between 11-20 hours and 11.8% (4) between 21-30 hours a 
week, only 40% (11) said that its political content influenced their 
participation and voting behaviour in the election, 60% (21) reported that 
its political content had no influence on them at all. 
These figures indicate that, though quite a small number of the Nigerian 
population own TV sets, a greater proportion view- TV for political 
information, yet very few report that they are influenced by the TV 
political broadcasts in their political participation and voting. In 
Chapter Seven I offered some explanation for this association, reviewing 
some of the theoretical merits of TV in the 1979 general election. I 
pointed out that TV was politically unimportant in the elections. 
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Perhaps the low political influence of TV on the Nigerian electorate could 
be an indication of the audience's inability to differentiate between 
television "show business and political activities-2 which the British 
audienceg because of their level of literacy, were able to distinguish in 
contrast to the majority of Nigerian political TV audiences. 
The actuality reports, such as those reflecting on the urban decay of Lagos* 
dominated some of the programmes; no similar rural problems were shown. 
Contents excluded the experience and problems of the sector whose votes 
determine the outcome of an election in terms of their members. Contents 
shift from urban questions to world events; thus only the urban elites could 
decode the political message and these are the smallest group of the 
electorate in Nigerian politics. Besides the urban elite are the least 
interested in voting in Nigeria. 
Furthermore 9 the structure of media ownership and control 
in Nigeria, as 
illustrated in the early chapters, generates a constraint on TV political 
broadcasts. Crucial to, the political TV programmes of 1979, which became 
more localised and widespread in the 1983 general election, was the 
combination of verbal and visual images at various interpretative levels, 
which most viewers found confusing and incomprehensible. 
Television can transmit complex political information in nonverbal and 
symbolic forms, communicating them with an intensity that could be 
unparalleled by radio or newspapers. Always this nonverbal information is 
visual and motional, which must be viewed at a 'single sitting': the 
information may not be repeated and the viewer may not have access to a 
broadcast recorder in order to refresh his mind and understand the 
significance of the. messages which were not understood the first time. This 
problem creates more problems in the audience and weakens TV political 
influence on the viewers. 
In Chapter Seven I therefore asserted that, because alternative sources of 
political influence and information flow existed in urban and rural areas, 
the electorate resorted to these alternatives and most of -them were 
compounded in the network of linkages between kin, relatives, friends$ co- 
workers, etc. Over-concentration on personalities rather than issues during 
the election made the impact of TV on political behaviour of elites and the 
non-rural elites virtually the same because both the urban and rural 
population in any'given region or ethrfic group in Nigerian politics are 
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represented by the same political leaders. As argued in Chapter Two in 
terms used by Rogers and Kincaid (1981: 312) the role of TV in Nigerian 
"politics as regards personality emphasis, only reinforces tribal political 
communication network stability". 
Another important explanation for the weak association between TV ownership 
by the respondents, their exposure to it and the actual political influence 
of the medium content on the voting behaviour of the audience is related to 
the long years of the military in government since the introduction of TV in 
Nigeria. This has stopped the media professional Nigerian politician from 
creating a TV political format which would reflect the realities and 
problems of Nigerian election campaigns. The persistent military rule has 
led to the development of TV along the lines of entertainment, particularly 
imported European and American programmes. In this case, a study of the 
impact of Western culture through TV in Nigeria would show a stronger 
relationship than political impact. The period of the oil boom saw a boom 
in national wealth (another important source of the cultural invasion rather 
than political influence of TV on the population). 
In Chapter Five I showed that the newspaper was the earliest and the most 
important medium in party political 'developments in Nigeria. It was even 
stressed that the history of politics in Nigeria is also the history of the 
press. The press began as an urban medium that linked all network groups, 
directly or indirectly, in both urban and rural areas as anonymous and 
heterogenous communities. In terms of convergence of two political 
environments and tradition, the press remains crucial in Nigerian politics. 
This is not only because of its characteristics on' information details, but 
because, unlike radio and TV, large numbers of dailies in Nigeria are not 
owned and controlled by the state and federal government, hence it does not 
have the same political constraints as the electronic media. 
In Chapter Five, af ter reviewing political relationships between the press 
and the audience, I stated that the empirical problem about the impact of 
newspapers in Nigeria is to assess the degree of influence of their content 
on different groups in Nigeria and how in particular their contents 
influence the electorate. Though we know that urban elites are the most 
available audience for newspapers, we must statistically find out how 
newspapers influence them and the rest of the audience. 
13.20 
Table 10: 13 
Political Influence Of Newspapers On The Respondents 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (11) (32) (43) 37.1 
25.6 74.4 100 
School Leaver (5) (7) (12) 10.3 
41.7 58.3 100 
Urban Poor (1) (6) (7) 6.0 
14.3 85.7 100 
Urban Elite (19) (19) (38) 32.9 
50.0 50.0 100 
Rural Elite (10) (6) (16) 13.8 
62.5 37.5 100 
Column (46) (7) (116) 100 
Total 39.7 60.3 100 
Number of missing observations - 37 
In the survey less than half, 39.7% (46), of the. respondents stated -that 
newspapers had an important influence on them in their political 
participation and voting. More than half of the respondents who were 
influenced by newspapers were urban elites, 16.4% (19),, and rural elites, 
8.6% (10). The influence of newspapers on political decisions of the 
respondents was most insignificant among the urban poor, 0.9% (1). The 
urban poor and those involved in urban politics are poorly associated with 
the press and television. This is not only because the characteristics of 
these media require a certain level of formal education in order to decode 
their political messageg which the urban poor lack, but because financially 
they are expensive. If they watch communally, their own ideas can be 
influenced by others in the group viewing. 
As in radio and TV, exposure to newspapers (readership f or political 
information) does not guaranteee that the political content would have the 
desired effect on the consumer. In the survey the association between 
newspaper political influence in the 1983 general elections and exposure to 
it is weak in all the groups, even among the urban elites. In the 
traditional group 26.0% (25) said that they read newspapers from 1-30 or 
more hours a week for political information, but only 9.4% (11) said that 
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the political content influenced their decision. Similarly, 13.5% (13) of 
the young school leavers did the same, but only 4.3% (5) were' influenced by 
them. An even smaller number of urban poor, 5.2% (5) read newspapers for 
political information, and only 0.8% (1) was influenced by it. A high 
proportion of the urban elite respondents actually read newspapers for 
political information between 1-20 hours a week, 38.5% (37), but only. 16.4% 
(19), just half, said that they were influenced in their political decisons 
by the press political content. A similar proportion of rural elites were 
exposed to newspaper politics between 1-30 hours or more a week, 16.7% (16), 
but only 8.6% (10) said that they were influenced by it politically. 
Thus exposure to media networks, and their political influence on the voting 
behaviour of Nigerians, have wide relationships and this varies from one 
group to another. The gap is narrower among the urban and rural elites and 
widest among the urban poor, despite their exposure to the urban political 
environment from where the mass media political contents are drawn. These 
self-reporting data on the influence of the media on the respondents show 
that the high rate of exposure of various political participants to media 
political messages has been wrongly concluded by media professionals and 
politicians as having political impact. It is this concept of media 
influence on the audience, consistent with the hyperdemic or linear 'theory, 
that I have insisted to be inadequate to explain political communication 
problems in Nigeria. The second problem, which the recognition of a weak 
relationship between exposure to media and media effects tends to resolve, 
is the methodology problem in social and political researches in Nigeria. 
During my field work, as I pointed out in chapter eight, I was asked by some 
elites I consulted to distribute my questionnaires only to schools, colleges 
and various private and government offices. This would have eliminated the 
traditional. and urban poor network groups from the survey and at the end 
presented us with the three elite groups: the urban and rural elites and the 
young school leavers. The data would show a moderately strong relationship 
between media political coverage exposure and influence. Thus in the 1979 
election as 'the first TV election', media professionals and politicians 
either reached conclusions on the impact of TV on the electorate on the 
basis of exposure without looking at actual impact, or their research, if 
any was conducted, was in the media setting and exclusively among the urban 
elites. Much of the effect of the media on the 1979 audience, however, was 
theoretically speculative, based on the hyperdermic model. 
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Another negative ef f ect of the media on the electorate in the 1979 general 
election is reflected in the ethnic pattern of voting illustrated in Chapter 
Seven with the computation of electoral results of the Presidential 
election. The voting behaviour of the electorate according to the table did 
not depart from ethnic participation, in sharp contrast to the military 
government's aim to shift the nation's politics from ethnicism. The 
military erroneously installed the old ethnic political leaders, Awolowo, 
Azikwe, Amino Kanu and Shagari to power, thus generating strong ethnic 
political identification which obliterated any non-ethnic political content 
effect of the media on the audience. 
The table below is a summary of the influence of the media, interpersonal 
communication factors and money as reported by the respondents themselves. 
Table 11: 13 
Factors Of Influence On Respondents 
Respondents 
Factors of Important Unimportant Total No. % 
Influence 
Parents 46.3% (56) 53.7%- (65) (121) 100 
School, college 
/uni. mates 32.2% (39) 67.8% (82) (121) 100 
Social, unions etc 26.3% (31) 73.7% (87) (118) 100 
Friends 48.3% (58) 51.7% (62) (120) 100 
Radio 51.6% (63) 48.4% (59) (122) 100 
Relatives 45.4% (54) 54.6% (65) (119) 100 
Money 21.2% (24) 78.8% (89) (113) 100 
Newspapers 39.7% (46) 60.3% (70) (116) 100 
Television 30.0% (30) 70.0% (70) (100) 100 
From the above table the three most important factors of political influence 
on the res pondents in all the five groups, as reported by the respondents 
themselvest are radio, friends and parents. Money is the least important 
influence on the respondents according to them. Television ranked next to 
last, after social clubs, unions and other'voluntary organisations. 
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From the reporting of the influence of money on the respondents, as stated 
by them, in certain circumstances such as the illegitimate use of various 
factors to influence the electorate in an election, it is unsafe to arrive 
at conclusions on an issue based on an answer provided by the respondents 
about themselves. Direct influence associated with linear' models favour 
such conclusions. 
In my own analysis attempts have been made not only to assess the influence 
which the media and other factors have on the respondents, but also what 
influence they thought the media and other factors had on others. In 
Chapter Two, we have shown from the various researches conducted in Africa 
south of the Sahara edited by J. Clyde Mitchell (1969) that the network of 
kins, friends, neighbours, cQ: --workers and sc-hool-mates influenced one 
another in political, social and economic relationships. 
Recently Meadowq R. G. (1980: 103) argued against opinion leadership and the 
two-step flow of information derived from the hyperdermic model. He writes: 
"A new, multi-flow of communications [has] emerged, with a variety 
of permutations and combinations ... Information flows to leaders 
through the mass media. At t, he same time, it flows from the. media 
to the iess attentivý. It also flows form the leaders to the less 
attentive, and vice-versa. And, of course, within groups it flows 
from leader to leader and from the less attentive to others who 
are equally inattentive. Thus, there are a variety of possible 
information and opinion sources, and the two-step flow no longer 
universally applies. " (Meadow, R. G., 1980: 103) 
In fact, Meadows' inattentive category can be substituted for our 
distinctive network category of followers in relationship to group leaders 
in Chapter Two. 'Opinion sources' are the equivalent of our factors of 
influence. 
In Chapter Two also, I cited Rogers and Kincaid (1981: 76) as saying that the 
effect of communication between sender and receiver was easier to study with 
the mass media than with interpersonal communication. But the network of 
communication analysis, "information flows occurs among participants", each. 
of whom are both "transmitters and receivers", communication in network 
anlaysis is "truly a process of mutual information-exchange". They 
concluded therefore that "convergence model and network analysis fit so well 
together" where "theory and method complement one another more adequately 
than in the case of effect research based on a linear model". 
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Having illustrated the influence of mass media, along with other Socio- 
political influences, on the respondents in order to evaluate the strength 
of the network of political communication based on sharing of information 
rather than one-way flow of information and influence, we should examine 
what effect the respondents thought the media and other factors had on 
others and what influence they (the respondents) had on others in their 
interpersonal networks. 
I 
The respondents were asked to indicate what effects they thought parents had 
on their children in the voters' political participation and voting 
behaviour during the 1983 general election. 
Table 12: 13 
Effects Parents Had On Voters' Participation According To The Respondents 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (26) (16) (42) 35.9 
61.9 38.1 100 
School Leaver (9) (4) (13) 11.1 
§9.2 30.8 100 
Urban Poor (6) (2) (8) 6.8 
75.0 25.0 100 
Urban Elite (32) (5) (37) 31.6 
86.5 13.5 100 
Rural Elite (14) (3) (17) 14.5 
82.4 17.6 100 
Column (87) (30) (117) 100 
Total 74.4 25.6 100 
Number of missing observations - 36 
From the five network groups 74.4% (87) said that parental influence had 
important political effects on the Political participation and voting 
attitude of their children. In all the groups, the percentage who reported 
that parental influence was important was high, ranging from 61.9% (26) in 
the traditional group to 86.5% (32) in the urban elites. The traditional 
group scored a lower percentage in this factor than the other groups. This 
can be explained in terms of strength of social relationships' in rural 
comunities-ýather than political association itself. This is a case where 
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social relations can be politicised to achieve an ef f ect. The explantion 
of f ered in the earier chapters about obligatory relationships in Igboland 
becomes critical here and the demographic characteristics of respondents 
reported in Chapter Nine, which showed the relationships between parents and 
their children, can help to explain this phenomena. We noted that in all 
the five groups, 85.4% of the respondents were educated by their parents and 
explained that at old age these children in turn take economic and social 
care of their parents. We also saw that old people, women and poor farmers, 
make up a large percentage of the traditional group. Their experience of 
how the new political system operates is vague, hence they cannot to a large 
extent influence their more educated off-spring,, in the way they vote. 
politicisation of socio-economic relations lies in the economic power of the 
younger generations to support their parents financially. Overt and covert 
influences of this economic support compel parents in rural areas to accept, 
the political views of their children. But a stronger and more important 
explanation can be drawn from participant observation than from the data. 
The tension between relatives, friends, etc. during the election debarred. 
large numbers of respondents from knowing that parents influenced their 
children and the effect it had on the voting behaviour. The network of 
interpersonal relations was strictly restricted to protect the interests of 
members 6f a family. 
However, there was a considerable contrast between the influence respondents 
thought parents had on them (46.3%) and on other people (74.4%). 
Respondents were also asked to indicate what ef f ect they thought school, 
college and university mates had on the political participation and voting 
of their associates. 47.7% (51) said it was important. 
The rather narrow difference of 15.5% between the importance of the 
. influence which respondents thought that school-mates had on them (32.2%) 
and the effect of such influence on other people (47.7%) might suggest that 
in the personal network of the respondents on the political influence of 
school, college, etc. was 'f 
airly accurate. It might be supposed that the 
narrower the percentage difference between influence of a particular factor 
on the political participation and voting of the respondents themselves and 
ohters in their network the more accurate is the report. But consideration 
should be given to the difference between the network groups. 
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Table 13: 13 
Effects School-Mates Had On Voters' Political Behaviour 
According To The Respondents 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (18) (16) (34) 31.8 
52.9 47.1 100 
School Leaver (5) (8) (0) 12.1 
38.5 61.5 100 
Urban Poor (3) (4) (7) 6.5 
42.9 57.1 100 
Urban Elite (14) (22) (36) 33.6 
38.9 61.1 100 
Rural Elite (11) (6) (17) 15.9 
64.7 35.3 100 
Column (51) (56) (107) 100 
Total 47.7 52.3 100 
Number of missing observations - 46 
According to our theories in chapter two, kinship rather than friendship 
characterises African rural social and political relations. Once the 
network of kinship was disrupted by intense competition between political 
parties in rural areas by unco-astitutional means of influencing relatives, 
some people would resort to old friends in other villages and outside the 
villages for political information and influence. 
The two most important urban network groups in the survey are the urban poor 
and the urban elites: with them strong network ties - are developed with 
friends. Nevertheless, the ties do not supersede obligatory kinship ties 
with distant relatives in the * 
village. In election periods, friends in the 
city influence each other in their political participation and voting. In 
the survey, 77.8% of the urban poor maintained that friendship had an 
important effect on the voting behaviour of the electorate. Similarly, the 
urban elite reported a related high importance of friends - 61.5%. 
We saw that the effectiveness of clubs and unions as organs of political 
mobilisation and support was neutralised and weakened by the split in Igbo 
leadership during the 1983 general election. In the survey, 38.9% (37) 
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considered that the influence of voluntary associations had an important 
political effect on the voting behaviour of the electorate. The difference 
between this and the figure for influence on themselves is very small. 
Table 14: 14 
Effects Of Friends On The Political Behaviour Of Voters 
According to the Respondents 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (25) (18) (43) 36.4 
59.1 41.9 100 
School Leaver (4) (7) (11) 9.3 
36.4 63.6 100 
Urban Poor (7) (2) (9) 7.6 
77.8 22.2 100 
Urban Elite (24) (15) (39) 33.1 
61.5 38.5 100 
Rural Elite (8) (8) (16) 13.6 
50.0 50.0 100 
Column (68) (50) (118) 100 
Total 57.6 42.4 100 
One of the most exciting experiences during the fieldwork was the communal 
viewing of political broadcasts on television, particularly in the village. 
It involved kin, relativesl etc. who belonged to and strongly identified 
with different parties - NPP or NPN. Often viewing was interrupted by sharp 
arguments. between relatives and an elder member of the family would stand up 
to calm disputants down until news, current affairs etc. concerning the 
elections were over. Then debates, arguments, and opinions about the 
programmes and issues about the elections in general followed. Some of the 
debates would turn into big jokes about the elections, and Nigerian leaders. 
Through these debates, arguments and interactive expressions of views about 
TV broadcasts between relatives, kins and friends, viewers were able to 
predict or state fairly accurately how much influence and effect TV content 
would have on the political participation and voting behaviour of their 
political opponents or allies. 
13.28 
Table 15: 13 
The Effects Of TV On The Voters According To Respondents 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (12) (20) (32) 34.0 
37.5 62.5 100 
School Leaver (5) (6) (11) 11.7 
45.5 54.5 100 
Urban Poor (0) (5) (5) 5.3 
0.0 100.0 100 
Urban Elite (15) (17) (32) 34.0 
46.9 53.1 100 
Rural Elite (6) (8) (14) 14.9 
42.9 57.1 100 
Column (38) (56) (94) 100 
Total 40.4 59.6 100 
Number of missing observations -0 59 
'In sum 40.4% (S8) believed that TV had an important ef f ect on the political 
participation and voting attitudes of other people. 
Communal viewing was more common in villages than in towns. Thus the number 
of respondents who thought that the TV political content had an important 
influence on their voting behaviour rose in the traditional group from 21.9% 
(7), to 37.5% (12) on other people. In the urban elite and young school 
leavers groups the influence which the respondents thought TV had on 
themselves and the observations they made about TV's effect on others 
remained comparatively thin. But there is an absolute similarity between 
the influence of TV on respondents and the effect the respondents thought TV 
political broadcasts had on other people. There was none in the urban poor, 
and in the more educated groups respondents' opinions were nearly equally 
divided. The absolute and near absolute similarities between the influence 
of TV on respondents and the effects respondents thought it had on others 
suggest that through this method the actual impact of mass media on the 
audience in an election campaign can be obtained. The complete political 
non-impact of TV on the urban poor, who could not understand different 
interpretative levels of TV political messages, as reported by the 
respondents themselves and similar non-impact 'on others in the same network 
groupt illustrates the importance of the approach used in this study. 
*1 q-20 
Relatives remain an important network of political communication influence 
which has a crucial ef f ect on voting and participation in Nigeria. When 
respondents reported the effect of relatives on the political participants, 
52.2% (60) believed that relatives' influence had an important effect on the 
voting behaviour of other people. The difference between the influence 
which all the respondents thought relatives had on themselves and others in 
their network is only 6.5%. Among different networks the sharpest contrast 
was within the urban elite, 51.4% (19) of whom said that the influence of 
relatives had an important political influence on voters, but in the same 
group 38.5% (15) said that the influence of relatives had no influence on 
their own political participation and voting. A possible explanation is 
that most people in this group had the economic, social and political 
knowledge and power to influence their relatives. In their urban 
interaction and association, they are aware of how each of them influence 
their relatives, both in the city and the village, who tend to rely on them 
for various reasons and needs. 
Table-16: 13 
Effect Of Newspap er On Voters According To Respondents 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (8) (32) (40) 36.4 
20.0 80.0 100 
School Leaver (6) (6j (12) 10.9 
50.0 50.0 100 
Urban Poor (2) (5) (7) 6.4 
28.6 71.4 100 
Urban Elite (17) (18) (35) 33.8 
48.6 51.4 100 
Ptural Elite (6) (10) (16) 14.5 
37.5 62.5 100 
Column (39) (71) (110) 100 
Total 35.5 64.5 100 
Number of missing observations = 43 
The ef f ect of radio and newspapers on their political participation and 
voting behaviour as reported by the respondents is nearly the same as their 
reported proportion of other people's political behaviour. 55.2% (64) said 
that radio had an important effect on others and 
1 
51.6% (63) on themselves. 
With newspapers, 35.5% (39) of the respondents also believed newspaper 
political coverage influenced them much the same. The narrow differences 
suggest that with the mass media, participants were able to assess in their 
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network media impact on the electorate in their various communities. Tables 
16: 13 and 17: 13 show the effects of radio and newspapers on the electorate 
as reported by the respondents. 
Table 17: 13 
The Effect Of Radio According To Resp ondents 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (28) (17) (45) 
62.2 37.8 100 
School Leaver (9) (4) (13) 
69.2 30.8 100 
Urban Poor (4) (4) (8) 
50.0 50.0 100 
Urban Elite (14) (19) (33) 
42.4 57.8 100 
Rural Elite (9) (8) (17) 
52.9 47.1 100 
Column (64) (52) (116) 
Total 55.2 44.8 100 
Number of missing observations - 37 
38.8 
11.2 
6.9 
28.4 
14.7 
100 
Table 18: 13 
Influence Of Money On The Respondents' Political Behaviour 
According to the Respondents Themselves 
GrouPs 
Traditional 
School Leaver 
Urban Poor 
Urban Elite 
Rural Elite 
Important 
(10) 
26.3 
(5) 
41.7 
(1) 
12.5 
(4) 
10.5 
(4) 
23.5 
-I 
Unimportant 
(28) 
73.7 
(7) 
58.3 
(7) 
87.5 
(34) 
89.5 
(13) 
76.5 
(89) 
78.8 
Total 
(38) 
100 
(12) 
100 
(8) 
100 
(38) 
100 
(17) 
100 
(113) 
100 
33.6 
10.8 
7.7 
33.6 
Column kZ4) 
Total 21.2 
Number of missing observations - 40 
15.0 
100 
13.31 
The influence of money on the voting and political participation of the 
electorate as reported by the respondents has very important implications in 
political communication and influence in Nigerian politics. Earlier I have 
compared the differences between the influence which the respondents said 
money had on their own political participation and voting and the effect it 
had on other people in various rural and urban communities. 
Table 19: 13 
Effects Of Money On Other Voters According To The Respondents 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (43) (4) (47) 38.5 
91.5 8.5 100 
School Leaver (11) (2) (13) 10.7 
84.6 15.4 100 
Urban Poor (6) (3) (9) 7.4 
66.7 33.3 100 
Urban Elite (31) (5) (36) 29.5 
86.1 13.9 100 
Rural Elite (14) (3) (17) 13.9 
82.4 17.6 100 
Column (1-05) (17) -022) 100 
Total 86.1 13.9 100 
Number of missing observations = 31 
A detailed comparison of these two tables shows that there is a wide gap 
between the influence which respondents reported that money had on their own 
political participation in the 1983 election and the effect it had on others 
in their communities - rural and urban. The crucial question is, who were 
the participants so much influenced by money other than the respondents 
themselves? By implication, money, as it shows such a wide gap of influence 
and effect on the respondents and respondents' "others" in the community - 
who were none else but themselves - had the most important political 
influence and effect on the communities. The game of politics and the 
expansion of the media coverage of the elections could not be compared with 
the effectiveness of money to influence individuals and communities to 
participate in the election. 
It is quite clear f rom my own observation that money ws used to link, 
mobilise and persuade people to vote. The media in various ways reinforce 
these on-going political practices during the election. From various 
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broadcastso media professions, interviewersq interviewees, politicians, 
electorates, etc. were very vocal about the use of money to buy electorates 
in the villages and cities to vote. * 
It was through the linkages of friends, relatives, neighbours, etc. that 
money was used to mobilise political support. The process endorsed face-to- 
face communication, the most important political communication during the 
election. It was the most important because it produced an effective 
outcome, ie through it money was used to persuade voters rather than mass 
media political broadcasts. The mass media are constitutional and 
legitimate organisations but money, as it was used to persuade the voter, 
was completely unconstitutional but effective. It was the nature of 
Nigerian politics rather than the media and the money themselves that was 
wrong. The 1983 general election was characterised by conflicts and immense 
distrust between friends, relatives, neighbours, clubs or social 
organisational units, etc. We noted earlier that when respondents were 
asked to indicate which of the means of political communication intensified 
the conflicts and which was the most unreliable 50% (64) said that word-of- 
mouth or face-to-face communication was the most unreliable, 11.7% (15) 
thought that newspapers were unreliable, and 13.3% (17) attributed such to 
TV and 25% (32) to radio. 
Thus the characteristic feature of the 1983 Nigerian general election was by 
50% associated with face-to-face political communication in both urban and 
rural areas. This makes it clear and that any study of political 
communication in Nigeria that neglects the roles of face-to-face 
communication will fail to reveal the particular way Nigerians communicate 
in an election period and the. structure of political communication media and 
factors of their effect of influence on "others" as reported by the 
respondents. 
In general, r espondents tend to believe that these factors of influence 
during thp 1983 general elections had more effect on others than themselves. 
The sharpest contrast is with the effect of money (for reasons already 
explained). But in both cases, the influence of television and newspapers 
on the respondents and, others in their networks are 'low. Clubs, eg Igbo 
State Union, which in the pre-1966 crisis was an important channel of 
political communication, has a low score both for the respondents and for 
respondents 'others' in influencing political participaton and voting. 
Table 20: 13 
Factors Of Influence On Others According To Respondents 
Respondents 
Factors of Important Unimportant Total 
Influence 
Parents 74.4% (87) 25.6% (30) (107) 100 
School Mates 47.7% (51) 52.3% (56) (107) 100 
Clubs 38.9% (37) 61.1% (58) ( 95) 100 
Friends 57.6% (68) 42.4% (50) (118) 100 
Radio 55.2% (64) 44.8% (52) (116) 100 
Relatives 52.2% (60) 47.8% (55) (115) 100 
Television 40.4% (38) 59.6% (56) ( 94) 100 
Money 86.1% (105) 13.9% (17) (112) 100 
Newspapers 35.5% (39) 64.6% (71) (110) 100 
However, this form of analysis of political communication does not create 
distinct boundaries between senders and receivers of a message, in 
particular with face-to-face qpmmunication, it emphasises sharing and 
exchange of information. This will not be completely meaningful if we do 
not know what influence our respondefits had on others. We have seen that 
electronic media are exclusively under the control and ownership of the 
federal and state governments, so the respondents could not influence their 
content, nor the political, behaviour of the media professionals who shape 
the content of media political output. 
In terms not only of political communication networks but also in social 
structures of Nigeria, and Imo State in particular, the respondents can 
influence their parents, school, college and university mates$ club-mates, 
children, relatives and co-workers in their political participation and 
voting - 
In Chapter Two I argued that, in Political communication, network linkages 
can become more important than the 'total network' itself, because it is the 
linkage that maintains the relationship when an individual moves from 
village to city or city to city etc. In Chapter Ten, it was shown that only 
3.8% (5) never visited their relatives in town and 3.1% (4) came from the 
traditional group. I explained that these are old people who no longer 
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travel outside the village, but their relatives visit them from cities. 
4.6% (6) visit their relatives in the city at least once a year, 16% (21) 
more than once a year, 40.5% (53) once a month, 18.3% (24) once a week and 
16.8% (22) more than once a week. Variations occurred and were explained 
in Chatper Nine in terms of individual network group's differences. 
We also noted in Chapter Ten that those in the village paid similar visits 
to their relatives in the village. Only one person from the traditional 
group never visited his relatives in the village increasing to 11.3% (15) 
visited relatives in the village at least once a year, 27.8% (37) once a 
month, 24.8% (3) once a week and 35.3% (47) more than once a week. 
From the above figures, it is abundantly clear that there is a strong 
network of communication between rural and urban populations in Igboland. 
We assumed that the content of linkage between rural and urban populations 
was economic and social in relationship to our argument on obligatory 
relitonship and kinship systems. 
But in the election period the relationship can be politicised, that is the 
content shifts from socio-economic to political persuasion and influence. 
Thus, in Chapter Two I emphasised that in an election period the fro-quency 
of visits and information flow between network groups 
;r individual networks 
are essential criteria in assessing group or individual pol . itical 
participation, influence and mobilisation through network linkages. 
Specifically Meadow (1980: 87,88) maintains that while parents influence 
their children in their political behaviour, the latter also influence their 
parents later in life. He also discussed the 'scope of influence' at the 
workplace and between friends in a political situation. 
My respondents were asked to list people or groups they could influence 
politically and particularly during election campaigns. They were also 
asked to rank them according to the order in which they thought they 
inf luenced them. Here, the content of communication between relatives, 
friends, etc. is specifically political. Political communication linkages 
embrace both rural and urban populations in this case. 
From all the groups 80.7% (96) thought that they had an important political 
influence on their parents. There is a sharp contrast between the 46.3% 
(56) who report being influenced by their parents and the 80.7% (96) who 
claim to have had an influence on their parents. 
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Table 21: 13 
Res pondents Political Influence On Their Parents 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (31) (10) (41)34.5 
75.6 24.4 100 
School Leaver (9) (3) (12)10.1 
75.0 25.0 100 
Urban Poor (7) (1) (8)8.7 
87.5 12.5 100 
Urban Elite (37) (4) (41)34.5 
90.2 9.8 100 
Rural Elite (12) (5) (17)14.3 
70.6 29.4 100 
Column (96) (23) (119)100 
Total 80.7 19.3 100 
Number of missing observations - 34 
In each of the groups, the influence which repondents thought they had on 
their parents I political behaviour during the election was high. In the 
traditional group 75.6% (31) maintained that their influence'on their voting 
was important or very important. 
Even among the young school leavers, 75% (9) said that they had an important 
political influence on their parents. This shows that in Igboland it is not 
economic power but knowledge that determines influence between kin. As I 
argued in chapter three, in the traditional Igboland open market or village 
square decision-making, menj women ch ildren, etc. gather and everyone is 
given an opportunity to express his or her views irrespective of wealth, age 
or sex. once an individual is equipped with knowledge and facts concerning 
an issue at hand and is capable of using them to solve a community's 
problem, he dominates. Once parents have educated their children they 
proudly depend on them for accurate political information and when they gain 
employment they also depend on them for financial support, particularly if 
patents are farmers or retired people. 
Yet even in the urban poor group 87.5% (7) thought they had an important 
political influence on their parents. Even though their earning power is 
weak and educationally poor, their influefice over their parents in an 
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election period may still be critical. I pointed out earlier that the 
kinship system in Igboland transcends politics in Nigeria. Most 
parent/children relationships are hardly affected by an election. Old 
parents adhere strongly to the opinion of their children, particularly if 
the latter live in cities and return home occasionally and at the time of an 
election. 
The strongest influence on parents during the elections was by the urban 
elites, 90.2% of whom believed that they had an important political 
influence on their parents during the 1983 general elections. This 
contrasts sharply with the rural elites who said that parental influence was 
an important influence on their own political behaviour. Here a combination 
of factors are important: social status, economic power and political 
knowledge. As I pointed out, these do not weaken their ties with their kin 
but also increase their obligatory duties to parents, their own children and 
relatives. In election time, they use these associate values to influence 
the voting behaviour of their parents and other kin. In Chapter Ten we saw 
that 83.3% visit home at least once a month. The visits enhance their 
popularity in the natal home and they become more familiar with local social 
and political issues. 
Also among the rural elites, 70.6% (12) reported that they had an important 
political influence on the behaviour of their parents, while 58.8% (10) 
reported that they were influenced by their parents. Political influence 
between respondents and their parents tend to be balanced. 
In contrast the influence which the respondents had on their school, college 
or university mates was generally low in the last general election. 
Across all the five groups, only 24.8% (29) believed that they had an 
important political influence on their school matess' etc. A noticeable 
difference which is difficult to explain exists in the rural elite where 
12.2% (2) said that they had an important influence on their school-mates 
yet we saw that 47.1% (8) believed that these school-mates influenced them. 
Among young school leavers 45.5% (5) said that they had an important 
influence on the voting behaviour of their school-mates, while 38.5% (5) 
believed that their friends influenced them. 
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Table 22: 13 
Res2ondents' Influence On Their School/College-Mates 
Groups Important Unimportant Total 
Traditional (11) (30) (41) 35.0 
26.8 73.2 100 
School Leaver (5) (6) (11) 9.4 
45.5 54.5 100 
Urban Poor (2) (6) (8) 6.8 
25.0 75.0 100 
Urban Elite (9) (32) (41) 35.0 
22.0 78.0 100 
Rural Elite (2) (14) (16) 13.7 
12.5 87.5 100 
Number of missing observations - 36 
The general low i-nf luences by and on school-mates may indicate a breakdown 
in horizontal interpersonal linkages or communication. Here reachability 
and connectedness among old school friends is hampered by horizontal 
geographical movement to various parts of the country after formal 
education. 
on the other hand a high proportion 42.5% (51), thought that they had an 
important political influence on their clubmates. Thus, despite the 
weakeness of the one large ethnic union such as the Igbo State Union, clubs 
functioned an important networks of communciation through which members 
influenced one another, particularly among elite social clubs. 
In the cities where the nature of social ties are instrumental and work 
seems to define the character of the relationship which does not carry 
specific obligations, it is more difficult to politicise the relationship. 
In contrast to kinship ties, only 22.9% (25) believed that they had any 
important political influence on the voting behaviour of their co-workers. 
My own observations of the 1983 general election in Nigeria revealed 'games' 
of betrayals and blackmails between friends, particulary in the elites. Co- 
workers who belonged to different parties tried to hide their political 
sympathy to avoid betrayal by co-workers. Besides, the Igbos have a 
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peculiar mode of political participation and voting. The majority vote and 
play more active roles in the village of their origin than in the city where 
they live and work. We noted earlier that those most actively involved in 
city life and politics are the urban elites. Strikingly, in the survey, 
only 12.5% (5) believed that they had an important political influence on 
their co-workers. In sharp contrast, 78.0% (32) of the urban elites 
reported that they had an important influence on their relatives. A higher 
percentage of workers' relatives live in the village than in the cities. 
Either in terms of 'light mesh' (Barnes, 1954: 54), 'multiplex, relationship 
by Gluckman (1955: 19), or the 'density', range or reachability in network 
elaborated in Chapter Two, Mitchell (1969) made an important observation 
about African socio-political relationships. He writes: 
"The importance of looking at the structural as well as the 
interactional aspects of network links is that the influence 
through several links of dissimilar content may be traced. " 
He then went on to illustrate the point by saying that: 
"the fact that A is linked to B in terms of kinship and B to C in 
terms of occupational ties, may or may not affect the extent to 
which A can enlist C's service for some purpose or other. " 
(Mitchellg 1969: 24) 
In a work situation, Mitchell proposed 
. 
that an employer/employee 
relationship might easily constitute a link in personal networks; it might 
not be reciprocated and the degree of influence of one person on another 
differs according to the direction of the interaction. In figure one I 
showed the direction of interaction and political influence between groups. 
The village is the environment in which relatives are concentrated. The 
dominant group is the traditional one and they and those other groups are 
influenced most particularly by the elites. In Nigeria, most workers would 
not discuss politics with their boss. Since the number of such posts are 
few, small numbers of them would influence their workers in their political 
behaviour. Co-workers at lower levels may interact frequently but the 
nature of the 1983 elections inhibited them from attempting to convert 
others to their political views. 
Hence workers in the city engaged in their Political persuasion and 
influence through their recognised obligatory networks of kins and 
relatives. Mitchell confirms that: 
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"these recognised relationships may be utilised for a specific 
purpose - to achieve some object, to acquire or pass on some 
information, to influence some other person in a desired 
direction. The recognised rights and obligations are potential 
links in an action or communication-sets which may come into being 
for a specific object and disappear again when that object is 
attained or frustrated. But the underlying consciously 
appreciated expectation which people have concerning other 
identified people obviously persists over a longer period than an 
action-set or communication-set, and may last, as in the case of 
kinship, for a person's life. " (Mitchell, J. C., 1969: 26) 
A point I have earlier stressed is that contemporary politics and in 
particular leadership elections in Nigeria cannot and have never transcended 
kinship ties and obligations, a view which was supported in chapter three 
with the concept of 'intensity' in network links where 'individuals' are 
prepared to honour obligations, or feel free to exercise the rights implied 
in their linksý to some 'members' of their close or extended families. 
"The intensity of a person's relationship with a close kinsman is 
likely to be greater than that with a neighbour or co-worker. The 
'strength' of ties which bind person to person,, the willingness 
with which the parties are prepared to forgo other considerations 
in carrying out the obligations assoicated with the ties. " 
"Face-to-f ace interaction is not a necessary condition 
. 
for the 
obligations entailed in a relationship to be honoured. There are 
many circumstances whe re an intense link with a person living some 
distance away may be an important factor in the behaviour of an 
individual. " (Mitchell, 1969: 28; Reder, 1964: 22) 
it is this intensity or the strength of the ties in personal networks in 
Igbo communities that calls for re-evaluation of the role of the mass media 
in politics in Nigeria. Since we reject the direct influence of mass media, 
and data from this survey support the arguments, it seems that face-to-face 
political communication networks when analysed in relation to the social 
structures reveal more about politics and communication than considerations 
based exclusively on mass media. 
In sum, I have considered political influence in terms of several factors 
such as parents, relatives and children that constitute elements of kinship 
and these have been shown to be more important than non-kin, such as - co- 
workers, club and school-mates etc. 
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Table 23: 13 
Respondents In General And Their Perceived Influence On Others 
Respondents 
Important Unimportant Total % 
Parents 80.7% (96) 19.3% (23) 119 100 
School-mates 24.8% (29) 75.2% (88) 117ý 100 
Club-mates 42.5% (51) 57.5% (69) 120 100 
Children 74.1% (80) 25.9% (28) 108 100 
Relatives 74.4% (90) 25.6% (31) 121 100 
Co-workers 22.9% (25) 77.1% (84) 109 100 
Here the . 
bedrocks , of kinship relation and political affiliation, 
identification and influence - parents, relatives and children - are 
indicated by high percentages, while co-workers and school-mates have low 
percentages. 
Evidently, the impacts of the mass media on voters I behaviour were marginal 
in comparison with other f actors examined in this chapter. Of all the mass 
media networks, radio played a fairly considerable part in influencing the 
voting attitude of the electorate whilst television was the least important. 
Thus my data serve to detract from the speculative importance of the impact 
of the mass media, particularly televison, in the Nigerian general elections 
of 1979 and 1983. The importance of face-to-face communication through 
networks of kin, relatives, friends, etc. have featured prominently as 
essentials of political communication in Nigerian elections. Moreover, in 
the 1983 general election the use of money as an illegitimate 'democratic' 
campaign factor was outstandingly important. 
Amongst the elites in Nigeria, it is generally believed that the impact of 
the mass media on political participation and voting behaviour is weak 
because of ownership and control, over-centralisation in the state and 
federal governments. In chapter four, the historical development of 
political parties and their relationship with the growth of mass media, 
ownership and control, were accounted for in detail. 
A final point often made about the political weakness of Nigerian mass media 
is that they place too much emphasis on Political personalities -a 
reflection of party ownership and control - rather than on issues that 
concern the electorates. This has been stated by many writers but has not 
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as yet been examined statistically. In this research, attempts have been 
made to state what these issues are in contemporary Nigerian politics. The 
issues are then related to different political network groups to see which 
ones would have greater impact on their political behaviour if the media 
were to shift from heavy concentration on personalities to issues. In the 
1983 general elections, certain newspaper headlines, radio and television 
broadcasts are examined and associated to the the same issues which might 
concern the electorate. 
This chapter has proved that by our definiton of characteristics and 
attributes, all the five hypothetical network groups were statistically well 
represented. Considerable numbers of the respondents have had both urban 
and village experience with constant geographical or horizontal mobility 
between the two areas. The social and cultural ties between village and 
urban populations in Imo State are historical and obligatory. The 
relationships transcend temporary political changes and development and 
create strong foundations for kinship network or relationships. 
It is upon these relationships that the social, economic and political lif e 
of the people depends. The mass media only reinforce the life rather than 
deteýmining it, particularly in the political activities of the communities. 
Certain major factors, such as the education of children by their parents, 
do not only strengthen the ties between urban and rural populations but a130 
the relationship between the elites and the traditional village network 
groups and other members of the community. For instance, 85.4% of the 
respondents disclosed that their parents were responsible for their 
education. Relatives ranked second, while only 1.0% reported that the 
government (state) was responsible for his/her education. The obligation 
which parents and relatives owe to their younger generations has 
tremendously weakened national consciousness. Even individuals' 
relationships are affected by this obligation. For instance, those who live 
in the city tend to comply with the demands and political pressure from 
relatives who live in the villages rather than similar pressures from 
neighbours and the mass media in the city. Mitchell (1969) remarked that 
most African communities are characterised by this kind of, relationship 
which constitutes an important political influence. 
The need now is to explore the empirical relationship between socio-economic 
and political issues and our five categorical groups and also to determine 
the degree to which media broadcasts were centred on personalities rather 
13.42 
than on the issues which were of primary concern to the electorate. We 
shall deal with these problems in the next chapter. 
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CEAPTER, FOURTEEN 
PERSONALITIES, PARTICIPATION, AND THE MEDIA 
A number of socio-political and economic issues have emerged in Nigeria as a 
result of developments, industrialisation and cultural changes. Some of 
them have become acute political questions which are either played down or 
unnecessarily overstated for political reasons. I have already stated that 
in Nigerian politics, political personalities feature more prominently in 
the media coverage than political issues. This does not mean that the 
electorates are not aware of the neglected issues but because they do not 
have access to the media to make political demands these issues are not 
politicised to catch votes. 
In the survey, the respondents were asked to indicate in ranking order which 
of the listed issues would have important political influences on them. The 
list of issues were: maintenance of traditional socio-political values ' 
economic security for local communities, rural economic development, eg 
electrification, free education, more urbanisation, political integration, 
more state creations, elimination of corruption, dtc. 
The changes in Nigeria over the years as discussed in the early chapters of 
this thesis, have eroded major traditional values. In Igboland, the 
shifting local political decision-making from the village elders to the 
emergent elite group has been remarkable. The power of traditional chiefs 
have been checked. Both urban and rural elites are now taking the titles of 
traditional chiefs. I pointed out that some political elites, eg Barrister 
0. Mbakwe the former governor of Imo State, took the title Chief Mbakwe; 
others include Chief Obafemi Awolowo, UPN leader, Zik the Owelle of Onitshal 
- leader of the NPP, and a host of others. The domination of the elites in 
the traditional chieftaincy as well as the modern political party system is 
near to political totalitarianism and would need political action to check 
its development. It is an issue that could form a package for party policy 
and manifesto during election periods. 
Only 9.8% (13) of the respondents considered as a whole ranked traditional 
values as an issue which would have an important political influence on them 
if it were to be maintained. Even the traditional group (who gave the 
highest ranking for the factor) 38.9% (42) regarded traditional values as of 
1 
no importance. 
The low percentage for the maintenance of traditional socio-political values 
and for the support of traditional authorities as a political question, does 
not only illustrate the impact of modern education in Igboland but clearly 
supports our theoretical arguments in chapter two that the Igbos lack 
centralised local authority. Where pre-colonial traditional chiefs did not 
exist, it is difficult to institute as an important vote-catching issue. 
During the oil boom, development and industrialisation were concentrated in 
the cities. Also in the 1970s and 80s, Nigeria saw the most rapid expansion 
of urban areas fed constantly by huge migrants from the villages. Besides, 
other emigrants from African, and West African countries in particular, came 
to Nigeria to live and work. The majority of them settled in the urban 
centres. The huge village/urban migration had serious economic consequences 
on the rural economy. Agriculturev which was the basic industry of Nigeria, 
was completely neglected. Only old men, women and children were left behind 
in villages - who were the least able to cultivate the land. Hence in 
Igboland for instance yam, cocoyam, palm products (Nigeria before the oil 
boom was the second world net exporter of oil palm produce after the 
Phillipines) declined to the point where Nigeria became a, net importer. 
Cocoyam has completely disappeared in certain Igbo communities such as 
Ikeduru/Mbaitoli, Mbaise, Orlu, Okigwe, etc. As a result, the economic 
security for t he local communities was seriously threatened. In view of 
this fact, Shagari in his regime launched the 'Green Revolution'. This was 
an important political policy for the NPN. Respondents in the survey were 
asked to indicate how the reactivation of economic security for local 
communities would influence their political participation and voting. 
Table 1: 14 
Respondents And Local. Economic Security As Important Political Issues 
Factors Traditional School Urban Urban Rural Row 
ranked Leaver Poor Elite Elite Total 
First factor (10) (2) (1) (5) (0) (10) 
55.6 11.0 5.6 27.8 0.0 100 
Second factor (14) (1) (0) (7) (2) (24) 
58.1 4.2 0.0 29.2 8.3 100 
No impact (25) (10) (10) (30) (16) (91) 
27.5 11.0 11.0 33.0 17.6 100 
Column (49) (13) (11) (43) (18) (132) 
Total 36.8 9.8 8.3 31.6 13.5 100 
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For the respondents as a whole only 13.5% (18) ranked local economic 
security as their first most important issue that would influence their 
voting behaviour. More than half of the respondents (55.6%) who regard 
economic security for the rural areas as a very important political issue 
come from a traditional group. This clearly indicates that they are the 
group most affected by the issue and would like some positive political 
decision to restore economic confidence in them. In the other groups, 
however, they are seeing this factor as having no impact and they form an 
overwhelming majority, ranging from 71.4% among the urban elites to 90.9% 
among the urban poor. 
Another important issue which was prominent during Shagari's government was 
rural -development, particularly electrification. 41.4% (55) of the 
respondents considered as a whole saw rural electrification as the most 
important issue that would influence their political attitude in the 
election campaign. 27.1% (36) said that it would be the second most 
important factor of influence in their voting behaviour whilst 31.6% (42) 
said that it would have no impact on them at all. 
Table 2: 14 
Respondents And Rural Developments As An Important-Political Issue 
Factors Traditional School Urban Urban Rural Row 
Leaver Poor Elite Elite Total 
First factor (23) (4) (4) (14) (10) (55) 
41.8 7.3 7.3 25.5 18.2 100 
Second factor (12) (5) (2) (14) (3) (36) 
33.3 13.9 5.6 38.9 8.3 100 
No impact (14) (4) % (5) (14) (5) (42) 33.3 9.5ý 11.9 33.3 11.9 100 
Column (49) (13) (11) (42) (18) (133) 
Total 36.8 9.8 8.3 31.6 13.5 100 
For the rural elites, this factor is relatively more important than for the 
other groups. This is because their job was not affected by village/urban 
migration. A decline in agricultural products would even benefit local 
teachers who combined their teaching profession with agriculture. They 
could sell farm produce to the nearby cities at reasonable profit margins. 
In general, all the network groups were. more interested in rural development 
and electrification than in economic security for the local communities. 
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The Igbos generally show a great tendency towards horizontal and vertical 
labour mobility. They have been the largest ethnic group, as previous 
studies have shown, to move out of their local communites to other parts of 
Nigeria in the quest for -new opportunities. Thus, they tend to favour 
economic growth not only within their own region but for the nation as a 
whole. In the survey 46.6% (62) believed that they would be influenced by a 
political policy which emphasised economic growth at national level as an 
issue, 12.8% (17) regarded it -as the second most important factor, while 
40.6% (54) considered it as not important in their political attitude and 
voting. 
Modernisation of Nigeria seemed to be an unpopular political issue among all 
the groups. Only 7.5% (10) considered it as the most important influence, 
9.8% (13) ranked it as a second factor of influence while 82.7% (110) said 
that it couldn't have any political impact on them at all. 
Some writers have believed that decision-making in governments in Af rica 
should be in the hands of the people. Local communities should decide on 
how to organise their political and economic life, and power should not be 
concentrated in the hands of the few political and military elites. These 
theories on the political structure. and philosophy sound plausible. 
However, in the survey only 3.8% -(5) thought that participation of voters in 
the democratic process in Nigeria was the most meaningful campaign issue 
that could influence their voting behaviour. 82. % considered it the second 
influence factor, while 88% (17) said it would not have any impact on them. 
Nigeria has been regarded as one of the most corrupt nations in the world. 
It has been a widespread national problem and in this study the effect of 
money in influencing voters behaviour by politicians and their agents has 
empirically demonstrated the magnitude of corruption in election campaigns. 
Different Nigerian governments have been confronted with the problem of 
corruption, which cannot be fully discussed in this thesis - because in 
itself it is an interesting area of research investigation. 
In the survey there was a general concern about corruption. 37.6% (50) of 
the respondents said that the elimination of corruption in Nigerian society 
would be the foremost political factor that would influence their political 
participation and voting behaviour. Another 22.6% (30) ranked it as the 
second mo 
' 
st important factor of political influence in their voting, while 
39.8% (53) believed that the elimination of corruption in Nigerian society 
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would not have any political impact in the voting. 
We have seen in Chapters Three and Four that education has played a very 
important role in the economic,, 'industrial, political and socio-cultural 
developments and changes in Nigeria. 
In the 1979 and 1983 general elections, it formed almost exlcusively the 
most important election campaign issue for the UPN - free education at all 
levels. The non-payment of teachers' salaries, particularly in Imo State, 
was an important aspect of education as a campaign issue. 
In the survey, 47.4% (63) ranked free education as the first most important 
factor of political influence on them. Another 
' 
21.1% (28) believed it could 
be the second most important issue for them. But 31.6% (42) considered free 
education for all unimportant as a political influence. From personal 
interviews, many respondents believe that free education for all cannot be 
achieved in Nigeria because of corruption. Some said that when free primary 
and secondary education was introduced in Imo, State, parents paid more 
money, levies and annual contributions, to schools and colleges than ever 
before. 
Another important and very disturbing issue in Nigeria today, and during the 
civilian government, was the growing rate of unemployment, particularly in 
the urban centres. In the survey, 43.6% (58) of the respondents stated that 
policies to increase employment opportunities would be the first most 
important issue to influence their voting behaviour. 33.1% (44) ranked it 
as the second political issue that could influence their voting behaviour. 
Only 23.3% (31) could not regard it as an important issue to influence their 
votes. 
More urbanisation did not feature well among all the groups as an important 
issue in the campaign. Only 6% (8) ranked it first and another 5.3% (7) 
considered it the second most important factor, while 88.7% (118) said it 
would not have any political impact on them. 
The austerity measures by NPN, in the face of. fast declining oil revenue, to 
control the import of consumer goods in Nigeria was capitalised on by 
opposition parties. They interpreted it as a deliberate attempt by NPN to 
starve the poor. The message for the control of the importing of consumer 
goods seemed to have filtered through to all sectors. In the survey, 13.5% 
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(18) from all the five groups ranked more importation of consumer goods as a 
primary factor of influence in their political participation and voting in 
the 1983 elections. 16.5% (22) ranked it second while 69.3% (93) ranked it 
as of no political impact on their voting attitude. 
During the civilian rule and shortly before the general elections, fears of 
the presence of illegal migrants, already discussed in chapter seven, were 
amplif ied. The government took drastic measures to expell all 'illegal' 
immigrants in Nigera, most of them West Africans. The move brought sharp 
criticism upon Nigeria by the world press. As a political and vote catching 
measure by the NPN, respondents in the survey were asked to indicate how the 
policy affected their voting and political attitude. Only 3.8% said it was 
of primary importance, 13.5% ranked it as the second important issue in 
their voting behaviour, while 82.7% said- that it would not have any 
political impact on their participation and voting in the general elections. 
Here, it appears that the attempt to create a 'moral panic' was counter- 
productive as a vote-catching measure for the NPN. 
Other important issues in contemporary politics in Nigeria are the old 
problem of political integration and more state creations. Many Nigerians 
seem to despair at the hope of political integration among different ethnic 
groups. The survey reflects this situation. 
From all the five networks, only 3.8% ranked Political integration of 
various ethnic groups in Nigeria as the most important issue that could 
influence their voting behaviour and 20.3% ranked it second, while 75.9% 
rejected it as of no impact on them. 
Similarly, more state creation was not a popular political issue among the 
respondents. Across all groups, 3.8% ranked it as the most important 
poitical issue to them, 29.3% thought it would be the second most important 
issue of politicial influence, while 66.9% thought it would not affect their 
political behaviour. 
From the above statistical representation of issues of influence, it is 
clear that in terms of the first factor of influence for political 
participation and voting in the 1983 general elections, respondents 
considered rural development, national economic growth, elimination of 
corruption, free education for all and at all levels, and increased 
employment opportunities as factors of importance in their participation and 
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voting. 
Having established empirically the relationship between - contempoary 
political issues and our respondents in the survey, the next crucial stage 
is to find out the relationship between these issues and the mass media 
coverage of issues of policy during the elections. This will enable us to 
answer quantitatively the question of whether the mass media neglected the 
concerns and worries of the electorate or concentrated on other matters such 
as personality which reinforces ethnic politics. 
MEWSPAPERS AND RADIO (SUMHARY OF WORLD BROADCAST (SWB)) 
In the survey, 316 daily newspapers in Nigeria were collected and their 
major headlines were examined in relation with the above issues discussed. 
99.7% (316) were issued in 1983 and only 0.3% (1) was a 1982 newspaper. Out 
of 316 newspapers 51.3% (162) did not deal with any of the above issues on 
their froat page headlines. 
Less than half, 48.4% (153) carried headlines which are connected With our 
16 different issues. 'But their coverage of the issues differed 
considerably, just as much as our five network groups concern about these 
issues differed immensely. The most widely covered issues by the papers was 
economic security for the local communities - 4.7% (15). In terms of 
absolute number, this makes sense when we consider that 13.5% (18) of the 
respondents stated that the same issue would be the first factor to 
influence their political behaviour and participation. On the contrary, in 
terms of rural needs 41.4% (55) of the respondents maintained that policies 
of rural development such as electrification would be the most important 
factor to influence their election participation and voting, only 1.3% (4) 
of the newspapers reflect this in their headlines. Thus the concern of a 
large number of electorates about rural development was poorly covered by 
the press and radio. 
For national economic growth as a whole 6.6% (4) of the newspapers carried 
headlines about it, contrasting with 46.6% (62) of the respondents who 
regarded it as a primary factor of influence in their election participation 
and voting. This issue could be said to be well covered by the press if the 
circulation of newspapers was efficient enough to reach readers in the urban 
and rural areas, and the audience listened to the broadcast. 
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Table 3: 14 
Social Political Issues And Newspaper Headlines 
Issues 
0 No issue 
1 Traditional Values 
2 Traditional Authority 
3. Local Economic Security 
4 Rural Development 
5 National Economic Growth 
6 Modernisation of Nigeria 
7 Voters Political Participation 
8 Elimination of Corruption 
9 Free Education At All Levels 
10 Improvement in Employment 
11 More urbanisation 
12 Importation of consumer goods 
13 Expulsion of Illegal Immigrants 
14 Political Integration 
15 Social Security Development 
16 Creation of More States 
Total 
Row 
Total 
(162) 
5.1.3 
(3) 
0.9 
(8) 
2.5 
(15) 
4.7 
(4) 
1-. 3 
(21) 
6.6 
(6) 
1.9 
(7) 
2.2 
(50) 
15.8 
(3) 
0.9 
(3) 
0.9 
(4) 
1.3 
(3) 
0.9 
(20) 
6.3 
(1) 
0.3 
(6) 
1.9 
(316) 
100 
The topic with the highest newspaper coverage on their headlines was 
corruption, 15.8% (50). This compares well with 37.6% (50) of the 
respondents from the five groups who reported that elimination of corruption 
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would be a major and most important issue to influence their voting 
behaviour. However free education, which 47.4% (63) of the respondents 
considered as the first factor of influence in their election behaviour, was 
poorly covered by newspapers - 0.9% (3). One important explanation of this 
is that UPN was a very unpopular party in Imo, State where the party politics 
were dominated by either the NPP or the NPN, whose policies on free 
education were assured. For instance, the three major parties talked about 
free education in their manifestos but with different tunes. The most 
committed to it was Chief Awolowo, lead of the UPN. In an interview with 
New Nigeria the interviewer stated that free education policy had made 
Awolowo popular in certain quarters. But the interviewee replied that it 
was 'not in certain quarters' but that free education had made him famous in 
all quarters. 'Quarters' here refers to certain regions or states which 
, were the 
v. Oruba states under the UPN. 
In an interview with the same body - New Nigeria - Shagari remarked that 
free education "in the language of the UPN is poor education because we have 
seen it before. This is not the first time. In the days of the Action 
Group they introduced what they called Universal Free Primary Education and 
it was universal poor education that they produced". Shagari believed in 
what he described as qualitative education, which was by implication more 
expensive and should involve sacrifice by parents and state. When Zik, the 
leader of the NPP was asked by New Nigeria what was his view "on the issue 
of free education? " he replied: 
"The constitution is quite clear on this matter and we'll provide 
whatever the constitution says. If it says we should provide free 
education then we do so. But you see there is no saving clause. 
It's qualified. Chief Awolowo talks about it but he has forgotten 
the qualification. I don't think it is fair to the taxpayers of 
this country to tell them we are going to give them free 
education. The constitution says subject to the availability of 
funds. -2 
Thus, as these two parties, the NPN and the NPP, were the two contesting 
parties in Imo State, newspaper coverage of their election campaign 
strategies did not emphasise free education as a major vote-catching issue. 
Political integration was fairly covered as an important political issue by 
a number of newspapers, 6.3% (20). Newspapers headlines on political 
integration were higher than the number of respondents, 3.8% (5), who 
thought that media coverage of it would be the most important issue to 
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influence their political participation and voting. We saw earlier that the 
problem of national unity and stability in Nigeria has been an acute 
historical and contemporary political problem. Graf (1979: 45) noted that 
the only problem, and hence issue, is that regionalism$ ethnicism or 
tribalism, and statism still play an active part in the lives of Nigerians. 
The over-coverage of it as an issue demonstrates that it is a critical 
question in the life of a nation, its importance transcends a temporary 
election campaign period. However in time of elections it can become so 
over-emphasised by the media that it becomes what we have described in 
chapter seven as 'over-kill' which makes the audience less attentive to an 
issue, which is very important, Even in non-election periods, the press 
from time to time carry extensive reports and articles on the problem of 
political integration in Nigeria. - For instance, Dr. Omo 0moryi in the 
Sunday Observer of 1st March, 1978, wrote on the 'regional tendencies in 
Nigerian society and politics': 
"Progressively the peoples of Nigeria were divided into 
Northerners, Westerners and Easterners and it became impossible 
for. anybody to participate in politics outside the area in which 
he was born. An Ef ik resident in Ibadan had to go home to stand 
for election. Between 1951 and 1959 it was more attractive for 
any ambitious politicians to be at the region instead of being at 
the tentre. " (Graf, -. 1979: 44) 
In 'the 1983 general elections, political leaders went to their native 
villages and towns to vote. Zik voted for himself at O'nitsha, Shagari did 
so at Ngawa, Malamari Police station in Sokoto. Mbakwe, the governor of Imo 
State and other leading politicians in the state went to their local 
villages from the state capitalq Owerri, to vote. This pattern of poitical 
participation and voting supports the theoretical concept that rural and 
urban politics in Nigeia converge through network linkages of groups or 
individuals who. play active roles in urban politics as well as in the 
villages or rural homeland. In Chapter Three, the historical background 
behind the political disunity, regional political tendency, in Nigeria was 
explained in terms of colonial rule and policies. 
Other issues were peripherally covered by the press during the elections and 
most of them are below 3.0%. 
The weakness of this table and its data analysis is that it does not tell us 
which of the 15 dailies in Nigeria covered these issues. Nor does it say 
anything about the exact time of the year in 1983 when these issues were 
14.10 
extensively covered. If we are examining these issues in relation to the 
1983 general elections, it is important to associate the issues to the 
particular period of the year when the election took place. We argued in 
chapter five that general elections are so brief that within a short period 
many political changes can take place. Then in chapter eleven we discovered 
that the most important newspapers read by the respondents were the Daily 
Times, the Guardian, the National Concord (the most popular) - 32.6% chose 
it as their first political information newspaper,, Nigerian Statesman, the 
second most important newspaper read by the respondents - 24.2% (23) in the 
first choice order. A few also read Nigerian Tribune. A very insignificant 
number paid attention to the Punch Nigerian Tide or the Daily Sketch. The 
same was applicable to Nigerian Herald Nigerian Observer etc. Af air 
number read the Satellite. Thus, in Nigeria during an election period, the 
most popular newspaper in Imo State was a privately owned newspaper, the 
Nigerian Concord by Chief Abiola. The federal owned press, the Daily Times 
was popular and at state level the Nigerian Statesman was widely read. The 
popularity of Abiola-'s newspaper clearly indicates that if radio and TV are 
privatised in Nigeria, a large number of the electorates would turn to 
private stations for political information and influence rather than the 
state's and federal government's stations. 
This table shows that most of the newspapers of the 1983 general elections 
were collected from the beginning of the campaign in May, 10.8% (34), to 
October, 11.1% (35), when the President started his second term of office, 
17.5% (55) in June, 20.3% (64) in July, August 14.2% (45), September 11.4% 
(36) and October 11.1% (35). It was during this period that most of the 
serious issues which the newspapers covered became prominent headlines. For 
instance, the elimination of corruption features as newspaper headlines in 
May to October. The same was applicable to the issues on local economic 
security, national economic growth, and political integration. A few were 
collected in November, 2.1% (7) and December 5.4% (17). Only one in 
January, 0.3%) but 2.5% (8) in March and 4.4% (14) in April. General 
elections in Nigeria are always big events which carry considerable amounts 
of speculations, and fears because of the violence and unpredictable 
consequences that accompany them. The mass media start in time to talk 
about it and often carry on matters of the election well beyond it. The 
1983 election was not an exception. In Imo Stae in particular, the hatred 
and resentments it generated among members of local communities took a long 
time to heal. The State government's attitude towards teachers who voted 
against it was more overtly displayed months after the election and some 
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Nigerian newspapers were very vocal about it. I therefore spread the 
collection of newspapers throughout 1983 but concentrated most in the months 
of the elections to capture the core of press coverage of the elections. 
In. Nigerian politics where issues are vaguely covered by the media for 
political campaign, personalities or political party candidates are 
emphasised to attract votes. In the survey, various important political 
names appeared on the main newspapers that circulated in Imo State and these 
issues also tend to be associated with political personalities. 
Table 4: 14 
Newspaper Headlines And Political Personalities 
ISSUES )IDNE SHAGARX ZIK YWOBOD WAZIRI VATAS IOAKAWE GOWAN EILATHWAITE *OJUKWU AKU UNORO D. KXO OTPERS TOTAL 
0 (82) (18) (14) (3) (0) (3) (6) (3) (2) (3) (1) (1) (26) (162) 
50.6 11.1 8.6 , 
1.9 0.0 1.9 3.7 1.9 1.2 1.9 0.6 0.6 16.0 100 
1 (2) (0) (0) (0) (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (3) 
66.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
2 (3) (2) (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (3) 
62.3 u 23.0 12.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
3 (13) (0) (0) (2) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
86.7 0.0 0.0 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
4 (2) (0) (1) (0) (0) (0) (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (4) 
50.0 0.0 23.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
3 (19) (2) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
90.3 9.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
6 (3) (0) (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (6) 
83.3 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
7 (6) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) (7) 
85.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 100 
8 (41) (1) (1) (2) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (2) (50) 
82.0 2.0 2.3 4.0 0.0 0. Q 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 100 
9 (2) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (3) 
66.7 - 0.0. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
10 (2) (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
66.7 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
11 (0) (0) (0) ' (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
12 (4) (0) (0) 
. 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (4) 
100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
13 (3) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (3) 
100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 100 
14 (14) (1) (4) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) (20) 
70.0 3.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 100 
ts (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) 
100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
16 (3) (0) (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (6) 
83.3 (0) 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Total (206) (25) (23) (7) (1) (3) (8) (3) (2) (6) (2) (2) (28) (316) 
. 63.4 7.9 7.3 2.2 0.3 0.9 2.3 0.9 0.6 1.9 0.6 0.6 8.9 100 
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Surprisingly, Awolow did not appear as prominently as other leading 
politicians in Nigeria on the headlines. Of those newspapers that 
circulated in Imo State, none patronised Awo as much as his education 
programme did not. Also because he was the leader of the UPN party, which 
most leaders and communities in Imo State could not identify with, and the 
press and radio in Imo State reinforced this attitude by equally excluding 
the party's leadership from the headlines. The two far-reaching contenders 
were the NPP and the NPN leadership and they featured prominently on the 
headlines. Though Abiola left the NPN, he did not want to patronise Awolowo 
with his National Concord newspaper either. In fact among all the National 
Concord newspapers collected during the survey only the 24/11/83, well after 
the elections, carried a headline on Awo. "Awo's aim is to serve Nigerians 
party replies Obasanjo", and the article goes on to say "Chief Obafemi, 
UPN leader, plans to continue, says party's organisational directorate". 
Where a political leader appeared less than twice on the newspaper's 
headlinesl he was grouped with the 'others' which made up the 8.9% (28) in 
the survey. 
The most prominent candidates on the headlines of the newspapers were 
Shagari, 7.9% (25), and Azikiwe, leader of the NPP 7.3%. Their most 
important followers-among tho- Igbos during the elections were the governor 
of Imo State, Samuel 0. Mabakwe, 2.5% (8), and Ojukwu, NPN senatorial 
candidate, 1.9% (6). Another prominent follower of Zik in Igbo communities 
was the NPP governor of Anambra State, Jim Nwobodo, 2.2% (7). His 
newspaper, The Satellite, featured him most, while the Daily Times carried 
headlines on Ojukwu and Alhaji Shehu Shagari. The Statesman carried 
headlines on Zik and Mbakwe and these were-the most important NPP leaders in 
Imo State. 
One important aspect of the table is that some of the issues are directly 
associated with the political personalities or leadership. They were either 
for or against the issues. For instance, only the name of Ibrahim Waziri, 
leader of the Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP) appeared on the Guardian 
newspaper of 13th August, 1983 "GNPP plans economic war against Japan - 
Waziri wins Presidency". In this article, Waziri was quoted to have been in 
favour of traditional values in order to promote indigenous industrial 
growth. 
Both Azikiwe (NPP) and Shagari (NPN) were concerned with the issues of 
traditional authority. On the 5th of July 1983 National Concord reads: 
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"RE-INTRODUCE HOUSE OF CHIEFS - Zik NPP presdiential candidate 
suggests reintroduction of House of Chiefs to increase traditional 
rulers participation in execution of constitution. " 
Similarly, but in different perspectives, Alhaji Shehu Shagari advocated for 
the rights and duties of traditional rulers and authorities to prevail 
particularly in an election period. In a Nigerian radio broadcast in Lagos 
11/9/83, printed in the BBC SWB 13/9/83, reads, "NIGERIAN PRESIDENT'S 
ADDRESS ABOUT THE 1983 ELECTIONS 
"Report of circumstances surrounding elections, condemnation of 
violence (esp. Ondo & Oyo) and steps taken to ensure security and 
relief (NERA). 'Our religious leaders and traditional rulers must 
play a fatherly role in reminding competitors for political office 
that they are all f rom one family ... they ... have a duty to 
continue that fatherly role. They should not relent in their 
efforts to maintain a channel of communications with all their 
children, so as to ensure at all times that differences in the 
pursuit of political office do not degenerate into the types of 
(word indictment) events recently experienced in Ondo and Oyo 
states. " 
This text clearly illustrates the essentials of a network of political 
communication 
* 
which has been our primary concern in the understanding of the 
structure of communication in Nigeria, the linkages, Shagarils 'channels of 
communication', between traditional rulers, local leaders and their 
$children' used in the sense of African extended family network system as 
well as Iclassificatoryl network of relationship between older and younger 
generations in Nigerian communities. The maintenance of linkages ensures 
adequate political communication. As a shared face-to-face communicatiýn, 
an effective non-violent election campaign is guaranteed in all rural 
communities in Nigeria. 
Shagari was well aware that it is competition between different parties at 
local areas that of ten leads to the violence which, as we have seen, 
characterises Nigerian general elections. In view of this fact, I asked the 
respondents whether their. parties competed very strongly with other parties 
at village level for information and resources. The respondents were asked 
to tick 'Yes' or 'no' only. 
The responses were listed including traditional chief s (see questionnaire 
no. 46). There were only 9 respondents who said that their pol 
* 
itical parties 
competed for traditional chiefs, and 144 missing observations. This large 
number of missing observations indicates that chiefs are not an important 
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political influence in Igboland. Most of them only exist in villages; thus 
66.7% (6) of the respondents were from the traditional group, 22.2% (2) 
young school leavers and 11.1% (1) urban elite and none from the urban poor 
and rural elite groups. 
Shagari's understanding of different network groups in Nigeria led him to 
comment, in the SWB report that: 
"The fusing together of very diverse groups in Nigeria into one 
political party is totally impracticable and in the Nigerian 
situation can never work. The objective of our federal system of 
government is to achieve unity in diversity. " 
While this passage has further meaning for our network of political 
communication, it could also be interpreted as a radio broadcast in which 
the leader of a ruling party, the NPN, and the President of the nation, was 
trying to make a defence against the accusation that the NPN and its 
policies and zoning system was pushing hard towards a one party system in 
Nigeria. British press and American networks held this view fairly strongly 
during the civilian rule. 
In terms of networks of political communicaton, 'unity in diversity' has an 
important relevance only to be fully grasped through our historiedl review 
of different political groups on the regional/ethnic basis found in Chapter 
Three of this thesis. That the Yorubas have an historically established 
chieftaincy in the urban and rural areas was recognised by Shagari. Though 
he made known his views on the role of chiefs in a political campaign 
through the electronic medium, this was inadequate for effective results in 
Nigerian political communication. The audience could not be moved by this 
broadcast. Thus on the 2/6/83, federal radio Lagos, SWB 4/6/83 announced 
that "National Party of Nigeria Launches Election Campaign'. 
"It was revealed that President Shagari visits the Oba of Lagos at 
the start of presidential campaign and says tradition and 
traditional rulers will not be relegated to background, the young 
must be taught respect for these. " 
Through radio, leaders reach an anonymous and heterogenous audience but the 
sharing of communication and information takes place through leaders for 
effective political participation and mobilisation. Since the Yorubas 
maintain a strong system of chieftaincy, their leaders had been involved in 
the early part of the political campaign. Both Zik and Shagari are 
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traditional leaders as well as national political leaders. Thi sis an 
important political phenomenon in which modern and traditional politics 
converge through political leaders. 
Jim Nwobodo, the NPP, the governor for Anambra State, was concerned with 
local economic security while Shagari applied the need for national economic 
growth. In. view of this policy issue, just a few days before his government 
was overthrown by the military, the National Concord 31/12/83 carried a 
headline: 
"Federal government still f or IMF loan - Shagari negotiations 
proceeding for balance of payments loan and structural adjustment 
loan from World Bank - President announced to NA (National 
Assembly)" buf Zik, Sunday Times advocated for modernisation, of 
Nigeria with particular reference to Niger state. 
Several of the leaders were associated with the elimination of corruption: 
Shagari, Radio Nigeria 22/10/83 - SWB 24/10/83, Jim Nwobodo, Daily Star 
9/6/83, Zik (Azikiwe) Nigerian Statesman 17/6/83, Ojukwu, SWB 29/9/83, but 
in Radio Nigeria 19/9/83. In all these cases, the above political leaders 
directly or indirectly condemned corruption in Nigeria and sought various 
ways to control or eliminate it., 
Political leaders Shagari, Daily Star 3/6/83, SWB 13/9/83, Zik Sunday Post 
5/6/83, Nigerian Statesman 9/4/83 and ' 11/4/83 - the week of political 
-0 --IS campaigning in Cross River States, and OjukWu Radio Nigeria Lago 19/9 83 
tentatively preached political integration in Nigeria. In all their 
manifestos, radio and newspaper broadcasts, none of these political leaders 
had any clearly defined consistent policies towards issues that concerned 
the nation and the common people. Issues were more or less treated in their 
political campaign as though they did not exist in Nigeria. In passing, 
Shagari (NPN) mentioned five of the sixteen issues, Azikiwe (NPP) 5, Nwobodo 
(NPP) 2,114bakwe (NPP) 1, Ojukwu (NPN) 2, Aper Aku 1, Umaru Dikko (NPN) 1 and 
all other politicians put together, 2. 
political personalities patronage and attacks featured strongly in most of 
the papers. 
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POLITICAL PERSONALITY 
Personality None Against For Total 
2214 21 51 316 
(77.2) (6.6) (16.1) (100%) 
ISSUES 
Issues None Against For Total 
199 17 100 316 
(63.0) (5.4) (31.6) (100%) 
From the table above, more than half the media coverage about political 
candidates were in support or patronage of the leaders. A signif icant 
number, 21 (6.6%) were broadcasts or publications that directly or 
indirectly discredited opponents. For instance, on the 28/7/83 the 
Satellite- carried a headline: Bloodbath at Nkpor: Assasination Bid on 
Governor Nwobodo fails, persons wounded 
I@Emeka Ojukwu and the Ikemba Front ambushed Anambra Governor, 
failing to set him on fire, they attacked members of his 
entourage. " 
A few days later the same newspaper 2/8/83 writes: Ojukwu a Gambler of Lives 
- Chike Obi Nigeria's foremost mathematician condemns Emeka Ojukwu in 
documentary on Anambra Television. 
Earlier in the year, 25/5/83, the Trumpet in a headline writes: 
"You are a disgrace a Okpara tells Jim and' Mbakwe. "Former 
ji-esii-ent R defunct tastern Nigeria deg-cribes NPP governments in 
Imo and Anambra States a 'total disgrace to the Igbo race"'. 
Attacks such as these overtly or covertly characterised a number of news 
headlines but the majority of them were image patronising, through the media 
owned and controlled by political parties. 
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While 117 news headlines were concerned with issues supporting or opposing 
them, only 29 of these headlines were associated with the view of political 
leaders on the issues. Both these issues and personalities were well 
covered by the media but a considerable number of them were neutral in 
opinion because of the lack of an authentic source of information - Nigerian 
journalists are grossly lacking in investigative journalism. Also the 
shakey political climate in Nigeria, over-control and censorship, tend to 
keep most of the media professionals neutral about issues. 
However, some of the Nigerian dailies have their recognisable characters. 
For instance, the Satellite often describes violence in terms of NPN leaders 
and associated its supporters with thuggery. When there was any intra-party 
split with NPN, the paper highlighted it. The paper sees Zik as the perfect 
answer' to many of Nigeria's problems and very biased towards NPP and rather 
breaks down complex political issues into a very simplistic version. Its 
crucial failure as a political medium during the 1983 election is the overt 
concentration on personalities involved in the issues discussed. 
The Guardian was f airly impartial and in particular regarded Zik as a good 
political leader. The Daily Times was strongly pro NPN and its leadership - 
Shagari - whose speeches the paper reported with enthusiasm. Like the 
Satellite, it very much looks at personalities. The National Concord was 
very concerned with national economic issues, rather than intra- and inter- 
party wrangling. Personalities were marginally treated but it looked at 
Nigeria in terms of global politics and economy. It also looks at domestic 
developments and causes of major setbacks and often makes useful suggestions 
as to the solutions to the problems. During the elections, the paper did 
not appear openly to be supporting any party. After the departure from NPN 
of its owner, the paper did not appear critical of Shagari. 
The Nigerian Statesman, very much concerned with national economic issues, 
tried to examine government corruption in context, particularly 
irregularities in government policies. It expresses a desire towards 
political integration as a solution to a number of inter-party disputes. In 
the run up to gubernatorial elections (especialy in August) its coverage and 
reports- were in favour of the state governor, Sam Mbakwe, but it was 
otherwise not too concerned with political personalities. , 
However, despite the different characteristics of the newspapers in Nigeriat 
the diversity of. needs in Nigeria both in terms of population and regions 
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makes it difficult for the newspapers or the mass media and party leaders to 
plan election campaigns in the light of issues that would appeal to 
different groups. Thus, the New Nigeria 15th November 1978 writes: 
11 ... is enough to pen the eyes of political leaders to the 
necessity of devising campaign strategies which will ensure that 
the programmes which they offer the people will have genuine 
relevance to their needs. They will have to choose between 
finding collective issues which have relevance for specific groups 
in the electorate. For example, if free education is the most 
important issue in Ogun State, and good roads are the most vital 
need of the River State, a political party could make each of 
these its major campaign issue in each of the States 
respectively. " 
Then the paper recognised the practical problem and goes on to say: 
"that such single issue campaign methods will not only weaken 
national unity and collective sense of direction but will also 
lead to contradictions in the party's final blueprint. -3 
Besides the acute problem of rejection of political leaders in Nigeria 
outside their own ethnic communities, the short period for election 
campaign, the heavy cost involved etc. compelled the politicians and the 
media professionals to concentrate on easy options rather than hard pressing 
issues. 
Another point of the newspaper as a political communication medium is that 
its contents meet the needs of small groups in the society, the elites. 
Even so, as the data above has shown, af ew of the elites were not 
influenced by the newspaper political messages. The lack of indigenous 
languages in the print media in Nigeria renders the press inadequate to 
cater for the political information of different groups in the communities. 
RADIO 
In chapter seven I considered in some detail the circumstances which reduced 
the possibilities of political violence in the 1979 general elections that 
previously characterised Nigerian elections. Both the army and civilians 
sought a peaceful transition of government from military to civilian rule* 
14.19 
This was achieved. The content of the mass media reflected this mood. In 
particular some of the texts of Imo State broadcasts were reviewed in brief. 
Similar newstalks on the 1983 general election were collected during the 
investigation period. In terms of issues, the . 
1979 radio broadcasts were 
restricted to peaceful transition and political integration. The voting 
attitude of the electorates was strongly ethnic. 
Very often newstalks in Nigerian radio stations during election periods were 
written by elites outside the media profession and read in the studios. 
They wrote on important and specialised social, political and economic 
affairs of Nigeria which could help the electorates to decide on which party 
to vote for if the issues were part of the party's manifestos. Ironically, 
they broadcast in standard English which again directs the content to the 
elites. A brief review (see Appendex 5) of some of these broadcasts from 
IBS during the 1983 general election illustrates some of the points more 
vividly and also helps to contrast the broadcasting contents of the 1979 
general elections. 
Most of these broadcasts contain recurring themes of electorates I increased 
political awareness, problems of political corruption exclusivýly associated 
with politicians who are' regarded as selfish, inefficient and generally 
neglect the needs of the masses. The broadcasts tend to treat the issues 
superficially and it is assumed that the masses are now well aware of the 
issues. They fail to educate the public on how to use the issues to make 
demands on the political aspirants. Broadcasters implicitly want the 
politicans to get away from slanging matches' and concentrate on issues etc. 
But conversely, the people are told by the same broadcasters to look at the 
characters of the political candidates and not concentrate solely on 
political issues. Information to the electorate on how to assess the 
character of the political aspirants was vague, undefined and suffers from 
over-generality. 
Since the colonial,, independence and po st -independent periods$, considerable 
socio-political and economic changes have occured in Nigeria. These changes 
have particularly generated new political demands for the electorates but 
unfortunately ethnicity as the structural base of Nigerian politics has 
enveloped the realities created by these changes. Worse still, the 
domination of political personalities in Nigerian politics has furthermore 
rendered issues obsolete in Nigerian political election campaigns. The 
electorates, thoughq are aware of the changes and major social and political 
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issues in the communities but they do not know how to sue them to make 
political demands. The development of the mass media could have been a 
great source of public information on issues as important elements of 
political demand but the structure of ownership and control of the media in 
Nigeria relegates issues to the background in all mass media political 
agenda. 
In this survey, the most important social as well as political issue of 
concern to the voters was corruption. The majority of the electorate 
favoured its elimination. Most of the respondents associated corruption 
with politicians. If corruption as a major issue of concern is associated 
with the decison-makers, it becomes difficult to include it as a serious 
political agendum by the same group who perpetuates itl 
Other important political issues reported by the electorates include local 
economic development, check on unemployment of young people, national 
economic growth, and political integration. The expulsion of illegal 
immigrants, which the government timed to correspond with the election to 
win popular support, was reported by the majority of the electorate as an 
issue of little political importance to them. 
Some of the Nigerian dailies showed concern over these issues. Equal 
concern was shown on corruption by ne, 4spapers and respondents. There is no 
doubt that the newspapers which carried on their headline articles about 
corruption were reinforcing public opinions about corruption rather than 
guiding the public to use it as a political demand on the politicians who 
needed their votes. There was less evidence to show that politicians 
(though some of them mentioned these issues in their campaign), presented 
issues as important campaign factors. The most popular newspaper read by 
the political audience during the election campaign was the National 
Concord. Ethnic unions were a weak base for political action in the 1983 
general elections, in contrast to what Audrey Smoch's studies showed among 
the Igbos in the pre-1966 military political system of Nigeria. We have 
drawn heavily on IBS network material. It was not possible to obtain such 
items from Radio Nigeria, Owerri, but radio and video tapes are appended to 
this thesis with brief comments on their relevance to our theoretical 
arguments and survey data. 
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
CONCLUSION AND SOME CAUTIOUS PROPOSALS 
Nigerian political communication systems can be described as transitional. 
There is clear evidence to support this claim. Since the'colonial period, 
changes in the pattern of politicial communication have occured which have 
affected the traditional systems. The introduction of mass media and the 
development of party politics are important phases in the transition. There 
are now professional politicians and communicators who are involved in 
systematically organised political communication. Part-1, cipation is no 
longer as a result of p' olitical position. A crucial characteristic of the 
transitional political communication systems in Nigeria is the relatively 
autonomous existence of village and urban areas. The village is 
characterised by traditional political communicaton and the urban area is 
dominated by modern political communication. The basis of the unity between 
the two areas is the participation by their population in the one common 
political system of the nation. Both rural and urban populations use the 
mass media and traditional network systems to participate in the political 
systems. 
In the surveys all the traditional groups more closely associated with the 
use of traditional communication system for political participation live in 
the village. Also all the rural elites in the survey live in the village. 
In the city, 81% of the urban elite who are associated with organised 
political communication live in the city,, but 69.2% of the urban poor who 
-share similar attributes with the traditional group live in the city (cf 
table 1: 9). Both the urban poor and the urban elite particpate in modern 
politics in the city and all' use the mass media and traditional 
communication systems to do so. Voluntary organisations which are 
completely traditional or are involved in both traditional and modern 
activities are found in the cities. Membership of them demands at least a 
common kinship descent. They are important channels. of political 
communication. These interminglings of traditional and modern political 
institutions among different categories of a city population are clear 
indicators of a society in its transitional stage. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RURAL AND URBAN ARIRA AND CONMUNICATION CHANNELS 
The two target areas in the study are rural and 4urban environments. The 
convergence of traditional and urban political communication systems is 
apparently achieved not so much as a consequence of the homogenising effect 
of the mass media but through network linkages. This study has demonstrated 
that the urban area is characterised by both traditional and modern 
political communication channels. Equally the rural area possesses both 
systems. It is unquestionable that centralised and formal political 
communicaiton channels are more related to the urban area. On the other 
hand, the predominant mode of political communication in the rural area is 
face-to-face or interpersonal communication. The fact that both traditional 
and modern communication exists within and between the two environments made 
it imperative to adapt the network approach to the study of political 
communication in Nigeria. That both environments and their populations were 
activated by the two systems of communication to participate in one event - 
National General Elections - furthermore strongly justifies the network 
approach. 
A particular elite group who mobilised the environments I populations has 
access to both. traditional and mass media channels for political- influence. 
Its access to traditional systems is endorsed by and made very effective by 
the strength of kinship ties between it and the rural and urban population. 
Its access to modern mass media is the reward of its orientation and 
acquired Western knowledge, its economic advantage and its manipulative 
ideological power. 
Since independence, Nigeria has not been able to advance beyond the 
transitional political communication system to the nation-state model. The 
emerging structures of political elites, party politics and mass media are 
shown in Chapter Four - Six. In particular, Chapter Three shoed how the 
colonial policies encouraged the political elite to mobilise -political 
support along ethnic lines using both traditional and modern communication 
channels to achieve such support - the outcome of constitutional 
regionalisation of politics. Thereupon, ethnic politics only emphasise the 
kinship and extended family/political culture, an orientation which has 
checked the development of a nation-state political communication system in 
Nigeria. Despite this particular problem, major change in political 
communication in the pre-colonial period" and in contemporary politics in 
Nigeria has occurred. This is the emergence of elite groups and the 
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development of urban centres particularly in Igboland where there were no 
city-states or highly centralised government before the advent of 
colonialism. But the new and the old systems have not been separated from 
the structure of social and cultural ties. 
THREE MAIN DIMENSIONS OF NETWORK TIES BETWEEN RURAL AND URBAN POLITICAL 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Network ties between urban and rural political environments have been 
theoretically and empirically studied and analysed in three major 
dimensions: first, at the level of individuals, who were aggregated into 
groups, according to their major attributes and characteristics, in order to 
transcend egocentric analysis which has inherent limitations (explained in 
Chapters Two and Seven). The advantages of 'group' or system analyses as an 
effective approach to understanding the structure of political communication 
in Nigeria were illustrated. 
The second level was the full consideration of the roles - of voluntary 
organisations, clubs, unions etc. as channels of political communication. 
These two dimensions constitute network linkages between urban and rural 
areas. Statistically, it was established that, through flexible horizontal 
mobility of urban and rural populations, there is a strong interdependency 
between the two relatively autonomous environments. Also, modern and 
traditional voluntary organisations exist both in the village and in the 
city. The two major criteria for membership of these organisations, clubs, 
etc., irrespective of the environments, are kinshp and religion. Thus the 
relationships between the populations are kinship-based with manifest or 
latent social, cultural, religious, political and economic content. I have 
maintained that these two dimensions are the premises in which effective 
interpersonal political communication takes place in Nigeria and they help 
us to understand the peculiar way Nigerians communicate. 
The political elites, by the virtue of their 'natural' membership of the 
systems and the strength of kinship ties, reinforced by the pattern of the 
Nigerian political communication set up, politicise these relationships 
within and between rural and urban environments, especially in an election 
period. Network analysis explains the structures of the relationships and 
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political behaviour during an election time. 
The third dimension of linkage between urban and rural populations are the 
mass media. Ownership of radio and television sets is widespread in both 
rural and urban areas. While there are more television sets in the urban 
areas, exposure to television is higher in the rural areas than in the city. 
Again exposure to television is associated with kinship relationship - where 
one TV set owned by a relative is watched by several members of the extended 
family. The presence of rural elites in the village makes the demand for 
newspapers printed in the urban area high in the village. Radio is a 
universal medium consumed by both the rural and urban population. Its 
characteristics make it readily accessible to the traditional group who 
would otherwise be totally cut off from the use of modern means of political 
information and communication in Nigeria. 
ARGMENT AGAINST THE LINEAR MODEL 
The theory that the cities in Africa are closely associated with the rapid 
development of the mass media and are used for political campaigns is strong 
supported by this study. But a thick cloud hangs over the relationship 
between the existence of mass media institutions and their effectiveness to 
influence the electorate in their voting behaviour in Nigeria -a major 
African state. 
The Federal and State governments have been persuaded by mass media 
professionals to believe rather firmly that the mass media are all powerful, 
particularly during elections: that they have the ability to change the 
passive and the undecided voters and audience exactly the way the 
politicians want. This conception of media political power, I believe, led 
the ruling National Party (NPN) during the last civil rule between 1979 and 
1983 to monopolise all the NTA stations in the Federation. In reaction, 
those states which were not controlled by the NPN established their own TV 
stations for completely political reasons. All the media instalations are 
located in the Federal and State capitals. But most of their political 
agendas and their professionals were so localised during the elections that 
they merely reinforced local political attitudes and behaviour, which were 
best understood and placed into political communication context through 
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face-to-face communication. 
This was a situation that the elite clearly understood and believed to be 
directly influenced by the mass media. This study in Chapters Ten, Eleven 
and Twelve demonstrated that most of the elites have strong ties with their 
relatives in the villages and cities; they are influenced by their relatives 
in the rural areas as much as they influenced their relatives' political 
behaviour. In Chapter Twelve in particular it was seen that the elite 
engaged more in face-to-face communication than the traditional group. Also 
the majority of the urban elite participated more actively in the 1983 
general elections in the village (where communication is interpersonal) than 
in the city (where impersonal communication predominates). If the linear 
model were to be applled in the analysis of political communication in this 
study, the role and development of the mass media and interpersonal 
communication would be obscured. 
MMOR CHANGES IN AND ROLES OF POLITICAL COMMICATION AS EVIDENCED By 1979 
1983 CIVILIAN RULE AND GENERAL ELECTIONS 
Though ethnic organisations still exist in most communities, they were less 
important in the mobilisation -of political support in the 1979 and 1983 
general elections. The civil war, the creation of states and the emergence 
of several new political parties and leadership have weakened the 
effectiveness of a regional (geographical) ethnic organisation such as the 
Igbo State Union to mobilise a region to support one leader and one party. 
In particular, with ref erence to IMO State , this study indicates a new 
pattern of political communication in which there was more interchange with 
the Igbos and the Hausa/Fulani through leadership. While inter-ethnic party 
political co-operation took place at leadership level, political conflicts 
which characterised Nigeria's election campaigns shifted from the regional 
and national levels to the local communities. Imo and Anambra States were 
typical areas where local conflicts were high in the 1983 elections. 
The emergence of new political egos (candidates), Ojukwu and others who 
confronted the pre-independence and post-independence Igbo political leader, 
Zik, and his NPP followers, radically altered the Igbo's political 
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participation and voting in the 1983 elections. This study has shown that 
through this new pattern of political development, the Igbos, for the first 
time in the history of Nigerian politics were deeply divided in their voting 
behaviour between an Igbo-dominated party, NPP, and a Hausa/Fulani-dominated 
party, NPN. 
There may be cautious optimism, but it should not be concluded prematurely 
that ethnic politics is threatened. Ojukwu, as former leader of Biafra, is 
poised to be a political equivalent of Zik, who dominated Igbo politics 
since the colonial era. That Ojukwu identified with a non-Igbo political 
party was merely a leadership shift to get the Igbos to break into the 
mainstream of Nigerian politics as before the civil war. The hidden 
political philosophy of the shift and identification was a rational one - 
"if you cannot beat them, join them". But the 'Join' is politically too 
superficial to be true. What is shifting is not the masses' ethnic 
political attitude but that of the leadership. This research also shows 
that the Igbos are increasingly beginning to feel that a more permanent 
political alliance between them and the Hausa/Fulani would create a stable 
political system in Nigeria. My own experience suggests that this does not 
imply that the Igbos would not co-operate with the Yorubas to create a 
stable Nigeria, but generally the Igbos. may dislike the Yoruba leadership in 
the person of Awolowo. 
Generally the Igbos have a great and natural tendency to like other people 
anywhere they live. They have been long advocates of Nigerian unity and 
preached it and 'fought' for it before the civil war. 
"Until 1966, Nigeria Unity had indeed been an article of faith 
with them ... 'The Igbos had nurtured 
'the idea of common 
citizenship with all people among whom they lived. To enquire 
into the precise identity of an Igbo was to insult his sense of 
fraternity with other Africans in Nigeria. Being an Ibgo was a 
private affair, perhaps a source of pride; but the public image 
was Nigeria. ' 
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo, is acknowledged by the generality of 
Nigerians as the founder of Nigerian Nationalism. His able 
lieutenants were of course drawn from all over Nigeria, but the 
most outstanding among them included many Igbos - Mazi Mbonu Ojike, Dr. K. O. Mbadive, Dr. Nwafor Orizu, Mokwongo Okoye, Obita 
Agwuna, Dr. M. I. Okpara, Ikenna Nzimiro ... "l 
If these were the spirits of the Igbos for the unity of Nigeria, their 
recent detachment from Yoruba leadership is a part of their resentment of 
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Awolowo Is betrayal shortly bef ore the civil war, as well as his part in the 
starvation of Biafra during the civil war. At the end of the civil war, it 
was claimed that he made life more difficult for the Igbos. In Ojakwuls 
political speech, cited earlier, he reminded his audience at Enign of the 
sufferings they had to undergo as a result of Awolowo's role in Nigeria 
during and after the civil war. 
Since the charismatic influence of Nigerians' leaders tends to dictate the 
pattern of political developments it would be therefore advisabe for other 
ethnic groups to develop their political participation along the lines of 
the Igbos in the 1983 general elections. The argument against such 
development might be that the circumstances of the Igbo since the civil war 
are different from other major ethnic groups in Nigeria. But what Nigeria 
needs is the development of a nation-state political system and not ethnic 
politics. If politically powerful leaders emerged from other ethnic groups 
and these new leader's identified with political parties not dominated by 
their ethnic groups the Nigerian electorate, who are influenced by 
charismatic leadership, would develop a tendency to identify and vote for 
parties other than those dominated by their different ethnic groups. 
, TIINIC STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN THE SURVEY THAT INDICATED THE NEW PATTERN OF F 
POLITICS IN NI 
I maintain that once new action-sets or communication-sets are created 
within local communities, new patterns of political communcation networks 
and voting behaviour would emerge. In the survey, 70% of the respondents 
believed that the last civil government was ethnically biased, 87.6% 
maintained -that there was evidence of inter-ethnic co-operation, 92.2% 
confirmed that ethnic politics is still alive and well in Nigeria, and a 
slightly higher. percentage, 93%, concluded that ethnic politics remains the 
bedrock of conflicts in Nigeria. However, a major development is that a 
moderate percentage, 46.2%, of the respondents who believed that a political 
alliance between the Igbos, Hausas and Fulani would reduce political 
conflicts and create stability in Nigeria. This feeling generally reflects 
the actual voting behaviour of the Igbos during the election particularly to 
the NPN which won 33.2% of the Igbos vote. 
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We should be very cautious of interpreting this new pattern of political 
development in Nigeria, particularly among the Igbos. The Igbos were voting 
for leadership rather than the NPN as a Hausa/Fulani dominated party. If 
those Igbo leaders, such as Ojuku, M. I. Okpara etc., admired by the Igbos 
did not join the NPN party, their voting attitude could have been different 
from what it was in the last general elections. If anything, in terms of 
the breakdown of ethnic politics in Nigeria, the Igbo tendency towards 
identification with a non-Igbo-dominated party is purely a pseudo political 
movement, but how real. this development could be in the future if allowed to 
continue remains an important ethnic political question. 
Most of the Igbos are not in favour of an Igbo/Yoruba political alliance. 
Only 8.5% thought that an alliance between them and the Yorubas would help 
Nigerian political development in the right direction. * 26.2% favoured a 
political alliance between the Yoruba, Hausa and Fulani, 13.8% opted for a 
one-party system and a low 5.7% favoured separate political party existence 
for the different tribes. From these figures, the evidence is clear that 
the charismatic leadership and the emergence of a new political ego (Ojukwu) 
and his action-set (eg Ikemba front etc. ), however ideological, produced 
within a short period a political behaviour among the Igbos which was new in 
the history of Nigerian general elections. The general negative attitude of 
the Igbos towards a political alliance with the Yorubas reflects both their 
dislike for Yoruba leadership as well as the complete lack of a single 
popular Igbo leadership joining the UPN party. Equally, Yorubas have no 
tendency to ally with the Igbos politically. 
The states in the table are the hearts of major different ethnic groups in 
Nigeria. In the 1979 Presidential election voting, the pattern was 
exclusively ethnic - 66.58% of the Hausa/Fulani in Sokoto voted for the NPN 
and 26.61% voted for GNPP. Only 0.95% voted for the NPP and 2.52% for the 
UPN. 
In 1983, the Hausa/Fulani maintained a similar voting pattern as in 1979. 
91.85% voted for the NPN, those who voted for the GNPP declined to a low 
1.65%. There was a slight improvement in the number who voted for the NPP 
from 0.92% in 1979 to 2.23% in 1983. Hausa/Fulani votes in Sokoto for the 
UPN remained almost the same in 1979 and 1983. 
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Table 1: 15 
Presidential Elections in 1979 and 1983 
1979 
State Ethnic GNPP NPN PRP NPP UPN 
Group Awulziri Shagari Aminu Zik Awolowo 
Kano 
Borno Kanuri 384278 246778 46385 9645 23885 
(N. East) (54.04%) (34.71%) (6.5%) (1? 35%) (3.35%) 
Imo, Igbo 34616 101516 10252 999636 17335 
(East) (5.00%) (8.80%) (0.59%) (86.6%) (0.64%) 
Ondu Yoruba 3561 57361 2500 11756 1294666 
(West) (0.26%) (4.19%) (0.18%) (0.86%) (94.51%) 
Sokoto Hausa/ 35902 898994 44977 12499 34102 
Fulani (26.61%) (66.58%) (3.33%) (0.92%) (2.52%) 
(N. West) 
. 
1983 
Borno Kanuri 179265 348974 26996 
(N. East) (24.96%) (48.60%) (3.76%) 
IMO Igbo 52364 398463 . 
18370 
(East) (3.29%) (25.07%) (1.16%) 
Ondu Yoruba 6874 438128 4449 
(West) (0.54%) (3.4%) (0.35%) 
Sokoto Hausa/ 46752 2605935 24280 
Fulani (1.65%) (91.83%) (0.85%) 
(N. West) 
26992 120138 
(3.76%) (16.73%) 
1064436 22648 
(66.99%) (1.48%) 
5022 1198033 
(0.40%) (95.00%) 
63238 75428 
(2.23%) (2.66%) 
A major Yoruba state - Ondo - contrasts more sharply in its voting pattern 
in both elections. In 1979 95.51% of the Yorubas in Ondo voted for the UPN. 
Only 4.19% voted for the NPN and a mere 0.86% for the ' 
NPP. In 1983 their 
vote for the NPN remained the same, the NPP dropped to 0.40% and the UPN 
remained at the level as in 1979 at 95%. In 197T Igbos in Imo State cast 
the majority of their votes for the NPP, 86.6%, 8.80% voted for the NPN and 
only 0.64% for the UPN. In 
1983 the UPN had only a small increase but the 
NpN made a substantial gain of 25.07 ' 
%, which affected the numbers of votes 
for the NPP from 86.6% in 1979 to 66.99% in 1983. 
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one major problem with table 1.15, Appendix 1 and 2 is that we cannot say 
that the small percentages of votes for other parties in a State are people 
of the same state or i=igrants from outside the State. In my survey, an 
attempt was made to resolve this problem. A cross tabulation of ethnic 
origin and political parties for votes cast in Imo State showed who voted 
for whom in the 1983 general elections. 
Table 2: 15 
A Crosstabulation of Ethnic Groups and the Political Parties for whom 
the Respondents Voted in Imo State during the 1983 General Election 
Imo State 
Tribe No. of GNPP NPN PRP NPP UPN NAP 
Respon- 
dents 
Igbos 102 33 66 1 2 
(83.6%) (27.0%) (54.1%) (0.8%) (1.6%) 
Yoruba 9 1 8 
(7.4%) (0.8%) (6.6%) 
Hausa/ 7 5 1 1 
Fulani (5.7%) (4.1%) (0.8%) (0.8%) 
other 4 1 - - 3 
Tribes (3.3%) (0.8%) (2.5%) 
Total 122 40 1 66 13 2 
100% (32.8%) (0.8%) (54.1%) (10.7%) (1.6%) 
of the 83.6% of the Igbo res. pondents who voted, 27% (33) voted for the NPN 
and 54.1% (66) voted for the NPP. Only 0.8% (1) voted for the UPN. In the 
survey there were 9 Yorubas, only one person voted for the NPN. The rest 
voted for the UPN and none at all for the NPP. The same was applicable with 
Hausa/Fulani who lived in Owerri, none voted for the NPP, 5 for the NPN and 
only one for the UPN. 
Despite the Igbo tendency towards the NPN in the 1983 elections, Nigerian 
politics is still strongly ethnic. The fact that Hausa/Fulani, Yorubas and 
other tribes who live in Imo State could not cast a single vote of theirs to 
an Igbo-dominated party where they lived and worked clearly indicated that 
tribalism in Nigeria knows no social, economic, cultural or geographical 
boundaries. This may also show that the 0.92% in 1979 and 2.23% in 1983 in 
Sokoto who voted for the NPP were Igbos or people from Plateau State who 
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live in Sokoto. Similarly 0.86% in 1979 nd 0.40% in 1983 in Ondo State who 
cast their votes for the NPP were non-Yorubas. These figures are worrying 
in themselves and clearly show that ethnicity is a major factor in Nigerian 
politics. 
In our study of traditional politics in Chapter Three, the social structure 
and the political organisation of the Igbos were coherent, that is the 
society is a plural one made up of sub-groups and "the relationship between 
the members of a village or village-group, and between one village-group or 
clan and another are marked by social discord. They are always disputing 
over one issue or the other - land, water, ceremonial rites, traditional 
offices and titles etc. None is prepared to accept the leadership of the 
authority of the other. Everyone is king unto himself. The quarrels are 
embittered by the poverty of the traditional Igbo society. -2 
Af ter the amalgamation, the development of party politics, regional and 
federal structures of government, the Igbos, through ethnic ties and 
organisations which are common to all Nigerians but in different patterns, 
brought with them their characteristics into Nigerian politics. The 
Yorubas' traditionalism and lobsequioqsness' make them loyal to and 
controllable by their . traditional chiefs and elders while 'the submissive 
humiltyl of the Hausa/Fulani, which is an aspect of Muslim doctrine, puts 
them under the autocratic leadership of their religious heads who are often 
their principle political leaders too. It is widely believed that the Sauna 
of Sokoto between 1960-1966 ruled Nigeria from Sokoto through Tafawa 
Bellewa. With the Northerners, religion is an inseparable part of politics. 
The uniqueness of their politics is based on this philosophy. 
Except in a common language dotted with diverse dialects, the Igbos have no 
common political thought but have: 
"inbred propensity for intra-group quarrelsomeness. Within 
the group, unless you are able to get them all in one 
political party, partisan politics of the modern Nigerian 
state is, in the tradition of that of the traditional 
community, approached in the spirit of a feud, which is fought 
with vehemence, with no quarters given on either side. l3 
Disheartened by this state of affairs among the Igbos, Nwakneze sadly points 
out that: 
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n*9* everybody acknowledges that the Political f eud of the Second 
Republic was more vehement and bitter in Imo, State and Anambra 
than in any other state. Igbos in different political camps were 
at each others' throats, with frequent clashes between their 
organised armed gangs which left in their trail considerable 
casualties in human lives and property. There was in particular 
the sad case of the Igbo Governor of Anambra State INPPI locked in 
hateful ýolitical feud with the Igbo Vice-President (NPN) of the 
country, also from the same State. And when the Second Republic 
was eventually overthrown by the military, every Igbo turned 
informer against his brother, writing endless petitions to the 
authorities. "4 
A point I have stated earlier which led to the massive transfer of teachers 
and the forced retirement of teachers and some civil servants. 
Catholicism and Protestantism as dominant relgions in Imo or Anambra States 
have the peculiar characteristics of individualism, achievement-orientation 
and discontent with traditionalism. Thus the Igbos have a religion which 
cannot be a base for a political front. Besides, the universal leaders of 
the Catholic and Protestant churches from Rome and Canterbury respectively 
forbid local church leaders from involvement in active politics. 
Generally, the Igbýos lack everything which holds other tribes in Nigeria 
together in their political attitude and behaviour. Their 27% (according to 
table 2: 15) vote for the NPN is an aspect of this I inbred propensity for 
intra-group quarreling rather than a genuine approval of another party's 
policies and benefits derived from them during the civil rule. Lack of 
strong leadership can be blamed for this situation: 
"The real problem with the Igbo since Independence is precisely 
the absence of the kind of central leadership which their 
competitors expect from them. This deficiency has left them open 
to self-seeking, opportunist, leaders who offered them little help 
in coming to terms with a new Nigeria in which individual progress 
no longer depends on the rules set by a fairly impartial colonial 
empire. 
The lack of real leaders in Igboland goes back, of course, to the 
beginnings of colonial administration. Once the white man had 
crushed Igbo resistance it was relatively easy for him to locate 
upstarts and ruffians in the community who would uphold his regime 
at the expense of their own people. . From those days the average Igbo leader's neutrality has not been entirely free of the 
collaborating warrant chief syndrome. ', 5 
The alliance f avoured by the Igbos f or political stability is not an 
alliance of political parties in order to form a majority party only after 
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an election, but an alliance governed by the actual voting of the people. 
The shift in the political attitude of Igbos, if allowed to develop, might 
in the long run provide some of the answers to Nigerians' ethnic political 
problems. But this is problematic because the position of the minority 
ethnic group can not be determined, which can cause major problems in 
political alliances between two major tribes only. 
TE[g MASS 14EDIA REFLECTED AND REINFORCED THE PATTERN OF POLITICAL CUNGEs AND 
DEvELOPMENT IN THE 1983 GENERAL ELECTIONS 
Any change and development in the political behaviour of a' society is 
reflected and reinforced by the mass media. In the localisation of 
political conflicts in the 083 general elections, a high proportion of the 
respondents believed that radio was the most important medium that resolved 
the conflicts. Different groups understand media messages differently. The 
way the Nigerian mass media reinforced political conflicts during the 
elections was also perceived differently by the respondents. A low 
percentage of 27.3%, mainly from the 
iraditional group,. stated that TV did 
not intensify political conflicts. 93.3% of the elites believed that 
newspapers did so. Other groups remained uncertain whether newspapers 
intensified political conflicts in the elections or not. Most of the 
respondents reported that face-to-face communication did not particularly 
intensify political conflicts but confirmed that interpersonal, face-to-face 
communication was the most unreliable channel of political communication 
during the elections. 
-w-uv 1217T. &TIONSHIP BEIVEEN OWNERSHIP OF RADIO AND llq. EVISIONS SETS, NEWSPAPERS 
AND EXPOSURE TO POLITICAL INFORNATION AND VOTING 
The research provides evidence that there is a weak relationship between 
ownership of radio and television sets and exposure to them for political 
information. 61.3% own a radio but only 53.6% use it for political 
information between I to 10 hours a week. In sharp contrast, only 2.4% own 
TV sets and another 23.5% own both TV and radio sets but 69% viewed 
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television for political information during the elections between 1 to 10 
hours a week and 31% did so between 11 to 30 hours a week. This sharp 
difference between ownership of TV sets (low) and exposure (high) is the 
result of communal viewing among members of the same family and kin in both 
rural and urban areas. 
Because of the local divisons between friends, and relatives, and the 
distrust people had for word-of-mouth political information, less people 
than expected were engaged in face-to-face political communication for 
information. For example, 44.2% reported that they engaged in face-to-face 
communciation for political information between 1 to 10 hours a week in 
comparison with 78.1% to newspapers, 69% TV and radio 53.6% for the same 
period of time. 
S 
Generally the number of respondents who exposed themselves to different 
chanels of political information between 1-30 hours a week are as follows: 
Radio 
TV 
Newspapers 
Face-to-kace communication 
125 respondents 
87 respondents 
96 respondents 
95 respondents 
But the relationship between exposure to and influence of the media, inter- 
personal communication and the voting behaviour of the respondents was not a 
strong one. Particularly, TV was the channel of least political influence 
which indicates that the influence of TV in Nigeria (as generally claimed 
with the 1979 general elections) was either presumptuous or a generalisation 
taken to absurb extremes. In this study radio rather than TV or newspapers 
was the most important medium both in terms of exposure and influence. 
Since radio is more widely used in the rural areas and the research 
indicates that it is the most important medium both in terms of exposure and 
influence for political information and voting, it is out of place to 
conclude that the mass media political influence is only associated with the 
cities in Nigeria. Besides, 'we have noted that the elite are the highest 
consumers of newspapers' political information, yet the majority of the 
elite participated more actively in the rural areas than in the city, where 
newspapers are widely used politically. In the light of this discovery, I 
would suggest that empirical research based on the five categorical groups 
and their exposure to the media should also be carried out at non-election 
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periods so that we can determine Nigerian's social, economic and cultural 
communication processes. 
The critical question is then, why do politicians attach . -such 
great 
importance to the mass media when it is of little political influence on the 
electorates' voting behaviour? The development tends to reflect the 
propaganda interests of the politicians and does not reflect or articulate 
public opinion or the political needs of the people. The mass media in the 
way they are owned and controlled by the State and the Federal governments, 
generally intensifies conflicts at local and national level. Furthermore, 
the belief by politicians that the media are powerful, leads them to conform 
to the dominant power structure in order to get access to the media. 
Gaining access to the media in Nigeria is different to getting access to the 
media by politicians in Western Europe and North America. To get access to 
the media by Nigerian politicians is to get power which heps them to decide 
where to set up the radio, TV and press at State or National level. They 
therefore decide who works there, and indirectly influence the mass media's 
political agenda and content. The establishment of ITV channel 59 by the 
NPP state governor, Sam Mbakwe, during the 1983 election campaign is an 
example of this situation. The mass media were used by the politicians to 
further their own -interests career and. local popularity. In the 1983 
general elections, the mass media political agenda did not reflect on the 
political realities of Nigeriat such as socio-political and economic issues. 
The dominant use of interpersonal interaction for effective political 
communication did not only make interpersonal networks the basis of 
political participation and voting, but also encouraged various corrupt 
practices. 
THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION FROM THE POINT OF INTERPERSONAL NETWORKS 
OF COMMUNICATION 
In political communication terms, the influence of parents, school-mates, 
voluntary organisations (clubs), friends and relatives operates through 
interpersonal interaction especially when money constitutes an important 
factor of politicial influence. In chapter twelve it was seen that 86.1% of 
the respondents reported that electorates in their. communities were 
influenced by money to vote for any party. This was only carried out 
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through interpersonal communication. Thus, the dominant mode of political 
communication and influence in Nigeria is face-to-face and not the mass 
media. The strong relationship between the social and cultural ties of the 
electorates and their political behaviour makes it absolutely imperative to 
study and understand the s tructure of political communication in Nigeria 
within a network frame of analysis. This structure of relationship cuts 
across village and city environments. 
Most of the respondents in the survey lived both in the village and in the 
city. This remains an important geographical mobility that justified 
network linkages between urban and rural politicial communication. The 
relationship at individual group, or voluntary organisations' 
levels are 
often obligatory, but based on the kinship system. During an election 
campaign the kinship based relationship is politicised. In turn, 
it weakens 
National Political consciousness and intensifies ethnic politics -a factor 
that shifts media political content far away from national issues to 
personality issues. Once this happens, the politicians only use the 
local 
mass media institutions already under their control to 
further their career. 
But as the communities are strongly linked by kinship networks, the corrupt 
politiciansq who are far richer than the rest of the population, utilise the 
network to buy voters with money. A high proportiori of the respondents 
reported that the failure of Nigerian political elections was caused 
by the 
corrupt means used by politicians, and most of them believed that the most 
corrupt citizens of Nigeria are politicians. Furthermore, the allegiance 
and obligations which parents and relatives fulfill in the community, such 
as the education of their children instead of the state, strengthens kinship 
ties rather than an allegiance to the state. For instance, in the survey 
85.4% of the respondents reported that their parents were responsible for 
their education. Only 1.0% stated that the state provided it. The 
importance attached to Western education, and the roles of those who have it 
in the political system in Nigeria, makes it an important factor which 
enhances the linkage between the elite in the city and their relatives in 
the village. The elite association with the corrupt politicial system and 
ties with urban and rural population through a network of kinship, makes 
corruption a widespread phenomenon between the two areas. This situation is 
characteristic of many African societies, and as Mitchel (1969) emphasised, 
constitutes an important political influence between urban and rural areas. 
Voluntary organisations exist in village and urban areas, which also implies 
that the two environments are linked at another important political 
communication level. Through voluntary organisations such as the Igbo State 
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Union an entire ethnic region could be politically mobilised. Many of them 
(33.8%) are based on the kinship criterion for membership and their leaders 
are the educated among the kin. They initiate external relations with other 
organisations within and outside the communities. If the elites are 
corrupto their leaderships of various voluntary organisations make 
corruption spread across cities and villages. This survey, however, in 
contrast to Audrey Smoch's studies of the strength of the. Igbo State Union 
in mobilising political support for the NCNC before the civil War, does not 
show that ethnic unions were a strong base for political participation and 
voting. Multiple action-sets which existed in villages and cities in 
support of the two parties, the NPP and the NPN, rendered large ethnic 
Unions ineffective political communication channels in support of any one 
party. 
POLITICAL PERSONALITY VS POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE 1983 GENERAL ELECTIONS 
Political personality and socio-political and economic issues are in 
conflict in Nigeria. , The former predominates in the mass media political 
agenda. The social, economic and political issues which have influenced the 
Nigerian electorate since the colonial period have changed in relation to 
structural changes in the country. These changes have produced new 
problems. Yet Nigerian politicians do not use the mass media in their 
election campaigns to discuss solutions to these changes and the problems. 
These changes and problems constitute major national political issues. 
Because these issues are neglected, politicians use corrupt means to promote 
themselves and to achieve their political ambition. In the survey, the most 
important issue of concern to the public was the elimination of corruption. 
This was directly associated-with politicians by the respondents. Also they 
conclude that politicians and corruption form the basis of political 
instability in the country. Other important socio-political and economic 
issues which the respondents noted were local economic development, national 
economic growth and political integration. The expulsion of illegal 
immigrants, which was highly politically motivated and which also attracted 
considerable world attention and criticism before the 1983 general 
elections, was surprisingly of very little actual political importance to 
the respondents. The expulsion order was effected so that the NPN could win 
the support of the large unemployed city population, particularly in Lagos. 
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Other reasons might be justified -by the timing of the expulsion makes it 
obvious that vote-catching was the main reason. 
NEWSPAPER HEADLINES AND COVERAGE OF THE ISSUES 
Newspaper headlines on corruption and the other major issues mentioned 
above, and the respondents degree of concern about them, are proportionately 
the same, a situation which supports the hypothetical argument made earlier 
that the localisation of the mass media both in content and professionalism 
1perely reinforces the public's attitudes to contemporary issues. But radio 
and television, which were directly owned and controlled by the State and 
Federal government, put less emphasis on these issues. The most important 
newspaper the respondents read and which talked about these issues in its 
headlines was the National Concord. Much of the paper's political position 
and concern for the national issues was the attitude of the owner, Abiola. 
His attack on the UPN, NPN leadership made him not only criticise political 
leadership in Nigeria as a whole, but also drew the attention of the public 
thr'bugh his paper to the critical national issaes which had been ignored by 
the political leaders in their election campaign, 
THE FUNCTIONS AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION OF EACH OF 
THE FIVE NETWORK GROUPS 
This study has shown statistically that rural populations in Nigeria in any 
given region are ethnicly and religiously homogenous but only relatively 
heterogenous in theý urban areas. That is, in any given region in Nigeria 
one particular ethnic group is predominant in the city and more exclusively 
so in the rural areas. This condition makes Nigeria a fertile ground'for 
the study of network of communication systems, where for instance one ethnic 
leader can only mobilise politic al support from his own region in both rural 
and urban areas through a network of kinship and organisations. The mass 
media are used to boost the image of the politicians within a region. They 
do not act as strong alternatives to kinship network ties for political 
participation and voting. 
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To study network of political communication at the regional level without 
identifying different political participants within the region presents a 
serious problem in terms of changes in the socio-economic structures. The 
identification of five different groups does not only help us to correct the 
generalisations of the ethnic politics but it also helps us to know exactly 
the political behaviour of different groups in a local community. The 
differences are then compared and explained in terms of the groups' 
different attributes and characteristics. 
For example, we now know that all the traditonal groups and rural elites 
with different characteristics and attributes live in the villages. A 
higher proportion of urban poor and urban elites with sharply different 
attributes live in the city. The young school leavers are the most mobile 
group between and within cities and villages. Theii relationship in the use 
of different political channels is different. Most of the elites are 
associated with newspapers; all the groups watch TV, and radio is widely 
used by all. the groups particularly the traditional group. While it was 
noted that all the network groups are exposed to different media, they were 
not very much influenced by the content of the media in their political 
participation and voting. Also where changes occured over time, we are able 
to associate them with different groups in the community. Consequently, - 
problems which emerge ; fs a result of the changes can also be solved in 
relation to different groupso particularly to those most adversely affected 
by the changes. I 
Early theories about mass media and political communication have considered 
the role of the media exclusively in terms' of the urban elites' close 
association to them. It was believed that the elites were engaged in mass 
media information for their political information and participation. By the 
development of analysis of network, based on the five groups, we discovered 
that the urban elites are 
. 
more actively engaged in face-to-face 
communication than the traditional group. Also the majority of the urban 
elite in Imo State participated more actively in the 1983 general elections 
in the rural areas than in the city. This means that elites' and the 
traditional groupst political communication channels (interpersonal) are the 
same. 
Through network groups, we can now study Nigerian political communication 
within any local (urban or rural) community to determine how different 
members of the community participate in an election. The localisation of 
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the 1983 general elections in Imo State and the conflicts it generated among 
the Igbos themselves makes the need to identify different political 
participants imperative. 
SOME SUGGESTIONS 
This research suggests that emphasis should be laid on network theory and 
analysis in the study and understanding of political communication in 
Nigeria. This is because it has the power to reveal abundantly the 
structure of political communication in both urban and rural areas, which 
distinctively characterise Nigerian society. The linear model gives a false 
picture of what is going on in political communication in Nigeria, 
particularly during an election period. 
The Federal and State governments should re-evaluate their policies on mass 
media development, particularly on the expensive media such as colour 
television stations. The government can reinstate some traditional socio- 
political institutions that promote kinship ties in the village and in the 
city, and use the mass media as effective channels of political information, 
socialisation and education between different ethnic groups in Nigeria. 
A combined and organised application of modern mass media and traditional 
networks of communication will reduce costs for the training of media 
professionals as well as the cost of broadcasting and office equipment. 
IN the first place it seems economically irrational for Nigeria, or another 
country in Africa, to use colour television for broadcasttng. Colour TV 
tends to be concentrated in the urban areas and often the political and 
social content of the TV broadcast is aimed at the rural population. Many 
writers have questioned the rationality of colour TV development in Nigeria. 
Peter Golding (1977) regards it as a prestige project: 
00. in a country where, as elsewhere in the developing world, 
even a black and white set costs as much as a farmer's annual 
income. Emphasis is often on production or transmission rather 
than on reception facilities. " 
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While he draws our attention to the arguments of alternative technology and 
different assumptions on the standard of media professionalism, Golding 
warned that: 
"All consideration of alternatives or appropriateness must be 
aware of the context of cultural dependence, of the ways in which 
professionalism ensures the reproduction of institutions and 
practices from the advanced industrial societies. -6 
He then contrasted the views of Shils (1963: 67,71) and explained that the 
media professionalism is in effect 'media imperialism' and is part 'of a 
broader cultural dependence'. 
Nigeria is already trapped in both media technological and professional 
problems. To alleviate the problemst political, social and economic 
activities should no longer be 'studio-bound' but taken out to the people 
using locals as crews for the productions. In this way costs will be 
reduced, the contents will reflect the deeper aspects of the real life of 
the people - which in turn could influence their attitudes. 
Government resources for media development can then be diverted from 
expensive technology, elaborate studios and high costs in the training of 
media professionals to meet world standards to making reception facilities 
cheaper for the poor to purchase. 
Even within media institutions in Nigeria, the problem of media equipment 
creates intense and bitter relationships between staff from different 
departments: 
"Where resources are minimal this problem can be acute, In 
Nigeria the film crews were invariably over-stretched by competing 
demands from news and programmes, and only a few were allocated 
exclusively to a news department. It was a common complaint that 
cameramen had been poached by a programme's producer or had their 
services unduly monopolised by other television departments. 
Studio facilities were also a subject of contention. No separate 
news studio was available at NBC TV, while the radio studies were 
in constant demand for rehearsal and programme preparation, film 
editing and processing, viewing rooms, the use of graphic artists, 
all have to be fought for competitively with the inevitable 
consolidation of a 'news versus the rest' view of interdepartmental relations. --7 
While television programme production should be outdoor orientated to 
alleviate these problems, Nigeria should start to utilise some of the civil 
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war time experiences of Biafra in the development of her radio broadcasts. 
The fact that Biafra used cheap mobile radio stations to carry out some of 
the most pýwerful and effective war time propaganda in the history of 
broadcasting should encourage Nigeria to employ this system to reduce costs. 
The oil-boom which made the nation embark on 'prestige projects, is over. 
Simpler but effective broadcasting methods such as mobile radio stations 
should start to replace the complex studios. 
The voluntary ethnic unions can be used to promote the process of educating 
the members and the public on how to make political demands on issues, 
rather than bending to the will of politicians. They should be encouraged 
to reject money offered to them by politicians during an election. Because 
of the structure of networks in the community, the organisations stand a 
better chance than the media to correct the evils of corruption. But one 
big danger is that an organisation may itself become another continuous base 
for ethnic politics, thus itself perpetuating one of the evils of Nigerian 
politics, corruption and ethnicity. The development of different political 
candidates and their action - or communication - set identifying with the 
different national political parties shuld be encouraged. This will check 
ethnic politics and enhance the process of eliminating corruption, and 
promote national unity and integration -a direction towards nation-state 
development in Nigeria. National issues would prevail rather than 
personalities. 
The mass media can play an important role in this process if they can be 
freed from the direct control of the political parties and politicians. 
Local radio stations, completely free from any political party, should be 
developed to give rural populations a say in national and local politics. 
This is because radio is the most popular mass medium used by various 
classes of people in Nigeria. But the crucial and the most pressing problem 
is how to meet the co. st of development and maintain the stations technically 
and prof essionally. There is no -easy answer to this problem. Meanwhile, 
local and national organisations should be reactivated as Nigeria's 
indigenous primary channels for political communication. To understand the 
effectiveness of different channels of communication for political influence 
and participation both the traditional and modern mass media should be 
studied together in the city and rural areas. 
15.22 
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APPENDIX 
IF (V2 EQ I AND V46 EQ 1 OR 3) V200-2 
IF (V2 EQ 9 AND V46 EQ 2) V200-3 
IF (V2 EQ 9 AND V46 EQ 1) V200-4 
IF (V2 EQ 9 AND V46 EQ 4) V200-4 
IF (V2 EQ 1 AND V46 EQ 2) V200-1 
IF (V2 EQ 1 AND V46 EQ 4) V200-1 
IF (V2 EQ 9 AND V46 EQ 3) V200-5 
IF (V2 NE 1 AND ((V16 LE 20) AND (V31 LT 50)))V400-3 
IF ((V200 NE 1) AND (V16 GE 30) AND MO LE 2))V400-2 
IF (((V200 NE 1) AND (V16 GE 20)) AND (V31 EQ 20 OR GE 50))V400-4 
IF (V200 EQ 1 AND V31 LT 50)V400-1 
IF (V200 EQ 1 AND V31 GE 50)V400-5 
V2 Respondents place of-residence: (1) village; (9) city 
V46 (1) Stay in the city; (2) Go to the village; (3) Go to another city; 
(4) Stay in same place; 
V200 Respondent mobility when unemployed 
LE Less than 
GE Greater than 
EQ - Equal to 
- NE - Not equal to 
THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE RESPONDENTS AND THE FORMATION OF CATEGORICAL 
NETWORK GROUPS FOR RELATIONAL DATA ANALYSIS 
a) 'if I V200 is not equal to 1 (as above), and V16 (respondents I last 
education) is equal to V20 (a trader)s and V31 (respondents' 
. 
education) is less than 50 (teacher), V400 (categorical network group/ 
system) is equal to 3 (urban poor). 
b) 'if' V200 is not equal to 1 and V16 is greater than 30 (artisan), and 
V10 (age) is less than 2, V400 equals 2 (young school leavers). 
APPENDIX 3 
C) 'if' V200 is equal to 1 and V16 is greater than 20 and V31 is equal to 
20 or greater than 50 (teacher) V400 equals 4 (urban elite). * 
d) 'if I V200 is equal to 1 and V31 is less than 50, V400 equals 1 
(traditional group). 
e) #if I V200 is equal to 1 and V31 is greater than 50, V400 equals 5 
(rural elites). 
V400 - Mutually exclusive network groups: (1) traditional group; (2) young 
school leavers; (3) urban poor; (4) urban elites; (5) rural elites. 
V16 - Respondents' last education: (10) none at all; (20) elementary or 
primary school; (30) secondary school; (40) post secondary or 
university. 
V31 - Respondents' occupation: (11) unemployed; (20) trader or 
businessman; (30) artisan; (40) farmer; (50) teacher; 
(60) professional. 
VIO - Age: (1) 10-20; (2) 21-30; (3) 31-40; (4) 41-50; (5) 51-60; 
(6) 61-70+ 
APPENDIX FOUR 
A brief review of some of the broadcasts from Imo, Broadcasting -Service '(IBS) 
, will illustrate some points more vividly and ý also help to contrast the 
broadcasting contents of the 1979 and 1983 elections, outlined in chapters 
seven and fifteen. 
23/5/83 'The Need for Free and Fair Elections in the 1983 Polls'l 
Text: Ogunna suggests that if Nigeria would have a democracy, the 
political leaders must bow to the electorates, He ref used to 
state what demands the electorates had to make to compel the 
political leaders to bow to them. However, he goes on to say 
that the political parties would be engaged in tough 
electioneering campaigns and to violence and provocative 
utterances would be expected". This is already indicative of a 
contrast with the 1979 general elections. Indirectly, he began 
to hint at what he implies. by "aspirant leaders must bow to the 
electorates" by asking crucial questions: 'is it possible for 
Nigeria to be a democracy when a lot of the electorate are 
politically ignorant and are easily bought for money? ' -a point 
which stresses the importance of money in Nigerian political 
participation and voting rather than the influence of the mass 
media. Bowing to the electorates should be understood clearly 
in terms of money: politicians pay to buy voter's cards. Thus a 
Nigerian newspaper writes: 
. Voters card sells N150 
"(Rivers state) 1983 general election voters registration cards 
allegedly bought by NPN supporters for 150 - 200". 
I 
200 is an equivalent of about E180, an attractive sum to any village or 
urban poor, unemployed young school leaver, . unpaid salaried rural elite 
teachers, even to the urban elites whose salaries were cut. 
The impact of money was so strong that the media political broadcast would 
have very marginal effects in the political behaviour of the electorates. 
The reality of Ogunna's statement can be seen in many activities during the 
1983 elections. Besides, while his article was read in the studio on the 
235/83, the newspaper headline 'of the above quotation appeared on the 
26/5/83. The two are closely reported to be different in an election, 
despite possible rapid changes that might occur during the campaign. 
Ogunna therefore believes that the illegitimate use of money in an election 
destroys the chances of free and fair elections. If any one does not follow 
the rules than any government may lose legitimacy and credibility in the 
eyes of the Nigerian population. Illegitimate government has no justice, he 
confirms, a point relevant to the response of the majority of the 
respondents in the survey. 86.3% stated that politicians were responsible 
for the political ills in NigZria and then at the same time 84.3% (10) of 
the respondents maintained that the 1983 general election was not free and 
fair. 
Ogunna in that article proposes that if the government is legitimated by 
f ree and fair elections, then the political system promises 
compatibility of public goals with private values and needs". Therefore, 
this is the time we can talk about issues as important Politicial influences 
through the mass media. Definitely Nigeria, is still far away from such a 
political process. Ogunna then said that people will accept government 
decisions if the system is based on justice. When elections are free and 
fair, the military tend to respect civil authority and any coup is 
prevented. He maintains that free and fair elections are threatened by "low 
cognitive orientation of the electorate and lack of independent and critical 
judgement about public issues. They are ignorant of political questions and 
civil duties. " 
He then points out a similar problem we noted earlier about mass media 
coverage of issues, eg the TV coverage of the urban question and the 
complete neglect of rural needs. The news talk concludes that 'free and 
fair elections' are threatened by such negative forces as ethnics religious, 
sectional and monetary considerations. In our network of political 
communication, identification with these 'negative forces's which operate 
effectively through face-to-face communications and- the mass media, only 
reinforces the process rather than changes it. 
Ogunna. encouraged that for free and fair elections to be' achieved, much 
depends on: 
1. electoral commission and their agents 
2. co-operation ýf party leaders etc. to observe the rules 
3. impartiality of police 
4. impartiality of the media 
S. objectiveness of the electorate. 
In this article , Ogunna looks at more specif ic reasons why f ree and f air 
elections might not happen, plus more general issues as to which Nigeria 
should have free and fair elections. 
18/1/83 Building an Ethnical society Through Electoral ProcesS3 
Text: Chioma aruges that the theory of law and punishment exists 
because there is nearly always evil in every society. Therefore 
people must be persuaded to be self-controlled etc. - otherwise 
they will be punished. On the scale of civilisation, norms, 
values, moralityt etc., Nigeria is pretty low down, Everyone is 
concerned. He points out that the situation is worse in high 
political circlesl where corruption and materialism prevail. 
The trend must stop* and encouragement must be given so that 
ethical revolution starts with the 1983 general elections -a 
revolutionary election politics in which the electorate must 
only vote for candidates with honest records - but how do we 
know them remains the critical question. 
Chioma's specific issue is that the ethical level of society can be 
determined by how the electorates vote. For him, personalities should be 
voted for irrespective of their party and ethnic origin. This is a newstalk 
which sounds good to the ear but has no applicability in real political 
practice in Nigeria. 
27/1/83 The Ideal Party System for Nigeria4 
Text: The forcast that in the 1983 general election there would be no 
landslide victory for any one political party. In Imo State , 
this was a recognition of the effect of the split in Igbo 
leadership between the NPP and the NPN. This split that 
consequently divided the Igbo electorates between the two 
parties made it difficult for any one party to achieve a 
landslide victory over the other. The was in favour of a two- 
party system f or Nigeria and thought that dictatorship could 
still be avoided. He imagined that the two factions of the GNPP 
and PRP (Peoples' Redemption Party) were going to run under NPP 
leadership in the 1983 elections. Mergers would ultimately 
promote national unity and ensure a peaceful political 
atmosphere. The Progressive Peoples Party (PPP) is seen as 
Nigeria's only answer and alternative to the NPN. 
This is a specific issue of political integration or unity in which two 
party systems form the base. 
The would believe that the system could 
enhance Nigeria's economic prosperity and political stability. 
2/2/83 The Case of the Presidential Quit Order on Illegal AlienS5 
Text: Chigbokwu Okenze was in f avour of the expulsion of illegal 
immigrants. He points out that the quit order was expected on 
1/2/83, but postponed until 28/2/83. He expresses the view that 
this is seen as something good done by the ' Shagari 
administration for its economic sec; rity and has moral 
implications. He thought that the order would provide more jobs 
for unemployed Nigerians. But he forgets that at Lagos in 
particular, jobs done by some of the aliens were rejected by 
Nigerians 
* 
either because of the nature of the work or the wages 
attached to them. He accused the illegal immigrants of causing 
troubles in Nigiera, eg Maitatsine religious disturbances in the 
North, and the smuggling of contraband goods and armed robberies 
in the country. He believes that some unpatriotic Nigerians 
collaborated with aliens to sabotage the economy, e. g. over 
foreign exchange reserves, Some aliens, he believes, help to 
plan coups. He insists that expelling them may aid ethical 
revolution, and that foreign prostitutes, gamblers, and drug 
takers will be halted. He disagreed with critics of the illegal 
immigrant expulsion. 
Okenze addressed the problem with a totally biased and racist view. He 
looks at illegal immigrants as all bad and Nigerians all perfect and good 
people, only to be corrupted by aliens. The broadcast lacked objectivity 
and balance. 
28/2/83 Political parties and the Choice of Candidates for the 1983 
General Elections6 
Text: Some senators and legislators have fulfilled their tasks well 
since the 1979 elections. Others set their goals far too high. 
some just squandered money. Some officials divided communities 
by suggesting autonomous states, He added that some of the 
politicians would pay for their second term of office by their 
failure. But this is where Mr. Anayawu fails to understand the 
power of money in political campaigns in Nigeria, where those 
who neglected their duties in pursuit of personal gains used 
their ill-acquired wealth to buy voters' cards at all costs and 
got elected again. The good ones ironically paid the 'price'. 
He thought that Nigerian electorates were more enlightened in 
the 1983 elections than in the 1979 election and that the 
electorates were able to choose candidates on individual merits. 
He thus advised political parties to be careful in choosing 
their flag bearers for the 1983 elections. 
He generalised on a few political issues but considered all of them narrowly 
in the context of personality character. 
12/5/83 The FEDECO and the Search for Peace In Nigeria7 
Text: The succes of the election depends most on FEDECO, according to 
some people. If they do their job properly, the election should 
be f ree and fair. An election commission should be like a 
referee in a game of politics but also, more importantly, must 
have credibility. 
y, alu addresses the issue of free and fair elections exclusively in terms of 
how FEDECO conducted them. This is another narrow view of a successful 
election in Nigeria, where many and often predictable factors can affect and 
alter the shape of the electionsi, 
4/7/83 Zik's Exemplary Approach to the Election Campaj&M8 
I 
Text: Power should lie in the hands of the people, but in Nigeria (and 
the rest of Africa - almost) some politicians have abused it. 
This leads to bad traits. But there are some selfless 
politicians who are not over-ambitious and do not want to abuse 
their power. For example, Ekenasi continues, Shagari described 
Zik and Awolowo as 'blind mice' when he [Shagaril launched the 
NPN Presidential Campaign in Benue State - 'Gboko 1831. It was 
the same Sharagi who awarded the two highest honours in the 
country. Also Shagari accused Mbakwe of creating a huge state 
debt. Zikj on the other hand, concentrated on issues not on 
personalities - other politicians should copy him, the article 
concluded, 
This is the radio patronage of a political leader, in which his deeds are 
seen as perfect and must be copied by other politicians. But the author 
fails to tell listeners what the issues were and how relevant they were to 
their needs. 
9/7/83 Choice and Performance in a Presidential Democracy 
Text: If the elector"-tes are enlightened, politicially conscious and 
literate, it should be easy for them to make their best choice 
at the polls. But these factors are not always so - he then 
blames the highest level of illiteracy in the country. In other 
words, for Iheakaram, the illiterate group in Nigerian 
communities do not make politically rational choices. Another 
impediment he points out is that the electorates have the 
difficulty of choosing from six candidates. In my view this is 
of little effect on the voting behaviour in Nigeria because each 
of the six leaders for the Presidency comes from one of the 
larger ethnic groups. The leaders pull their largest political 
supporters from their different ethnic groups. The electorates 
do not have any problem in choosing between Presidential 
Candidates. He then goes on to advise that voters should not 
consider the political party of a candidate but concentrate on 
the honesty of the leader. 
He points out that politics is a big business in Nigeria where money f rom 
oil and taxes make politicians more wealthy than if they were outside 
politics. 
Iheakaram was very eloquent on the ef f ect of money in Nigerian politics: 
"Those who won party nominations for the 1983 elections to the 
national and state assemblies do not hide the fact that they spent 
between forty and fifty thousand naira to do so. Now that these 
candidates face inter-party opponents, only heaven knows how many 
thousands of naria they will lavish on the electorate. On their 
part, the voters do not see why these politicians should not win 
or lose by paying through their nose, since in less than four 
years both elective and appointive political office holders enrich 
themselves with oil and taxpayers money ... 
They acquire in a few years what they would not in their lifetime 
outside politiicsý ... Experience has shown that a materialistic 
electorate vote overwhelmingly f or an obviously wrong candidate. 
When an electorate sells its conscience by accepting a gif t from 
the wrong candidate, it cannot have the courage of its convictions 
to point out his poor or non-performance and inadequacies. " 
This radio broadcast clearly illustrates my argument and data findings that 
money is the most important factor of influence in Nigerian politics both on 
the politicians - during party nomination - and on the electorate during 
elections. 
The 'materialistic voter' is the elite, but in our survey the urban poor, 
the unemployed young school leaver and the traditional villagers are even 
more prone to accept bribes from the politicians. The electorates voting 
'overwhelmingly' for the wrong candidate implies that the mass media and 
political issues are comparatively irrelevant in influencing voters, 
participation and voting. 
He then concludes: electorates should now be better informed about what 
makes a 'good candidate'. The journalist and the media arb the key to 
truthful information. 
15/7/83 A Guide on How to Avoid Rigging during- the General Election of 
198310 
Text: Everyone should follow FEDECO 1979 presidding officers, and 
polling clerks and party agents should set out clearly. Also 
checks should be made that voters would not vote twice, discuss 
their voting, vote by proxy, etc. Supervision of counting 
should be strict, honest and trustworthy. The police should be 
involved in a responsible way. 
Awuzie's concern was for a fair and free election. 
1/7/83 A Good Government and its Peoplell 
Text: Good administration means clear cut objectives and a coherent 
programme. Imo State has the best record of all of these, 
except perhaps Lagos State. Imo State's success is due to the 
NPP leader, Chief Sam Mbakwe and his assistants. Their success 
is even greater when compared with the harsh f ormer military 
government leaders General Obasonjo, who did not help Imo State 
at all. Even now, the President does very little for Imo State 
but promises and does much for other states. Ozidi demands that 
the federal government should assist in the development of 
education in Imo State by spending more money on it. Some 
people believe that the federal government-has done a good job, 
but Ozidi thinks it is a 'value judgement'. 
He conclude "the people are hungry. Most of them have no 
shelter. Their businessness are virtually ruined. There is a 
scandalous mass unempolyment rate in the country. " 
12/7/83 The Nigerian Police and the 1983 General Elections 
Text: Issues of law and order are very important to the public. The 
success of the elections depends on how prepared the police and 
the FEDECO are. 'The role of the police is to ensure fair and 
f ree elections I. This is crucial, especially as the election 
hots up. Increased political thuggery compelled Shagari to make 
the 17/5/83 speech and to hold a meeting with the Council of 
States. 
The Imo State governor, Sam Mbakwe said that "free and fair 
elections could only be assured if members of the police force 
were disciplined, patriotic and committed to the preservation of 
the sovereignty of Nigeria. " A similar statement was made by 
the Bendel State governor, Alli. The police were also committed 
towards ensuring free and fair elections in 1983, for instance, 
the Ogun State commissioner of police, Alabi Adeyenmi and Imo 
State police commissioner, made it clear that they were 
committed to eradicate thuggery and political violence before 
and during the elections. 
The text considers that it was the responsibility of the police to ensure 
fair and free elections in 1983. 
13/7/83_ The Austerity and its Effects on the Lives of Nigerians13 
Text: The National Assembly decision in April 1982 to let Shagari have 
af ree hand in improving the economic situation nearly led to 
disaster. Only a few people were able to be involved in foreign 
trade. Foreign goods became very hard to get, including raw 
materials for the industries. Thus domestic industries were 
hard hit. Okibedi then called for a halt to austerity measures 
or else the nation would face a catastrophe. After 22 years of 
independence, he said, hunger, poverty, illiteracy, 
unemployment, political violence, and strikes abundantly prevail 
in Nigeria. Agriculture is poor and business in general fast 
declining. High import duties make it more difficult for the 
economy to expand. All these have contributed to smuggling and 
the black market, which in turn increases inflation. An 
unhealthy economy also leads to heightened political tension. 
Shagari must do something - restore importation of essential 
commodites and jobs. 
The Okibedi radio broadcast was an attack on Shagari's austerity measures. 
In his view, austerity measures had failed, and caused great hardship,, 
hitting normal citizens and businessmen, and led to a large black market 
which made things worse and therefore must be changed. 
19/7/83 The Politicians and the Electorates Demands14 
Text There are a lot of election promises, says Igwe, but what good 
are they? Do political aspirants think that the electorates 
believe their wild promises? " He suggested that the Nigerian 
electorate may not be that politically mature but they are not 
all that stupid either. He points out that it is the same 
politicians who cause the huge rises in food prices which led to 
a large number of families unable to afford to feed themselves. 
A good government provides welfare for the masses3, but the problem with 
Nigerian politicians is that they would not face up to the problems - they 
were always looking for scapegoats - what I call leasy*political options'. 
Despite some autonomous economic action by State governments, the Nigerian 
federal government controls the major part of the economy and therefore 
should be responsible for the masses. 
He approaches the failure of the federal government from a very narrow issue 
based on non-provision of welfare to the masses. He does not look at 
specific reasons why the federal government does not provide welfare to the 
masses. 
july 5thl, 1979 -'Lessons, of the First RepubliC35 
summary 3 main questions: 
What was the major cause of the demise of the First 
Republic? 
Were the crises in the 160s avoidable by looking at 
political theory and practices? 
What lessons from the elections? 
Text: in 1960, Nigeria promised an era of democracy, good government 
and rapid national development, but in reality there was a 'rape 
of democracy, maladministration, political unrest and civil 
war'. 
These were mainly due to selfish interests, ambition for 
political power, etc. Also, the elections were never fair and 
free. Both federal and regional elections were rigged, gross 
irregularities and. thuggery prevailed. The Nigerian Electoral 
Commission was incompetent. Thus, resultant social unrest and 
political confusion led to military intervention. 
Whenever elections are not f ree, the newstalk maintained that 
the government lacks legitimacy to create favourable political 
climate. Revolt and political unrests follow. Theref ore the 
experience of the First Republic warns us to be very caref ul 
during forthcoming 1979 elections. Politicians, electoral 
officers and voters must, therefore, observe new rules in ordec 
to make elections free and fair, which would determine other 
developments. 
The text mainly stressed that elections must be free and fair, 
otherwise it is . impossible to have a legit Amate government. 
Politicans, electoral officials and voters must all be honest. 
ection 1979 - The role of electoral officials36 
Summary of Broad6ast: 
outcome of election will depend on officials. The f ailure in 
the pre-1966 elections was largely due to the partisan poliitics 
of electoral officials who employed various types ' of 
malpractices. All these malpractices led to disillusionment in 
electoral processes. General Murtala Muhammed's speech 
addressing Constittuion Drafting Committee on October 8th, 1975 
stated the basic requirements of the committee - to make the 
election fair and free. The text's general emphasis once more 
was on how important honest electorial of ficials should be in 
establishing civil democracy in Nigeria. 
6 
July 7th, 1979 - Election 1979 - The role of the voters37 
Text: Today, first of the five elections to usher in a civil and 
democratic elected Nigerian Governemnt after 13 years of 
military rule. Everyone can votep irrespective of religion, 
class or positign, etc. If you are an eligible voter, you have 
a privilege, obligation and responsibility to vote. Proper vote 
would ensure democracy in Nigeria. By voting, the voter 
overthrows evils in Nigeria - injustice, unemployment, nepotism, 
bribery, etc. 
Voters should not be blinkered by religious bigotrys or by 
ethnic-bias etc. Only good candidates should be voted for. 
Mainly a call for those aged 18 and above to vote. 
July 8th, 1979 - Election 1979 - The winner and the loser38 
Text: General Obsango asked party leader in December 1978 to be 
'sporting' if they lose the election. To the winners, victory 
carries responsibility - the election promises 'humility and 
magnanimity in victory' and no arrogance etc. must be shown. 
While taking part in election you should have developed the 
spirit of 'sportsmanship' - be able to 'take your defeat 
gallintly'. The general call to politicians was sportsmanship 
and accepting defeat gracefully and victory without being 
arrogant. Similar spirit encouraged by Aminn Kano in 1983 - 
'Politics Without Bitterness'. 
july 9thq 1979 - Election 1979 - The correct meaning of leadership 
9 
Text: Those to be elected will be the founding fathers of new style of 
government (presidential). Hopefully this will lead to peace 
for Nigeria. Interpretation of leadership in Nigeria has been 
wrong - it does not mean lordship and position for amassing 
wealth without anybody questioning it or being in an ivory 
tower. Rather it means 'to guide in directon, course, action, 
opinion, etc. ' 
Some accompanying practices are questionable. Ordinary 
Nigerians want leadership candidates to reassess themselves. 
Citizens do not want selfish and arrogant leaders but hard 
working, humble, just and honest. Election promises - good 
roads, pipe-borne water, health services, free education - are 
basic rights of citizens and any money supposed to go to such 
projects must all go to them. When awarding contracts, the new 
leaders should be more careful than previously. The text 
brought together many issues, then a general call to leaders 
(and political aspirants) to be honest, fair and just. 
lection 1979 -A post-mortem of the first round40 
Text: Last week's senatorial elections gave curage to those standing 
in future elections. Prblems of FEDECO and political parties 
should now be identified and hopefully remedied. Only 45 
million out of 48 million registered voters voted in the first 
round. , The Public Enlightenment Committee was blamed for 
failing to educate urban and rural dwellers on how to vote. It 
concentrated too much on mass media, forgetting that most rural 
dwellers have neither radio nor TV. The Public Enlightenment 
Committee should have gone to the villages to give in depth 
instructions. (This broadcast showed a clear need for a network 
of political communication so that large numbers of people would 
turn up at the poll). The broadcast points out other factors 
that led to confusion in the 13th July 1979 first round of 
elections. Too much emphasis on personality of presidential 
candiate - Zik, Awo, Amno, Kano Shagari, etc. A lot of people 
knew nothing of the functions etc. of senators. Therefore, 
voting was based on party choice rather than on the individual 
senators. In the forthcoming elections, candidates should make 
themselves known to the electorates and not just chiefs and 
local government chairman (another important point in relation 
to the relationship between ego (political candidate), action- 
sets and the voters in our concept of political communication 
network of links within African context and Imo State in 
particular). 
Consequently, the broadcast concluded that the actual siting of 
polling stations led to confusion, leading many voters to go 
home after a number of unsuccessful attempts to vote, Also a 
number of electoral officials did not turn up. ýt points out 
that politicians and media should properly educate the 
electorate to promote more participation. 
lection 1979 - The second round4l 
Text: Keeps stressing how it is the voter's civil responsibility and 
right to vote. some of the problems voters had to encounter - 
finding the right polling statinos, delays by officialso rain, 
sun etc. eee were named. The peaceful atmosphere was taken as 
indicative of political maturity and Nigerians' commitment to a 
democratic government. (This is a concept proved wrong by the 
civil government 1979-83. This is af ailure to note that the 
peaceful atmosphere was the result of army control of these 
elections). The text postulates by rejecting the theory of 
collective political bargaining where "state, class or ethnic 
origin transcend the good of the nation". There was, as usual, 
a general call for voters to vote. 
july 16th, 1979 -; - Election 1979 - The f ear and consequences of 
2 
In 1975, General Murtala Muhammed announced a five-point 
programme to ensure smooth transitionto civil rule, namely: 
the settlement of more states creation (f rom 12 to 19 
states) and the appointment of 49 membrs Constitution 
Drafting Committee. 
Reorganisation of local government system and 
estbalishing constituent assembly. 
Ban on political activities lifted. 
iv) & v) 2 elections 
The text mentioned that despite assurances from FEDECO that rigging of the 
1979 election is impossible, there are allegations of it, eg in Lagosj the 
President of the Electoral Commisson, Mrs. Yetunda Gbadebog ordered the 
arrest of a polling officer on the election day in connection with electoral 
malpractices. Three ballot boxes reported missing at the end of senatorial 
election. There was a heavy plea to all involved to make the electon fair,. 
warning that otherwise results will be disastrous for Nigeria. 
In all these broadcasts, there was a total absence of direct attack an an 
individual or particular political parties or groups, There was expressed 
anxiety for peaceful elections, so that the army would leave power for the 
civilians. The need not to provoke vengeful reaction through the media was 
one of the implicity early requests by the military. Similar broadcasts on 
the 1983 general elections will be examined and their content compared. As 
the political atmosphere changed, so did media content on general elections. 
The next chapters will use available data to analyse the relationship 
between different network groups, the political system and the media in 
reference to the 1983 general elections. 
APPENDIX FIVE 
QUESTIMAIRE 
A Please write on the dotted line or 7. 
put a tick in the box for each 
correct answer like this: V 
Where do you live? (State whether 
village or town and give name): 
(Tick one) 
Village Town Name 
8. 
....... ..... ..... 
2. What is your state of origin? 
(Give the name cn the dotted line below) 
.......... 6........... 
3. How long have you lived in the 
village or town? (Tick as appropriate) 
Town Village 
10-15 years .... .... 
16-20 years .... .... 
2 1-30 years 
31-40 years .... .... 
41 50 years .... .... 
51-60 years .... .... 
61-70 years .... .... 
70+ .... .... 
4. What is the ethnic origin of yc)ur parents 
and yoursel f? (state below): 
Father 
... 
Mother Self 
...... .... 
5. 
... 
What is you r sex? 
Male [:: ] Female 
6. How old are you? (Tick one box) 
10-20 21-300 
31-40= 41-50 
51-60 [: D 61-7040 
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What is your marital status? 
(Tick one) 
Single, unattached 
Engaged or going steady 
Married but no children 71 
Married with children 0 
How many brothers and sisters 
have you got? ( State number 
in box) 
Brothers .0 
Sisters 
a 
I 
E; l 
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The following s et of questions is 12. Where did your parent s and you 
related to your education, religion receive part of your education? 
and occupation: Tick one box in 
each colomn for each answer: Father M other Self 
Village =L 
9. What type of ed ucational Insti tu- 
tion did your'p arents and your self Town 
last attend? 
Britain 
Father Mother Self 
Elementary/ 
school ar i 
USA 
y pr m 
France t--T 
Secondary schoo i r= 
M. Germany[= 
Post secondary 
or University Canaaa 
None at all Elsewhere 
in Africa 
10. When did your parents and you as 
Elsewhere 
Asia r--j 
well leave the 
institution? 
last academid 
Elsewhere 
in S. America 
Father Mother Self 
1-10 years ago Elsewhere in 
Europe 
11-20 
21-30 13. What is your parent s' and your 
31-40 
religion? 
41-50+ Roman. 
Father Mother Self 
Catholic 
11. Who was responsible for your parents' Protestant 
education and yours t oo? (Financially) 
I . Non 
rents P 
Father Mother 
r 
Self 
L j 
denominational 
a 
Relatives 
__ 
= Muslim 
Village/ 
Pagan 
community Do not believe= 
Region/Sta-te r__1 F-1 
The Church F-1 
14. What are your parents' and your 
own occupations? If your parents 
Federal govIt 
are not working or 
were their last full 
retired, what 
-time occupa- 
Foreign'state/ 
tions. Same applies to you: 
organisation 
Self F= 
Parents: Father Mother 
Job ...... ....... 
Grade 
Industry ...... ...... 
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15. What is your occupation? 20. When your parents or you are out of 
Job ................ 
work. where do they or you s tay? 
Grade ............... Stay in. city 
Father Mother Self 
F-1 
Industry .............. 
16. Are your parents' Jobs and your 
Co to the village 
city job permanent? Go to another city 
Father Mother Self 
Yes Stay at the same 
No 
place 
21. How often do you 
How of ten are your parents or you visit your relatives. 
out of work? friends, etc. in 
other towns and 
Father Mother Self 
Very of ten C= 
villages? 
Rarely Never 
Town VilLale 
Never Less than once a year 
Once a year 
18. Are your parents or yourself self- 
d ? Once a month 
T-1 
employe 
. Father Mother Self once a week 
Yes C: 1 
More than once a week 
No 1ý:: l 
19. If your parents or you are self- 
employed. how many employees 
under them or you? 
Father Mother Self 
1-10 L-=] MM 
21-30 
31-40 
41,50 
51-60 
61-70 
71-80 
81-90 
91-100+ 
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THE FOLLOWING SET OF QUESTIONS IS 
RELATED TO YOUR SOCIAL LIFE 
22 Do you belong to any social organi- 29 Who makes major decisi ons in your 
sation such as club. union, society, club, union, etc.? 
religious organisation, etc.? 
The leaders 
Yes No 
The Committee 
23 Has your club got branches in the 
village as well as in the cities? 30 Is there any time when meetings 
Yes = No r__1 
become more frequent th an usual? 
IF YOU TICK 'NO' TO QUESTION 22, GO 
Yes 1=1 No = 
STRAIGHT ON TO QUESTION 40. If you answered 'Yes' to question 30 
24 How old is your social club. union, etc.? 31 When is this? 
1-10 11-20 
National election period 
21-30 31-40 
(political) 
41-50 51-60+ 
When there is a major M 
on-going project 
25 What is the name of your club. union, No special time 
etc.? 
Name ............................... 32 How do you get information when 
meetings are to. be held? 
26 Whatare the menbershir criteria? Through letters 
Members of the same kindred [=] to word of mouth 
People from the same village=] radio 
People from the same ethnic 
group TV 
26 People from the same state Press 
People of the same Telephone 
profession 
Any interested Nigerian 33 How many of these clubs do you belong 
to and where are they? 
Nigerians and foreigners 
No Town Village 
27 How are your club leaders chosen? 
By election 
. 5-10 By appoin tment 
11-15+ 
28 How often do you hold meetings? 
Never ra Less than 3a year 
Once a. year =Once a month E=1 
Once a week 1=3 
34 when there is a major problem in your 
social organisation, how do you solve 
it? 
A meeting is called and all 
members discuss the problem 
Only committee members look 
into the problem 
Only the chairman or the 
president decides what to do 
35 Do your clubs, unions, 
associationsi etc. establish 
any relationship with other 
similar organisation at the 
Village level 
Township level 
Divisional level 
National level 
International level 
36 Who has the most important 
position within the club 
in determining relations with 
outside organisation? 
(Tick one) 
The leaders 
Selected members 
All members 
37 Do you think that your 
social organisation, is: 
Traditional 
Modern 
Combination of both 
i 
38 How is your club, association 
etc. financed? 
Voluntary donation 
General levy 
Village general collections 
State government subsidy 
Federal government subsidy 
All of these 
0 
Pa ge 5 
39 In the last civil government, did you 
belong to any political party? 
(Tick one) 
NPN NPP r-1 
UPN = GNPP [= 
PRP = PPA = 
NAP ý= 
40 What made you join this party? 
Party leader/chairman's popularity 
Party's policy/manifesto 
Party's national 
achievement 
Ethnic reason 
Parents' influence 
Friends' influence 
Your club membership 
None of these 
41 Do you think your club Played active 
political roles during the civilian rule? 
Yes = No = 
42 When are these roles most active? 
Election period M 
All the time r 
Never 
43 Was the last civilian government (Tick One) 
Parlimentary system 
Presidential system 
Autocratic dictatorship 
A combination of all these 
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44 Did you participate actively In 
politics in: 
The city 
- 
The village 
Both places 
45 Did your party compete very strongly 
with other parties at village level 
for information and resources? 
(tick one only) 
Yes * [-ý:: j No 
46 What were these resources? 
Government fund 
Private donations 
Influencial locals 
Social clubs 
Tradition chiefs 
Local council support 
All of these 
50 Do you think that tribal politics 
is responsible for political 
instability in Nigeria? 
Yes C:: j , No C: 11 
51 Do you think that ethnic politics 
create conflicts in Ni8eria? 
Yes [-:: I No [-::: I 
47 Was the last civil government 
strongly ethnic oriented? 
Yes No 
48 Was there any tendency towards 
inter-ethnic cooperation between 
parties during election period? 
Yes F__J No 
49 Which of these three major ethnic 
groups do you think can f orm a 
more lasting political alliance for 
political stability in Nigeria? 
(Tick one only) 
Hausa/Fulani and the Ibos 
Ibo and Yoruba 
Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani 
Each controlling a separate 
party 
All in one party 
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IN THE NEXT SET OF QUESTIONS, WE ARE 
MAINLY CONCERNED WITH YOUR VIEW OF 
THE MEDIA AND HOW YOU USED THEM 
52 Do you think the mass media help to 
create more ethnic, class and social 
conflicts in Nigeria? 
Yes M No M 
53 Which of these means of communication 
help to resolve political conflicts in 
Nigeria? (Tick as many as apply) 
Radio [= No 
Newspapers 
Word of mouth 
54 Which of these means of communication 
help to intensify the conflicts? 
(Again tick as many as apply) 
Radio [: ] TV 
Newspapers =1 Word of mouth 
55 Which of these means of communication 
is the most reliable for political 
information? (Tick one only) 
Radio [= TV 0 
Newspapers= Word of mouth 
56 Which is the most unreliable medium? 
(Tick one only) 
Radio [= TV 
Word of mouth [= Newspapers 
57 Do you own any of these? (Tick as 
many as apply) 
Radio [-I TV 
Telephone r-=l 
58 How many hours a week do you 
read papers, watch TV. listen to 
radio or discuss politic s with other 
people? 
1-10 11-20 21-30+ 
hburs hc%urs hours 
Radio ED M: 5 
TV 
News/ 
papers 
Converj= 
sations 
59 Below is a list of TV channels. Please 
rank these in order of the frequency 
with which you choose them: Ill 
beside the one you use m ost. 121 for 
the second, 131 for the t hird, etc.: 
Channel 1 Channel 4 
Channel 2 Channel 5 
Channel 3M Channel 6 
Channel 7 Channel 14 
Channel 8 Channel is 
Channel 9 Channel 16 
Channel 10 Channel 17 
Channel 11 Channel IS 
Channel 12. Channel 19 
Channel 13 Channel 20 
Channel 59 
60 Which are the three most Important 
Nigerian newspapers you read for 
political information (news )? Write 
their names below in the order of 
their importance to you: 
(a) .................... ...... 
(b) .................... ......... 
(c) ................... ......... 
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61 Do you think that the last general 66 Which parties were the most popular 
election affected your relationship and unpopular, One for each column 
with other people in good or bad only. 
ways? 
Good Bad Popular Unpopular 
Parents NPN F-D 
Relatives TJPN 
Friends PRP 
Co-workers NPP 
Other ethnic NPA 
groups 
PPA 
62 Was this good or badrelationship GNPP 
due to: 
Good Bad 
Radio broadcast 
TV 
Newspaper news 
Word of mouth 
63 Do you think that the last 
general election was free and 
fair? (Tick one) 
Yes E=I No 
64 What do you think was particularly 
wrong with the 1983 general elections? 
(Tick me) 
Corruption ED Tribalism 
Vote rigging= Media lies 
All of these 1=1 
65 Who made things go wrong? (Tick one) 
Politicians [= Business people [= 
Civil servants["=] Farmers F-I 
Students r= Clubs 
ChristiansM Muslims 
The media = Everybody 
Every organisation I= 
Page 9 
BELOW WE HAVE LISTED SOME PEOPLE. ORGANISATIONS WHICH MIGHT HAVE 
INFLUENCED YOUR POLITICAL VIEWS AND REASONS FOR PARTICIPATION. PLEASE 
RANK EACH FACTOR IN TERMS OF THE EFFECT YOU THINK IT HAS HAD ON YOU, 
BY TICKING ONE BOX FOR EACH FACTOR. 
Factors Rank of importance 
Very important Important Neutral Not very 
important 
Unimportant 
37 Parents 
58 School/College 
university mate, 
69 Clubs. unions, 
etc. 
70 Friends 
71 Radio 
72 Relatives 
73 TV 
74 Immediate 
financial gain 
75 Newspapers 
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76 Now please rank each factor in terms of the effect that you think it has on most 
other people; 
Factors Rank of importance 
Very important Important Neutral Not very 
important 
Unimportant 
77 Parents 
78 School/College 
university mates 
79 Friends 
30 Clubs, unions, 
etc. 
31 Tv 
32 Relat ives 
33 Radio 
34 Immediate 
financial gains 
15 Newspapers 
86 Below is a list of people or group you can influence Politically and particularly 
during election campaigns. Please rank them according to the order In which youthink 
,, you can influence them by writing a 'I' in the box beside the group you can 
most influence, a 12' by the second and so on until 161. 
Parents = 
School, colle8e/university mates 
Social club mates 
Your children M 
Relatives = 
Co-workersE: j 
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87 Please read through the following issues. and then put a Ill beside the one which you think had most influence on you and a 121 beside the second most important factor, and so on up to 161 
' ISSUES 
Maintenance of traditional 
socio-political values 
Support for traditional 
authority 
Economic security for 
the local communities 
Rural economicdevelopment, 
e. jq. electrification 
Economic growth for 
Nigeria as a whole 
Modernisation of Nigeria 
Participation of voters in 
the democratic process 
Elimination of corruption 
Free education for all 
Increased employment 
op_portunities 
More urbanisation 
More importation of 
consumer Roods 
Expulsion of all illegal 
immigrants 
Political integration 
Development of Social Security 
More state creations 
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